



Defence Against Terrorism Review

Ahmed S. HASHIM

Lions and Tigers in Paradise: Terrorism and Insurgency and the State's Response in Sri Lanka

Arshi KHAN

Hindutva and Terrorism: Implications for Federal India

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Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: A Threat for the West

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Power of Media and Words: Analysis of News on PKK

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The Challenges of NATO-UN Interoperability to Better Fight Against Terrorism

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Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe

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Military Intelligence in Countering Terrorism

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Editor's Note

Activities of terrorist groups in various parts of the globe constitute the main focus of the Spring 2010 issue of the *Defence Against Terrorism Review* (DATR). This was not a deliberate choice of the Academic Board of the Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism. However, based on the subjects of the articles that were submitted to DATR, it so turned out that, bringing the ones having a common theme together would make more sense for our readership in comparing and contrasting the motives behind different terrorist organizations around the world.

Hence, in this context, Ahmed Hashim, in his article entitled “Lions and Tigers in Paradise: Terrorism and Insurgency and the State’s Response in Sri Lanka” discusses how the Sri Lankan government managed to defeat the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which purported to speak in the name of the Tamil ethnic community of Sri Lanka and that the lessons of Sri Lanka would be instructive for many countries faced with similar problems of terrorism and insurgency. Ahmed Hashim explores the origins of the conflict and the evolution of the protracted internal war between 1983 and 2009, and then focuses on how Sri Lanka developed the strategy for victory that paved the way to the virtual elimination of the LTTE as a fighting organization, and the decapitation of almost all its entire senior leadership. Hashim concludes, however, that military victory does not mean resolution of the conflict and that there is an important political aspect to this conflict, which must be resolved justly and equitably, in a manner that addresses and resolves the grievances that led to hostilities.

Similarly, in his article entitled “Hindutva and Terrorism: Implications for Federal India,” Arshi sheds light on a controversial issue, which has not been investigated or discussed extensively in academic circles. Arshi Khan emphasizes the diversity of India’s social realities and historical identities, as well as its centuries of experiences with social cohabitation, bringing about an evolving recognition of the federal polity. That diversity is well recognized in India’s Constitution, in relation to both national minorities and those who are dispersed in areas dominated by the majority religious community. Khan points out that the federal polity ensuring the rights of the vulnerable communities is now under threat due to the rise of fascist elements in various spheres, and no preferential treatment is available for the Muslims who constitute over 14 percent of India’s total population. Yet he goes on to argue that they are now trapped in another problem of the terrorism, by the Hindu fascists and terrorists, and thus it is important to analyze those aspects of *Hindutva*, which is politically motivated to create hatred and to demonize the Muslims in the minds of the majority, government and in other public fora. Khan concludes that this is not only a threat to the minority groups but also to the majority community as it is divisive, provocative, politically-motivated and extremely violent in nature; it needs to be contained very seriously in the larger interest of the people as well as the letter and spirit of the Constitution of India which seeks to promote liberty, equality, justice, democracy and federalism.

Olivier Guitta claims, in his article “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: A Threat for the West,” that since 2006, North Africa has become a major front in the “war against terrorism.” Olivier Guitta explains the pyramidal organizational structure and the tactics of Al-Qaeda in North Africa (AQIM) in detail, as well as the ways and means of recruiting elements and raising funds for sustaining their operations. Guitta argues that while AQIM has been very active with a series of bloody suicide bombings and attacks in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, it does not mean that it is not present and expanding in other African nations, and that from Mauritania to Chad, AQIM militants operate in the inhospitable Sahara. Guitta concludes that AQIM has sleeper cells all over Europe and logistical support as well. Despite the fact that European law enforcement agencies have been excellent in

their fight against AQIM, terrorists may still strike tomorrow in Paris, Brussels, Madrid or Rome. Hence, AQIM might be morphing into a criminal/narco/terrorist organization à la FARC, which will make it an ever more formidable adversary.

Serra Pehlivan and Kim Dixon elaborate on how the activities of the PKK terrorist organization, mainly operating in Turkey, is reported in various countries and how this has impacted the way the PKK is perceived by the populations of those individual countries. Pehlivan and Dixon undertake a comparative study with a view to analyzing the media coverage of the PKK, as reported by prominent Turkish, U.S. and Dutch newspapers, focusing on how the PKK is characterized in headlines, and where in the story the references to the PKK as a terrorist organization are found, if present at all. Authors argue that the civilian population often derives their opinions through news reporting, particularly for those events that occur a long way from home. That same civilian population, once its mind is made up, can in turn influence its government, and how a news story itself is written, how the news story ‘labels’ an organization, and where that information is physically placed within the story can all influence how a reader perceives the ‘news’ and that organization. Pehlivan and Dixon conclude that media do not show much attention to terrorist activity taking place in another region of the world, especially when the terrorist act does not pose a direct threat to the society the media represents. This lack of attention by media and its selection of not calling a declared terrorist group ‘terrorist’ can cause a lack of support for the policies of the government of that particular media’s governments.

It goes without saying that one of the most important missions of NATO is to defend the allied territories against the threats posed by terrorist organizations. To attain this goal, the Alliance has been undergoing a steady process of transformation for nearly a decade now. Hence, one particular objective, *inter alia*, is to create the necessary conditions to achieve interoperability with other international organizations, such as the United Nations, for effective implementation of the headline goals of the Alliance. In this respect, Pavel Necas argues, in his article titled “The Challenges of NATO-UN Interoperability to Better Fight against Terrorism” that the UN offers much more than a framework of legitimacy for the actions of the NATO, and that the Alliance needs the UN because the allies would strongly prefer to rely on UNSC resolutions as a legal basis for non-Article 5 operations and a political framework of legitimacy for such operations. Necas, however, concludes that differences in interests and national caveats among the major powers, including the five permanent members of the UNSC, constitute a major factor constraining prospects for NATO-UN cooperation and an enhanced fight against terrorism.

In addition to the above-mentioned articles by distinguished authors, the current issue also brings to the attention of our readers two very important sets of remarks by two world-renowned scholars; namely, Prof. Dr. Graham T. Allison from Harvard University and Prof. Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman from the CSIS, who shared their rich experiences on what must be done and what must be avoided in the fight against terrorism. Prof. Allison’s remarks on “Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe” and Prof. Cordesman’s remarks on “Military Intelligence on Countering Terrorism” were among the keynote speeches delivered during the “Third International Symposium on Global Terrorism and International Cooperation” held on 15-16 March 2010 in Ankara, organized by the Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism. It is our great pleasure to make these extremely important presentations available to our readers.

Mustafa Kibaroglu

Editor-in-Chief

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Lions and Tigers in Paradise: Terrorism and Insurgency and the State's Response in Sri Lanka

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Abstract: *The lessons of Sri Lanka are instructive for many countries faced with the problem of terrorism and insurgency. This article will explore the origins of the conflict, then the evolution of the protracted internal war between 1983 and 2009; the focus will be on how Sri Lanka evolved the strategy for victory – a victory that ended in the virtual elimination of the LTTE as a fighting organization and the decapitation of almost all its entire senior leadership. First, it will briefly address the historical and political background of the conflict. Second, looks into the form of warfare and asks what the weapons of this conflict were? Third, explores what the factors that allowed the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) to turn the tide and win a dramatic victory in May 2009 are.*

Keyword: *Terrorism, Insurgency, State Responce Sri Lanka Tamil Tigers.*

Introduction

A year and a half ago, the Sri Lankan Armed Forces (SLKAF) decisively defeated one of the most formidable, innovative and ruthless terrorist/insurgent organizations of contemporary times, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) which purported to speak in the name of the Tamil ethnic community of Sri Lanka. How the Sri Lankan government managed to defeat this organization after three decades of protracted and seemingly endless conflict is a remarkable story, particularly since for almost 20 years the government had had little success whatsoever. Many countries which have been faced with the blight of terrorism and internal war have shown a great interest in studying the lessons of the Sri Lankan victory. In this context, the lessons of Sri Lanka are instructive for many countries faced with the problem of terrorism and insurgency. Of course, there is no one

magic template for victory against terrorism and insurgent groups that can be universally adopted by countries without taking into consideration environmental, cultural, political and social differences. In this context, I am not arguing that everything that worked in and for Sri Lanka can necessarily be adopted by other countries. Every country that is faced with terrorism and insurgent non-state actors has to tailor its strategies and policies to suit its own idiosyncrasies and peculiarities with respect to culture, environment, terrain and international factors. This article will explore the origins of the conflict, then the evolution of the protracted internal war between 1983 and 2009; the focus will be on how Sri Lanka evolved the strategy for victory – a victory that ended in the virtual elimination of the LTTE as a fighting organization and the decapitation of almost all its entire senior leadership.¹

This paper will undertake the following specific tasks. First, it will briefly address the historical and political background of the conflict. In short, what was it about? Too often when we study serious and protracted internal conflicts, there is a tendency to gloss over the background because within it we are faced with the issue of origins and causes. These things are difficult to address in any objective way because there is always two sides to the story. Governments are particularly loath to concede some form of legitimacy to political groups using violence to advance their agendas. Furthermore, however convoluted and misguided the goals of the terrorists or insurgents are, it is necessary for the state – the counter-terrorist and counter-insurgent side – to know what motivates the opponent in order to find a solution.

Second, what was the form of warfare and what were the weapons of this conflict? The LTTE was one of the most sophisticated and effective terrorist groups of contemporary times. But it was no mere terrorist organization; it was a large insurgent organization. There is clearly a difference between a small group of poorly-organized and poorly-resourced terrorist organizations like *Baader Meinhof* in Germany in the 1970s or the *Brigati Rossi* in Italy of about the same time-frame on the one hand, and well-organized, well-resourced groups with organizational depth and functionally specialized groups like the LTTE, the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the FARC in Colombia and Sendero Luminoso in Peru on the other hand. Such groups deserve the moniker of terrorist organizations, but they are capable of doing more damage than ‘merely’ terrorizing societies and governments; they can do serious and sustained damage for long periods of time. Nowadays, many of the non-state actors around the world do not only engage in terrorism; they have even begun to develop effective guerrilla warfare strategies and even quasi-conventional warfare capabilities.

Third, what are the factors that allowed the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) to turn the tide and win a dramatic victory in May 2009? While even small terrorist groups have proven difficult to eradicate and require considerable investment in counter-terrorism policies and strategies, it is clear that sophisticated groups like the LTTE and the others mentioned above require even greater investment of resources on the part of the besieged governments in question

1 This article is based on a longer research study being prepared by the author called *A Bright Shining COIN: Sri Lanka's Defeat of the LTTE*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011, which itself is based on a five week field research trip to Sri Lanka in June 2010.

Historical and Political Background of the Conflict

Any analysis of such a longstanding conflict must begin with a historical and political background.² What accounts for the descent of the country into vicious ethnic conflict? The origins of the conflict lie in the ethnic pluralism of the island nation, the policies of the British colonial power, and the policies of subsequent independent governments from 1948 onwards. Although the shooting war started in 1983, the conflict has its origins in history. Sri Lanka, which used to be known as Ceylon before the name change in 1972, is a stunningly beautiful island in the Indian Ocean, separated from the southeastern tip of India by a mere 22 miles of water known as the Palk Strait. The ancient Greeks and Romans had a vague knowledge of an island located in the Indian Ocean; they thought it was much larger than it actually is. They called it Taprobane. Moreover, the Greek philosopher, Pliny, seemed to regard it as a utopia as reflected in the following description; in Taprobane he wrote:

Nobody kept a slave, everybody got up at sunrise and nobody took a siesta in the middle of the day; their buildings were only of moderate height; the price of grain was never inflated; there were no law courts and no litigation ... [and] the king was elected by the people on the grounds of age and gentleness of disposition and as having no children, and if he afterwards had a child, he was deposed, to prevent the monarchy from becoming hereditary.³

Ancient Arab sea-faring traders who discovered Ceylon long before the advent of Islam were mesmerized by its beauty and its riches; they called the island Serendib, from the Sanskrit *Simhaladvipa*, or “Dwelling Place of the Lions.”⁴ After the advent of Islam, many Arabs and other Muslims from Iran and southern India settled there and intermarried with the locals. Their descendants constitute an important element of the small but commercially important Muslim minority within the island nation.

What of the inhabitants of the island? Where did they come from? We know that the island was inhabited at one time by an original aboriginal people, the *Veddas*. They were, however, displaced by mass migrations of two distinct peoples from the Indian sub-continent, the Dravidian Tamils from the southern India and the Aryan Sinhalese from northern India. They set up their own respective kingdoms on the island; sometimes they cooperated and sometimes they fought one another. The Sinhalese were adherents of Buddhism which was brought to the island around 250 BCE. The

2 In order to minimize the number of footnotes, this section on the origins and political evolution of the conflict is summarized from my forthcoming book, *A Bright Shining COIN?: Sri Lanka's Defeat of the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011; Robert Oberst, “Sri Lanka: Ethnic Conflict and the Disintegration of a Third World Democracy,” <http://pl.library.yorku.ca/ojs/index.php/refuge/article/viewFile/21121/19818>; Daya Somasundaram, “Ethnic consciousness: The Case of Sri Lanka,” http://transcurrents.com/tc/2010/02/hist_497.html; the highly informative essay by Alfred Jeyaratnam Wilson and A. Joseph Chandrakanthan, “Tamil Identity and Aspirations,” *Conciliation Resources*, August 1998, <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sri-lanka/tamil-identity-aspirations.php>; and, of course, the following essential works on the history of Sri Lanka and the conflict itself:

3 Cited in <http://livingheritage.org/taprobane.htm>.

4 The English writer Horace Walpole coined the word serendipity to refer to something that is discovered by chance or accident.

symbol of the Sinhalese is the Lion. The Tamils are Hindu and their symbol is the Tiger. As the noted Sri Lankan political commentator, D.B.S. Jeyaraj pointed out:

Mythological history traces Sinhalese origins to Prince Vijaya who in turn is believed to have had a leonine ancestor. Sinhaya is the Sinhala word for “lion” and the Sinhalese themselves are called “People of the Lion” or the “Lion Race.” The Sri Lankan national flag bears a sword-bearing lion, which is a replica of the one used by Kandy, the last Sinhalese kingdom to fall to the British colonialists...When Tamil nationalism reached warring proportions it had an appropriate counter-symbol – the roaring tiger, which was used by the most martial Tamil dynasty in India, the Cholas...⁵

That ethnic pluralism was a factor in the Sri Lanka is unquestioned.⁶ Sri Lanka is a multi-racial and multi-religious society. The Sinhalese constitute 74% of the total population; the main ethnic minority, the Sri Lankan Tamils, represents around 12.7% of the population. There are also smaller ethnic minorities: the Indian Tamils who constitute around 5.5% of the population; the Muslim Tamils, often referred to as Moors, constitute 7.5% of the population; and there is a small and dwindling community of ‘Burghers,’ or Sri Lankans with European – primarily Portuguese and Dutch -- ancestry.⁷ The confrontation between the Sinhala-dominated government and the Tamil-minority was never a straightforward one based on primordial ethnic differences between two distinct communities. First of all, neither the Sinhala nor the Tamil are monolithic ethnic groups. Indeed, the upper classes of both communities cooperated and intermarried with one another; moreover, Buddhism in Sri Lanka is not that far removed from Hinduism since the pantheon of Hindu gods have, to some extent, been assimilated into the popular religion of the Sinhala people.

The island’s history has been vastly influenced by 450 years of Western colonialism. The first Europeans to colonize the island were the Portuguese who introduced Roman Catholicism and mercilessly persecuted the other religions on the island, Buddhism and Hinduism, but particularly the small Muslim minority. The Portuguese called the island Ceylon, which name it kept until 1972 when it was re-named Sri Lanka which means ‘resplendent island,’ in the Sinhalese language. The Portuguese were supplanted by the more dynamic mercantile Dutch; the latter were not as interested in propagating their religion, Protestantism. They were interested in making money; however, their notions of strict racial hierarchies did not prevent them from intermarrying with the locals, the result of which is a small Eurasian community of Sri Lankan nationals known as ‘Burghers.’ Britain, whose navy was the most powerful in the world, ‘politely’ seized the island from the weakening Dutch at the turn of the 19th century as the Napoleonic Wars raged across Europe. It was the British who left the most enduring foreign imprint on the island.

The British gave Ceylon a liberal and progressive system of government; they also created a prosperous plantation capitalist economic system which contributed to the emergence of upper and

5 D. B. S. Jeyaraj, “Lions and Tigers,” *Himal Southasian*, April 1998, http://www.himalmag.com/99Apr/lions_tigers.htm.

6 Robert Kearney, “Ethnic Conflict and the Tamil Separatist Movement in Sri Lanka,” *Asian Survey*, Vol.25, No.9 (September 1985), p. 898.

7 See, *inter alia*, Sunil Bastian, “The Failure of State Formation, Identity Conflict and Civil Society Responses – The Case of Sri Lanka,” *Center for Conflict Resolution*, Working Paper No.2, University of Bradford, September 1999, p. 4.

middle classes composed of people from the various ethnic groups. Most important of all was that they created an education system second to none in South Asia; the medium of instruction was in English. The communities that benefited the most from this education system were the minorities such as the mixed race Burghers, Christians, and the Tamil community. The Tamil north was – and still is – an economically backward region, but it had good educational facilities, thanks largely to the efforts of the Christian missionaries posted to the north for long periods of time. The Tamils used their English language training and vocational skills to dominate the bureaucracy and the civil service, as well as the medical and legal services. The Tamils combined educational advantages with a traditional entrepreneurial flair. This enabled them to attain lucrative positions in the colonial bureaucracy and to set up successful commercial enterprises in Colombo and the economically dynamic Western Province. With education and property being the qualifications for franchise and political representation, upper-class Tamils entered the Ceylonese political mainstream in relatively large numbers and came to acquire a stake in the unitary colonial system, deriving from it power, prestige and prosperity. As long as these benefits continued to accrue to them, the new Tamil elite were content not only to exist within a unified Ceylon, but also to play a key role in its leadership and management. Indeed, they viewed themselves as staunch Ceylonese nationalists.

The Sinhalese of the coastal regions around Colombo also benefited; however, the majority of the Sinhalese of the interior did not benefit from good educational facilities and remained economically marginalized. Throughout the 19th century, many Sinhalese felt that their culture was threatened by an unholy constellation of hostile and greedy external forces — Dravidian expansionism from southern India, the global and integrated capitalist economy (the globalization of the 19th century), Christian proselytism by enthusiastic missionaries, colonialism and modernity -- which sought to crush the Sinhalese and Buddhist identity of the island. Fearful that their unique Sinhala language – not spoken anywhere else -- and Buddhist religion were in jeopardy, many began to develop a marked ‘minority complex,’ and a profound antipathy for anything that was not ‘Us.’ As the Tamil presence in the colonial administration, the professions and business increased, it was often conflated and identified with these ‘invading’ influences.

Moreover, as it prospered under the British, the Tamil community’s educated sector increasingly looked down on its Sinhalese counterparts, provoking further anxieties and resentment. Sinhalese fears of being culturally ‘swamped’ both spurred and were reinforced by a Sinhala Buddhist revival in the second half of the 19th century. This revival reasserted a world view through which many Sinhalese perceived themselves to be a ‘special’ people tasked by Lord Buddha with the responsibility of protecting the Dhammadipa, the ‘island of the just’, the ancient home of Buddhist society. Tamils had long regarded both themselves and the Sinhalese as founding peoples of Ceylonese culture and history. The Buddhist revival forcefully repudiated this view; Ceylon was the Dhammadipa and no more. Other peoples, like the Tamils, lived on the island as ‘guests’ and at the sufferance of the Sinhalese.

The British stayed until 1948 when Ceylon attained independence as a member of the British Commonwealth. Ceylon’s path to statehood was peaceful, without the brutal blood-letting witnessed on the Indian sub-continent which led to the creation of India and Pakistan or the chronic instability which plagued Burma. The British, to their credit, left a politically stable and democratic country whose social indicators -- health, low infant mortality and high literacy – were the highest in the region and the envy of the rest of South and Southeast Asia. However, by the late 1980s the country

was an economic basket case, a violent place, and a battered democracy. This was not surprising since the country was in the throes of a violent confrontation between its two leading ethnic communities, the Sinhala – who dominated the government – and the disgruntled Tamil minority, which had become a politically and economically marginalized community as a result of government policies. By the time the war ended in May 2009, somewhere between 80,000 and 100,000 people had been killed.

In the years preceding independence, majority interests were given a significant boost, at the expense of the minority Tamil elite, when universal suffrage was recognized in 1931. At the same time, the emerging Sinhalese national movement demanded proportionate representation for ethnic groups within the new indigenous legislature. With the political mobilization of the Sinhalese majority, it is clear that the Tamil minority could not expect their disproportionate parliamentary representation to continue, and that alternative strategies should have been explored to safeguard their political, professional and commercial interests. Nevertheless, Tamil leaders did not give adequate thought to the promise of federalism, which would have given them a considerable amount of control over regional affairs and much clout at the center in Colombo. Unprepared to perceive itself as a minority interest group, the Tamil leadership spent the years leading to independence to lobby for 50-50 communal representation within a centralized legislature. Their struggle was fruitless. Having secured naval and air bases in Ceylon and the safeguarding of commercial interests, and unwilling to get involved in this controversial issue, the British had little interest in accommodating the ‘communalist’ demands of Tamil leaders. By February 1948, a markedly majoritarian constitution had been promulgated. After Sri Lanka gained its independence, the politically enfranchised and demographically dominant Sinhalese moved to reduce the allegedly over-privileged position of the Tamil minority within the society at large.

The stage was set for increasing Sinhalese policies of ‘affirmative action’ in favor of their marginalized community. This was reflected in the stark statement of one Sinhalese government official, Minister of Finance Ronnie Del Mel, in 1983 at the height of anti-Tamil violence that precipitated the three decade war: “The Tamils have dominated the commanding heights of everything good in Sri Lanka”⁸ In the 30 years from the mid-1940s, successive governments animated by a potent Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism took measures to reduce the disproportionate number of Tamils in the professions and the public sector. The first measure which undermined Tamil power within the state bureaucracy was the introduction of universally free education from kindergarten to university shortly before independence. The expansion of educational facilities enabled even poor Sinhalese to compete for government jobs. The growing pool of powerful Sinhalese politicians and qualified candidates greatly increased Sinhalese ethnic patronage within the government bureaucracy. With the competition for limited openings ever growing, however, supply could never match demand, the Tamils slowly but surely found themselves eased out of the bureaucracy to make way for the Sinhalese who had the backing of powerful patrons. As time passed, the electoral promise of pandering to this chauvinism tempted even the most cosmopolitan of Sinhalese politicians.

8 Quoted in “The Wages of Envy,” *The Economist*, August 20, 1983, p. 22; also in Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, “Socio-economic inequality and ethno-political conflict: some observations from Sri Lanka,” *Contemporary South Asia*, Vol.14, No.3 (September 2005), p. 341.

The second measure which ensured a reduction of Tamils in the employment sector was the 1960 nationalization program by the socialist government which removed all secondary schools from the control of private bodies and the churches. Education came under the control of the centralized, and Sinhalese-dominated, public sector. In time, Tamil schools in the north and east would be deliberately deprived of funding and equipment to the obvious detriment of future Tamil job-seekers. The third measure was the introduction of the 1956 'Sinhala Only' Act, which replaced English with Sinhala as the language of official government business, clearly disadvantaged large numbers of Tamils who were fluent in English but not in Sinhalese. The final straw, however, was the introduction in the early 1970s of communal quotas for university entrance. This led to the exclusion of merit-worthy Tamil students and it was this policy that lit the ethnic powder keg. With 'standardization' it became clear that the Tamils had lost the education and employment opportunities which had conditioned their commitment to a unitary Ceylon in the first place. Not surprisingly, Tamil alienation from the Ceylonese state began to set in.

Tamil defensive nationalism began in earnest in the mid-1950s as a response to the discriminatory language policy and was fuelled by further discrimination in access to state employment and higher education. Between the mid-1950s and the mid-1970s, the Ceylon Tamil national movement sought redress within the framework of the existing state. The principal objective was to establish a federal government structure through which the Ceylon Tamil people could defend its rights in a power-sharing arrangement with the Sinhalese. At this stage, the Ceylon Tamil national movement focused on non-violent resistance and launched a series of *satyagrahas* (peaceful protests) in the Gandhian tradition. The coalition government (1960-1965), led by the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), struck the first violent blow against the Tamil national movement when the predominantly Sinhalese armed forces were deployed in the Jaffna peninsula in 1961 to repress these peaceful protests. Thereafter, state violence against Tamil activists escalated. To add insult to injury, the SLFP-dominated United Front government introduced a new constitution in 1972 which categorically rejected the Tamil demand for internal self-determination. This constitution confirmed Sri Lanka as a unitary state and forbade Parliament to delegate its powers to subordinate entities.

The reaction of the Tamil national movement to these developments was two-pronged. On the one hand, it increasingly articulated a demand for self-determination within an independent state of Tamil Eelam. On the other, an armed liberation movement emerged, adding a revolutionary dimension to the national struggle. In 1976, a new parliamentary party of Tamils was formed, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), which sought to make political capital out of the changing aspirations of the Tamil movement, committing itself to the goal of Eelam through its founding 'Vaddokoddai Resolution.' The resolution excoriated the Sinhalese state for its 'racist' and 'discriminatory' treatment of the minorities. It concluded with a rousing call for self-determination for the Tamil nation. The Tamils endorsed the resolution in the 1977 parliamentary elections and voted overwhelmingly for the TULF. However, the TULF politicians proved incapable of providing effective leadership and seduced by the prospect of power at the center in Colombo, collaborated in a half-hearted and ill-resourced government decentralization scheme and lost significant popular support.

The upper-class Tamil political elite was outflanked by a new generation of young Tamil activists who, economically marginalized by discrimination in employment and higher education and also brutalized by state repression, concluded that the salvation of the Tamil people lay in armed

resistance. They took their cue from a violent but short-lived terrorist group in the southern part of the country where disgruntled and marginalized Sinhalese youth launched a dramatic assault on the state in 1971 that was marked by indescribable brutality on both sides. The Tamils also looked overseas and their attention was drawn to some of the more successful politically violent groups that had achieved their aims, i.e. the Bengali separatists who fought the Pakistanis with Indian help and established the nation of Bangladesh.

The militants formed five major guerrilla organizations in the middle to late 1970s, including the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) who were led by Villupillai Prabhakaran, and launched their campaign to establish Eelam throughout the Tamil-speaking majority districts of northern and eastern Sri Lanka. Large numbers of young Tamils came to the conclusion that their socio-economic aspirations could only be fulfilled within a separate Tamil state. The LTTE, which began as the Tamil New Tigers (TNT), was formed by the youth league of the TULF and had a more military approach. Prabhakaran's central presence in the TNT laid the foundation for the significant role he would come to play in the group over the years. Prabhakaran, who grew up exposed to the rising militancy of the northern peninsula of Jaffna, was associated with activist youth gangs and participated in various political kidnappings. In 1975, the TNT carried out the group's first major operation. They assassinated Alfred Duraipappah, the mayor of Jaffna, which gave them a nationwide reputation as one of the most extreme Tamil insurgent groups. Eventually, other militants joined the group and it officially became the LTTE.

What did the LTTE want? Its demands were often stated by its leader, Villupillai Prabhakaran (VP), on many occasions. He made one of the most unequivocal expressions of its demands at a major press conference in the so-called capital of the Tamil state, Kilinochchi, on April 10, 2002:

There are three fundamentals. That is Tamil homeland, Tamil nationality and Tamil right to self-determination. These are the fundamental demands of the Tamil people. Once these demands are accepted or a political solution is put forward by recognizing these three fundamentals and our people are satisfied with the solutions we will consider giving up the demand for Eelam.⁹

Despite a seeming willingness to negotiate with the GoSL concerning the moderation of his ultimate goal and countenance a generous measure of autonomy as he did during the negotiations of 2000-2003, it is clear that VP died still believing in the right of the Tamil people to self-determination. Indeed, LTTE proposals for extensive self-governance short of actual independence were too much for the GoSL and the nationalistic Sinhalese politicians to stomach. The latter viewed such proposals as stepping-stones towards the ultimate break-up of the unitary state and the creation of two independent entities.

The Form of Warfare

Given the emergence of ethnic contention between the two sides which came to a head in the late 1970s, the Tamil extremists decided that there was no choice but to seek to settle the differences

9 Quoted in Suchismita Pahi, "Of Terrorists and Terrorism in Sri Lanka: Liberation Tigers of Eelam," *Nazar: A South Asian Perspective*, February 05, 2009, <http://nazaronline.net/politics/2009/02/of-terrorists-and-terrorism-in-sri-lanka-liberation-tigers-of-eelam/>.

on the battlefield. For the LTTE and its leader, violence was the method by which the Sri Lankan state would be forced to recognize the necessity of giving up the Tamil-inhabited territories. The Sri Lankan government was forced to respond to the outbreak of violence by implementing a massive, but initially haphazard and disorganized, program of transforming its largely small and ceremonial military establishment into a large force dedicated to the formulation and implementation of Counterterrorism (CT) and Counterinsurgency (COIN).

What are the armed methods of insurgent organizations? Terrorism is one of them; having said this, there is a clear distinction between insurgent organizations that have used and currently use terror as part of their repertoire of violence – but have other extensive means of violence (see below) -- and small *terrorist* groups whose operational goal is to hit undefended or innocent targets and whose capabilities are limited to such actions. I will discuss the issue of terrorism at length here, because it is salient in the contemporary world and because it was very evident in the sanguinary conflict in Sri Lanka. Terrorism is a controversial topic of discussion and has eluded universally accepted definition. Many experts have noted that terrorism is a pejorative term that is often applied by people or states to groups (or even states) whose policies and actions make them concrete enemies. Almost no politically violent individual or group proudly proclaims that they are terrorists. Certainly, the LTTE objected vociferously to being labeled as a terror organization; its anger over this grew as 9/11 made people and states less welcoming to sub-state actors engaged in violent activities no matter the justification or presumed legitimacy.

The Sri Lankan government has labeled the LTTE a terrorist organization from the very beginning of the conflict. As I recall from my readings on the topic, the only group that proclaimed itself to be terrorist was the 19th century Russian *Narodnya Volya* or People's Will. More recently, the notorious Usamah Bin Laden distinguished between commendable terrorism – which, of course, was his kind of terrorism against *Al Qaeda's* enemies – and the non-commendable terrorism practiced by his enemies, i.e. the United States and its allies. Moreover, no state, except revolutionary France under the sinister and sanguinary Maximilien Robespierre, has viewed state terror – which was practiced on hundreds of thousands of hapless citizens of France – in a positive light. In contemporary times no state in its right mind declares that some of its actions, both internally and externally, are examples of positive terrorism against opponents. Indeed, states shrink from the label and bitterly contest it when others accuse them of state terrorism. But states are quick to label other states as state-sponsors of terrorism and they are even quicker to declare organizations or groups that oppose them violently to be terroristic in nature.

Indeed, given the overwhelming predominance of the state in the international arena, it is not surprising that terrorism is often regarded as an activity restricted to non-state actors of whom one disapproves. Furthermore, since it is states which are supposed to have the monopoly over the instruments of (legitimate) violence, armed forces, it follows that non-state actors with 'armed force' are engaging in illegitimate (terroristic?) violence. However, it is not that simple; in many places around the world, the state no longer has the monopoly over the instruments of violence. What do we call sub-state actors raised, trained and armed by states and which then go out and commit violence on behalf of a patron state? Bruce Hoffman, one of the world's leading experts on terrorism, has noted that:

Terrorism is a pejorative term. It is a word with intrinsically negative connotations that is generally applied to one's enemies and opponents, or to those with whom one disagrees and would otherwise prefer to ignore... Hence the decision to call someone or label some organization 'terrorist' becomes almost unavoidably subjective, depending largely on whether one sympathizes with or opposes the person/group/cause concerned. If one identifies with the victim of the violence, for example, then the act is terrorism. If, however, one identifies with the perpetrator, the violent act is regarded in a more sympathetic, if not positive (or, at the worst, an ambivalent) light; and it is not terrorism.¹⁰

This very set of conditions laid out by Hoffman is what makes common definition difficult. Nonetheless, the 'collective we' can recognize terrorism when we see it or watch it on television, even if the perpetrators or their sympathizers do not share our labeling of an action as terrorism. This extended debate has still not defined terrorism. I always begin with the seminal article by Thomas Perry Thornton written almost fifty years ago and which constituted my first introduction to the world of terrorism studies years ago: "terror is a symbolic act designed to influence political behavior by extranormal means, entailing the use or threat of violence."¹¹ Thornton then goes to elucidate the key characteristics of terrorism. It is political rather than nonpolitical violence. In other words, as has been repeated time and again, an organization like the Mafia may terrorize opponents through threats or acts of violence, but the goal in mind is not political but criminal economic gain.¹² Similarly, pirates may terrorize their maritime vessels by their actions on the high seas, but they are motivated by economic, not political, gain. Thornton accurately notes the fact that the "military function of terror is negligible," because as he continues, "it is a small-scale weapon and cannot *in itself* have any appreciable influence on the outcome of military action."¹³

This is why small terror groups cannot easily overthrow governments or defeat police or armies; it is also why any serious contestant seeking to achieve concrete rather than quixotic political goals has to go beyond 'mere' terrorism as part of its armory. Terrorism is a 'symbolic act' says Thornton, by which he meant that the act has a "meaning broader than its component parts." The targets are the symbols of the state, but even more important as a set of targets are the "normative structures and relationships that constitute the supporting framework of the society."¹⁴ What does this seemingly long-winded and convoluted sentence mean? To this author it means nothing less than the use of violence against civilians and what is of value to them (the LTTE attack on the Buddhist shrine in the holy city of Kandy was an attack on civilians as well as on a symbolically meaningful structure). I am not arguing that military personnel cannot be targets of terror; they often are.

10 Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, p.32.

11 Thomas Perry Thornton, "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation," in Harry Eckstein (ed.), *Internal War: Problems and Approaches*, New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964, p.73.

12 There is, of course, a potential caveat; the actions of the *Cosa Nostra* as the Mafia is known in southern Italy, can, and do have political goals in consideration when they act against the personnel of the state.

13 Thornton, "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation," pp.74-75.

14 *Ibid.*, p. 77.

In the case of the Sri Lankan conflict, countless military personnel have been blown to bits at bus stations or in their barracks. But a true terror campaign is one in which civilians bear the brunt of the violence – whose purpose is to unravel the society and make it amenable to concessions or sue for peace. Finally, terrorism must be indiscriminate violence: “terror must always have at least some element of indiscriminate violence, else it becomes predictable, loses its broad character, and can no longer be legitimately described as terror. Also, it becomes relatively easy to combat.”¹⁵ Indiscrimination is important because it causes disorientation and anxiety; these things help put society under strain. Now if terrorism was completely discriminate in the sense that the terrorist group undertakes an action in a specific area, against a specific group of the enemy, at a particular period of time, then people will acclimatize themselves to the situation. The terror is neither that threatening nor that effective; and the terrorist group in question would win no prizes for ingenuity or innovation. From Thornton, I invariably move to cite one of the more contemporary definitions that implicitly build on this original work. Once again, Bruce Hoffman’s definition in his definitive work, *Inside Terrorism*, is worth quoting in full:

We may therefore now attempt to define terrorism as the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change. All terrorist acts involve violence or the threat of violence. Terrorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist attack. It is meant to instil fear within, and thereby intimidate, a wider ‘target audience’ that might include a rival ethnic or religious group, an entire country, a national government or political party, or public opinion in general. Terrorism is designed to create power where there is none or to consolidate power where there is very little. Through the publicity generated by their violence, terrorists seek to obtain the leverage, influence and power they otherwise lack to effect political change on either a local or an international scale.¹⁶

While many insurgent organizations and insurgent theorists/practitioners have eschewed terrorism, and regarded it as counterproductive, as did Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara, not all did so. Indeed, some insurgencies have actually argued that selective terrorism was of benefit to their causes. The Front de Liberation Nationale in Algeria, fighting the French presence in Algeria, used terrorism as part of its repertoire; as did the Vietcong whose terrorist activities in rural areas against civilians and government officials are well documented.¹⁷ Yet neither insurgent movement viewed their terrorism as indiscriminate, rather each viewed terrorism as instrumentalist and undertaken with a rational purpose in mind. The same held true for the LTTE for whom terrorism was as indispensable as its irregular warfare capabilities.

The LTTE was innovative, particularly in the arena of suicide bombing (which is discussed more later) and in its impressive ability to raise funds globally on a large-scale. It was well-organized; its members were well-trained, dedicated, if not fanatical, and ruthless—Almost everybody, whether it was a terrorism expert or government observer, referred to the LTTE as the ‘A-team’ of terrorism. That the LTTE was a terrorist organization goes without saying. It was an effective and bloody

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

¹⁶ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2006, p.41.

¹⁷ Richard Shultz,

terrorist organization that left a vast trail of death among civilians in Sri Lanka; it was also the only terrorist organization in the world to have killed two heads of state, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi – which proved, in retrospect, to have been a colossal strategic blunder – and Sri Lankan President Premadasa. It almost killed another Sri Lankan head of state, President Chandrika Kumaratunga. It did kill scores of military officers, civilian officials and ordinary innocent Sri Lankan civilians irrespective of their creed or ethnicity. The forerunner of the LTTE, the aptly named Tamil New Tigers (TNT), began purely as a *bona fide* terrorist outfit in the mid-1970s. It unleashed a wave of violence in the Tamil-inhabited Jaffna Peninsula against government officials and security forces, including the police; the latter were often Tamils. In order to obtain funds, arms and recruits it conducted a wave of daring bank robberies. As its reputation and that of its seemingly charismatic leader, Villupillai Prabhakaran, grew, it increased in size. The group then moved into the inhospitable jungle region of the Wannī, in northern Sri Lanka, and began to train for even more deadly terrorist and insurgent operations.

The LTTE's signature form of terrorism was the suicide bomber. In the case of suicide terrorism, a terrorist kills others by killing himself. Here the terrorist knows full well that the attack will not be executed if he is not killed in the process.¹⁸ Suicide terrorism can be broadly defined as an individual's readiness to sacrifice his/her life in the process of destroying or attempting to destroy a target to promote a political goal. One analyst, Schweitzer, defines suicide terrorism as a:

Politically motivated violent attack perpetrated by a self-aware individual (or individuals) who actively and purposely causes his own death through blowing himself up along with his chosen target. The perpetrator's ensured death is a precondition for the success of his mission.

According to Emile Durkheim, (1856-1919) the French sociological thinker, and one of the greatest sociologists of all time, along with the German Max Weber, there are three basic typologies of suicides. The first type is termed Egoistic Suicide, by which an individual commits suicide if he fails to integrate himself with his family and society. The second form is known as Anomic Suicide, by which an individual commits suicide when he feels helpless due to a breakdown of regular life, resulting in industrial, financial and social insecurity. Suicide terrorism falls into Durkheim's third type, called Altruistic Suicide, in which when the individual commits suicide due to his close integration with the prevailing social values and belief systems of his community. The individual is therefore ready to give up his life, so that his 'whole' might survive. The society to which the suicide bomber belongs makes him believe that the 'collective whole' is under the social, cultural, economic or political dominance of an external force, which drives him to self-sacrifice for the sake of society.

Furthermore, like the Middle East, South Asia has had its share of deadly suicide bombings in India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka. The last named state had the highest percentage of suicide attacks in South Asia until the demise of the LTTE. No other terrorist group in the world, not even Al-Qaeda, has been as successful as the LTTE in this deadly art form. Suicide battalions of the LTTE – or Black Tigers – were the global leaders of this phenomenon. Until its demise in 2009, the LTTE led the global list of groups that carried out suicide attacks such as the Palestine Islamic Jihad

18 Riaz Hassan, "Global Rise of Suicide Terrorism: An Overview," *Asian Journal of Social Science*, Vol.36 (2008), p.273.

(PIJ) and the Hamas in Palestine, the Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Turkey, the Groupe Islamique Armee (GIA or the Armed Islamic Group) in Algeria. The Tamil Tigers' ideology, inclusive of recruitment and legitimization of suicide terrorism, was a secular one. The group and its members fought for a political, not a religious aim; they sought to create an independent and free homeland of Eelam, that is, the Tamil state. The major ideology behind the Tamil struggle as well as the use of suicide terrorism was nationalism.

LTTE suicide bombers were used against both military and civilian targets. The Black Tigers launched their first attack in July 1987, and from then on, suicide bombings became an enduring feature of the LTTE's struggle. On 5 July 1987, the first suicide attack was launched by Captain Miller, by ramming a truck packed with explosives into a military camp at the Nelliady Central School in northern Sri Lanka, which marked the beginning of the use of this deadly method in Sri Lanka. The suicide bomber constituted a deadly weapon for which Sri Lanka had no easy response. Other than the loss of leaders, the country's national, political, economic and cultural infrastructure was severely damaged by suicide attacks. The LTTE deployed suicide bombers with deadly accuracy to damage the Joint Operations Command, the nerve-center of the Sri Lankan security forces; the Central Bank; the World Trade Centre; the Temple of the Tooth Relic, the *Sri Dalada Malligawa* in the holy city of Kandy, an act which stunned and infuriated the Buddhist Sinhalese and certainly exacerbated their anti-Tamil sentiments; and the oil storage installations in Kolonnawa. The LTTE used suicide bombers to kill a number of service personnel, apart from political leaders and outstanding intellectuals such as Neelan Thiruchelvam, a leading Tamil critic of the LTTE's terrorist methods and civil/human rights activist. The Sri Lankan Navy chief Admiral Clancy Fernando was killed by a suicide bomber on a motorcycle soon after he returned from India where he discussed Indo-Sri Lankan naval cooperation.

The LTTE was no 'mere' terrorist sub-state actor. It was clearly more than a mere terrorist organization. No 'mere' terrorist organization could have committed the level of havoc and destruction that the LTTE subjected the island nation to for thirty years; no mere terrorist organization could have undertaken the well-organized attacks on military installations as did LTTE cadres, e.g. the assaults on Anuradapura air base and Bandaranaike-Katunayake civil/military airport north of Colombo. It was also an insurgency: it was a war between a government with a conventional force structure supplemented by paramilitary forces fighting a non-state actor with an irregular warfare structure supplemented by embryonic conventional forces. Insurgencies are the most common form of political violence today. Indeed, as the famous Correlates of War Project points out, of the 464 wars that they have in a data base covering the years 1816 to the end of the 20th century, only 17% (79 wars) were purely conventional interstate wars; the rest (385) were intrastate wars.¹⁹ There is no one standard and universal definition of insurgency. Bard O'Neill, a noted expert on irregular war at the U.S. National Defense University, defined insurgency as a "struggle between a non-ruling group and the authorities in which the non-ruling group consciously uses political resources and violence to destroy, reformulate or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics."²⁰ The well-known U.S. Field Manual 3-24 defines insurgency as "an organized, protracted politico-military

19 Cited in David Kilcullen, *Counter-Insurgency*, London: Hurst and Company, 2010, pp.ix-x.

20 Bard O'Neill, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*, (2nd Edition), Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, Inc., 2005, p.15.

struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.”²¹

There are several structural types of insurgencies.²² An anticolonial insurgency is designed to get rid of a colonial power usually located far away from a territory over which it has political and economic control. The post-1945 era was the heyday of successful anti-colonial insurgencies, although some colonial powers took an inordinate amount of time to recognize the writing on the wall, such as the Portuguese who remained in their African colonies until the 1970s. A revolutionary insurgency is dedicated to the overthrow of the existing political system and its total replacement by a new political and socioeconomic structure; among the most famous examples of such insurgencies are those of Maoist China and Ho Chi Minh’s Vietnam. In the Sri Lankan instance, the insurgency was designed to *separate* from the existing political system. Separatist (or secessionist) insurgencies are usually ethnic insurgencies and they seek to withdraw from the nation-state of which they are formally a part, and they may or may not include radical social transformation within the territory they capture.²³ They are hard to defeat because they are almost a zero-sum game between two distinct communities: one has the guns while the other often lives in a distinct part of the country and feels marginalized and discriminated against. The insurgent organization’s task is to mobilize this disgruntled ethnic/religious community in favor of separation/secession. This is an arduous task because it is not clear that an entire community, despite its alienation from the center (i.e. the nation-state of which they are a part), will necessarily see everything in the same light as the insurgent organization that purports to represent their national interests and identity. Often that insurgent organization has to battle other groups within the disgruntled community; it then has to proceed to invent a new identity, one which they hope would solidify their legitimacy as the sole representative of their people.²⁴ Insurgent groups usually use guerrilla strategy as their preferred *modus operandi*. There has been considerable semantic confusion in the study of irregular warfare, with the terms insurgency, small wars, guerrilla war, low-intensity conflict, etc. used interchangeably without any discipline.²⁵ Here I will refer to the LTTE as an insurgent organization which used, among other weapons, guerrilla warfare. In this context, it waged war in the manner typical of such organizations throughout history. This begs the question now of what I mean by guerrilla strategy. Again, Bard O’Neill comes to the rescue; he defines guerrilla warfare as being “highly mobile hit-and-run attacks by lightly- to moderately-armed groups that seek to harass the enemy and gradually erode his will

21 *Field Manual* 3-24.

22 I have derived this from Shale Horowitz and Deepti Sharma, “Democracies Fighting Ethnic Insurgencies: Evidence from India,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 31 (2008), pp. 749-751; see also Harald Havoll, *COIN Revisited: Lessons of the classical literature on counterinsurgency and its applicability to the Afghan hybrid insurgency*, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, No. 13, 2008, pp. 7-8.

23 Bard O’Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*, p. 24; there is a subtle difference between separatism and secessionism.

24 On this issue within the Sri Lankan Tamil context, see Apratim Mukarji, *Sri Lanka: A Dangerous Interlude*, Colombo: Vijitha Yapa Publications, 2005, pp. XII-XIV.

25 For more details on an attempt to try to clear this semantic confusion see Ahmed S. Hashim, *Small Wars*, London: Hurst (forthcoming in 2011).

and capability.”²⁶ However, one of the best descriptions of the characteristics of guerrilla military activity, without a doubt, is the oft-quoted paragraph by the most successful irregular warrior of the 20th century, Mao Zedong, which O’Neill also cites:

What is basic guerrilla strategy? Guerrilla strategy must be based primarily on alertness, mobility, and attack. It must be adjusted to the enemy situation, the terrain, the existing lines of communication, the relative strengths, the weather, and the situation of the people. In guerrilla warfare, select the tactic of seeming to come from the east and attacking from the west; avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack; withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision. When guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws. In guerrilla strategy, the enemy’s rear, flanks, and other vulnerable spots are his vital points, and there he must be harassed, attacked, dispersed, exhausted and annihilated.²⁷

But the matter does not end here. The LTTE was *more* than a terrorist and insurgent organization. Indeed, during parts of the final campaign, known as Eelam IV, the fighting resembled conventional warfare more than anything else. As the Sri Lankan military analyst, Sergei DeSilva Ranasinghe, writing for *Jane’s Intelligence Review* put it:

In many respects, the final phase of Sri Lanka’s long-running conflict with the LTTE was very different from other insurgencies. Although infamous as a pioneer of asymmetric tactics, including suicide bombings, the LTTE had transformed itself into a relatively conventional enemy by the time the conflict re-escalated in 2006. Having developed a separatist state, complete with ground, maritime and air forces, it was determined to hold territory and had become dependent on maritime supply lines.²⁸

Two other analysts have referred to the LTTE’s military structure and combat capabilities in their extensive analysis of the Security Sector Reform in Sri Lanka. They write:

By the late 1990s the LTTE had transformed itself into a disciplined and highly effective conventional fighting force, of well over 10,000 cadres at its height, capable of operating along a continuum that encompassed, at one extreme, suicide-bomb attacks in the capital, Colombo, and conventional warfare in the north and east at the other, and even an air and naval arm. It was a formidable fighting force. Though massively outnumbered and outgunned by the Sri Lankan armed forces, estimated today at over 200,000 personnel, it made up for these shortfalls in many ways, through effective use of resources, bravery/martyrdom and tactical mobility, for example, enough to deprive the Sri Lankan state of a monopoly of force and even to lay plans to create a *de facto* state within Sri Lanka.²⁹

26 Bard O’Neill, p. 35.

27 Mao Tse-Tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, trans. Samuel Griffith, New York: Frederick Praeger, 1962, p. 46.

28 Sergei DeSilva Ranasinghe, “Good education – Sri Lanka military learns insurgency lessons,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, November 13, 2009, online version: http://www4janes.subscribe/jir/doc_view.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/mags/jir...

29 Eleanor Pavey and Chris Smith, “Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Security Sector Reform in Sri Lanka,” in Hans Born, Gordon Peake, and Albrecht Scharbel (eds.), *Security Sector Reform in Challenging Environments*, Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2009, p.192.

While too much has been made of the LTTE's quasi-conventional capability, the fact that they were developing it, of course, raises the question of what kind of warfare was the LTTE practicing? Given the above descriptions, could one really argue that it was an insurgent organization? And was the Sri Lankan military waging a counterinsurgency or a conventional campaign against it? These issues were raised in the various blogs that deal with irregular war when the war ended and everybody wanted to know how the Sri Lankans did it. This debate is sterile and artificial in my opinion since it simply does not recognize the complexity of irregular war. First, even during the heyday of irregular war in the mid-20th century, there was a clear recognition on the part of its most successful practitioners, such as Mao Zedong and Vo Nguyen Giap, that irregular warfare warriors must necessarily transition or move up/progress to quasiconventional or conventional ('mobile' warfare) as the insurgent movement becomes better organized, disciplined, and equipped. This was clearly spelled out by Mao in one of his famous tracts:

There must be a gradual change from guerrilla formations to orthodox regimental organization. The necessary bureaus and staffs, both political and military, must be provided. At the same time, attention must be paid to the creation of suitable supply, medical, and hygiene units. The standard of equipment must be raised and types of weapons increased. Communication equipment must not be forgotten. Orthodox standards of discipline must be established.³⁰

Very few revolutionary or insurgent movements were able to transition to the conventional level as did the Chinese Communist Red Army that defeated the Japanese imperialists and crushed the Nationalist Chinese. An example that readily comes to mind, and which borrowed carefully from the Chinese model, was that of the Vietnamese war of national liberation against the French colonial power and the war to unify Vietnam under Communist rule; the famous Vietnamese commander Vo Nguyen Giap describes in considerable detail the requirements to build a guerrilla force into a disciplined 'mobile' conventional military in his book, *People's Army, People's War*.

Second, in the contemporary era, I argue here that the lines between terrorism, insurgency, and quasi-conventional capabilities are increasingly blurred for the more sophisticated/developed non-state actors; indeed, some countries around the world have even followed non-state actors and have actually combined the three forms of warfare as their best chance for a deterrent strategy against more powerful countries.³¹ For the contemporary, sophisticated, non-state actor, the trajectory will not necessarily be a transition or progress upwards from terrorism/irregular war to (quasi) conventional war; it will most likely be a combination of the three being used in parallel. Of course, the construction of an elaborate quasiconventional military structure will take some time to achieve, but once it is in place, such non-state actors are not going to forego the use of the other strategies in their arsenal; all three approaches together represent a force multiplier. This has been the case with the LTTE. In this context, I adopt as my framework for understanding the LTTE's form of warfare from the discussions on what has been termed 'hybrid war.' The LTTE was capable of waging hybrid warfare; that is, it had terrorist and guerrilla warfare capabilities and had developed *nascent conventional warfare capabilities*.

30 Mao Tse-Tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, Translated by General Samuel Griffith, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1962, p. 113.

31 The Islamic Republic of Iran comes to mind.

Many analysts have argued that future wars will be 'multi-modal' or 'multi-variant,' that is to say, exhibiting many forms rather than one form of warfare. There will be a blending or blurring of forms of warfare in combinations of increasing frequency and lethality.³² Instead of separate challengers with fundamentally different approaches (conventional, irregular, or terrorist), we can expect to see actors (both state and non-state) who will employ all forms, often at the same time, not *sequentially*. In the words of Frank Hoffman, one of the leading exponents of hybrid war:

Hybrid threats incorporate a full range of modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts that include indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder. These multi-modal activities can be conducted by separate units, or even by the same unit, but are generally operationally and tactically directed and coordinated within the main battle space to achieve synergistic effects in the physical and psychological dimensions of conflict.³³

As described by the United States Marine Corps Strategic Vision Group: "Hybrid Wars combine a range of different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder."³⁴ The complementary effects of hybrid warfare are generated by its ability to exploit the advantages of each kind of force and increase the nature of the threat posed by each kind of force; to wit: the irregular forces attack weak areas compelling a conventional opponent to disperse his security forces; this in turn, opens the dispersed conventional forces to attack by the enemy's concentrated conventional forces.

The LTTE sought to create quasi-conventional force structures in the three combat domains: land, air and sea. Its record in the first two domains remained mixed at best. The LTTE was a formidable guerrilla force; its efforts to create a conventional force structure failed despite the tremendous efforts they devoted to it. The conventional units were simply undermanned and poorly-equipped. Outside observers were struck by the profusion of so-called LTTE conventional 'brigades.' Little did they realize that these 'brigades' did not reflect the necessary force structure of true brigades which usually had a complement of 2,500 to 3,000 personnel. Instead, LTTE 'brigades' were more like battalions of around 750 to 1,000 personnel. Moreover, during the final phase of the war as experienced cadre were killed, wounded, or captured, they were increasingly manned by ill-trained and unwilling youths.³⁵ The LTTE also invested some effort in trying to create an air-wing. They did not have much success in this field; they managed to acquire some light 'micro' planes which undertook some psychologically disruptive but militarily insignificant air raids on the outskirts of Colombo. However, the LTTE was notable for its development of a sophisticated maritime terrorist capability. Just as there is no authoritative definition of terrorism as such, 'maritime terrorism' is hard to define. What distinguishes it from piracy is mainly its aim, piracy being undertaken with *animus furandi* in mind, i.e. for selfish reasons, whereas terrorism is best understood as one among

32 Frank Hoffman, "Hybrid Warfare and Challenges," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 52, 1st Quarter (2009), p. 35.

33 Frank Hoffman, "Hybrid Warfare and other challenges," p. 36.

34 U.S. Marine Corps, "Hybrid Warfare and Challengers" *Strategic Vision Group Information Paper*, February 12, 2008, p. 1.

35 Discussions with Sri Lankan army officers in Vavuniya, June 2010.

several forms of armed rebellion for the sake of some higher cause.³⁶ The LTTE was the only terrorist or sub-state actor in the world with a dedicated and well-trained maritime terrorist arm. This arm, known as the Sea Tigers, managed to destroy almost a third of the Sri Lankan Navy (SLN) over the course of its history, thus forcing the Sri Lankan government to devote considerable resources to modernize and re-equipping a generally expensive branch of the armed forces in any country. All in all, over the course of the conflict between the government and the LTTE, something on the order of 40 major naval engagements occurred between the naval arms of the two combatants; some of these were among the most intense naval actions since World War II. Among the most notable actions was the Sea Tiger attack on the important naval base of Trincomalee in October 2000, in which they sank a naval vessel and damaged several others after a three-hour long battle. Another attack was launched in November 2006 against Dakshina Naval base in Galle using heavily armed gunboats and speed boats. A special squad called “Black Sea Tigers” was formed in 1990 to carry out suicide attacks. In July 1990, it carried out its first suicide mission attacking the navy’s command ship *Edithara*. The LTTE was also in the process of building its own mini submarine.³⁷

The Sri Lankan State’s Counter-Terrorism and Counterinsurgency Responses

From the above analysis we can conclude that the LTTE constituted a formidable adversary; it took the government almost three decades to defeat them. This it finally did in May 2009. The cost of the violence in Sri Lanka was enormous: 100,000 dead military personnel and civilians on both sides, enormous infrastructural damage, and three decades of lost development and economic progress. When we look at the early stages of the conflict, we can say, in retrospect, that the government could have taken more effective steps to deal with the embryonic violence and that it could have nipped the insurgency in the bud. Counterfactual history – which examines the issue of ‘what if’ – is all very fine; however, it is interesting to note that there were occasions in the early days when the Sri Lankan security forces were on the verge of success against the then still underdeveloped LTTE – Prabhakaran was almost captured on a number of occasions – but success eluded the GoSL for almost three decades.

The LTTE’s effectiveness was enhanced by the role that India played in the internationalization of this conflict. Almost no internal conflict within a particular society is safe from the pressures of the outside world. Even before Sri Lanka’s descent into open warfare, India had begun to play a significant role in the ethnic crisis, indeed as early as the mid-1970s. At that time India was beginning to flex its regional muscles; after its defeat of Pakistan in 1971, India was the preeminent military power on the sub-continent. It engaged in a massive program of military modernization, particularly in the form of the construction of a major navy. Several things also began to worry it; further outbreaks of internal violence within South Asian states – particularly in small countries like Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and Sri Lanka – were to be prevented lest they invite interference from outside powers in India’s backyard. Yet at the same time, India began to render effective

36 From Bjorn Moeller, *Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Naval Strategy*, DIIS Report, 2009, http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2009/DIIS-Report_2009_02_%Piracy_maritime_terrorism_and_naval_strategy.

37 Amal Jayawardene, “Terrorism at Sea: Maritime Security Challenges in South Asia,” <http://www.rsis.ntsasia.org/activities/convention/2009-singapore/Amal%20Jayawardane.pdf>.

aid to the growing militant Tamil movements within Sri Lanka; it extended military and logistics support and training in a wide variety of camps within southern India. Why did under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi promote the militant movements in Sri Lanka when the country's leadership clearly professed a desire to see internal stability within South Asian countries? The reasons were primarily strategic and political. It should be clear from the outset that India's promotion of trouble within Sri Lanka had nothing to do with a desire on its part to promote the territorial division of the island nation into two small territories. India itself could not afford to promote such designs because of its own fissiparous tendencies. New Delhi did not want the 65 million Tamils of Tamil Nadu state getting any ideas about an independent 'Dravidastan.' Yet New Delhi had to placate this powerful federal state and its vocal political parties who began to rail about Colombo's 'genocidal' tendencies toward the Tamil. This became more acute as Tamil refugees began to flow into India, bringing tales of woe at the hands of the Sinhalese state and security forces, particularly after the nasty anti-Tamil pogrom of July 1983. In the 1980s Sri Lanka began to adopt a pro-Western policy; India at the time was a self-professed non-aligned nation, that was, in fact, pro-Soviet. With its profound paranoia toward the West at the time, New Delhi thought that Sri Lanka was going to allow Western (i.e. US navy ships) to berth in Trincomalee harbor, one of the best natural harbors in the world. Sri Lanka was also making deals to allow powerful Voice of America transmissions from its territory. For New Delhi, the island nation's drift into the Western orbit was something that could not be entertained.

If New Delhi was paranoid about a growing Western presence in Colombo, it was positively livid over the growth of Sri Lankan-Pakistani political and military relations. It was rumored in New Delhi that a successful Sri Lankan military offensive against the LTTE, which almost captured VP, was secretly led by a combat-proven Pakistani Brigadier (General). Pakistani intelligence agents were instructing the Tamil-speaking Muslim community to side with the Sinhalese government and people. Pakistan did develop strong relations with Sri Lanka; these continued to grow well into contemporary times. But whether there was any truth to the more outlandish Indian claims about nefarious Pakistani activities in the 1980s, is not as important as the fact that the Indian government and its over-active intelligence service, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), actually believed them. In this context, the LTTE rapidly became a means whereby to pressure Colombo and also deflect Tamil concerns in the Tamil Nadu state. Since the situation between the Colombo government and the Tamil minority worsened by 1986, New Delhi's alarm grew and it began issuing strident warnings about the impact of this crisis on Indian national security. But New Delhi was not about to engage in the conflict on behalf of the LTTE's quest for independence; VP knew that, which is why he was very suspicious of Indian motivations for 'taking on' the mantle of the Tamil cause. That they were not became rapidly clear to him when, during his extensive contacts with Indian officials and intelligence operatives, they queried the LTTE cadre about Colombo's regional and international politics: what it intended to do with the harbor of Trincomalee, was it inviting Western political and economic presence on the island, etc. This irked and worried VP tremendously; while he wanted Indian help, he had come to realize that India's interest in the ethnic conflict was based on the promotion of its own strategic interests and not the establishment of an independent Tamil nation aligned with India. In one of his numerous interviews with the well-known and intrepid Indian

journalist, Anita Pratap, VP made it clear that he viewed India as distinctly hostile to his paramount goal of creating an independent state and that he would ultimately be forced into open conflict with India.

In 1987 the Sri Lankan military actually had the LTTE on the run. Despite its problems and weaknesses, it had actually launched an effective military operation, *Operation Vadamarachchi*, on the Jaffna Peninsula. Alarmed by this stark turn of the tide and threatening military action, New Delhi ordered Sri Lankan President Junius Jayawardene to stop. Outrage greeted the preemptory Indian demand, but the country could not stand up to India militarily. It acquiesced; under an Indo-Lankan Accord of 1987, the two sides agreed that an Indian peacekeeping force would land on the northern part of the island, disarm the various militant Tamil groups, and help promote the devolution of power to the Tamil Northern and Eastern Provinces. Supposedly secret annexes to the accord limited Sri Lanka's sovereignty vis-à-vis India, e.g. it must never allow the harbor of Trincomalee to come under foreign 'control.' The accord was not universally accepted by politicians in Sri Lanka or by the people. In fact, a violent terror campaign was launched by the Sinhalese nationalist party which resulted in considerable bloodshed in the south.

What is more important for our purposes is the fact that the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka actually contributed to worsened instability and terror within the island nation in many ways that one could argue convincingly that India bore a great deal of responsibility for the protraction of the war. First, VP and the LTTE refused to disarm; India succeeded in disarming the other groups. The LTTE then turned on them and decimated them, leaving the organization as the only significant military force. Second, the LTTE turned on the Indians who had begun, like most occupiers do eventually, to rough up the increasingly sullen population. The professionalism and initial courtesy displayed by the huge IPKF disintegrated in the wake of terrorism against, and assassinations of, officers and ambushes of Indian military units. To Indian military fury, a supposedly rag-tag force of LTTE cadres took on India's best, airborne commandos, in a significant battle in the north, and beat them. What the Indian military did not realize was that their country's cavalier and independent intelligence wing had actually trained many of the LTTE cadre who had started to return in large numbers back to their country, where they used their skills against the increasingly hated Indian occupiers. India was to suffer from blowback even before the West did in Afghanistan with its support of the anti-Soviet Mujahidin guerrillas, or Pakistan with its imprudent support for the Taliban in the 1990s. Third, as the LTTE and the Indians fought, the former began to improve their military skills against a formidable and professional army; furthermore, because of the mistreatment of the populace by the Indian military, the LTTE began to expand and intensify its links with the people who provided it with recruits and intelligence. Fourth, as the southern Sinhalese portion of the country watched the situation unfolding in the north – the Sri Lankan military was confined to barracks – many within the government, but even among ordinary people, the LTTE was seen as a native force fighting a foreign invader! The result was a covert operation by segments of the government to provide the LTTE with arms to fight the Indians. Needless to say, the majority of the Sri Lankan officer corps was outraged by the government's support for a terrorist organization. Nonetheless, the LTTE received significant

arms supplies from the government; when the Indians withdrew in 1990, the LTTE proceeded to use these arms against the Sri Lankan security forces. Fifth, by 1990 the Indians had had enough; they withdrew from the island in a sulk, but they had built up infrastructure and as they withdrew the LTTE moved in and took over the territory and infrastructure. This is very significant as it provided the organization with the territorial sanctuary within which it could establish deep roots and set up an embryonic infrastructure of a state within a state.

However, when one addresses the Sri Lankan side, we can also see that eradication of the LTTE in the early days was, nonetheless, a tall order. The security forces, as many frustrated senior officers pointed out in public or in their memoirs, were seriously underdeveloped in terms of capabilities and manpower. They lacked effective information-gathering capabilities and had virtually no intelligence organization. Their relationship with the local Tamil people was appallingly bad; indeed, the maltreatment of the locals virtually ensured that not only would they not provide information, but that they would willingly join the LTTE. For many years there was no institutionalized cooperation and coordination between the various branches of the security forces involved in combating the LTTE: the army, navy, air force and police 'did their own thing.' Last but not least, politics at the center, contributed markedly to the dismal performance of the security forces. For many years the various governments that were elected in the midst of the violence failed to provide the necessary resources to fund the security forces and the police effectively; procurement was a messy subject due either to corruption as some people lined their own pockets when Sri Lanka bought weapons from overseas or the government officials were taken for a ride when they were sold obsolescent, useless, or inappropriate weapons. Civilian government officials, who did not know much of what was going on in the battlefield, would force the security forces to undertake offensives for manifestly political reasons even when the forces were not prepared. In regional and international arenas, the Sri Lankan government failed to counter the effective media and propaganda efforts of the LTTE, as well as its very effective global fund-raising activities which netted it around US\$ 300 million annually from a large and pro-LTTE Tamil diaspora in the West.³⁸

In 2000 the third stage of the conflict ended in the mutual exhaustion of the two sides. The government had come off worst in that campaign; it had suffered a humiliating defeat in some major conventional battles and LTTE cadre had conducted several successful terrorist attacks. But even the LTTE was also at the end of its tether by 2000; it also had suffered severe losses due to the tenacity with which its opponent fought against it. A tenuous ceasefire was declared and both sides decided to enter into peace negotiations under the auspices of Norway in 2002. But the problem which became rapidly apparent was that neither side had much trust or faith in the other. For the Sri Lankan government, the LTTE used negotiations as another form of warfare like many other terrorist and insurgent groups; furthermore, the ceasefire was seen by the government as a breathing space for the LTTE to rearm itself and get ready for the next round of conflict. For the LTTE, the 'chauvinistic' Sinhala-dominated government, particularly the nationalist government of Mahinda Rajapaksa

38 This is a brief summary of the analysis in Ahmed S. Hashim, *A Bright Shining COIN? Sri Lanka's Defeat of the LTTE*, see, in particular Chapter III.

which came to power in 2005, had no intention of granting even a modicum of Tamil demands.³⁹ As for the new government, it had absolutely no faith in the LTTE's profession of interest in negotiating a mutually acceptable solution. Indeed, for the government, the LTTE was using the ceasefire to prepare for war and eventual statehood. By 2002 the LTTE ran a virtual state within a state. Its status was enhanced by the 2002 ceasefire agreement and technical control lines which quickly morphed into 'borders' – complete with immigration checks, visas and customs and tax. The 'capital' of Eelam, Kilinochchi, was the LTTE's administrative center, and hosted a range of institutions such as police and a detailed legal code. Other signs of administration included departments of works, public transport and fuel, hospitals, asylums, clinics, children's homes, rehabilitation centers, primary and secondary schools and the construction of a university.⁴⁰

Things changed dramatically in 2005 following the election of Rajapaksa. These changes were far-reaching and profound; they led to the utter defeat of the LTTE in May 2009 with the elimination of virtually all of its senior leadership, including Prabhakaran, and scores of combat cadres. The structural problems of the armed forces, which I briefly discussed above, were taken care of prior to the outbreak of Eelam IV War, which proved to be the final and decisive stage of the war. The government implemented a thoroughgoing joint politico-strategic and military CT and COIN campaign which began by learning from the mistakes of the past. Government officials from the president on down were on the 'same sheet of music' concerning the goals of the coming campaign: decisive defeat of the LTTE. In short, the government was not going to wage a CT and COIN campaign in order to attain a better strategic position for yet another round of fruitless negotiations. There was considerable coordination between the civilian and military leaderships as a result of which the armed forces were provided with the resources – both in terms of materiel/weaponry and personnel – they needed for a successful prosecution of the war. The size and training of the police, paramilitary and armed forces were improved enormously; furthermore, greater and better coordination was implemented between the various branches of the security services. Moreover, the government recognized that it had to wage a counter-terrorist, a counter-insurgency campaign and a conventional war against a ruthless and dedicated enemy that had the ability to wage violence across a three-tiered spectrum of war.

But it was not only changes on the Sri Lankan side that contributed to victory; we must keep in mind that things also changed in the regional and international arenas too. After 9/11, nations were less willing to tolerate global terrorism and many countries took action against some of the more dangerous ones like the LTTE. The organization was proscribed in many countries which was a psychological blow and put a major dent in its fund-raising activities globally. Countries like India – badly burned by the LTTE, enraged by the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, and increasingly facing

39 For more extensive details see my forthcoming book, Ahmed Hashim, *A Bright Shining COIN? Sri Lanka's Defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011.

40 Damien Kingsbury, "Peace Processes in Aceh and Sri Lanka: A Comparative Assessment," *Security Challenges*, Vol.3, No.2 (June 2007), p.101.

its own protracted terrorism and insurgencies -- proved willing to help Sri Lanka; the U.S. provided naval information-gathering systems that enabled the Sri Lankan Navy to decisively eliminate the terrorist naval capabilities of the LTTE, one of its most successful branches. Pakistan and China provided the requisite weapons on a large-scale. The LTTE leadership made serious blunders at the political and strategic levels. They came to rely more and more on the Tamil diaspora in the West and in India, and less and less on the local Tamil population whom they began to brutalize. VP did not recognize the seriousness of the new government in Colombo. He failed to maintain the considerable external support that the LTTE had amassed over time. Furthermore, as the fourth and final stage of the conflict between the Sri Lankan state and the LTTE unfolded between 2006 and 2009, it became readily evident that the organization had serious structural weaknesses and had also suffered serious blows, of which the government took advantage.

The LTTE leadership had no idea what was in store for them when the war broke out again in the spring of 2006. Indeed, the vaunted LTTE intelligence capabilities – another area in which the LTTE was again a leader among terrorist and insurgent groups – had actually become unglued by 2006. This unraveling was due to serious internal rivalries within the intelligence organization which resulted in the removal of its head. Another reason was because the LTTE intelligence organs were focused on dealing with the fallout from the defection of a senior leader of the organization, ‘Colonel Karuna Aman’ and two to three thousand battle-hardened cadres who were located in the Eastern Province, an important multi-ethnic region that the LTTE and government had fought over vigorously.

Conclusion

The protracted Sri Lankan conflict ended in May 2009 in a decisive military victory for the government side. Sri Lanka is still basking in the euphoria; however, *military victory* does not mean *resolution of the conflict*. There is an important political aspect to this conflict which must be resolved justly and equitably and in a manner that addresses and resolves the grievances that led to war. The conflict in Sri Lanka has its roots and origins in the existence of a plural society, in the evolution of the colonial entity under the British which provided considerable opportunities and privileges for the Tamils (and a significant section of the coastal Sinhalese community), and particularly in the populist and discriminatory policies of Sinhalese-dominated governments following independence which implemented ‘affirmative action’ policies that pandered to the Sinhalese masses, the overwhelming demographic majority.

The result was the mobilization of the Tamil population in favor, initially, of some form of autonomy or federalism, and then the advocacy of outright independence, particularly by militant groups such as the LTTE. The LTTE, however, bears the blame for the failure to reach an equitable solution within a united Sri Lanka. Its elimination of much of the Tamil political leadership and other organizations within that community spelled doom for any political resolution of the conflict. Its extensive acts of terrorism in the southern part of the country fueled Sinhala parochial nationalism and sense of siege; this, in turn, contributed to Colombo’s reluctance to negotiate anything which was seen as a first step towards dismantling of the country.

By 2002 the former terrorists of the LTTE were trying to morph into politicians, officials and statesmen and were running a virtual state, but by the spring of 2009 most of them were dead. For the international community and long-time observers of Sri Lanka's long agony, this was a totally unexpected outcome. Some even acted as if it were an unwelcome outcome. When the fighting erupted again in spring 2006, the general view or expectation was that there would be some intense fighting between the two sides but that eventually the co-belligerents would call upon the international community to negotiate yet another ceasefire as a first step, hopefully, toward a more permanent settlement. It did not work out that way. The GoSL fought the LTTE without much success for about 27 years. The counter-terrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies that Sri Lanka implemented between 2006 and 2009 proved to be decisive. The Sri Lankan government defeated the LTTE in the first clear-cut counter-terrorist (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) victory of the 21st century. Sri Lanka managed to achieve what others are struggling to achieve, that is, victory against groups that wage deadly and protracted terrorism and insurgency in combination and which may constitute an even greater danger if they attain effective quasi-conventional military capabilities.



Hindutva and Terrorism: Implications for Federal India

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Abstract: *The diversity of India's social realities and historical identities, as well as its centuries of experiences with social cohabitation, has brought about an evolving recognition of the federal polity. Diversity is well recognized in India's Constitution, in relation to both national minorities and those who are dispersed in areas dominated by the majority religious community. Despite adhering to the principle of 'common citizenship,' the concept of group/cultural rights is also embedded in the 1950 Constitution. On the other hand, India's territorial vastness and regional variations have been dealt with by federal political arrangements, both symmetrical and asymmetrical, for the states of the Indian Union on the basis of cultural, linguistic and ethnic factors.*

Keyword: *Hindutva, terrorism, muslims, federalism*

Introduction

Human beings are known for their socio-political and moral attributes which prepare the broad boundary of society to encompass various institutions, mainly the polity for regulating the behavior of the individual and the groups in areas affecting their counterparts. Platonic polity wanted human beings – both the governed and the ruling persons – to construct a model city-state with moral and ethical ambitions and expectations. The Papacy-dominated *Republica Christiana* was envisaged to prevent human wickedness through a coercive but benevolent state. Later states were taken over by absolute kings who were finally challenged by the emerging needs and desires of the new economic classes and parliamentarians all over the Western Europe. Finally the issue of governance was settled within the logical framework of the principles of state sovereignty, people's right to accountable government, vigilant citizens (in the scheme of J. S. Mill), rule of law, and the right of the state only to use force or other methods for keeping peace in society.

Other than the western model, there is also a very successful Ottoman model of the *Millet system* through which the Ottoman institutions and principles endorsed those models and features which are being debated in the west today. The *Millet system* became the vital hub of facilitating pluralism, civic/*demos* nation, group rights, consociationalism, and a kind of common law system resulting in the promotion of the rights of nationalities including minorities. However, the rise of nationalism and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire finally squeezed it into a Turkish nation-state. Experiments in other parts of the world seem to indicate the fact that a large number of countries have followed the Western and the Ottoman models, along with the addition of their own attributes of painting the picture of political universalism with local miniatures. Whatever may be the differences of their pasts and experiences, almost all the polities seem to maintain the rhythmic coherence of creating a terror-free society. This expectation became a kind of systemic choice of those polities which are associated with democracy as well as social and political federalism.

Federal Attributes of Indian Polity

Peace, non-violence, maintenance of order, attainment of rights and other attributes usually set the constitutional key-note of the Indian federal polity which negated all kinds of terrorism by any kind of actors — state or non-state. The diversity of India's social realities and historical identities, as well as its centuries of experiences with social cohabitation, has brought about an evolving recognition of the federal polity. Diversity is well recognized in India's Constitution, in relation to both national minorities and those who are dispersed in areas dominated by the majority religious community. Despite adhering to the principle of 'common citizenship,' the concept of group/cultural rights is also embedded in the 1950 Constitution. On the other hand, India's territorial vastness and regional variations have been dealt with by federal political arrangements, both symmetrical and asymmetrical, for the states of the Indian Union on the basis of cultural, linguistic and ethnic factors. Besides accommodating various rights under federal arrangements for the 28 states and the seven Union territories within the Indian Union, the Indian Constitution and several later statutory developments envisaged compensatory measures for economically weak, historically discriminated peoples, as well as for alienated tribal populations of the country, in terms of reserving seats in elected bodies, employment, job promotions and, in many areas, community development schemes.¹ It is important to recall the view of the late Rasheeduddin Khan, one of the greatest advocates of federalism in India:

India's polity is federal twice over. Political federation of the union type has been superimposed by the constitution over a classic socio-cultural federalism whose survival and continuity in the duration of time, continental dimension, social complexity, and cultural diversities which makes it the world's oldest, largest and most persistent plural society, the like of which human history has never known.²

Federalism also becomes fundamentally relevant as a principle of governance in terms of managing a bi-communal or multi-communal society where no community should dominate over

1 Arshi Khan, "Situating Federalism, Minorities and Communalism in the Indian Polity", *European Yearbook of Minority Issues*, Vol. 4, 2004/5, Netherland, p. 85.

2 Rasheeduddin Khan, *Federal India: A Design for Change*, Vikas, New Delhi, 1992, p. 21.

another due to the risk of it becoming a permanent majority or minority ruling community in a diverse society. Therefore, federalism should not only balance the interests of the federal and constituent governments but also the interests of the diverse communities. It is now commonly recognized that federalism provides a safety valve for minorities against the permanent domination of the majority. In other words, federal principles of governance in a diverse and multicultural society further boost democratic institutions and the democratization process by either creating a ‘functional civic establishment’ or by providing some viable measures for the protection of minorities.

Thomas Fleiner and Lidija R. Basta Fleiner have argued that minority protection has to be understood as an immanent characteristic of true democracy. Thus, the objective of federal governance is to build such a polity and society in which individuals and groups – minorities and majority, governments and public – can trust and cooperate with one another despite sometimes being critical and competitive. In the contemporary world, this is expressed in one dominant form: the principle of territoriality. In other words, different layers of governments, commonly known as federal government and constituent units, together legitimize the supremacy of the constitution as well as the choice and will of the people and public. She has said that democratic integration remains a major challenge in multicultural societies, not only as an objective but also as a strategy. She has warned that the winner takes all system within pluralist and segmented societies inevitably produce illegitimate group politics. It is well argued in her summation that it is federalized democracy as a strategy of constitution making that can be critically important to nation-building in multicultural societies.³

Emerging Threats to the Social Order

The federal polity ensuring the rights of the vulnerable communities is now under threat due to the rise of the fascist elements in various spheres. No preferential treatment is available for Muslims who constitute over 14 percent of India’s total population. They have been declared backward and very backward by at least three commissions set up by the Government of India — the Dr. Gopal Singh Committee (1983), the Justice Sachar Committee (2006), and the Justice Ranganath Mishra Commission (2007). Over 80% of Muslims in India are poor, very poor and vulnerable. Preferential treatment exists for several weaker segments of the Hindu community. Today the majority of the Muslims are excluded from the structures of powers. The rates of unemployment, illiteracy, poverty, housing problems and other issues are higher for the Muslims. This requires constitutional and policy measures on the part of the national and sub-national governments for the fulfillment of social and economic rights. They are now trapped in another problem of the terrorism by the Hindu fascists and terrorists. In fact, they are the only community, other than the Christians, which face terrorism of the out-group fascists.

To begin with, it would be imperative to mention three unique social settings of India. First, it has eight religious communities with about 80 percent Hindus. Muslims constitute the second

3 Basta Fleiner’s views in the Scientific Summary of Sessions 5 and 17 based on Case-Studies of Cyprus, Serbia and Montenegro, South Africa and Switzerland, *International Conference on Federalism 2002: Federalism in Changing World – Learning From Each Other*, St. Gallen, Switzerland, 27-30 August 2002.

biggest grouping (14%, unofficially more) and the rest of the minorities, except Neo-Buddhists, are prospered communities. Second, India is a historical society where communal consciousness is deeply embedded. All the communities have maintained a kind of medieval social construction showing strong allegiance to their faith, religious institutions and traditions. Third, the use and misuse of the community/religious factor in political mobilization, particularly by the majority group of the center-right and fascist political parties since the 1970s, have weakened the constitutional rights of the minorities, particularly the Muslims, due to communal politics. Communal consciousness or communalism is a common social Indian reality signifying the attachment of an individual with his faith and community and preferring priorities for the 'self' against the 'other.'

Modern-looking secular, federal and democratic arrangement of institutions were endorsed and adopted to transform the 'communal' nature of society into a 'civic' society. Secularism was meant to maintain peaceful co-existence and federal democracy was meant to uphold substantive equality and social justice against discrimination, exploitation, poverty, backwardness, special birth-rights (caste-system), and exclusions and deprivations on the basis of religion, color and creed. In this context, one can find three major set of questions that India had to address after it became independent in 1947. They were Federal-Units sharing of power (related to the powers and autonomy of sub-national governments), Casteism (caste conflicts and caste-based inequalities), and Communalism (community-based fear of insecurity, discrimination and backwardness due to the representation and force of numbers/majority community). The first two have been addressed systematically without similar sensitivity to the problem of communalism. Therefore, majority communalism was strengthened due to lack of checks and balances at the level of the organization, principles and guidelines for political parties, distribution of party-tickets for contesting elections, employment in the government sector, enforcement agencies, delivery of goods and in the sphere of the 'rule of law.' As a result, communal tendencies became rooted in the structures of powers and political parties, which transformed communalism into communal politics facilitating the forces of *Hindutva* echoing cultural nationalism with the advocacy of One Nation, One Culture, One Language and its opposition to asymmetrical federalism, particularly in the case of Jammu and Kashmir.

The consolidation of communal forces in power politics, including some other civic institutions, established three disturbing trends in the country. First, anti-Muslim violence (usually called communal riots) has become a permanent feature of power politics since 1947 and more rabid after the 9th General elections of 1989 when a small political party increased its strength in Parliament from 2 to 88. On the other hand, anti-Christian violence started as a new phenomenon in the late 1990s with planned and coordinated attacks on churches, priests and their followers.

Second, in many places, the enforcement agencies have begun to habitually overlook lawlessness which resulted in giving a free hand to the attackers and organizers of crimes against the peace and the law of the land. It is important to mention here that timely reporting and warnings by local and domestic intelligence agencies, which are supposed to know the depots of weapons, training grounds, publication of heinous literatures and hate speeches, could have controlled violence in many places as most of the violence has appeared as organized crimes against humanity. The tradition of setting up inquiry committees is quite strong but actions and implementation of their suggestions have not yet set precedents. As a result, the organizers of violence and hate crimes do not get discouraged.

One of the Hindutva brigands —Shri Ram Sena – a chief based in Karnataka, Pramod Muthalik, “agreed to vandalise an art exhibition for a price” when it became clear under a sting operation conducted jointly by Aaj Tak TV channel and Tehelka magazine.⁴

Third, the followers of the militant ideology went to the extent of taking advantage of the ‘War on Terror’ by engineering bomb blasts at several places in the last few years and accusing the minority community of the crimes against peace. Such blasts, of quite a new kind and nature in the Indian panorama, were shocking incidents to Federal India which began to create the image of Muslims as enemy-terrorists. Muslims in India have no organized or unorganized terror organization for waging war against India. A small group of youngsters belonging to the Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), known for their militant approach but not involved in terrorist activity, is already banned and their key members were arrested. Muslim militancy exists in the northern state of Jammu and Kashmir, mainly due to the excessive use of force by the governmental agencies and blatant violation of the federal principles and autonomy of the special federal unit in the country. The central and state governments have been chasing militants in Kashmir since 1989 that has resulted in thousands of deaths. They have also chased SIMI and others who have no physical existence at all but similar efforts and precautions seem to be lacking against those who organize terrorist acts against minorities and masterminding bomb-blasts in different parts of the country. After a great deal of damage was done to the Muslim minority community for the blasts, some of the more honest officers unearthed the deep involvement of the *Hindutva* forces in such blasts in which military connections were also found for a missing 60 kg of RDX explosives. A leading English daily newspaper reported from Mumbai in November 2008 that the Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) suspected that Lt Col Prasad Purohit supplied the RDX explosive that was used in the Samjhauta Express blast on February 18, 2007 that killed 68 passengers. Seeking an extension for the police custody of Purohit, Special Prosecutor for Maharashtra ATS Ajay Misar told a Nashik court that a witness in the Malegaon blast case told the agency that Purohit had claimed he had 60 kg of RDX in his possession which he had got from Jammu & Kashmir. Misar said: “When Purohit was stationed at the Deolali army camp, he had gone to Jammu and Kashmir on official work and is believed to have got 60 kg of RDX and a part of it was given to this link ‘Bhagwan’, who used it in the Samjhauta train (India-Pakistan bound) blast. The ATS is probing his involvement.” Madhya Pradesh police officials involved in the probe last year said that when a SIMI connection failed to emerge, suggestions were made to examine the possible involvement of Hindu right wing groups, but it was not taken up then. Haryana police confirmed that the SIMI angle was ruled out after investigation.⁵

The central government has been informing its counterparts in the US and other countries about the role of the ISI; here the ATS was claiming that the blast was the handiwork of a serving Indian Army officer. Forensic examination of the blast site and two unexploded bombs had conclusively proved that RDX was not used, but the ATS was leveling an allegation to the contrary,” a senior bureau

4 N A Ansari, “Rent-a-riot or riot for price”, *The Milli Gazette*, 1-15 June 2010, p. 5; Dr. S. Ausaf Saied Vasfi, “Rent-a-Riot: The Sri Ram Sena Way”, *Radiance*, 23-29 May 2010, pp. 8-9.

5 Mustafa Plumber & Anubhuti Vishnoi, “Purohit supplied RDX for Samjhauta bomb: ATS”, *The Indian Express*, 15 November 2008; <http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news/Purohit-supplied-RDX-for-Samjhauta-bomb-ATS/386143/2/>

official observed.⁶ The ATS had also arrested Sadhvi Pragya Singh Thakur, Dayananad Pandey and a retired major, Ramesh Upadhyaya, among others, for the blasts, which were allegedly planned by the radical right-wing Hindu outfit Abhinav Bharat.⁷ It is, therefore, important to analyze those aspects of *Hindutva*, which is politically motivated to create hatred and to demonize the Muslims in the minds of the majority, government and in other public sphere. Such hatred and prejudices have increased over the years as reflected in the rising number of trials, detentions, encounters and forced confessions. In the case of Muslims, even doubts are enough to implicate them whereas existing substantial evidence, in the case of Hindus, are not generally taken as substantive grounds for the same methods of inquiry by the police, intelligence and media as in the case of Muslims. On the other hand, *Hindutva* is busy in representing itself as the savior of the majority community for its political consolidation in which the attitude of the officials, media and intelligence is to maintain benign neglect.

Hindutva: From Communal Politics to Communal Terrorism

After India experimented with party-politics and periodic elections while the governmental apparatus expanded, communal consciousness turned into communalism/communal politics signifying communally motivated actions, policies and preferences made by the parties in power, parties in opposition, and enforcement agencies which resulted in discrimination, inequality and prejudices against the Muslim community in general. Since late 1980s, militant communalism was openly embraced by the chauvinist, rightist and fascist political party – Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP with *Hindutva* ideology) – and its followers which expanded the number of its deputies in Parliament from 2 in 1984 to over 80 in the 1989 general elections. The cost of this spectacular rise of the BJP was caused by not only a paradigm shift from building India into a civic nation to a misguided kind of ethno-nation where the Muslims and the Christian communities are made country-wide projects for hatred, intolerance, subjugation, discrimination and prejudice.

In other words, the communal Indian society became a divided society due to politically motivated hatred but this division was not based on the rational ground of different faiths; instead it was based on the fascists' terror agenda of creating anti-Muslim hysteria, feelings and prejudice in villages, towns and cities in many parts of the country. The fascists made massive rallies, anti-Muslim speeches, video films, audio-visual cassettes, print-outs, posters and stickers to misguide common Hindus and divert the majoritarian sympathy against the Muslims on the pretext of erasing the Babri Mosque and to erect Hindu temple in northern India. They demolished the mosque contrary to the order of the Supreme Court and engineered massive anti-Muslim terror in various parts of the country.⁸

6 “ATS retracted RDX claim under pressure”, *The Times of India* (Mumbai), 18 November 2008; <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/ATS-retracted-RDX-claim-under-pressure-/articleshow/3725212.cms>

7 “Malegaon case: Col. Purohit likely to be sacked by Army”, *The Times of India*, (New Delhi) 19 March 2010; <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Malegaon-case-Col-Purohit-likely-to-be-sacked-by-Army/articleshow/5699180.cms>.

8 Chaitanya Krishna (ed.), *Fascism in India: Faces, Fangs and Facts*, Manak, New Delhi, 2003.

The fascists formed their governments (from 1989 onwards) in several important federal units of the country, including the partner of the coalition government at the federal level. As a result, they consolidated their position and injected their sympathizers into ministries and governmental agencies. Media had no hesitation to embrace them. Moreover, their affiliates and satellites also expanded all over the country along with their anti-Muslim activities. They advocated *Hindutva*, which they mean to be cultural nationalism and add other meanings serving their interests. I have tried to define it here. *Hindutva* is a politically motivated ideology of Hindu communal-fascist organizations generally known as the *Sangh parivar*, headed by the *Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh* (RSS). It aims to transform all Hindus from a tolerant religious community into a monolithic militant and political community on the basis of creating prejudices, exclusive nationalism, fear and hatred against the Muslims and the Christians which do not constitute *Sangh's* notion of the Hindu Nation. As a result, it benignly justifies its anti-Muslim and anti-Christian mind-set, schemes and actions on the pretext of protecting and promoting Hindus' interests.

Therefore, Indian federal polity has been passing through the dangerous phases of violence, terrorism and hatred, particularly after 1989. Hindu-Muslim riots are generally known as communal violence but the dozens of investigation reports have shown that the fascist agencies and parties are directly involved in anti-Muslim acts of terrorism.⁹ I will briefly mention the mother organization of terrorism later. The fascists use words like '*Hindutva*' (adherence to their Hindu way of life), 'cultural nationalism' and 'greater India' but in reality they are highly anti-Muslim and anti-Christian. Since their (RSS) inception in 1925, they have killed a large number of Muslims in organized acts of terror, raped women, destroyed their properties and prevented them from seeking justice. It was only after 1989 that they also started terrorism unambiguously against the Christians, their churches and their followers.¹⁰

The RSS is known for many problems of insecurity, killings, loss of honor, destruction of properties, and fear vis-à-vis the Muslims and Christians. It has many affiliates and its political face is represented by the BJP (established in 1980), which is known for creating a post-Partition Hindu-Muslim divide. Before independence (and partition), it was mainly the RSS which had created the Hindu-Muslim divide. It is more than that of the EOKA terrorists who destroyed the unity of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in 1950s. It is an open fact that RSS members killed the Father of the Nation – Mahatma Gandhi – in 1948. They also planted idols in the Babri mosque in 1949 to order to claim it. In the late 1980s, they held thousands of anti-Muslim demonstrations aimed at demolishing the Babri mosque and sensitized the Hindus with anti-Muslim propaganda. This resulted in many cases of anti-Muslim terrorism in several parts of the country due to their 10,000 km journey inside the country.

They finally demolished the mosque on 6 December 1992 in spite of all security precautions. Soon after the demolition, these terrorists made massive acts of terrorism in various parts of the country and destroyed hundreds of tombs, other mosques and graveyards in many places. While appointing the Special Investigation Team in 2008 to probe hundreds of instances of communal violence in the

9 Arshi Khan, "Police Prejudice Against the Muslims", in Asghar Ali Engineer and Amarjit S. Narang (eds.), *Minorities and Police in India*, Manohar, New Delhi, 2006, pp. 141-162.

10 Ibid.

state of Gujarat (western India), the Supreme Court of India observed: “Communal harmony is the hallmark of democracy.... If in the name of religion people are killed that is absolutely a slur and blot on the society governed by the rule of law.... Religious fanatics really do not belong to any religion. They are no better than terrorists who kill innocent people for no rhyme or reason.”¹¹ The fascist programs and activities shifted from communal politics to communal terrorism which can be easily traced in various acts of anti-Muslim and anti-Christian violence and acts of terror in rural areas and other peaceful places. Most of these acts were pre-meditated and politically motivated violence against the Muslims in furtherance of political and social objectives.¹² Their actions can be rightly observed in the American definition of terrorism which amounts to endangering life, property, infrastructure to intimidate or coerce civilian population.¹³ In general, the media, intellectuals, political parties and the judiciary have designated the terrorist activities of the RSS and its family maximum as communalists, rightists, and ultra-nationalists. I. K. Shukla, who resides in Los Angeles, uses terms like *Hindutva* terrorists, Hindu fascism, terrorist gangsters, saffronazi gangsters-rapist-arsonists-murderers-thugs, theo-terrorist gangsters, and traitorous squads.¹⁴

The comprehensive meaning of terrorism includes violence aimed at inspiring fear and intimidating target populations:

Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.¹⁵

In response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the Sixth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly attempted to formulate a comprehensive general definition of terrorism. Article 2(1) of the *Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism* provides:

(1) Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes:

- (a) Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or
- (b) Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or the environment; or

11 S. Varadarajan, “Immunity for Mobs in the War on Terror”, *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 7 April 2009, p. 8.

12 Asghar Ali Engineer and Amarjit S. Narang (eds.), *Minorities and Police in India*, Manohar, New Delhi, 2006.

13 Ben Golder and George Williams, “WHAT IS ‘TERRORISM’? PROBLEMS OF LEGAL DEFINITION”, *UNSW Law Journal Volume 27(2)2004*, P. 277; *The Definition of Terrorism*, A Report by Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C., Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, by Command of Her Majesty, UK, March 2007, p. 15.

14 Indu Kant Shukla, *Hindutva: Treason and Terrorism*, Pharos, New Delhi, 2005.

15 Terrorism refers to Article 2 (1) (b) of the *International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism*, opened for signature 9 December 1999, 2178 ILM 229 (entered into force 10 April 2002).

- (c) Damage to property, places, facilities, or systems referred to in paragraph 1(b) of this article, resulting or likely to result in major economic loss, when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing an act.¹⁶

The *Terrorism Act 2000* (UK) defines terrorism:

- (1) In this Act ‘terrorism’ means the use or threat of action where –
 - (a) the action falls within subsection (2);
 - (b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public; and
 - (c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.
- (2) Action falls within this subsection if it –
 - (a) involves serious violence against a person;
 - (b) involves serious damage to property;
 - (c) endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the action;
 - (d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public; or
 - (e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.
- (3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use of firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1) (b) is satisfied.¹⁷

The RSS claims to be a cultural-nationalist organization but there is much evidence which proves it to be a dreaded terrorist organization. It was banned twice by the Government of India in 1948 and again in the mid-1970s for a short time. It has over 44,000 branches operating across 30,000 cities and towns. The exact number of its volunteers is not known but could be in the range of seven to eight million. S. M. Mushrif, the Inspector General of Police in the western state of India – Maharashtra, who retired in 2005, has dealt with the issue of the terror of the RSS in detail with a lot of credible sources and other materials in his book.¹⁸ These branches meet every day in the early morning to indoctrinate the Hindu youth. The youths and the preacher wear a particular dress at a particular time. The donors and the amount collected by the RSS is still a secret. It has its own military schools, hidden training camps and indoctrination centers. Mushrif has also listed the names of its front organizations which have many different names (to confuse the general masses) for the different purposes of agitation, militancy, education, publications, media, etc.¹⁹ The RSS guides

16 Ben Golder and George Williams, “What is ‘Terrorism’? problems of legal definition, p. 274.

17 Sir David Williams, “Terrorism and the Law in the United Kingdom” (2003) 26 *University of New South Wales Law Journal*, p. 179.

18 K. M. Mushrif, *Who Killed Karkare? The Real Face of Terrorism in India*, Pharos, New Delhi, 2009, p. 26.

19 *Ibid.*, pp. 26-28.

many organizations endorsing its objectives so the combined effort is known as the *Sangh parivar*. To them, the disruptive forces are represented by the non-Hindu segments of society – Muslims, Christian and the westernized elite.²⁰

The RSS reign of terror in India is a different kind of terrorism which seeks to draw the attention of the world. The whole world knows about the Gujarat genocide where thousands of Muslims were killed by the RSS and its family in 2002. Even today there are thousands of Muslims living in the relief camps and only the exceptionally fortunate ones have gotten justice either in getting the culprits arrested or in getting some monetary compensation. Writing on this subject of the terrorism, Jairus said:

In other words, these ghastly mobs comprised both directing groups and directed serialities, bound together in dispersive acts of murder and destruction orchestrated by the activists of the VHP and the Bajrang Dal, who formed an organized element extracting organic actions from inert non-organised series. A democracy that cannot disarm these storm-troopers is a democracy well on the way to its own destruction by fascism.²¹

Amrita Basu says:

The movement that Hindu nationalist groups launched around the destruction of the mosque in Ayodhya fostered extensive Hindu-Muslim violence which, in turn, weakened already frayed institutions, deepened biases of the civil service and accentuated a leadership crisis in the state. Most importantly, Hindu nationalism seeks objectives which are inimical to democracy, above all in seeking to undermine minority rights.²²

Automacity of Fascism: Anti-Muslim Riots

Riots, in which several actors play roles before and after the crimes against humanity, poison many minds beyond the boundaries of the rule of law. The term ‘riot’ is quite commonly used to describe all kinds of violence that take place at the inter-community level. For example, the recent violence in Gujarat has been termed by many who visited the affected sites as ‘genocide.’ Terrorism against the Muslims as reflected in the communal riots has taken place in all those places where the members of minority groups maintain sizeable strength and they have occurred almost every year under the regimes of all different parties. The following table contains the official numbers, which differ significantly from the local estimations. A table is given below to show violence against the Muslims in India during 1950-2002.²³

20 Walter K Anderson and Shridhar D Damle, *The Brotherhood in Saffron The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and Hindu Revivalism*, Vistaar, New Delhi, 1987, p. 72.

21 Jairus Banaji, “The Political Culture of Fascism”, in Chaitanya Krishna, ed., *Fascism in India: Faces, Fangs and Facts*, pp., 25-26.

22 Amrita Basu and Atul Kohli, “Introduction”, in Basu and Kohli (eds.), *Community Conflicts and the State in India* Oxford, New Delhi, 1998, p. 2.

23 Asghar Ali Engineer, *Communal Riots After Independence*, Shipra, Delhi, 2004, 224.

Year	No. of riots/communal incidents	No. of persons reported officially as killed	Injured
1950	56	50	256
1954	84	34	512
1955	75	24	457
1956	82	35	575
1957	58	12	316
1958	40	7	369
1959	42	41	1344
1960	26	14	262
1961	92	108	593
1962	60	43	348
1963	61	26	489
1964	1070	1919	2053
1965	173	34	758
1966	144	45	467
1967	198	301	880
1968	346	133	1309
1969	519	674	2702
1970	521	298	1607
1971	321	103	1330
1972	210	70	1056
1973	242	72	1318
1974	248	87	1123
1975	205	33	890
1976	169	39	794
1977	188	36	1122
1978	230	108	1853
1979	304	261	2379
1980	421	375	2691
1981	319	196	2613
1982	470	238	3025
1983	500	1143	3652
1984	476	445	4836
1985	525	332	3751
1986	768	418	5389

1987	711	383	3860
1988	710	259	3103
1989	922	802	3871
1990	1421	1241	3913
1991	29	877	6370
1992	37	1972	13571
1993	33	960	4496
1994	8	39	450
1995	17	54	235
1996	20	24	28
1997	70	137	495
1998	600	207	2065
1999	52	43	248
2000	24	91	165
2001	27	56	158
2002	28	1173	2272
Total	13952	14686	68182

The Inquiry Report of Justice Joseph Vithayathil on the Tellicherry Riots of 1971, the Report of the Justice Venugopal on the Kanyakumari Riots of 1982 and other reports have lamented the unlawful behavior of the fascist organizations. The Justice Jaganmohan Reddy Commission report on the Ahmedabad riots (1969) also indicted the *Sangh* leaders and workers of organizing violence against the minority. Terror riots also cause collateral damage to the victims – mainly economical and psychological. Rasheeduddin Khan, whose scholarly views are better known in relation to secular democratic India, said:

Communal riots in India have acquired a permanency as a factor of recurrent tension and violence. Basically it is a phenomenon of Hindu-Muslim conflict and violence, in which, as almost all the official reports and judicial inquiries establish over the years, without any exception, stated that the main sufferers in terms of casualties and loss of properties have been mainly the Muslims. Communal riots have been a euphemism for the killing of Muslims and destruction of their business and properties. Of course members of the Hindu community are also assaulted and killed, but their total number and proportion and loss of property is always smaller.²⁴

Ultimate Goal of *Sangh* Terrorism

Terrorism is generally seen as the most brutal and violent act of murder and destruction of properties belonging to individuals, groups or the government. In most of the cases, the terrorists

²⁴ Rasheeduddin Khan, *Bewildered India: Identity, Pluralism, Discord*, Har-Anand, New Delhi, 1994, p. 225.

use explosives and other weapons. In the case of the *Sangh Parivar*, it is a unique case of terrorism in terms of propensity, duration and psychological impact. The *Sangh* terrorism is not only linked with the instant loss of life and property but to a large extent their terrorism is aimed at inflicting deep psychological, social, cultural and religious wounds. Even if the affected person survives, he or she would never have a normal life due to painful memories. As a result, the affected person or the group would not even think of taking relief and help within the law as their constitutional rights. This happened in 18 districts of the state of Gujarat (western India) and in many other states where cases of anti-Muslim violence occurred, where the affected Muslims not only hesitated to submit their complaints to the police but they also restricted themselves to claim only the amount of compensation promised by the government. In the cases where the certain amount had to be paid by the government, many of them received a far lesser amount due to the involvement of corrupt middlemen. Despite knowing these facts, the victims lost the courage to seek their just compensation.

This is basically the post-violence impact of the *Sangh* terrorism which needs to be addressed by the national and state governments and by the international organizations, in case of the failure of the former actors. In other words, their terrorism has both intermediate and ultimate goals which are meant for creating a frightened community blind to their constitutional rights and claims.

Another unique dimension of the *Sangh* terrorism is the new phenomenon of bomb blasts in markets, trains, Hindu temples, mosques and other places which has puzzled the minds of many. Hundreds of Muslims were arrested without evidence. The new name of the Muslim *Mujahideen* was flashed in the media to which no one claimed. Muslim *ulema* belonging to different sects openly condemned these blasts but the psychological game of framing Muslims as terrorists continued until the unfortunate killings of three senior police officers who had traced the major roots and sources of these blasts. The *Sangh* terrorism was exposed, although very late, in 2008 by one of the most bright, honest and fair police high officials and his team in western India which indicated the involvement of a several politicians and leaders associated with the *Sangh parivar*. In the major terrorist attack in the city of Mumbai in western India on 26 November 2008, the terrorists killed foreign nationals, some Jews, and over one hundred Indians (with a good number of the Muslims) which looked like a Muslim terrorist attack. Terrorist attacks took place in several places in Mumbai where the intellectuals and the local government numbers differ from the official version.

In these attacks, the leading team of three senior police officers known for their commitment to the Rule of Law, and not the *Sangh* ideology, were shot and killed. Various statements by the academic wife of the most famous police officer – Hemant Karkare – who had exposed for first time in the history of bomb blast cases in India in the 21st century, which were reported in the English dailies, confirm that anti-democratic, fascists and enemies of communal harmony killed her husband. The *Sangh* terrorism is aimed at creating a monstrous image of the Muslim community as an enemy of peace and stability. In this case, hundreds of the Muslim youths belonging to all categories – rural, urban, rich, poor, literate, techie, illiterate, intellectual and academic, political, social, petty criminals, etc., -- and from different regions of India were arrested and detained. Forced confessions and other evidence were obtained.

It is important to mention here that over 150 million Muslims of India, with the exception of those in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, have never entered into organized or unorganized militancy or terrorism against the state or any community. They have also maintained distance

from cross-border terrorism. Nor they ever showed any kind of engagement with Al-Qaeda, the Taliban or Pakistan-based militant groups. They even do not have a history of retaliating against the *Sangh* terrorists and officials who killed their people, raped their women and destroyed properties and homes in thousands of incidents of anti-Muslim violence. It was in the midst of the American war on terror and India's pledge against terrorism that the *Sangh parivar* wanted to 'fry their own fish.' Dozens of bomb-blasts occurred in different places and Muslims were blamed directly; their faces and dress became the front-page news in the press. In some blast cases, solid evidence of the *Sangh* involvement was found but soon disappeared. Detained Muslim youths were first shown as having an independent terrorist organization, then with Pakistan and then with Kashmiri militants. At the end Pakistani terrorists were highlighted. This game continued until Hemant Karkare opened the tight knot of the rope of the *Sangh*-sponsored terrorism. However, again the infiltration of six terrorists through Nepal and Bihar became headlines.²⁵

Communal Terrorism of the *Sangh Parivar* in Gujarat

I have taken up the case of Gujarat terror and the bomb blast cases to reflect the nature and forces of violence and terrorism. In the words of Amartya Sen: "The Gujarat massacre, unrestrained by a state that proved to be, at best, grossly incompetent but very likely a great deal worse, is a manifestation of vicious sectarian politics that is doing its best to turn India into a barbaric country of which every citizen has reason to be ashamed."²⁶ He further says: "The Gujarat butchery is more than a communal slaughter; it reflects a diabolic beastliness that communal sectarians have planted well into India's body politic."²⁷ It covered as many as 40 cities and over 2000 villages. The losses amount to about 40,000,000,000 rupees. In Surat and Ahmedabad cities, over 60 factories owned by Muslims have been completely gutted. In other cases, all big and small commercial establishments have been looted.²⁸ In one district of Himmatnagar alone, 2161 houses, 1461 shops, 304 smaller enterprises, 71 factories, 38 hotels, 45 religious places, and 240 vehicles were completely or partially destroyed.²⁹

In the recent Gujarat riots, more than 2000 Muslims were burned alive and over 20 mosques and mausoleums were vandalized: "15 of them were converted overnight into temples."³⁰ The mosque in the middle of Naroda's busy bazaar was a few hundred meters from the local police station and the *mazar* (grave) of the poet Vali Gujarati stood in the middle of the road between the police lines and the police commissioner's office in Shahibagh. Assessing the situation on the ground, a journalist reported:

25 *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 2, 3, and 4 January 2010.

26 Amartya Sen, "Forward", in Rafiq Zakaria, *Communal Rage in Secular India*, Popular Prakashan, Mumbai, 2002, p. vii.

27 *Ibid.*, p. viii.

28 Rafiq Zakaria, "Economic Extermination of Muslims", in Chaitanya Krishna, ed., *Fascism in India*, p. 187.

29 Bela Bhatia, "A Step back in Sabarkantha", in Chaitanya Krishna, ed., *Fascism in India*, p. 195.

30 Manas Dasgupta, "Shoot orders in many Gujarat towns", *The Hindu*, 2 March 2002, p. 1.

[T]he civil administration ... has been quick to erase any signs that these buildings actually existed. It has leveled the land and removed the rubble at the sites of 22 mosques and mazars, turning them into vacant plots, or in the case of Vali Gujarati's mazar into part of the road that runs by the Police Commissioner's office. ... In many places in the city Maha-artis, a public ritual favored by the VHP [Vishna Hindu Parishad organization], were held – including at the Mansa Masjid [Masjid meaning 'mosque' in Arabic] in Bapunagar and Noor Masjid in Hardasnagar – and statues of Hanuman placed inside. Even now saffron flags hang from the minarets of desecrated mosques.³¹

By all accounts, most of the attacks were made “in full view of police, who remained mute spectators to the crime. The continued indulgence of the Gujarat police towards the *Sangh Parivar* over the years has virtually snowballed into *Hindutva* protagonists virtually acquiring quasi-police powers, calling the shots in almost every walk of life.” One senior police officer told a journalist that “the intention this time was mass murder of Muslims.” He described it as a “genocide” and said “a substantial amount of homework was done beforehand ... they knew which shop, business, factory ... which home belonged to a Muslim.” The fact is, as many police officers agreed, “Ahmedabad was bloodied because the police high command and the civil administration allowed it to be bloodied.”³² The Justice Madon commission on the Bhiwandi, Jalgaon and Mahad riots (1970) said that “the working of the Special Investigation Squad is a study in communal discrimination. The officers of the Squad systematically set about implicating as many Muslims and exculpating as many Hindus as possible irrespective of whether they were innocent or guilty.”³³

Before discussing the Gujarat case of 2002, it would be useful to briefly look at some of the activities of the RSS family, particularly during its anti-Muslim activities in the late 1980s and early 1990s. During this period, it was seriously engaged in a kind of psychological operation to reconstruct the Hindu community as an anti-Muslim body for the purpose of ethnic subjugation. It raised the issue of demolishing the Babri Mosque in order to build a huge Ram temple to show a kind of subjugation of the Muslims. In this pursuit, the RSS family commonly known as *Sangh parivar* resorted to terrorism. Its activities led to terrorism against the Muslims in the form of communal riots in Aligarh, Muzaffarnagar and Khatauli districts in October 1988 in the state of Uttar Pradesh.³⁴ The *Sangh parivar* decided that the Hindus would not abide by the court verdict or any executive decision on the Babri dispute and would lay the foundation stone of the Ram temple on 9 November 1989. For this purpose, it collected bricks for construction from over 100,000 villages of India and collected funds for the temple.³⁵ Its aggressive communal mobilization resulted in widespread terror against the Muslims and tension in northern and western India, which created a sense of insecurity

31 Anjali Mody, “Genocide in the land of Gandhi”, *The Hindu*, 10 March 2002, p. 17.

32 Ibid., p. 16; Akshaya Mukul, *The Times of India*, 3 March 2002, p.5.

33 Ibid.

34 Asghar Ali Engineer and K.S Durani, Communal Riots in Muzaffarnagar and Khatauli and Aligarh”, *Economic and Political Weekly*, Mumbai, 7 January 1989, pp. 22-24.

35 “Communal contagion at the Kumbh”, *Link*, New Delhi, 19 February 1989, pp. 4-8.

among the Muslims.³⁶ Anti-Muslim violence was engineered by the *Sangh parivar* ‘in the states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Karnataka.’³⁷ In September-October 1989 alone, 55 acts of anti-Muslim violence took place due to the *Sangh parivar* demonstration for the temple.³⁸ It laid the foundation stone of the temple near the mosque.³⁹ It recruited *lumpen* (disassociated) youths throughout the country to make up suicide squads for the demolition of the mosque.⁴⁰ The *Sangh*-sponsored motorized journey of the BJP leader L. K. Advani covering a distance of 10,000 miles again resulted in anti-Muslim violence in several places due to the *Sangh* terrorists’ anti-Muslim slogans like the “offspring of Babur will go to the graveyards”, “give one more push and break the Babri mosque. They also displayed various weapons.⁴¹ The then Prime Minister of India, V. P. Singh, heading the minority government at the center, said on 22 October 1990 in his address to the nation: “What we face is not just a new problem [or] a new crisis: the nation is being tested as never before. The challenges we face is not only to the rule of law, not only to our political system and our Constitution....”⁴²

During 1987-1992, the *Sangh parivar* not only resorted to hundreds of episodes of politically-motivated violence but also tried for the emotional outburst of the Hindus against the Muslims. The chronology of these events is fully mentioned in a widely read book.⁴³ In brief, the unlawful demolition of the 500-year-old Babri Mosque by the *Sangh* terrorists and their well-planned violence against the Muslims and their belongings, including their religious places and institutions, certainly created a deep sense of their insecurity, fear and humiliation, which are the manifested outcome of terrorism.

Another major incident of *Sangh* terrorism can be found in the western Indian state of Gujarat where the state government was headed by the *Sangh*-sponsored party – the BJP – resorted to pervasive terrorism in early 2002. Within hours of the Godhra outrage, a meticulously planned pogrom was unleashed against the Muslim community, led from the front by the *Sangh parivar*.⁴⁴ Thousands of Muslims were killed. More than a hundred and fifty thousand people, driven from their homes, now live in refugee camps.⁴⁵ This figure is a fact about only one major district whereas anti-Muslim terrorism affected 18 districts of Gujarat. Women were stripped and gang-raped; parents

36 *National Herald*, New Delhi, 23 July 1989.

37 *The Hindustan Times*, 8 October 1989. Reports in other newspapers like *Indian Express*, *New Time*, and *The Times of India* of 3 to 7 October 1989.

38 *Economic and Political Weekly*, 18 November 1989, pp. 25-28.

39 *India Today*, New Delhi, 15 December 1989.

40 *The Patriot*, New Delhi, 6 June 1990.

41 “Advertising Discord”, written by a group of academics of JNU, New Delhi, *Mainstream*, New Delhi, 26 January 1991, p. 51.

42 *Radiance*, New Delhi, 25 November-1 December 1990, p.19.

43 Rasheeduddin Khan, *Bewildered India: Identity, Pluralism, Discord*, p. 1994.

44 *The Economic Times*, 18 April 2002.

45 *Indian Express*, 17 April 2002.

were bludgeoned to death in front of their children.⁴⁶ Two hundred and forty mausoleums and 180 mosques were destroyed. In Ahmadabad, the tomb of Wali Gujarati, the founder of the modern Urdu poem, was demolished and paved over in the course of a night.⁴⁷ The tomb of musician Ustad Faiyaz Ali Khan was desecrated and wreathed in burning tires.⁴⁸ Arsonists burned and looted shops, homes, hotels, textile mills, buses and private cars. Tens of thousands lost their jobs.⁴⁹ There was a deliberate, systematic attempt to destroy the economic base of the Muslim community. The leaders of the mob had a computer-generated registry list marking out Muslim homes, shops, businesses, and even partnerships.⁵⁰

Soon after this terrorism, the *Sangh parivar* called its Chief Minister – Narendra Modi – a national hero and equated the incident with a struggle for freedom.⁵¹ Arundhati Roy, internationally renowned Booker prize winner, wrote:

Whipping up communal hatred is part of the mandate of the Sangh parivar. It has been planned for years. It has been injecting a slow-release poison directly into civil society's bloodstream. Hundreds of RSS branches and its Sarasawati Sishu Mandir (their schools) across the country have been indoctrinating thousands of children and young people, stunting their minds with religious hatred and falsified history....⁵²

Eminent Indian scholar of Politics, Rajni Kothari wrote:

Hindutva is the biggest single danger faced by Indian civilization (consisting of a 'Hindu' core and several other cultural and religious' traditions and milieus). It represents a new—fangled Hindu militancy as against traditional Hindu religiosity. There is nothing religious about Hindutva (just as there is not a shred of religious striving in the RSS). The appeal of the RSS is heavily secular more so since it became the main-spring of the Sangh parivar.⁵³

Defining the RSS and, in general, the organizations of militant Hinduism as undemocratic, with authoritarian, paramilitary, radical, and violent tendencies, and as having sympathy for fascist ideology and practice, has been a major concern for many politically-oriented scholars and writers.⁵⁴ The first Premier of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, always called the RSS communal and fascist. It was

46 *The Hindu*, 18 May 2002.

47 *Human Rights Watch Report* of 2002, pp. 15-16, 31; Justice A. P. Ravani, Submission to the National Human Rights Commission, New Delhi, 21 March 2002, Appendix 4.

48 "Artists Protest Destruction of Cultural Landmarks", *Press Trust of India*, 13 April 2002.

49 R. Lakshmi, "Sectarian Violence Haunts Indian City: Hindu Militants Bar Muslims from Work", *Washington Post*, 8 April 2002, p. A 12.

50 Arundhati Roy, "Gujarat, Fascism and Democracy", in Chaitanya Krishna, ed., *Fascism in India*, p. 32.

51 *The Economic Times*, 23 April 2002.

52 Arundhati Roy, "Gujarat, Fascism and Democracy", in Chaitanya Krishna, ed., *Fascism in India*, p. 36.

53 Rajni Kothari, "Reversal of Ideology and the Rise of Fascism", in Chaitanya Krishna, ed., *Fascism in India*, p. 49.

54 Marzia Casolari, "The Fascist Heritage and Foreign Connection of RSS: Archival Evidence", in Chaitanya Krishna, ed., *Fascism in India*, p. 106.

banned in 1948 for the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi. The confidential report circulated within the Congress at that time stated that the RSS started as a sort of Hindu Boys Scout movement and gradually developed into a communal, militarist organization with violent tendencies. It practices secret and violent methods which promote fascism. The general public is usually told that its aim is only physical training but the real aims are shared with the inner circle. There are no records or proceedings of the RSS organization; no membership registers are maintained. There are also no records of its income and its expenditures.⁵⁵

Marzia Casolari has alleged, on the basis of archival evidence, that the representatives of the Hindu organizations and fascist Italy had direct contacts for the militarization of the Hindus. Another leader, V. D. Savarkar, has also been associated with Nazism.⁵⁶ The *Sangh* terrorism in Gujarat in 2002 was carried in a planned manner – with the stockpile of weapons, trained terrorists and deadly chemicals to burn houses and bodies, to deftly light and throw burning gas cylinders, to make available swords (a contraband object) — “all this proves months of systematic planning and not at all spontaneous outburst.”⁵⁷ The RSS drew a single corollary from this – that all Muslims are a threat to faith and nation, and especially to women at all times....⁵⁸ Another horror of the *Sangh* terrorism rooted in their deep psyche is its “dark sexual obsession about allegedly ultra-virile Muslim male bodies and over-fertile Muslim female ones, that inspire and sustain the figures of paranoia and revenge. Its religious wing—the *Vishwa Hindu Parishad* (VHP) leaflets, openly circulated in Gujarat in 2002 promised: “We will cut them and their blood will flow like rivers. We will Kill Muslims the way we destroyed the Babri mosque.”⁵⁹

Priyanka Kakodkar has related the accounts of nine Muslim children from different victims’ camps in Ahmedabad, Gujarat, whose statements would flood our eyes with tears.⁶⁰ Testimonies of sexual violence (gang-rape, killing and burning of the bodies of Muslim girls and women) are too inhuman to be rewritten here.⁶¹ Earlier the investigations made by the biggest national women organization – AIDWA – in 1992-93 in two cities of two different states in India, Surat and Bhopal, had pointed out several similar features. Muslim women were “tortured, molested, raped and then burnt to death. Sometimes their children were killed before their eyes.”⁶²

Coming back to the *Sangh* terrorism in Gujarat in 2002, women were killed in very large

55 *Sardar Patel Correspondence*, microfilm, reel no. 3, National Archives of India, A Note on the RSS, undated, mentioned in Marzia Casolari, “The Fascist Heritage and Foreign Connection of RSS: Archival Evidence”, in Chaitanya Krishna, ed., *Fascism in India*, p. 108.

56 *Ibid.*, pp. 108-128.

57 Tanika Sarkar, “Semiotics of Terror: Muslim Children and Women in Hindu Rashtra”, in Chaitanya Krishna, ed., *Fascism in India*, p. 156.

58 *Ibid.*, p. 157.

59 *Ibid.*, p. 159.

60 Priyanka Kakodkar, Gujarat’s Children of Terror”, *Outlook*, 13 May 2002.

61 Syeda Hameed, Ruth Manorma, Malini Ghose, Sheba George, Farah Naqvi and Mari Thekaekara, “Testimonies of Sexual Violence”, in Chaitanya Krishna (ed.), *Fascism in India*, pp. 174-185.

62 *Ibid.*, p. 160.

numbers. At the mass grave that was dug on 6 March 2002 to bury 96 bodies from the locality of Naroda Patiya, 46 women were buried.

Tanika Sarkar says:

This identification between killing and masculinity, is a strong and uniquely *Sangh* teaching. In Gujarat, mobs who raped, sometimes came dressed khaki (deep mustard-yellow color half pant and white shirt) shorts, rape being obviously seen as a religious duty, a *Sangh* duty.⁶³

The National Human Rights Commission in its report referred to it:

Given the widespread reports and allegations of groups of well organized persons, armed with mobile telephones and addresses, singling out certain homes and properties for death and destruction in certain districts, sometimes within view of police stations and personnel, the further question arises as to what the factors were, and who the players were in the situation that went out of control.⁶⁴

On the other hand, the National Commission on Minorities pointed out in its report that:

Attacks were organized by the VHP and Bajrang Dal who had earlier gathered information on minority houses, shops, etc. The attacks were planned accordingly with first looting, and then burning of shops and establishments along with brutal violence, stabbing and battering of people; besides burning them alive with kerosene, petrol and diesel; they also alleged sexual assault on women and gang-rape in the presence of their relations. The victims were then killed and burnt.⁶⁵

The Human Rights Watch said in its report:

“What happened in Gujarat was not spontaneous uprising; it was a carefully orchestrated attack against Muslims. The Attacks were planned in advance and organized with extensive participation of the police and state government officials.”⁶⁶

The European Union condemned the carnage. Former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of India J. S. Verma said: “The Gujarat carnage was nothing short of war in terms of the sufferings undergone by the affected people. How is it different from war? Are their sufferings any less than in war.”⁶⁷

The Case of Bomb-Blasts: Unfolding Linkages

The terror of the *Sangh* continues in India where 700 million people are voters and the Federal

63 Ibid., p. 162.

64 *The Hindutan Times*, 19 May 2002.

65 *The Hindustan Times*, 15 May 2002.

66 Rafiq Zakaria, *Communal Rage in Secular India* Mumbai: Popular Prakashan, 2002, p.40.

67 *The Times of India*, 5 August 2002.

government claims to be the largest democracy in the world. However, there is another fact that this democratic polity has not produced a domestic balance of forces to counter the *Sangh parivar*. Over the years, it has grown more its original size while on the other hand, the genuine grievances of the Muslim and the Christian victims of *Sangh* terrorism have seen mere paper promises and Machiavellian statements. Perhaps it seems to be the only democracy where the *Sangh*-like communal terrorists are so confident that they are branded ‘cultural nationalists.’ In fact, the *Sangh*’s existence in its all forms is the anti-thesis to the concept of the rule of law which constitutes the core of democracy and federal polity.

Encouraged by the deliberate misuse of democratic freedoms, the terrorists, along with continuing periodic anti-Muslim violence in different parts of the country, experimented with another dangerous strategy of terrorism by managing bomb blasts in religious places to legitimize their anti-Muslim hatred, since all the detainees were Muslims. In all the blast cases since 2001, mostly Muslims were targeted. Since the Muslim community in India lacks the structures of power, economy, media and pressure groups, their grievances mostly got frozen street talks, occasional demonstrations and reporting in the vernacular press.⁶⁸ Farah Mihar of the Minority Rights Group (London) informed the media that “across the world, counter-terrorism laws have been used to clamp the rights of minorities. In India also, the government has used counter-terrorism measures to detain and arrest a large number of youths belonging to principal minority.”⁶⁹ It is important to recall that the *Sangh parivar* has all the infrastructure needed to create hatred and militancy. They have managed the military schools since the 1930s. They trained their terrorists for the demolition of the Babri mosque in 1992 and to attack the camera-bearing journalists. The VHP formed ‘suicide squads’ for the Ram temple.⁷⁰ *Sangh* associate Shiv Sena Member of Parliament Moreshwar Save said on 7 December 1992:

... [the] demolition was planned well in advance and executed with military precision by 500 Shiv Sena *karsevaks* (volunteers) who were trained in Chambal valley. Their use of weapons and explosive materials were hardly investigated. Their premises were never monitored and inspected. Their accounts never worried both the state and federal governments.⁷¹

Startling Evidences of Terrorism

The years since 2002, but in particular from 2006 to mid-2008, can be recorded as the most dangerous phase of terrorism in that the claimants were absent and the computer-created terrorist

68 Frozen street talks indicate that the grievances are not taken up by the media or the empowered sections of society but remains concentrated to the street talks or the minority press

69 <http://news.webindia123.com/news/articles/India/20100701/1538739.htm>.

70 *Patriot*, 6 June 1990.

71 See National Dailies published in India dated 8 December 1992.

organization – Indian *Mujahideen* – became the headlines.⁷² No one knew their chief, or members, offices, training centers, supporters or financiers, except the police and media. When this bombing was engineered in the southern parts of the country, the *Deccan* (south in the *Urdu* language) *Mujahideen* group became the hot news in TVs and newspapers. Later, some Muslim youths were shown linked with Kashmir militants and finally some states with sizeable populations of Muslims, mainly Uttar Pradesh, were shown infected with Pakistan's ISI agents. This one-way character assassination of the Muslim community gave a free hand to the government and the enforcement agencies to propose stringent laws and to give psychological and political safe-passage to the *Sangh parivar* to escape.

It worried Muslims about being falsely implicated. Although various signs and evidence of the *Sangh* involvement were successfully traced at the local level, the facts were suppressed immediately until Hemant Karkare finally got the chain of evidence. After that, bombings stopped until December 1, 2009. Some crucial evidence of the terrorism of the *Sangh parivar* has been briefly mentioned.⁷³ In March 2000, 40-50 Bajrang Dal members attended training that included the use of Gelatin sticks. Himanshu Panse, who headed the camp, was killed in the Nanded Blast of April 2006 while preparing a bomb; this was disclosed in the official investigation.⁷⁴ In 2001, 115 *Sangh* members received 40-days' training in the handling of weapons, the making of bombs and the demolition of the same on the premises of the Bhonsala Military School, Nagpur. Retired and serving army officers and retired senior Intelligence Bureau (pro-*Sangh*) officers were among the trainers (as disclosed in the investigations of the Nanded Blast case of 2006 and the Malegaon Blast case of 2008.)⁷⁵ In 2003, 50 youths received training in preparing and detonating bombs in a training camp organized at the Akanksha Resort on the Singhad Road near Pune city.⁷⁶ On May 15, 2002, 153 *Sangh parivar* members in the age group of 15-45 years old attended a 21-day orientation camp in Pune and, at the same time, similar camps were organized at 71 locations across the country.⁷⁷ A week-long firearms training was given to Bajrang Dal members in the Bhopal capital city of the state of Madhya Pradesh.⁷⁸ Knife and sword training was imparted to female members of the VHP in a camp in Mumbai on May 17, 2003.⁷⁹ The RSS also organized training for women in the use of lethal guns in 73 cities.⁸⁰

72 Computer-created terrorist organization means that the news of a terrorist organization namely Indian Mujahideen (IM) pertaining to North India, and later Deccan Mujahideen (DM) pertaining to South India, do not exist at all as no one claimed affiliation with their offices in India or abroad. Indian Muslims (excluding Kashmir) have no terrorist group so far. So the name of IM and DM are based on emails which too are changed later. There is no inquiry on this.

73 K. M. Mushrif, *Who Killed Karkare? The Real Face of Terrorism in India*, pp. 43-53. based on highly reliable sources.

74 *Ibid.*, p.43.

75 *Ibid.*

76 *Ibid.*, pp. 43-44.

77 *Ibid.*, pp. 44.

78 *Ibid.*, p.44; *The Times of India*, Pune, 31 May 2002.

79 *Ibid.*, p.44; *The Times of India*, 18 May 2003.

80 *Ibid.*, p.44; *Sunday Express*, Pune, 1 June 2003.

Bomb explosions occurred in various places like temples, mosques, offices of the *Sangh parivar* and other areas during 2006-2008 but the investigations based on solid evidence exposed the terrorist face of the *parivar*. In the Nanded blast in April 2006,⁸¹ two *parivar* terrorists were killed while making bombs with striking similarities were found in the temple blast in Aurangabad in May 2006.⁸²

In June 2006, an attempted terrorist attack on the RSS headquarter at Nagpur was later found to be fake by the fact-finding team headed by Justice B G Kolse Patil. Two suspected *parivar* members were killed in mysterious blast on 10 February 2007.⁸³ In September, the police caught three youths in Rampur claiming to belong to an unknown group, the Jihad-i-Islami, who were Hindus.⁸⁴ The same month, six bombs were found in Mumbai ahead of the arrival of cricket team; the local police caught two Hindu youths who were carrying six bombs, enough to kill at least a half a dozen people.⁸⁵ In October, the police caught two Hindu youths in connection with sending bombs as gifts in the Hindu Diwali festival.⁸⁶

The police arrested eight persons belonging to *Sangh parivar* after a thorough investigation into the blast at the RSS office in the southern state of Tamil Nadu. The police said that 14 pipe bombs were assembled and the operation had begun in July 2007. The arrested persons confessed that their objective was to create a communal divide.⁸⁷ The police caught two Hindu youths on a motorcycle in the Kolhapur district in April 2008 who were carrying 35 crude bombs, ammunition and a gun.⁸⁸ In mid-April, the police raided a pathology laboratory in the basement of a private hospital in Malegaon and recovered five live RDX explosives, three used RDX explosives, one pistol, a laptop, a scanner, two pocket-phones, four fake 1000 Rupee notes one thousand each and 5000 ruprees in cash and arrested Hindu youths belonging to an unknown organization.⁸⁹

In the case of anti-Muslim violence, the police found the manufacturing of pistols, swords, and other weapons on a large scale in the village of Amerti in the Jalgaon district. It also found one trainer, belonging to the *parivar*-sponsored political party, who was training youths in the use of weapons and showed communally provocative (anti-Muslim) films and CDs to the youths.⁹⁰

There were 43 cases of bomb-blasts, killing over 140 persons in four major cities during June-

81 *Lokmat*, Aurangabad, 24 May 2006.

82 *Ibid*.

83 *The Times of India*, Pune, 11 February 2007.

84 *The Milli Gazette*, New Delhi, 1-15 October 2007.

85 *The Times of India*, Pune, 27 September 2007.

86 *Dainik Bhaskar*, 3 November 2007.

87 *The Milli Gazette*, 16-29 February 2008.

88 *Pudhari*, Kolhapur, 11 April 2008.

89 *The Milli Gazette*, 1-15 May 2008.

90 *The Milli Gazette*, 16 -31 May 2008.

September 2008.⁹¹ The official investigation of the blast in the city of Thane and the planting of bombs in Vashi and Panvel found the same *parivar* gang which had planted a bomb in the Muslim graveyard of Ratnagiri on Ratnagiri-Panvel road at the time of Diwali festival in 2007.⁹² One RSS activist was arrested by Barabanki police (in Uttar Pradesh state) for conspiring to demolish a Hindu temple and causing anti-Muslim violence.⁹³ The blast occurred in the Gadkari Rangayatan Theatre in Thane, injuring seven persons in early June 2008 where a modern-secular play was due to be staged. The police found the involvement of *parivar* and recovered massive stocks of explosives at Penn and Satara based on the tips from the arrested accused.⁹⁴ Another bomb was planted at the Cineraj Cinema in the town of Panvel during the screening of the film *Jodha-Akbar* showing the unity of the Hindus and Muslims. The Nasik Police seized 50 detonators, 11 boxes containing gelatin sticks, and 5 packages of ammonium nitrate from an unidentified vehicle which was suspected to have links with the Bajrang Dal.⁹⁵ Another 15 kg of RDX was found in the house of Shankar Shelke (a Hindu), in Ahmednagar district in Maharashtra, who later died mysteriously.⁹⁶ In the same district, a large quantity of explosives was seized by the police from a sugar factory at Pathari.⁹⁷ In another district, Aurangabad, 4.5 kg of ammonium nitrate, 186 gelatin sticks and 566 detonators were seized.⁹⁸ There are more similar cases that will not be mentioned. A terrorist (Nankaoo Das) in the guise of a monk was arrested by the police when he was entering the courthouse in Faizabad district carrying a live bomb in his bag.⁹⁹ Two Bajrang Dal activists, Rajiv Mishra and Bhupinder Singh, died while making explosive devices in the city of Kanpur in the state of Uttar Pradesh for a massive explosion; during the subsequent investigation, the police found a huge stock of explosive material, a diary and a hand-drawn map of the minority-dominated Ferozabad district.¹⁰⁰ The Special Task Force found in its investigation that the dead terrorists had frequently called two cell phones in Mumbai in Maharashtra state in the two months before the blast.¹⁰¹

The Crime Branch of Mangalore (Karnataka State, south India) arrested Duresh Kumar (belonging to Hindu community) for storing a huge quantity of gelatin sticks, detonators and other explosives in a private commercial complex in Putur.¹⁰² Massive blasts killed over 150 Muslims praying in the mosque in Malegaon (Maharashtra) in October 2008 and the inquiry exposed the involvement of the *Sangh parivar* unit – Abhinav Bharat – and some Indian army officers who were

91 Uday Mahurkar, “The New Terror”, *India Today*, New Delhi, 23-29 September 2008.

92 *The Milli Gazette*, 16-31 July 2008.

93 *Ibid.*

94 *Communalism Combat*, Mumbai, July-August 2008.

95 Marathi Weekly *Shodhan*, Mumbai, 4-10 July 2008.

96 *Ibid.*

97 *Ibid.*

98 *Ibid.*

99 *The Milli Gazette*, 1-15 September 2008.

100 *Communalism Combat*, September 2008; *Outlook*, New Delhi, 15 September 2008.

101 *The Times of India*, Mumbai, 29 October 2008.

102 *The Milli Gazette*, 1-15 October 2008.

also responsible for the blasts in the mausoleum in Ajmer, the Samjhauta express train (crossing India Pakistan) and other places. It was revealed that this group was preparing for a nation-wide bombing campaign as early as 2002. In December 2002, the police of the State of Madhya Pradesh had discovered an improvised explosive device at the Bhopal (its capital city) railway station. A second IED was found in 2003 in the vicinity of Bhopal, designed to attack a Muslim religious congregation; they were planted by the same group.¹⁰³ In November, two RSS members were killed while assembling bombs in the Kannur district of the southern Indian state of Kerala. The next day, the police recovered 18 crude bombs from the house of the BJP leader Prakashan, about 200 meters away from the blast spot.¹⁰⁴

Since the brutal Mumbai terror attack at the end of November 2008, the bomb blasts and other terror attacks have taken a new turn; governmental agencies have unearthed a great deal of evidence against the Sangh Parivar members and associates. Renowned scholars and humanist politicians are also engaged in discussing such terror threats. Subhas Gatade quoted Digvijay Singh, the General Secretary General of the biggest party in India, the Indian National Congress, and the former Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh State, who mentioned the names of a few *Sangh* leading members for training “the activists of VHP and Bajrang Dal in bomb making.” Devendra Gupta, under police custody, used to stay with RSS Pracharak Sunil Joshi in Dewas, who also happened to be one of the accused in the Mhow bomb blast in 2001, where six members of the RSS and VHP were found to be involved.¹⁰⁵ The leading TV Channel’s (CNN-IBN) website of 14 May 2010, mentioned the statement of Ashwini Kumar, the Director of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), that “there is a link between the Ajmer Sharif blast (Rajasthan) and the Mecca Masjid Hyderabad blast (both in 2007). Both blasts took place on a Friday right after *namaz* (prayers). The Home Minister of Rajasthan, Shanti Dhariwal has confirmed the links.”¹⁰⁶

On 17 May 2010, the National Investigation Agency filed a charge sheet of 3000 pages in a court action against 11 activists of a Hindu right wing organization, *Sanatan Sanstha*, for the 16 November 2009 blasts on the eve of a grand Hindu *Diwali* festival that killed two people who were carrying bombs in the Margaon town of the coastal State of Goa.¹⁰⁷ Congress spokesperson Manish Tiwari said, “Government will holistically look at the links of the Abhinav Bharat, Ram Sena and its links with the RSS. There was a clearly premeditated design to polarize the society, and its nexus with the RSS, ahead of general elections. Any organization with terror links has to be banned.”¹⁰⁸

The blast in Goa was, in fact, the fourth accidental explosion within a couple of years. In all four incidents – in the cities of Margao, Thane, Nanded and Kanpur – Hindu extremists had allegedly

103 *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 20 November 2008.

104 *The Indian Express*, Pune, 11 November 2008; *The Times of India*, Pune, 13 November 2008.

105 Subhash Gatade, “Unearthing the linkages between Makkah Masjid, Ajmer and Malegaon blasts”, *The Milli Gazette*, 1-15 June 2010, p. 6.; *Jagran Rashtriya*, 15 May 2010, translated from original Hindi.

106 *Ibid.*

107 “Goa blast: Charges framed against Hindu right wing activists”, *The Milli Gazette*, 1-15 June 2010, p. 11.

108 <http://www.ndtv.com/news/india/chargesheet-filed-against-11-in-go-a-blast-case-26081.php>.

carried the bombs, which went off accidentally, making them the victims.¹⁰⁹ The CBI also filed charges on 10 June 2010 against four workers of a Hindu terror group in the Mecca Masjid blast of 18 May 2007.¹¹⁰ Senior Congress leader Digvijay Singh said to a very credible media agency that he had facts regarding the RSS and VHP making bombs. He stated that:

in 1992 there was a bomb blast in the VHP office in Madhya Pradesh, where one VHP member died and two were injured while making bombs. Then in 2002, there was a bomb blast in a temple in Mhow. When the police arrested the VHP activists after investigation, they confessed that they were even given training to manufacture bombs. I have a videocassette of that confession. Again, in 2006, in Nanded, there was a bomb blast in the house of a RSS activist where two RSS activists died. After that in March 2008, there were bomb blasts at two places in Tamil Nadu. Then too VHP activists were arrested by the Tamil Nadu police who confessed that they were involved. And how did the Gujarat police suddenly find eighteen bombs planted on trees in Surat?¹¹¹

The then Chief Minister of Kerala, A.K. Antony (now the Defence Minister of India) made a statement on July 14th 2002 where he branded the R.S.S as a terrorist organization. While another Congress Chief Minister, Digvijay Singh of Madhya Pradesh, said on 7 September 2003 that the RSS incites violence and communal feelings.¹¹² After a sting operation, the TV channel, Headlines Today, made a telecast on the evening of 15 July 2010 regarding secret meetings discussing the need to carry out terrorist attacks. It made a shocking revelation of an audio tape that a senior RSS member had visited a central university in New Delhi to attack Hamid Ansari (now Vice-President of India) in 2007 while he was attending a function but could not find opportunity to carry it out.¹¹³ The next day RSS workers attacked a TV Today office in New Delhi and broke glass panes, destroying property in the process. The TV Today's Hindi channel Aaj Tak had shortly before reported the alleged links of some RSS activists to the persons accused of the Mecca Masjid blast. In a blatant attack on the media's freedom of speech and expression, a large mob of activists gathered outside the office building and shouted slogans in support of their leaders exposed by Headlines Today's report. The mob blocked the streets leading to the building, not allowing traffic and creating panic among bystanders. Delhi police personnel and security guards were punched and pushed with some injuries.¹¹⁴

Thus it appears that the *Sangh parivar*, mainly the RSS and its associates, has emerged as a massive threat to federal nation-building, rule of law, freedom, equality and justice. Its endorsement

109 <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Goa-blast-Intel-probe-confirms-role-of-right-wing-Hindu-group/articleshow/5139927.cms>.

110 <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/City-Hyderabad/Accused-failed-twice-in-bid-to-plant-bombs-at-Mecca-Masjid/articleshow/6080710.cms>

111 "I have evidence of RSS and VHP making bombs, Digvijay Singh", *Tehelka*, 18 August 2008; <http://www.sahilonline.org/english/news.php?catID=nationalnews&nid=3108&viewed=0>

112 R. Reddy, "Hinduism, Hindu organizations and people calling them a 'terrorist' and communal"; http://www.gatewayforindia.com/articles/hindu_organizations.htm

113 Neena Vyas, "Fresh allegations of RSS terror links surface", *The Hindu* (New Delhi), 16 July 2010, p. 12; Smita Nair, "Cracking the terror code", *The Sunday Express* (New Delhi), 18 July 2010, p. 13.

114 Ashok Kumar, "TV channel office vandalized", *The Hindu* (New Delhi), 17 July 2010, p. 1.

and adoption of terror methods and activities are now being unearthed, although not very seriously but systematically, as they became more divisive and destructive. Evidence that *Hindutva* groups were seeking to acquire terrorist capabilities began to emerge late in 2002. From 2006 onwards, more evidence began to become available that *Hindutva* terrorist groups were seeking to enhance their lethality. However, few in India's intelligence services saw these activities as a serious threat. Former Maharashtra State anti-terrorism police chief K.P. Raghuvanshi's concern was likely driven by information that *Hindutva* groups could gain access to more lethal explosives. In September 2006, the police seized a 195-kilogram cocktail of military grade explosives from an Ahmednagar scrap dealer, Shankar Shelke. Shelke, investigators found, retrieved the material – more than enough to execute all terror strikes across India since 1993 – from a decommissioned Indian Army ordinance store which had sold it as scrap. From Shelke's telephone records, the investigators established the existence of a huge underground market for high-grade explosives. What lessons ought India to be learning from the story of the *Hindutva* terror network?

Key among them is the urgent need to address the country's dysfunctional communal politics.¹¹⁵ Individuals associated with *Hindutva* outfits like the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and the Bajrang Dal are developing terror networks in north Maharashtra to target the region's Muslim population. An exclusive report 'Nanded Blast: The Hindu Hand' by Shashwat Gupta Ray (www.tehelka.com), which revealed the manner in which local *Sangh Parivar* members were installing their own terror networks, did not cause any furor. The most disturbing thing about the Nanded blasts is the lack of sincerity on the part of the investigating agencies in pursuing the case, despite getting enough evidence that district and state leaders of Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and RSS were involved in conceiving and executing the plan. As the investigation done by the People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) and other democratic rights organizations (www.pucl.org) made it clear, the district administration even saw to it that the news of the blasts did not get wide coverage outside. They also allegedly pressured the local media to not follow the case any further after the initial reaction was over.¹¹⁶ The Terrorism Research Center, an eastern Virginia-based center dealing with terrorism and security related studies, declared the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) a 'terrorist organization' and lumped it together with a host of jihadi and secessionist outfits. RSS was added to the list way back in September 2004.¹¹⁷

Behind the VHP and Bajrang Dal stands a quasi-paramilitary body, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS or Association of National Volunteers), which is the mother organization of the Hindu revivalist BJP. Described by Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first Prime Minister, as "an Indian version of fascism, the RSS is at the center of a protean network of front organizations. This structure facilitates arm's-length money-raising. It also makes it easier for the RSS to deny it is inciting agitation against Muslims and Christians. It is high time that more and more people get to know about these criminal/

115 Praveen Swami, "The Rise of Hindutva Terrorism", *Outlook*, 11 May 2010; <http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?265400>.

116 Subhash Gatade, "Hindutva — Terrorism's New Signature", *Countercurrents.org*, 12 October, 2007; <http://www.countercurrents.org/gatade121007.htm>.

117 Mohua Chatterjee, "US think-tank calls RSS terrorist, Sangh fumes," *Times News Network*, 27 May 2005.

anti-human actions of the *Hindutva* terrorists.”¹¹⁸ There have been other clear instances of *Hindutva* groups being involved in bombmaking in Nanded, Kanpur, Bhopal and Goa. Most of these are linked to the Bajrang Dal, which is a front of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS).

There is now a clear linkage between the RSS, its fronts and personnel and a series of bomb blasts. If terror derived from religious fundamentalism has one headquarters in India, it is the RSS. Their younger siblings, the Islamic, Sikh or Christian fundamentalists, although dangerous in their own ways, cannot match the organizational network, financial muscle or political legitimacy that the RSS, with its affiliates and personnel, possess. After all, India’s principal opposition party is a 100% subsidiary of the RSS and it is the shrill communal politics of this ‘family’ which has created the political climate where any terrorist act could be, despite all evidence, linked to Muslims.¹¹⁹

Although both the State (federal units) and the Central Government have started the process of investigation, they need to be more expansive and speedy. The preliminary findings of the Concerned Citizens Inquiry conducted by Justice Kolse-Patil, Teesta Setalvad and others, which went to the site with a forensic expert and conducted interviews supported this conclusion. The fact finding team concluded that central government should keep a close watch and monitor the increasing low intensity terror activities being conducted by political outfits that are misusing the Hindu religion. Independent investigation under a team of officers known for their utter professionalism and neutrality are a must; an impartial inquiry into the Nanded incidents, as well as the Malegaon Parbhani and Purna blasts needs to be instituted, open to the public, to first and foremost investigate whether state intelligence and police agencies are professional and neutral in investigating instances of politically-driven Hindu right-wing terrorism.¹²⁰ Even though evidence of the existence of such groups has been there since 2002, investigative agencies have always turned a blind eye towards them. Timely action on the part of investigators could have helped saved many lives and prevent certain blasts. Surprisingly, investigative agencies have time and again neglected cases that have allegedly had the ‘Hindu terror’ angle.¹²¹

Mumbai advocate and human rights campaigner Mihir Desai said: “For the last 10 years, stories about Hindu right wing violence have been trickling out. Instead of a systematic investigation, there has been an event-to-event investigation. The larger story has remained underinvestigated and underreported.”¹²² All these arrests are an indication that investigators are slowly shifting their focus to the once neglected ‘Hindu terror’ groups and are waking up to the potent threat of ‘Hindutva terrorism.’

Communist Party of India (M) leader Sitaram Yechury alleged that *Hindutva* terrorism is a reality. The police and investigating agencies “did not make serious efforts to probe further and

118 Subhash Gatade, “Hindutva —Terrorism’s New Signature.”

119 Editorial, “Unravelling Hindutva Terrorism”, *Economic And Political Weekly*, 25 May 2010.

120 Subhash Gatade, “Hindutva —Terrorism’s New Signature.”

121 Nikhil S Dixit, “Investigators have neglected ‘Hindu terror’ for a long time”, 19 May 2010; http://www.dnaindia.com/mumbai/report_investigators-have-neglected-hindu-terror-for-a-long-time_1384754

122 Smruti Koppikar, Debarshi Dasgupta, Snigdha Hasan, “Hindu terror: The Mirror Explodes”, *Outlook*, 19 July 2010; <http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?266145>

establish the culprits and their links with the *Hindutva* organizations” in several cases. To him, the UPA government has shown a “lack of clarity and firmness in dealing with Hindutva terror.”¹²³ It is very important to recall here that Digvijay Singh, who is also the spokesman of the Congress Party, mentioned the “violent and anti-national character of Hindu fundamentalists” over vandalizing the Headlines Today TV on July 16.¹²⁴ Another Congress spokesperson, Jayanti Natarajan, said that “the involvement of senior RSS leaders with terror groups and specific acts of terrorism” needed to be investigated because “they have the power through such acts to destabilize the entire society, Constitution and our political system.”¹²⁵ Thus it can reasonably be said that *Hindutva*, an ideological movement based on hatred, prejudices and emotional exploitation of the misuse of Hinduism, which culminated into the *Sangh parivar*, has resulted in acts of terrorism. This is not only a threat to the minority groups but also to the majority community as it is divisive, provocative, politically-motivated and extremely violent in nature. It needs to be contained very seriously in the larger interest of the people and the letter and spirit of the Constitution of India which seeks to promote liberty, equality, justice, democracy and federalism.

123 “Govt is soft on Hindutva: CPM”, *Expressindia*, 13 May 2010; <http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news/Govt-is-soft-on-Hindutva-CPM/618435/>

124 Soroor Ahmed, “Hitting Headlines: Sangh Parivar’s Fascist Method of Creating Chaos”, *Radiance*, 25-31 July 2010, p. 8.

125 *Ibid.*



Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: A Threat for the West

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Abstract: *One of Al Qaeda's most advanced and sophisticated affiliates is Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), officially created in 2007 after the merger with the Algerian GSPC. AQIM has radicalized itself over time using Iraqi tactics, including suicide bombings and also sending troops to Iraq. AQIM has also a multi-pronged strategy that includes kidnappings, narco-terrorism and alliances with various criminal and terror organizations around the world. The fact that AQIM has been spreading its wings in different parts of the African continent in addition to its historical base in Europe is very worrisome. In the past few years, AQIM has pulled off terrorist attacks in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Mali, Mauritania, and has shown up one way or another in Nigeria, Niger, Somalia, Iraq and throughout Europe. AQIM has shown resilience and an ability to adapt to new situations, making it a dangerous and resourceful adversary.*

Keywords: *Al Qaeda, Maghreb, Terrorism, Nexus between terrorism and criminality, international cooperation*

Introduction

Since 2006, North Africa has become a major front in the so-called 'war against terrorism'. While Algeria has witnessed regular attacks, Morocco, Tunisia and more recently Mauritania have also suffered from violence. The Maghreb, or "the West" in Arabic, is slowly turning into a crucial front and Al Qaeda is making that crystal clear. In fact, its number two, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has devoted many of his recent messages to the Maghreb calling for the overthrow of regimes in place and attacking French and Spanish interests there. The emergence of a sophisticated affiliate called Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), is making that threat all the more credible.

AQIM's ancestor: The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat

During the 1980s, thousands of volunteers from Algeria “traveled to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets and then came back to Algeria more radicalized.”¹ Algeria was the third-most represented nation in Afghan training camps after Saudi Arabia and Yemen.² Algeria’s military regime canceled the country’s 1992 parliamentary elections when it appeared that the Islamist party, the Islamic Salvation Front, known by its French acronym, FIS - Front Islamique du Salut, would likely gain power. This was the starting point of a bloody civil war between the Islamists and the regime that resulted in over 150,000 Algerian deaths.

The main Islamist armed group was the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) that had by 1997 lost popular support because of its brutal tactics that included massacring “entire villages, including women and children.”³ This was not surprising since the GIA had declared the entire Algerian population to be infidels and apostates from Islam. This evolution caused the founding of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, also known by its French acronym GSPC (Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat) in 1998. Indeed its leader, Hassan Hattab, a former GIA commander, stated that the GIA had deviated from Salafist doctrine, instead embracing *takfiri* doctrine that justified the “killing of innocents.”⁴ The GSPC vowed to continue the fight against the Algerian government and the establishment of an Islamic caliphate but avoid the indiscriminate slaughter of civilians. Interestingly, the reference to the caliphate meant that from the get-go the GSPC had global aspirations.

This explains why the Algerian group had connections to al-Qaeda. Allegedly, prior to the GSPC’s founding, Osama bin Laden had advised Hattab to work with other jihadists to form an Algerian mujahideen organization that could rival the GIA and present a “better image of the Jihad.”⁵ According to Rohan Gunaratna, an al-Qaeda expert, bin Laden “often phoned Hattab to discuss operations.”⁶ However, this claim is very much open for discussion since some analysts deny that bin Laden was involved in the GSPC’s formation.⁷ Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda second-in-command, in fact initially considered the GSPC to be a group of amateurs, and for some time wanted nothing to do with them.

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- 1 Lorenzo Vidino, *Al-Qaeda in Europe: The New Battleground of International Jihad* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2006), p. 136.
 - 2 Botha, Anneli, “Terrorism in the Maghreb: the Transnationalisation of domestic terrorism,” Monograph #144, Institute for Security Studies, June 2008.
 - 3 Vidino, *Al-Qaeda in Europe*, p. 139.
 - 4 Quoted in Stephen Ulph, “GSPC Rival Leader Hattab Reclaims Title,” *Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor*, Nov. 14, 2005.
 - 5 “Bin Laden Held to be Behind an Armed Algerian Islamic Movement,” *Agence France Presse*, Feb. 15, 1999.
 - 6 Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (New York: Berkley Books, 2003), p. 166.
 - 7 Nesser Petter, *Jihad in Europe: Exploring the Sources of Motivations for Salafi-Jihadi Terrorism in Europe Post-Millennium* (Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, 2004), pp. 53-54.

Nonetheless, other facts seem to confirm the close relationship between the two terrorist entities. For instance, a report in *Al-Arabiya* details that “bin Laden sent a number of delegates starting in 1998 to meet Hattab and to get rid of the Islamic Group’s ties” with the GIA. Bin Laden reportedly offered “financial assistance and weapons through smuggling networks spread all over the world” in exchange for the GSPC’s loyalty.⁸

Al-Qaeda also helped to train GSPC militants in Afghanistan.⁹ In return GSPC allowed its extensive European network to be used for al-Qaeda’s purposes. Some terrorist plots prior to 9/11 highlight this cooperation in Europe. Ahmed Ressam, the attempted ‘millennium bomber’ who was apprehended at the border crossing from Canada into the United States, “met al-Qaeda’s GSPC members” in Spain before flying to North America.¹⁰

After 9/11 the GSPC’s violent campaign was renewed, and the group drew closer to al-Qaeda. The GSPC became active in supplying fighters to foreign jihads, particularly Iraq.¹¹ According to Saudi security sources, more than 1,200 Algerian militants were allegedly fighting alongside al-Qaeda in Iraq by March 2006. As a symbol of their close relationship during this period, the GSPC sent a letter to Zarqawi asking him to “support brothers in Algerian jihad groups by making sermons that call for defeating the tyrants.”¹² The GSPC’s European networks continued to be active during this period.

On September 11, 2006, al-Qaeda’s deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri announced a merger with the GSPC.¹³ On January 27, 2007, the GSPC changed its name to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).¹⁴ Since then, it has taken on more of a global focus in its terrorist activities rather than the purely domestic agenda of toppling Algeria’s government.

AQIM’s Structure

AQIM retained the GSPC structure that consists of nine geographical zones headed by an appointed emir. Furthermore, specific general functions are in the hands of a top AQIM official. AQIM has a global reach with cells throughout Europe: in France, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Britain

8 *Al-Jish al-Jaza’ari Yaqadi ‘ala z’aim al-Qa’ida*, (The Algerian Army Kills al-Qaeda Leader) *Al-Arabiya*, June 20, 2004.

9 Vidino, *Al Qaeda in Europe*, p. 140.

10 Gunaratna, *Inside al-Qaeda*, pp. 171-72.

11 Parker, Ned, “Saudi’s role in insurgency outlined,” *Los Angeles Times*, July 15, 2007.

12 “Algerian Terror Group Seeks Zarqawi’s Help,” *United Press International*, May 2, 2006.

13 *Akbaru tandhimin musallahin fil-jaza’ir yu’linu mubaya’atahu li Bin Laden, wal-Dhawahiri yuhaddidu faransa* (“The largest armed organization in Algeria declares its fealty to Bin Laden, And Zawahiri threatens France.”) *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, September 15, 2006 (translated from Arabic).

14 *Al-Ja’amiyat al-Salafiyat al-Jaza’aryat Taghyar Ismaha ‘Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Balad al-Maghreb*, (The Algerian ‘Salafi Group’ changes its name to Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb Lands), *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat*, Jan. 27, 2007 (translated from Arabic).

and many more countries. These cells collaborate on logistical issues, weapons procurement, communications, and propaganda.¹⁵

AQIM has a pyramidal structure with an executive council under the leadership of Abelmalek Droukdel. Even though AQIM's intention was to become a federation of terror groups in the region, most of its leadership remains composed of Algerian elements. The former GSPC could not give in to the idea of sharing power with other nationalities. Hence there is a dearth of Moroccan and Libyan leaders within AQIM's top cadre. In a way, AQIM's leadership represents just a slightly enhanced GSPC rather than a tremendous improvement from the Algerian group.

Interestingly, AQIM members in Algeria number only in the hundreds (estimates put the number anywhere between 400 and 800)¹⁶ and maybe over 1,000 in the rest of the region, but the organization has been on a very active recruiting campaign. It is using the al-Qaida brand to attract the youth who think they are going to fight in Iraq but are then used for domestic operations, including suicide bombings. Indeed, facing a loss of popular support, AQIM had trouble finding 'fresh blood' to join their ranks, in particular in Algeria. But the perspective of joining the worldwide jihad in a faraway country has drawn new recruits that would rather fight in Iraq than in Algeria. Operating within self-contained cells for secrecy reasons, some of these newcomers are sacrificed almost right away. For instance a young 15-year-old recruit was the suicide bomber behind a Sept. 8, 2007 attack in the Algerian town of Dellys that killed 30.

Interestingly Algerian counter-insurgency tactics have had no real impact on the number of people joining AQIM.

AQIM's "Iraqi" Tactics

It seems that AQIM is really following al-Qaeda in Iraq's modus operandi. AQIM wants to turn the Maghreb into a new Iraq and that is why it is using suicide terror attacks rather than a classical guerilla war that it is indeed losing (suicide bombings happen also to be less costly to the organization than a guerilla war).

The devices employed in the latest attacks reflect a change in AQIM's tactical operations. AQIM has begun adopting tactics from the Iraq insurgency, such as coordinated suicide bombings against official government and international organization targets. Also in June 2008, AQIM used a pair of bombs to target a train station east of Algiers; after the first bomb went off, the second was triggered after emergency personnel were on the scene.¹⁷ In describing the December 11 attack,

15 Thomas H. Johnson, "Analyses of the *Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et la Combat* (GSPC)," *Strategic Insights*, Nov. 2006.

16 Mekhennet Souad, Moss Michael, Schmitt Eric, Sciolino Elaine, Williams Margot, "Ragtag insurgency gains a lifeline from Al Qaeda", *The New York Times*, July 1, 2008.

17 Mekhennet Souad, Moss Michael, Schmitt Eric, Sciolino Elaine, Williams Margot, "Ragtag insurgency gains a lifeline from Al Qaeda", *The New York Times*, July 1, 2008.

AQIM referred to the UN building as “the green zone,”¹⁸ a direct reference to the secured area of Baghdad and the bombing of the UN compound in Iraq in August 2003. Dr. Nourredine Jebnoun of Georgetown University’s Center for Contemporary Arab Studies argues that the attacks on foreign entities in Algeria are part of AQIM’s overall strategy to “isolate the Algerian regime from the international community, symbolically represented by the UN, by implementing a process of ‘Iraqization’ of Algeria.”¹⁹

Indeed, AQIM’s leader, Abdelwadoud Droukdel, viewed Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian-born al-Qaeda in Iraq leader who was killed by the US military in 2006, as his mentor.²⁰ It is possible that Zarqawi’s influence on Droukdel led him to mimic the arch-terrorist’s style of attack. Algerian terrorism specialist Faycal Oukaci said, “Droukdel’s strategy involves two main points: attacks with explosives and a large amount of media attention on suicide attacks.”²¹ Under Droukdel’s leadership, AQIM has not only taken up al-Qaeda’s political agenda, but has also copied its strategies, attack tactics, and propaganda techniques. Also for instance, improvements in AQIM’s use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) suggest the group is acquiring knowledge transferred from extremists in Iraq.²²

AQIM also tends to adapt its tactics to its environment. So for example in rural areas, where it can more easily fade into the mountains and caves, AQIM uses guerrilla tactics and ambushes against security forces, often successful thanks to very accurate information on troops movements. In urban areas, AQIM usually targets hard and high-value symbolic targets to gain maximum media attention and recently used vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs).²³

AQIM’s Arsenal

What is most frightening is the possibility that AQIM may also be able to pull off a biological attack. In fact, on January 6, 2009 the Algerian newspaper *Echorouk* reported that a number of terrorists had died of plague in one of AQIM training camps in Tizi Ouzou. Another Algerian newspaper *Ennahar*, confirmed that 50 terrorists had been diagnosed with the plague, 40 of whom had already died. While the information cannot be confirmed for sure, a slew of elements seem to give credibility to this story. First Algerian authorities and counterterrorism officials declined to comment about the veracity of the story.²⁴ On the other hand, *The Washington Times* confirmed

18 Dr. Nourredine Jebnoun, “What is Behind the December 11th Bomb Attacks in Algiers?,” Georgetown University’s Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Dec. 12, 2007, <http://ccas.georgetown.edu/research-features.cfm?id=36>.

19 Jebnoun, “What is Behind the December 11th Bomb Attacks in Algiers?”

20 Belkadi, “Ruthless Chief, Head of Al-Qaeda’s NAfrica Branch,” *Middle East Online*, Dec. 13, 2007.

21 Belkadi, “Ruthless Chief, Head of Al-Qaeda’s NAfrica Branch.”

22 Testimony by Director of National Intelligence J. Mitch McConnell before the Senate Armed Services Committee, *Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Armed Services Committee*, Feb. 27, 2008.

23 Jebnoun, “What is Behind the December 11th Bomb Attacks in Algiers?”

24 Interview with the author, Jan. 2009.

through a senior U.S. intelligence official that an incident had taken place at an AQIM training camp that had to be shut down as a result. Coincidence or not, sixty terrorists from AQIM from Tizi Ouzou (the same region where the incident allegedly occurred) miraculously just decided they wanted to surrender to the authorities. It is very rare that such a large number of AQIM operatives defect at the same time. That could mean that they possibly got really scared of what had taken place in the training camp and did not want to get involved with any biological weapon experimentation that could likely result in their deaths. On January 21, in a communiqué the group accused “some hypocrites who quoted their masters at the Algerian intelligence agency” of being behind this false story. The group also noted that this story was planted to dry up the well of new AQIM recruits. If indeed that is the case, it might be a very smart strategy that should maybe be copied. What could be another explanation of the alleged deaths of the AQIM operatives is the result of very bad hygienic situation in the camps. Indeed, several former AQIM terrorists told the Algerian *Ennahar* that the living conditions are horrendous and that numerous deaths result from this bad hygiene. They add that the AQIM emirs (chiefs) quarantined the sick right away because the disease propagated itself very quickly.

Also over a year ago, Pakistani terrorists came to train in AQIM training camps and may have one way or another contributed to the production of that biological agent. Interestingly, the *Washington Times* mentioned an intercepted communication between AQIM leaders and AQ Central in Pakistan relating the mishap. Al Qaeda operatives in Europe had tried to develop biological weapons in the recent past. In France, Menad Benchelalli, a terrorist specializing in poisons, had produced small amounts of ricin and Botulinum toxin that he intended to release in France. He was arrested in 2002. Then in 2003, British authorities arrested seven individuals accused of also producing ricin. AQIM was ‘hired’ by AQ central mostly because of its extensive network in Europe that could allow them to strike Europe at some point. AQIM’s leadership has been under intense pressure to attack European targets in order to maintain its credibility. In fact, by not using a ‘conventional’ weapon, AQIM would prove its value to AQ Central. If the group was indeed developing a biological weapon, it was surely destined for delivery in Europe, and most likely in France. Interestingly, AQIM did not wait long to refute this story.

AQIM’s Kidnapping Business

Indeed, after having imported suicide bombings into Algeria (mostly since the April 11, 2007 attacks), then recruiting teenagers, now AQIM is kidnapping foreign nationals. AQIM was facing a financial crisis in 2007, as proven by the letter published by the Saudi daily *Asharq al-Awsat* entitled, “Call for help from the Islamic Maghreb.” In this letter, AQIM acknowledged that it is suffering from a lack of operatives and most importantly that its elements have “an urgent need of cash.” And so to finance its activities, AQIM has since 2008 re-entered the kidnapping business.

Interestingly enough, the kidnapping of the two Austrian tourists in 2008 mirrors the operation led by the Algerian GSPC in 2003 under the command of Abdel Rezak al-Para. Back then, 32 European tourists (including Austrian, Swiss and German nationals) were kidnapped in the Algerian Sahara. Seventeen of them were freed thanks to a military operation led by Algerian forces, and the remaining 14 – one hostage had died – were released six months later after a large ransom

was allegedly paid by German authorities. This money was used to buy substantial quantities of sophisticated weapons that Algerian security services seized in January 2004.²⁵

The idea behind this strategy is to kill the tourism industry and dry out foreign investment in the region. The ransom money is quite meaningful and allows the group to auto-finance itself. After the Austrian government reportedly paid 5 million euros in November 2008 for the release of its nationals who had been kidnapped by AQIM in February, the Algerian minister for Maghrebi and African affairs, Abdelkader Messahel, harshly criticized Austria. Indeed he said that by giving in to blackmail and to the demands of hostage takers, the governments in question encouraged terrorist organizations to continue these tactics and implicitly financed terrorism. He added, “the payment of ransoms to terrorist groups to obtain the release of hostages is an act condemned by international bodies.”²⁶

Because of this fruitful tactic, AQIM has accelerated the pace of kidnappings of foreign nationals in the region in 2009. No less than six kidnappings have taken place this year alone and for the first time ever a British hostage was executed by the terrorists.²⁷ Just in the last weeks of 2009, a Frenchman, three Spaniards and two Italians were taken hostage by AQIM in Mauritania and Mali. In April 2010, a 78-year old French aid worker was abducted by AQIM in Niger. In an effort to liberate him, Mauritanian forces, helped by French troops, organized a raid against an AQIM camp in Mali, killing six terrorists but failing to find the French hostage. After this failed operation, AQIM, though its leader Abdelmalek Droukdel, announced that Michel Germaneau was executed in retaliation for the raid against his men.²⁸

AQIM's Drug Business

Another source of revenues for AQIM is drug trafficking. In fact, numerous reports had previously mentioned AQIM entering the narco-business but recently proof has emerged. Three alleged AQIM Malian associates were charged in December 2009 in New York with conspiracy to smuggle cocaine through Africa and onto Europe. According to the complaint, AQIM finances itself in part by protecting and moving loads along smuggling corridors that run through Morocco into Spain and through Libya and Algeria into Italy.²⁹ One of the defendants, Harouna Touré, boasted of his strong relationship with AQIM; they had for instance worked together on transporting one to two tons of hashish to Tunisia.³⁰ Touré also mentioned that his group “provides protection for planes that land in their area, including planes from Colombia,”³¹ and the complaint specifically alleged that

25 Ali Lmrabet, “Al Qaeda seduce a los tuareg”, *El Mundo*, September 18, 2008.

26 Hakim Kateb, “Comment l’Europe finance le terrorisme”, *L’Expression*, December 2, 2008.

27 Ghiousa Ikram, “Al Qaida dicte sa loi au Sahel”, *L’Expression*, December 3, 2009.

28 Nathalie Guibert and Arnaud Leparmentier, “M.Sarkozy confirme la mort de Michel Germaneau, *Le Monde*, July 27, 2010.

29 Rotella Sebastian, “U.S. prosecution links drugs to terrorism”, *Los Angeles Times*, December 19, 2009.

30 Rashbaum William K., “U.S. charges 3 Malians in drug plot”, *The New York Times*, December 19, 2009.

31 Rotella Sebastian, “U.S. prosecution links drugs to terrorism”, *Los Angeles Times*, December 19, 2009.

the three men reportedly worked also for the Colombian FARC. Touré added that he also provided AQIM with gasoline and food and “collects taxes from many rich Malian people throughout the region on Al Qaeda’s behalf,”³² plus they collaborated in the human smuggling of Bangladeshi, Pakistani and Indian subjects into Spain.³³ These new activities will allow AQIM to replenish its coffers in order to rearm itself, go on a recruiting binge and buy off corrupt government officials in the area.

AQIM’s Identity Problem

The Iraqization of the conflict has had a major impact on AQIM’s identity. In fact, according to a top French official cited recently by *Le Monde* and testimony from several GSPC dissidents, Droukdel has been allegedly trying to end a rebellion in the ranks of the AIQM. Indeed, the decision by Droukdel to use terror bombings again was not approved by many of his close associates.³⁴ Confirming this was Benmessaoud Abdelkader, the emir of the south, who surrendered to Algerian authorities in the summer of 2007. Abdelkader explained to the Algerian media in August of that year that the crisis began when Droukdel, along two of his close advisers, decided to join Al-Qaeda without consulting the base and the different phalange leaders. For the latter, the announcement was a total surprise. According to *El Watan*, all these terrorists close to Droukdel voiced their disagreement with the new “suicide bombers strategy” that they deem “imported from Iraq and serving only Al-Qaeda.” For them, the GSPC is following the same path that led to the death of the Algerian GIA (Armed Islamic Group) in the mid-1990s, the organization GSPC originally spun off from. Incidentally, the rebellious elements had been kicked out of the leadership and have since been replaced by more hardcore elements. Also the situation is so dire that these dissidents run the risk of being physically eliminated. The main consequence of this new allegiance to Al-Qaeda is that it has pushed some AQIM leaders to turn themselves in. Others are waiting for ‘new orders’ to decide what course of action to follow: either to go on or to accept the National Reconciliation Charter (a plan approved in a September 2005 referendum and promulgated in March 2006 that included a general amnesty for jailed terrorists and Islamists) and surrender. Further proof of this rebellion is that numerous anonymous calls were recently placed to authorities, most likely from terrorists, allowing the security services to prevent a couple of bombings in the center area, in particular in Boumerdès and to the east of the capital. Also, according to Abdelkader, even some of the foreign fighters inside the organization – including Tunisians, Malians and Nigerians – have already defected. Confirmation of this mini-rebellion was brought forth when *Echorouk*, citing security sources, claimed that Droukdel had ordered his followers to keep watch on all his members and limit their movements.

Interestingly, responding to the public outcry and the dissidence among his own troops, Droukdel has been active on the media front with communiqués, video clips and audio recordings. First, a 23-

32 Rashbaum William K., “U.S. charges 3 Malians in drug plot”, *The New York Times*, December 19, 2009.

33 Rotella Sebastian, “U.S. prosecution links drugs to terrorism”, *Los Angeles Times*, December 19, 2009.

34 Geoff Porter, “Splits Revealed Inside Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” *Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor*, Sept. 19, 2007.

page statement released at the beginning of June 2007, signed by one of GSPC's ulema (religious authority), Abu Al Hassan Rachid, stated that the 4/11 suicide bombings are "licit and based on examples taking place at the time of Ibn Taymiya. Using suicide bombers is indeed justified, as also the fact of picking sites full of civilians in order to strike the apostates." He added, "civilians who die in terror attacks against apostates will go to heaven" and that to avoid being killed, civilians are advised to avoid going to sites near public buildings. But in another later communiqué, Droukdel himself justified its recent actions by pointing out that using suicide bombings was in fact due to a lack of human and material resources.

In light of the recent defections, it is possible that a split-off of the North African terror group might occur between those who want to stick with Al-Qaeda's objectives and those who are focusing solely on Algeria.

The Algerian Battlefield

Even though Algeria witnessed more terror attacks than Iraq in 2008, it is not much in the news. Nonetheless, almost on a daily basis AQIM targets, murders, kidnaps or maims law enforcement personnel, regular citizens – whom they regard as allies of the government – and foreigners: 295 in total ³⁵ just for 2008; that is more than in Iraq. As a result of these attacks in 2008, 136 people died and 276 were wounded.³⁶

Algeria remains far from the main battlefield for AQIM. The reason behind this is mostly historical, as previously stated, since Algeria's terror groups have extensive experience in fighting both authorities and civilian population alike. Mostly because of the cancelled elections and the ensuing civil war, Algeria very much remains the main objective for AQIM, even though it has taken on a more global agenda.

The situation in Algeria itself is very dire but the Algerian government pretends in public that everything is under control. Clearly it is not. At this point in time, the regime is still very much minimizing inroads made by Al Qaeda. In an attempt to end this low-intensity civil war, in comparison to the 1990s, the government launched a plan for national reconciliation that was approved in a referendum in September 2005 and promulgated in March 2006. It included a general amnesty for jailed terrorists and Islamists. The authorities released 2,200 Islamists from prison, and, according to Interior Minister Noureddine Yazid Zerhouni, an additional 200 or so Islamist fighters turned themselves in. Unfortunately, AQIM would have no part of this reconciliation. Shortly before the referendum, its leader, Droukdel, warned the Algerian people on an Islamist website, "If you participate in this referendum, you have declared war on Islam, you are following Satan, and you have abandoned Allah." Sure enough, in March, a GSPC 'goon squad' gunned down a former military adviser to the group, Abdelkrim Kaduri, who had appealed to GSPC members to support the peace plan. "Do not let this opportunity for reconciliation slip by," Kaduri had urged just before

35 U.S. Department of State *Country Reports on Terrorism: 2008*, available at <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2008/122412.htm>.

36 U.S. National Counterterrorism Center, *Worldwide Incidents Tracking System*, available at <http://wits.nctc.gov>.

he was killed. His murder was a deterrent to any dissidents who might think of helping the Algerian security services.

And in other ways, the attempt at reconciliation is looking more and more like a recipe for disaster, endangering the security of Algeria and Western nations alike. For instance, the two suicide bombers that perpetrated the December 11, 2007 attack against the UN Algiers office and the Constitutional Council benefited from the amnesty.³⁷ Also two other individuals freed in the amnesty, Mohamed Benyamina and Akil Chraibi, were part of extremist cells recently dismantled in France. Benyamina belonged to the Bourada cell, which had planned to attack the Paris-Orly airport, the Paris subway, and the headquarters of the DST (the French equivalent of the FBI). Chraibi, a student in Montpellier, was arrested in Algeria while providing AQIM with explosive devices. French authorities are also concerned about preventing dangerous individuals from entering French territory. In fact, France considers AQIM its biggest threat, especially since the group's communiqué identifying France as the number one enemy.³⁸

While it is true that Algerian security forces have been relatively successful in fighting off AQIM terrorists in open military combat, AQIM is still alive and kicking. Also as mentioned earlier, AQIM's new *modus operandi* has resulted in a huge decline of AQIM's popularity among Algeria's population, especially since the attacks are also very much targeting civilians.

But AQIM is not the only organization that has lost credibility; the Algerian government has too, for a few reasons. First, the authorities keep on downplaying AQIM's capacity to hit Algeria. The same declarations from Interior Minister Yazid Zerhouni after each attack stating that AQIM is dying off and that this latest attack is proof of its weakness and despair is ringing very hollow. Mr Zerhouni also sounds like a broken record when he keeps on repeating that AQIM numbers only 400. If that was true, then AQIM would be down to 0 members today with all the terrorists that have been announced as killed by the Algerian army or police. Realistic estimates put AQIM's members at over 1,000. The authorities would do well not to underestimate AQIM at the risk of looking ridiculous in the eyes of their people and the international community. European and other North African officials have complained privately that indeed Algeria has in a way undermined the fight against AQIM by constantly playing down the terrorist entity's capabilities.³⁹

The Regional Battlefield

AQIM's terror activities have not been confined to Algeria alone. In fact since the Moroccan GICM (Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group), responsible for the 2003 and 2004 attacks in Casablanca and Madrid, joined this group, Morocco has also been a target of AQIM.

As proof, on March 11, 2007, three years to the day after the Madrid bombings, a cyber café in Casablanca was hit. Two terrorists carrying explosive belts entered the cyber café to use the Internet.

37 Marcel Bigéard, *Mon Dernier Round*, Editions du Rocher, Monaco, 2009, pp. 99-100.

38 Pascal Combelles Siegel, "AQIM Renews its Threats Against France," *Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor*, Aug. 7, 2007.

39 Various interviews with the author October-November 2009.

They were trying to connect to a terrorism-linked site and the manager wanted to prevent them from doing so. When he approached one of the two terrorists, the suicide bomber decided to activate his bomb, killing himself and injuring four. His accomplice fled but was later arrested by Moroccan police. The most credible explanation is that the two terrorists wanted to consult the Internet to receive their orders for an attack against targets, most likely the police headquarters and Western interests, including a McDonald's restaurant. In their 2007 book "Quand le Maroc sera islamiste" (When Morocco will be Islamist), journalists Nicolas Beau and Catherine Graciet paint a very bleak albeit realistic picture of the Kingdom. Indeed, one of the top French anti-terrorism officials, cited by Beau and Graciet, recently stated that Morocco is by far the most worrying country in North Africa. For him, "today, Morocco is 1916 Russia." Also, according to the Spanish anti-terror judge Baltazar Garzon: "Morocco is the worst terrorist threat for Europe." He estimated that Al Qaeda-linked cells number over 100 and that at least 1,000 terrorists are actively sought by Moroccan authorities. In fact, Western intelligence fear specific attacks on Western interests in the country. Some are even evoking an image of a "terrorist tsunami."

One of the most troublesome aspects of the latest in a way of 'foiled' attacks is that the suicide bomber had been jailed after the May 16, 2003 multiple suicide attacks in Casablanca for his connections to the terrorists involved. But King Mohamed VI pardoned him back in 2005. The same goes for most of the people arrested afterwards in connection with that latest attack. In light of this, pardoning might not be such a good idea to fight terrorism but overall give Morocco a lot of credit for fighting the War on Radical Islam.

Indeed, Moroccan authorities are not sitting idle and waiting for the next inevitable attacks. On March 8, 2007 they arrested Saad Hussaini, GICM number 2, in a Casablanca cyber café while he was chatting with other jihadists.

Also new tactics are being used. For the first time since the 2003 attacks, lists of wanted terrorists have been widely distributed and broadcast in the media, inviting the population "to help the security services to find where two particularly dangerous members of Al-Qaeda hide." In the last two years, multiple arrests have occurred and the tension is more than palpable.

Priority has been given to the collection of information. Security forces agents have been focusing on watching the new arrivals in the suburbs, the new day laborers on the construction sites, etc. Agents in plain clothes are mixing with the crowds which wait in front of certain consulates. In various areas of Casablanca, some agents have even started to account for all the hardware stores (potential place to buy explosives), the cyber cafés and the apartments occupied by single people. Security measures were particularly beefed up in the areas of Tangier and Tétouan. Two experts in explosives would, according to several news services, infiltrate into Morocco through the Tangier harbor. Various members of sleeper cells of Al Qaeda in Europe have also moved to the Maghreb since the merger between GSPC and Al Qaeda was sealed. Parking is from now on prohibited near consulates and certain significant buildings in the city.

While Algeria and, more recently, Morocco have been pinpointed as potential terrorist hotbeds, Tunisia was, for a long time, relatively quiet. But on December 23, 2006, and then again on January 3, 2007, Salafi terrorists armed with RPGs engaged hundreds of Tunisian police, army, and secret service in battles which saw anywhere from 12 terrorists and two security forces – official tally – to at least 60 killed, according to the French daily *Le Parisien*. And so, Tunisia has woken up to a grim new reality – Al Qaeda is infiltrating the traditionally quiet and safe European vacation spot.

Still, it is interesting to note that it took Tunisia and its government-controlled media 18 days to acknowledge the terrorist nature of the incidents. In the end, it was not a group of “drug traffickers” or then “dangerous criminals” as initial reports suggested but “salafi terrorists” who intended to target foreign embassies and dignitaries. As in 2002, after the GSPC terror attack on a synagogue in Djerba, the Tunisian authorities were downplaying the gravity of the attacks in order to demonstrate their control of the situation and prevent any plunge in tourism-related revenue. In fact, the Tunisians only divulged some of the facts after the French media reported the involvement of Al Qaeda elements in the recent shootings, and a subsequent release of a communiqué claiming responsibility by a group called “The Youth of Unification and Jihad in Tunisia.” According to the daily *Le Soir D’Algérie*, Tunisian authorities decided after the attacks to ban all Algerian males below the age of 30 from entering the country for a while in an effort to prevent future attacks by the Algerian-based group.

While AQIM has been very active with a series of bloody suicide bombings and attacks in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, it does not mean that it is not present and expanding in other African nations. From Mauritania to Chad, AQIM militants operate in the inhospitable Sahara, following the advice given in the early 2000s by a Yemeni representative of Osama bin Laden to the GSPC’s then leader, Hassan Hattab, to use the desert as its fallback base. Since then, AQIM has been expanding in the Sahel, a narrow band of semi-arid land south of the Sahara that some experts view as a “second Afghanistan.” For the time being, this description is a stretch but it could become a reality if the region is left to AQIM. For sure, the area is a new front on the war against radical Islam. In fact, the Sahel has become a haven for AQIM since they benefit from the fact that some regimes do not control most of the region under their supervision. It is the ideal place to install a terrorist base since the area is almost impossible to patrol for such poor nations.⁴⁰ This region represents a great hiding location from US satellites since it is very mountainous and full of caves. Still, terrorists need to move as often as possible. Also there, AQIM gets easy access to weapons: in fact, in 2005, the economic community of West African states estimated that around 10 million light weapons were circulating within the 15 member states. Regional security officials confirm that AQIM has bases and caches in the Sahel where it stores fuel, food and ammunition. Its members move quickly throughout the region, avoiding busy tracks.

Also, according to a report by the French DGSE (French equivalent of the CIA), since 2004, Algerian salafists have been training foreign recruits, in particular Mauritians and Nigerians.⁴¹ It also welcomes European and Pakistani jihadists, as well as Islamist groups that have been forced to cease operating from Algeria, something that Mauritania’s counter-terrorism czar, Mohamed Abdellahi Ould Dah, considers “a major concern.”⁴² He points out two specific areas of concern: the border area between eastern Mauritania and Mali and the Timbuktu area in northern Mali. Interestingly, he even claimed to know the precise area where Islamists come to pick up recruits arriving from abroad. When asked how he came by that information, Ould Dah acknowledged that

40 “Le ‘No Man’s Land’ du Sahara Sert de Refuge aux Islamistes (The Sahara ‘no man’s land’ is used as a hideout for Islamists),” *Le Monde*, April 12, 2007.

41 “Sur les traces des djihadistes au Sahara,” (“Tracing the jihadists in the Sahara”) *Le Figaro*, (France), March 19, 2007.

42 “Le ‘No Man’s Land’ du Sahara Sert de Refuge aux Islamistes (The Sahara ‘no man’s land’ is used as a hideout for Islamists),” *Le Monde*, April 12, 2007.

he had good relations with Western intelligence services, most likely from the United States and France. In fact, in 2005, after the attack against the Mauritanian soldiers, the FBI dispatched a team to the Mauritanian capital Nouakchott. Since then, the Americans, like the French, have made incursions in the north of the country and have trained the Mauritanian police.

During his visit to Nouakchott in February 2009, France's Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner hinted that his country helps the authorities to monitor the long border with Mali. A reconnaissance aircraft, based in Dakar, flies over the area regularly, an operation that is tantamount to finding a needle in a sand dune.

And indeed Mauritania has become a very worrisome spot, starting with the killing of four French tourists in December 2007, the attack against the Israeli embassy by a few gunmen in February 2008, the killing of an American aid worker in Nouakchott and finally the suicide attack against the French embassy in August 2009.⁴³

Another country of concern of late is Mali. It is one of the poorest countries in the world and the northern portion of the country is particularly poor. Coupled that with an almost impossible area to monitor full of caves and mountains, and an army with almost no means, makes this inhospitable area a dream base for Al-Qaeda. Three major reasons explain why AQIM has built a base in Northern Mali (in particular in Timbuktu and in Kidal): first, it is a very inhospitable area with a difficult terrain making it tough for nations to monitor it, even for U.S. satellites; second, some Arab tribes are located there and, finally, the Malian regime is weak.

The fact that the Western hostages are presumably in northern Mali is also unsurprising. Nonetheless, terrorists need to be on the move quite often: they use Toyota Land Cruisers and refueling stations buried in the ground that they locate with GPS equipment. AQIM possesses heavy weapons, mortars and ground-air missiles, among other sophisticated equipment, such as scramblers for their Thuraya satellite telephone communications.⁴⁴

To make matters even more complicated and unstable, the area is home to the Tuaregs, a Berber group (200,000 people strong), whose main military group – The Alliance – is fighting Malian authorities. For instance, on March 20, 2008 violent fighting erupted between Malian forces and Tuareg forces; eight people were killed and thirty-three Malian military personnel were kidnapped. The Malian government blames the Tuaregs for the various kidnappings of foreign nationals in the region while AQIM is the clear culprit. Nonetheless, complicities are possible. Interestingly enough, the Tuaregs might be the key to the future of the region. The Tuaregs openly accuse AQIM of trying to seduce them and become their allies in order to build an African Afghanistan. Even though the Tuaregs are adamant that they will refuse any AQIM's offer,⁴⁵ they nonetheless openly criticize the West for its described hypocrisy. They also add that some of their members have been "ideologically contaminated" by AQIM.

43 Trofimov Yaroslav, "Islamic rebels gain strength in the Sahara", *The Wall Street Journal*, August 15, 2009

44 "Sur les traces des djihadistes au Sahara," ("Tracing the jihadists in the Sahara") *Le Figaro*, (France), March 19, 2007.

45 "Arrestation d'un important membre du GSPC au Mali," ("Arrest of a major GSPC member in Mali") *El Watan*, (Algeria), March 3, 2007.

The first real test of a possible alliance between AQIM and the Tuaregs occurred in 2003 when a group of 32 European tourists was kidnapped by the GSPC. Part of the deal that finally resulted in the release of the hostages included the granting of asylum for Mokhtar Belmokhtar, GSPC's emir of the Sahara, in Mali. A sanctuary deal was facilitated whereby Belmokhtar promised not to perpetrate any hostile actions on Malian soil in exchange for Malian authorities leaving him alone.

While Germany always denied paying a €5 million (around \$7.3 million) ransom to release the hostages, a Tuareg leader that took part in the negotiations affirmed that it was indeed paid. He added that the German ambassador to Mali gave the money to the Tuareg leader and to the Malian government's representative so that they could pay off the ransom to Abderrazak El Para, GSPC's mastermind. According to some witness accounts and El Para's testimony after his arrest, El Para gave money back to the two mediators and started investing the ransom money in the area. Distributing antibiotics to sick children and buying goats for double the going rate are winning the hearts and minds of the local population, thus buying off alliances with local tribes; some measures involved going as far as marrying three wives from various clans. This alliance of sort lasted while the money was flowing. However, in order to partly restore their reputation, in 2006 the Tuaregs decided to combat their former allies on two occasions and ambushed AQIM operatives, killing in one operation the # 2 of the Sahelian branch. While rumors of Algerian implication have been making the rounds, a Tuareg leader pointed out that both the Americans and French had requested their help to make up for the lack of efficiency of the Malian army. But that cooperation was short-lived because the Americans refused to provide the Tuaregs with modern weapons and wanted them to track AQIM down in other parts of Mali, outside of their home base. Interestingly, the Tuaregs note that the Malians do not want to die fighting AQ because they see it as an Arab-Western issue but they themselves have their territory at stake and are therefore motivated.⁴⁶

That is why avoiding an ideological contamination of the Tuareg community is the goal of Western nations that would hate to see Al-Qaeda succeeding in recruiting more personnel. For the time being, except for a few youngsters that have fallen to the charms of AQIM mostly because of the financial reward, the Tuaregs are very much staying clear of AQIM. Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that the divisions between the Tuareg and AQIM are not entirely clear-cut. According to a senior American military intelligence source: "While the organized Tuareg political groups are still sticking to the deals they made with the Sahel governments, many Tuaregs have been radicalized by Saudi and Tablighi Jamaat proselytizing and were subsequently recruited by AQIM/GSPC leaders Amari Saifi and Mokhtar Belmokhtar."⁴⁷

But another factor must be taken into account. Complicity with AQIM might not be limited to the Tuareg community. Interestingly, Algerian official media explain that AQIM kidnaps foreign citizens and brings them right away to Mali where negotiations begin with the Malian government of Amana Touré. The same media affirms that AQIM terrorists are protected by Malian authorities, like some Algerian extremists from the FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) and the GIA (Islamic Armed Group) have been in the past.

46 "Sur les traces des djihadistes au Sahara," ("Tracing the jihadists in the Sahara") *Le Figaro*, (France), March 19, 2007.

47 Senior American military intelligence officer, Apr. 3, 2008.

Mali is viewed as a sanctuary because AQIM seems untouched and its emir for the Sahara, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, has alliances with lots of different tribes, in particular through various marriages. Also, handling of arrested AQIM elements in Mali point out to a possible lenience of Malian authorities. For example, one of the leading emirs in the Sahel, Osama El Merdaci, was arrested in Timbuktu en route to Somalia. Since then Malian authorities have refused to extradite him and even put him on trial while two Libyan terrorists were arrested and extradited almost right away.

A recent example of a possible complicity with AQIM occurred at the beginning of November 2009, when a Boeing 727 full of cocaine reportedly coming from Venezuela and destined for AQIM crashed in the Malian desert. Mali tried to sweep this incident under the rug and it took three weeks for President Touré to address the issue. This fueled suspicions of a possible complicity between drug traffickers and the Malian administration.⁴⁸

Furthermore, Western experts blame Mali for not fighting Islamists head-on, despite the French, Spanish and American military aid. Boubai Maiga, a former Malian Defense Minister, confirmed that Mali is very cautious in reacting to the AQIM threat because it does not want to become a battlefield between Westerners and Islamists, de facto becoming a second Afghanistan.⁴⁹

But according to Western officials, the tacit non-aggression pact between AQIM and Mali has recently been broken.⁵⁰ Mali has become a legitimate target for AQIM, as proven by the assassination of a military officer in Timbuktu, followed by the killing of more than two dozen Malian soldiers and paramilitary forces.⁵¹ Therefore, after the recent kidnapping of one of its citizens, France has quietly evacuated residents in the north and beefed up security in the capital.⁵²

The US has a training center in Gao, in northern Mali, where it trains Malian military units for counter-terrorism combat purposes. This is part of a five-year, \$500 million counterterrorism program in ten countries in the region that has been described by a Mali-based diplomat as “not very effective.”⁵³

But that is not all; AQIM is also present one way or another in two other major African nations: Nigeria and Somalia. Regarding Nigeria, it was recently revealed that the extremist Islamist sect, Boko Haram, that was behind the murderous rebellion events that took place over the summer of 2008 and resulted in about 800 deaths, has links to AQIM. According to a security source cited by *The Nation*, many Boko Haram members, among them the nephew of a former Nigerian governor, started training in AQIM camps in Algeria as early as 2006.⁵⁴ Regarding Somalia, several media

48 Bernard Philippe, “Le Mali touché par la menace globale d’Al-Qaida”, *Le Monde*, December 3, 2009.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.

51 Bruilliard Karin, “Radical Islam meets a buffer in West Africa”, *Washington Post*, December 21, 2009.

52 Bernard Philippe, “Le Mali touché par la menace globale d’Al-Qaida”, *Le Monde*, December 3, 2009.

53 Bruilliard Karin, “Radical Islam meets a buffer in West Africa”, *Washington Post*, December 21, 2009.

54 Alli Yusuf, “Revealed: Boko Haram leaders trained in Afghanistan, Algeria”, *The Nation*, August 2, 2009.

reports point to the numerous contacts between AQIM and the Shabaab, the Al-Qaeda-linked terror group that is controlling a portion of Somalian territory.⁵⁵

The International Battlefield

In order to get worldwide exposure, AQIM has to perpetrate spectacular attacks on international targets; that is why AQIM has made no secret that turning to soft targets by targeting foreign nationals has become one of their priorities. For instance, in Algeria, AQIM has targeted U.S. and Russian contractors. The group's first such attack targeted a bus transporting Halliburton employees in December 2006, killing one and injuring nine more. On March 3, 2007 the group staged another attack, this one targeting Russian contractors and then the U.N. compound in Algiers.

Western nations have warned their citizens of the risks associated with remaining in the country. AQIM recently almost succeeded in kidnapping two French executives. After this incident, a number of French nationals (mostly women and children) left Algeria to return to safer territory. In recent years, the U.S. Department of State has issued several travel warnings for Algeria urging American citizens there to evaluate carefully the risk posed to their personal safety due to the increased frequency of small-scale terrorist attacks, including bombings, false roadblocks, kidnappings, ambushes, and assassinations.

The Pakistani connection does not stop there; indeed, Pakistani terrorists recently arrived in Algeria to train with AQIM members. This is all the more worrisome in that of all the Al-Qaeda's affiliates, AQIM is the organization most capable of striking at Europe. But the real challenge for AQIM is to inflict massive damage in Europe. Zawahiri has instructed them to do so on multiple occasions. In order to keep its credibility alive and please its 'masters,' AQIM has been trying hard to orchestrate a terror attack on the continent. At the end of 2007, the level of 'chatter' increased dramatically (and continued unabated into the first month of 2008), in particular with specific threats against France. This led to the cancellation of the very popular Paris-Dakar auto race for the first time and also compelled Belgian authorities to cancel the New Year's Eve fireworks in Brussels.

The United States is another target of the GSPC. As mentioned earlier, it was already in the crosshairs of the GIA with the millennium bombing.⁵⁶ In fact, GSPC leader Droukdel declared on September 27, 2005: "There is no doubt that defeating evil America will bring an end to all the apostate and treacherous regimes on the planet, including the apostate regime in Algeria. O Allah, destroy America and its apostate tyrants everywhere and bestow victory upon your mujahedeen servants." And unsurprisingly, AQIM made good on its promise when it targeted the US consulate and American language school in Casablanca in April 2007. In a *New York Times* interview in 2008, Droukdel explained that because AQIM had been placed on the U.S. list of terror organizations and because the U.S. was conducting military exercises in the south of Algeria, plus plundering Algeria's

55 Ghioua Ikram, "Al-Qaida a approché les pirates somaliens", *L'Expression*, December 10, 2009; also see Trofimov Yaroslav, "Islamic rebels gain strength in the Sahara", *The Wall Street Journal*, August 15, 2009.

56 Burns John F., Pyes Craig, "Radical Islamic Network may have come to the U.S.", *The New York Times*, December 31, 2009.

natural resources, “it became our right and our duty to push away with all our strength this crusade campaign and declare clearly that the American interests are legitimate targets to us. We will strive to strike them whenever we can.”⁵⁷

Today AQIM uses the Europe-based cells of the former GIA for fundraising and for logistical support of plots. In June 2007, the Algerian daily *La Tribune* reported that Algerian authorities had uncovered an AQIM-run drug smuggling network that was bringing marijuana into Spain and using the proceeds to purchase weapons.⁵⁸ Europe, however, is also a target. In November 2007, Jonathan Evans, the director of MI-5, warned of the threat AQIM posed to the UK.⁵⁹

The two countries that represent the biggest stakes for AQIM are France and Spain – France because of the colonial history the support to the regime; Spain because Andalusia has been one of the top priorities of Al Qaeda Central. In fact the reconquest of Al Andalus would be a huge step for the establishment of the caliphate for Al Qaeda. To prove the importance of that goal and the symbolic, AQIM recently created its media arm and named it “Al Andalus Establishment for Media Production.”⁶⁰

International Cooperation

The issue remains the lack of collaboration among the countries of North Africa. This is a product of the suspicion and animosity that characterizes regional affairs. For instance, Morocco and Algeria have had a rocky relationship for the past 30 years and this does not favor the exchange of sensitive information between them. On the contrary, each country has a tendency to accuse the other of being too lax on fighting terrorism, letting militants cross into the territory of the other. And then there is the reality of reputation. None of the countries in the region want to recognize that they have a terrorism problem because of the impact such a perception could have on tourism and foreign investment. For example, when two Austrian tourists were kidnapped in February 2008 in Tunisia by AQIM, the Tunisian authorities claimed they had been abducted in Algeria and not in their “very safe” country.

But also Western intelligence and diplomatic officials complained that Algeria has not been fully cooperative in sharing information on AQIM, like for example on the U.N. bombing.⁶¹ Today, more than ever, states in North Africa must put aside their divergences on the political level to better facilitate co-operation on counter-terrorism. Anything less would leave AQIM with a clear advantage. Also partnerships with the West, including with NATO in the frame of the Mediterranean Dialogue, should be expanded; it is indeed in the interest of both parties.

57 An Interview with Abdelmalek Droukhal, *The New York Times*, July 1, 2008.

58 “Afrique du Nord: En provenance de l’Europe de l’Est et destinées à Al Qaïda Maghreb (North Africa: Coming from Eastern Europe to Al Qaida in the Maghreb),” *La Tribune* (Algeria), June 14, 2007.

59 Paul Cruickshank, “Al-Qaida’s Expanding Franchise,” *Guardian* (London), Dec. 12, 2007.

60 Cembrero Ignacio, “Al Qaeda en el Magreb bautiza su órgano de propaganda Al Ándalus”, *El País*, October 17, 2009.

61 Mekhennet Souad, Moss Michael, Schmitt Eric, Sciolino Elaine, Williams Margot, “Ragtag insurgency gains a lifeline from Al Qaeda”, *The New York Times*, July 1, 2008.

Conclusion

AQIM needs to prove to al-Qaeda central that it is worthy of the trust they put in it. For the time being, al-Qaeda doubts Droukdel's abilities to mobilize in Europe. Nonetheless, AQIM has sleeper cells all over the continent and logistical support as well. For the time being, European law enforcement agencies have been excellent in their fight against AQIM. But that does not mean that AQIM could not strike tomorrow in Paris, Brussels, Madrid or Rome. Finally, AQIM may be morphing into a criminal/narco/terrorist organization à la FARC, which will make it an ever more formidable adversary.

In light of the recent missed terrorist attack aboard an Amsterdam-Detroit flight over Christmas Day allegedly planned by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, one should not underestimate an Al Qaeda affiliate.



Power of Media and Words: Analysis of News on PKK

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Abstract: *This article undertakes a comparative analysis of media coverage of the PKK, as reported by prominent Turkish, U.S. and Dutch newspapers, focusing on how the PKK is described by the newspaper reporting. Findings revealed that while the Turkish newspaper liberally uses the words “terrorists” and “terrorist organization” throughout its reporting, the U.S. and Dutch newspapers are more conservative in their framing of the organization, using various descriptors that could evoke a range of emotional reactions, from support for its cause to outrage over its tactics. How the media reports on the organization can influence the readership’s perception of the PKK. Those readers, in turn, work to persuade their individual governments to support or deny support to a given organization.*

Keywords: *terrorism, PKK, terrorist, news, militant, Kurdish, separatist, rebel*

Introduction

Any government involved in a fight against terrorism cannot be successful without the support of its society. This is mainly because any level of a military intervention necessitates an enormous amount of public resources and risks the lives of the society’s men and women. That support is often not willingly provided and the government must work to persuade the members of its society to contribute to the fight against terrorism. Therefore, when it comes to gaining the support of a society, forming public opinion, typically through the media, gains importance.

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The power of the media to set a nation's agenda and to focus public attention on a specific issue is immense. Not only do people acquire factual information about public affairs from the news media, readers and viewers are also influenced as to the importance to attach to a topic on the basis of the emphasis placed on it in the news. Newspapers provide a host of cues about the salience of the topics in the daily news – the lead story on page one, prominence above or below “the fold,” impactful headlines, etc. These cues, when repeated day after day, effectively communicate the importance of each topic, at least as determined by the managing editor of the publication. In other words, the news media can set the agenda by drawing the public's attention to a select group of issues around which public opinion forms.

The principle outline of this influence was sketched by Walter Lippmann in his 1922 classic, *Public Opinion*, which began with a chapter titled “The World Outside and the Pictures in Our Heads.” As he noted, the news media are primary sources of those pictures in our heads about the larger world of public affairs, a world that for most citizens is ‘out of reach, out of sight, out of mind.’¹ What people know about the world is largely based on the information they learn through the media. Issues prominent on the media agenda become prominent in the public mind. The issues covered in the news, the description about an incident, and subsequently the discourse of the news make a considerable difference in how people view that issue. In situations in which the fight against terrorism requires international support, the media's role becomes even more important. In many cases, media becomes the only source of information about a terrorist incident taking place in another country. Therefore, the abovementioned role becomes more vital in terms of forming public opinion to attract the attention of policy makers and decision makers, particularly because a terror act taking place in another country receives less attention from foreign media unless there is a risk for other countries to be affected by the terror act or by the same terrorist group.

Media coverage of the PKK organization in Turkey by three liberal newspapers in Turkey, the U.S. and the Netherlands could be key to providing insight into how the PKK is perceived in those countries. An analysis revealed how the discourse in the Turkish newspaper differed from a U.S. and a Dutch newspaper when reporting on the PKK and its designation as a terrorist organization. Newspaper reports between April 6, 2009, and December 31, 2009, were analyzed using ‘PKK’ as the keyword while searching in the archives of the newspapers' websites. This article analyzes the comparison of coverage between sample newspapers, how the PKK is described in newspaper reporting, how the PKK is characterized in headlines, and where in the story the references to the PKK as a terrorist organization are found, if present at all.

The Dilemma in Defining Terrorism

There are many organizations throughout the world engaged in political struggles with governmental institutions, seeking to persuade or influence those governments. Those organizations rely on the civilian population to help them accomplish their goals, often seeking sympathy or support from the populace. While many of these organizations use lawful and legitimate means to accomplish their goals, many of them cross a line that is not acceptable in civilized society. They are often deemed ‘terrorists’ by governments, a word meant to evoke a negative image in the eyes of

1 Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion*, New York, Macmillan, 1922, p. 29.

the populace. However, naming a terrorist organization is a relatively subjective matter and one that has been a challenge to governments as there are no internationally accepted common criteria for a terrorist organization. Thus, in order to determine if an organization should be deemed a ‘terrorist’ one, it is helpful to look at history and at various definitions as established within the international community. The word itself is thought to be derived from the Latin word *terrere*, meaning “to tremble,” combined with the French suffix *isme* (to practice), coming together to mean a word standing for fear, panic, and anxiety, *i.e.*, terror.²

The origin of the term appears to date back to revolutionary France when a group of revolutionaries used it to describe their own actions.³ An English author at the time used the anglicized version of the word, terrorism, in such a way so that he began the process of “defining terrorism and terrorists and delegitimizing their behavior”⁴ when writing of the events he observed there. Since that time, attempts have been made to define terrorism by a variety of communities, including academicians, states, the international community, and the terrorists themselves. In fact, according to Walter Laqueur, there “are more than a hundred definitions for terrorism.”⁵ As this article focuses on how print media frames one specific organization in its reporting, thus influencing the readership in its perceptions, who in turn work to persuade their governments, we will focus on the definitions proffered by states and the international community. Agreement is not easily found even within state governmental schools of thought. In fact, the U.S. alone has several different definitions codified in the laws and regulations of its various governmental agencies. Section 2656f(d) of Title 22 of the US Code defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.” Within the U.S. federal government, both the US State Department⁶ and the Central Intelligence Agency⁷ subscribe to the Title 22 definition of terrorism.

A more comprehensive definition was adopted on September 23, 2001, when President Bush signed Executive Order 13224, providing a means for disrupting financial support networks for

2 Joseph S. Tuman, *Communicating Terror – The Rhetorical Dimensions of Terrorism*, SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, California, USA, 2003, p. 2.

3 Tuman, pp. 2-3.

4 Tuman, p. 3. According to Tuman, Sir Edmund Burke wrote of the revolution in France and warned about those who were creating havoc and panic in the country. “Though Burke did not himself define *terrorism* or *terrorist* in his *Reflections*, he as much as provided the definition by operationalizing it in several ways. In Burke’s view, a terrorist was a *fanatic*; therefore, it could be inferred that a terrorist does not follow any means of logic or reason to justify his or her actions. Moreover, a terrorist was an *assassin* – a *murderer* – and a *thief*, and a *fraud* – not to mention an *oppressor*. None of these labels describes an individual whose characteristics could be admired or sympathized with.”

5 Walter Laqueur, “Terrorism: A Brief History,” May 11, 2009 (<http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2008/April/20080522172730SrenoD0.6634027.html>), p. 1.

6 Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, April 30, 2001, <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2000/2419.htm>. Noting that no one definition of terrorism has gained universal acceptance, the acting coordinator for counterterrorism declares this report follows the definition found in Title 22, section 2656f(d).

7 <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-on-terrorism/terrorism-faqs.html>.

terrorist and terrorist organizations. For the purpose of the order, terrorism is defined as “an activity that (1) involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life, property, or infrastructure; and (2) appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, kidnapping, or hostage-taking.”⁸ Even the U.S. Department of Defense has established its own meaning, including not just violent activity, but also merely the *threat* of violent activity in its definition of terrorism, defining it as “The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear and intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.”⁹

The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) acknowledges “there is no single, universally accepted, definition of terrorism” in its *Terrorism* report.¹⁰ The FBI primarily cites the definition as found in the Code of Federal Regulations -- “the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”¹¹ For the purposes of its *Terrorism* report, it goes on to amplify the definitions of terrorism, breaking into categories of domestic and international terrorism, the latter of which is most relevant for the purposes of this article, which notes:

International terrorism involves violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any state, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or any state. These acts appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping. International terrorist acts occur outside the United States or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.¹²

Within the international community, there has been no easier success in crafting a single definition of terrorism. Much of the literature appears to focus on defining specific acts that constitute terrorist acts when performed within specific parameters, thereby labeling those organizations who commit those acts as terrorist. In 2002, the European Union defined a series of acts that constitute terrorist acts as “intentional acts which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or international organization and which are defined as an offence under national law.”¹³ As further clarification, it goes on to state that in order for those acts to constitute terrorist acts, “they must be carried out with the aim of seriously intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a Government

8 Executive Order 13224, September 23, 2001, <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/122570.htm>.

9 Department of Defense Directive 2000.12, DoD Antiterrorism (AT) program, Certified current as of December 13, 2007, p. 29, <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/200012p.pdf>.

10 FBI Report, *Terrorism 2002-2005*, http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terrorism2002_2005.htm.

11 28 C.F.R. §0.85a, http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/cfr_2001/julqtr/pdf/28cfr0.88.pdf.

12 FBI Report, “Terrorism 2002-2005”, http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terrorism2002_2005.htm.

13 European Union Factsheet, “The EU list of persons, groups and entities subject to specific measures to combat terrorism,” 16 June 2009, p. 2, citing Article 1(3) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP.

or an international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization.”¹⁴

Although the United Nations (UN) has taken on the ‘terrorism’ issue in various conventions/agreements since 1963, it has had no less a difficult time in coming to a consensus on the definition of terrorism. In the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (Strategy) adopted by the General Assembly in September 2006, the UN noted it was “Reaffirming further Member States’ determination to make every effort to reach an agreement on and conclude a comprehensive convention on international terrorism, including by resolving the outstanding issues related to the legal definition and scope of the acts covered by the convention, so that it can serve as an effective instrument to counter terrorism.”¹⁵ However, the Strategy did allow specific acts that could be labeled as terrorist ones by

Reaffirming that acts, methods and practices of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations are activities aimed at the destruction of human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy, threatening territorial integrity, security of States and destabilizing legitimately constituted Governments, and that the international community should take the necessary steps to enhance cooperation to prevent and combat terrorism.¹⁶

In light of the various attempts to define and to label terrorist acts and terrorist organizations, Tuman has stated that many theorists “have tried to capture a consensus of the definition by examining all definitions to see what parts they have in common.”¹⁷ Brian Jenkins, a terrorism consultant, distilled the various definitions into their most basic components, suggesting that “terrorism is the use or the threatened use of force designed to bring about a political change.”¹⁸ A.P. Schmid found “some 22 components” the various terrorism definitions had in common, creating a slightly more complex definition that sees terrorism “more of a method or form of combat and struggle, attempted for a variety of reasons more complex than just the ‘political.’”¹⁹ Yet another author, Robert E. Goodin,

14 European Union Factsheet, p. 2.

15 General Assembly Resolution 60/288, The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 20 September 2006, p. 2, retrieved from UN Office on Drugs and Crime Web site: <http://www.unodc.org/pdf/terrorism/Index/60-288en.pdf>.

16 General Assembly Resolution 60/288, p. 2.

17 Tuman, p. 11.

18 Tuman, p. 11, discussing the theory of Brian Jenkins, a consultant on terrorism and counterterrorism security.

19 Tuman, pp. 13-14, discussing the work of A.P. Schmid, who provided advisory work for the UN. His definition said “Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.”

presented the idea that “(n)owadays, terrorism is typically defined as involving most fundamentally ‘violence against’ (and in the limiting case ‘the killing of’) ‘innocent civilians.’”²⁰

For the purposes of this analysis, similar to these experts, we have elected to reduce the various state and international definitions to their commonalities, in order to determine a definition of terrorism and how it is reflected in certain written media. In this study, a broader definition of terrorism as ‘one who uses violence in order to intimidate or coerce both civilian populations and governments in an effort to influence the policy of a government’ is considered.

The next challenge for an individual state in defining terrorism is having its internal terrorist organizations accepted as such by the international community as a whole. As has been noted, often “the ultimate goal of terrorism is to influence political behavior,”²¹ and that is the political behavior of the state in which the organization operates. Identifying that behavior in the international arena as terrorism is difficult without a commonly accepted definition, which often allows a terrorist organization to operate outside its own borders, relying on the fact that their activities have not been identified as a crime in other states. “Without answering the question of ‘what is terrorism,’ no responsibility can be imposed on countries supporting terrorism, nor can steps be taken to combat terrorist organizations and their allies.”²² Until there is an international agreement, states must rely on other governments, which are often influenced by their own populace, to take measures against individual terrorist organizations.

The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), as an organization recognized as a terrorist organization by Turkey, its country of origin, and by many other countries, is the main concern of this article. The activities of the PKK – which are explained in more details later in this study – have netted them designation as a terrorist organization by several countries.

In October 1997, the U.S. Secretary of State first designated the PKK as a foreign terrorist organization, renewing that designation in October 1999, October 2001, and January 2004.²³ The newest State Department Foreign Terrorist Organization list continues to list the PKK.²⁴ The legal effect of designation on the list makes it unlawful for any person subject to U.S. jurisdiction to knowingly provide “material support or resources” to the PKK.²⁵ A less tangible intended effect is to “heighten public awareness and knowledge of terrorist organizations.”²⁶

20 Robert E. Goodin, *What's wrong with terrorism*, Polity (press): Cambridge UK, 2006, p. 6.

21 Sertaç Başeren, *Terrorism and Human Rights*, The Turkish Yearbook, Volume XXXm, p. 35.

22 Boaz Ganor, “Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?,” Ict, [online] available at <http://www.ict.org.il>.

23 U.S. Congress, House Resolution 796, “Condemning the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) for its ongoing terrorist attacks against Turkey and the Turkish people,” November 5, 2007, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/gpoxmlc110/hr796_ih.xml.

24 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, December 30, 2009, available at <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm>.

25 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Terrorist Organizations. The U.S. Supreme Court recently upheld provisions against material support to the PKK, even under the guise of humanitarian aid. *Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project*, Docket 08-1498, 21 June 2010.

26 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Terrorist Organizations.

Similarly, the Council of the European Union has included the PKK on its list of “persons, groups and entities...involved in terrorist acts.”²⁷ The organization was added in early 2004,²⁸ with inclusion on the list providing for a freezing of all funds, other financial assets and economic resources, and prohibiting any of those items being made available to them.²⁹

Today Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Spain, Sweden, Finland, Netherlands, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Greece have included the PKK (also known by its more recent name, KONGRA-GEL) on their list of terrorist organizations, based on the Terrorist List of the Council of European Union. Germany and France were the first EU countries to ban the PKK in 1993. The Netherlands banned the KONGRA-GEL in 2004. Other countries that have officially recognized PKK as a terrorist organization are Australia, Philippines, Kazakhstan, Canada, Moldavia, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Bulgaria.³⁰

Turkish Anti-Terror Law 3713 brings a slightly more specific definition to terrorism. According to Article 1 of the same law adopted in 1991 and amended in 2003:

Terrorism is any kind of criminal act done by one or more persons belonging to an organization with the aim of changing the characteristics of the Republic as specified in the Constitution, its political, legal, social, secular and economic system, damaging the indivisible unity of the State with its territory and nation, endangering the existence of the Turkish State and Republic, weakening or destroying or seizing the authority of the State, eliminating fundamental rights and freedoms, or damaging the internal and external security of the State, public order or general health using force and violence and by means of pressure, terror, intimidation, oppression or threat.

History of the PKK

Formation of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK³¹) goes back to 1972 when Abdullah Öcalan held his first meeting with a group of students in Ankara to form a political group with the ultimate goal of establishing an ‘independent Kurdistan.’ In 1975, the group issued its 68-page ‘manifesto,’ which drafted the organization’s program, defining its aims as the ‘independence of Kurdistan by struggling through a separatist organization.’³² In 1977, the leadership of the group convened to

27 Council of the European Union, Council Common Position 2009/468/CFSP, “updating Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism and repealing Common Position 2009/67/CFSP,” June 15, 2009.

28 The U.S. Congress makes mention of the EU designation of the PKK as a terrorist organization in H. Res. 796, noting the date as April 2004. However, a news article posted on the website Statewatch.org refers to the date as May 2, 2004.

29 European Union Factsheet, p. 1.

30 www.egm.gov.tr/temuh/mucadele9.htm, official website of the Turkish Security Directorate.

31 Partiya Karkaren Kudistan in the Kurdish language. PKK changed its name to KADEK (Kurdistan Liberty and democracy Congress) in 2002, to KONGRA-GEL (Kurdistan People’s Congress) in 2003.

32 Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, *PKK Faaliyetleri*, Ankara, 1999, p. 42-43.

assess regional activities of subgroups in the Southeast and announced its aim, under the name of the ‘Kurdistan Revolutionaries.’³³

In November 1978, the group held a meeting in Lice/Diyarbakir, which was later described as the party’s first congress, and officially announced its name as “PKK.”³⁴

The party’s organizational structure was disclosed when one of the main members of the party was arrested in 1979. In June 1979, Abdullah Öcalan escaped to Syria. The PKK announced its existence by staging an assassination attempt against Kurdish parliamentarian Mehmet Celal Bucak on July 29, 1979.³⁵

Adullah Öcalan then went to Lebanon where he made an agreement with Palestinian terrorist groups for the training of PKK members in Lebanon camps. In 1984, the organization transformed to a paramilitary organization using training camps in Syria. In August 1984, PKK militants attacked a military unit in Erüh and Semdinli/Silopi.³⁶ This attack was later followed by many other attacks and bombings against government offices, military and civilian targets.

In the mid-1990s, the PKK kidnapped foreign tourists in southeastern Anatolia and set forests on fire in tourist resorts in order to damage Turkey’s economy. In the same period, the PKK started suicide bombings. In 1998, the PKK moved its camp in Bekaa Valley/Syria to northern Iraq, establishing many small camps. In 1999, Öcalan was captured in Kenya with the help of the U.S. and was brought to Turkey to stand trial where he was subsequently sentenced to death, but the sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment.

According to information released in 1995 by the Turkish Ministry of Interior, 982 villages were evacuated in southeast Turkey due to the PKK terror.³⁷ To date, the PKK has staged numerous attacks resulting in the death of 38,000 Turkish citizens in Turkey; of whom 22,000 were military and security forces personnel.

Media Framing: The Reflection of Terrorist Activities in Print Media

As our definition established for the purposes of this article notes, a distinguishing feature of organizations considered to be terrorist is their desire to coerce. The government designation of a group as a terrorist organization is only part of the effort to defeat terrorism. The civilian population must also be persuaded that an organization’s methods and tactics serve to create a terrorist organization, no matter what that organization’s stated ideals are. The civilian population often derives their opinions through news reporting, particularly for those events that occur a long way from home. That same civilian population, once its mind is made up, can in turn influence its government.

33 Kürdistan Devrimcileri

34 Fikret Bila, *Santraç Tahtasındaki Yeni Hamleler: Hangi PKK? Ümit Yayıncılık*, Ankara, 2004, p.27.

35 Ali Nihat Özcan & O. Rengin Gün, ‘PKK’dan KADEK’e: Değişim mi, Takkiye mi?’, *Stratejik Analiz (Aylık Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Analiz Dergisi)*, ASAM Yayınları, No: 25, Ankara, May 2002, p. 45.

36 www.belgenet.com/dava/dava21.html - Öcalan Davası – İddianame.

37 www.taraf.com.tr/haber/39892.htm.

Thus organizations designated by governmental organizations as terrorists, such as the PKK, gain their power not only through their terrorist acts, but through the reporting of those acts in the print news media.

“The publicity generated by a terrorist attack and the attention focused on the perpetrators are designed to create power for the terrorists, fostering an environment of fear and intimidation amenable to terrorist manipulation.”³⁸ That publicity is most often promulgated by the news media.

Reams of paper have been used to discuss the power of the media, in general, and the influence it has over its readership/viewership, and this article is not attempting to add to that discourse. However, the media’s wielding of that influence is, in fact, of concern in the instant case. “The modern news media, as the principal conduit of information about terrorism, plays a vital part in the calculus.”³⁹

“In the words of Walter Lippmann, the news is responsible for providing the ‘pseudo-environment’ upon which we rely to experience and understand events we cannot observe directly.”⁴⁰ Zizi Papacharissi and Maria de Fatima Oliveira refer to framing as “a way of classifying that allows users to locate, perceive, identify, and label everyday occurrences.”⁴¹ “Framing theory emphasizes the ability of any entity – media, individuals, or organizations – to delineate other people’s reality, highlighting one interpretation while de-emphasizing a less favored one.”⁴² In essence, simply how a media organization presents the news can influence the reader. According to Papacharissi and Oliveira, whenever terrorist violence occurs at the media, readers are made witnesses, either face to face or in front of a television screen, they may take sides... Oftentimes moral ambiguity takes hold of them– they may share the goals of the terrorists but disapprove of their means. Hence... there is a saying that ‘one man’s terrorist is the other man’s freedom fighter.’⁴³

Certainly, news journalists have historically made the case that they aim to provide ‘balance’ in their coverage of news events. Notwithstanding, “[h]owever balanced coverage is, problems of pervasive influence remain, which are of course compounded when the coverage is unbalanced.”⁴⁴ There are several factors involved that can influence how the media coverage of a given event is perceived.

There is power in words. How a news story itself is written, how the news story ‘names’ an organization, and where that information is physically placed within the story can all influence how a reader perceives the ‘news’ and that organization.

38 Bruce Hoffman, “A Form of Psychological Warfare,” May 11, 2009 (<http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2008/April/20080522172318SrenoD0.7353784.html>), p. 1.

39 Hoffman, p. 2.

40 Zizi Papacharissi and Maria de Fatima Oliveira, “News Frames Terrorism: A Comparative Analysis of Frames employed in Terrorism Coverage in U.S. and U.K. Newspapers,” Sage Publications, 2008, p. 52-53, downloaded from <http://hij.sagepub.com>.

41 Papacharissi and Oliveira, p. 53-54.

42 Papacharissi and Oliveira, p. 54.

43 Aytaç Önder, “The relationship between the mass media and the State on terrorism: A case study of terrorist attack to the World Trade Center,” A thesis submitted to the Graduate School of Social Science of Middle East Technical University, March 2002, p. 195.

44 Önder, p. 213.

The first factor is the “rhetorical tradition” employed by the journalist.⁴⁵ An “information tradition” presents a story in a straightforward, informational manner, which serves to convey the news with calm dispassion and is less likely to evoke an emotional response or a fearful reaction. A “sensationalism tradition” trades on emotion, with the news material presented in a manner that emphasizes alarm, threat provocation, anger, and fear. The “feature story tradition” tells a story, often focusing on individuals as heroes or villains, or perpetrators. The “didactic tradition” focuses on explanation and education, potentially providing analysis and cause/effect of actions reported upon.⁴⁶ The journalist thus can influence the reader by engaging his or her emotions, such as sympathy and compassion, or anger and outrage, all by the manner in which the journalists chooses to craft the story. And all the while, the media can support its position by stating that as long as the facts in the story are accurate, the creative license of the journalist in crafting the story is acceptable, even if that journalist’s “creativity” serves to influence the readership in a manner directly contrary to the position of the government.

The second factor is the words themselves. The terms used to define activities and organizations as used in a story can impact how the issue is perceived by the reader. It is widely accepted that choice of words in news reports is by no mean arbitrary. To some extent, wording is not a journalist’s own creation, but the representation or reflection of the social, political or religious ideas shared by the social group the journalist belongs to.”⁴⁷ The subtle, and sometimes not so subtle, distinction between different words used to describe a terrorist organization can either garner sympathy or foster a negative opinion for the philosophies of that organization. “The actual ability to name, and to have that name accepted by an audience, holds great power.”⁴⁸ “...the modern terrorist wants to be known as a freedom fighter, a guerilla, a militant, an insurgent, a rebel, a revolutionary – anything but a terrorist, a killer of random innocents.”⁴⁹

A third factor is the placement of words or definitions within the print story itself. The journalist style of writing is called the “inverted pyramid.” In this style, the most important and substantive information is placed at the beginning of the story, in the lead and within the first three to four paragraphs. Then, less substantive information, such as background information, is placed in the story in some type of logical order, often chronological. The philosophy behind this style of writing is two-fold. First, it allows for relative ease in editing, as the editor can conceivably cut paragraphs up from the bottom of the article, without fear of removing substantive content from the article. Second, it has become commonly accepted that most readers only read the first two to three paragraphs of a news story, thus allowing them to digest more information from the vast amounts

45 Önder, p. 213, citing Robert G. Picard, *Media Portrayals of Terrorism: Functions and Meaning of News Coverage*, State University Press: Iowa, 1993, p. 230.

46 Önder, p. 213-214, citing Picard.

47 Lei Gong, “Divergence Behind Consensus: A critical discourse analysis of Australian and Chinese press coverage of Athens’ preparations for the 2004 Olympic Games,” Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Australian and New Zealand Communication Association, Christchurch, New Zealand, 4-7 July 2005, p. 4.

48 Michael V. Bhatia, “Fighting Words: naming terrorists, bandits, rebels and other violent actors,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 5-22, 2005, p. 9.

49 Laqueur, p. 3.

of news sources available to them. The Pew Research Center found “that among those who read a paper the day before, 62% spent half an hour or more with it. Another 12% spent less than 15 minutes, and 26% spent 15 to 29 minutes.”⁵⁰ With that little time being spent with a newspaper, it is likely readers spend a minimum amount of time with each story. Thus, even if a news story reports on activities by an organization, but does not refer to that organization as a ‘terrorist’ one until near the end of the story, it is likely the reader would form a different opinion of that organization than if it were called a ‘terrorist’ organization in the headline. Even if the reader makes it to the end of the story, he or she has been conditioned to know that the less important facts are found near the end. It is more likely the reader would discount the pronouncement of the organization being a ‘terrorist organization’ if it were found in the last paragraphs of the story.

Methodology

As one of the most prominent research tools in mass media studies, content analysis is a research methodology that utilizes a set of procedures to make inferences from the text. Early application of content analysis started in 1920s to the early 1930s. Called the ‘renaissance of content analysis,’ the second period began in the 1930s with the work of Harold D. Lasswell and his colleagues. The studies of Lasswell caused the expansion of communication studies and content analysis techniques.

Content analysis has been defined in many different ways, from the classical definition of Berelson to that of the modern era. Berelson, the pioneer of this field, defines content analysis as “a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication.”⁵¹ A similar definition was offered later by Kerlinger, who defined content analysis as “a method of studying and analyzing communication in a systematic, objective and quantitative manner for the purpose of measuring a variable.”⁵² Walizer and Wienir defined content analysis as “any systematic procedure which is devised to examine the content of recorded information.”⁵³ Krippendorff’s definition of content analysis is similar to the definition of others, except that concepts such as communication, objectivity, systematization and quantification were not part of his definition. His definition of content analysis is ‘a research technique for making replicable and valid references from data to their context.’⁵⁴ Krippendorff believes that the concept of replication contains both characteristics of ‘objectivity’ and ‘systematization’ in Berelson’s definition. He has further excluded some concepts in Berelson’s definition such as ‘manifest’ and ‘quantitative.’ His interpretation gives content analysis a broader definition than Berelson. Although most of the definitions are quite similar, Berelson’s definition, which contains the major scientific

50 The Pew Research Center 2005 Annual Report – Newspaper Audience, March 15, 2005, found at <http://www.journalism.org/node/913>.

51 B. Berelson, *Content Analysis in Communication Research*, Free Press, New York, 1952, p. 22.

52 Fred Kerlinger, *Foundations of Behavioral Research*, Rinehart and Winston Press, New York, 1986, p. 477.

53 Michael H. Walizer, and Paul L. Weinir, *Research Methods and Analysis: Searching for Relationships*, Harper and Row Ltd, New York, 1978, p. 343.

54 Klaus Krippendorff, *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology*, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1980, p. 130.

characteristic of the research method and Krippendorff's definition, is adopted in this study as it brings a broader definition and is not restricted to the quantitative and qualitative searches.

This study examines media coverage of the PKK organization in Turkey by a Turkish, a U.S. and a Dutch newspaper and how the discourse of Turkish newspapers differed from that of the U.S. and Dutch newspapers about the PKK and its designation as a terrorist organization.

Three comparatively similar liberal newspapers were chosen for analysis in this study: the Turkish language *Hürriyet* in Turkey, a center-right daily with the largest daily circulation in Turkey; *The New York Times*, considered only one of three U.S. "national" newspapers; and the Dutch language *Rotterdam NRC Handelsblad*, a prestigious left-of-center daily in The Netherlands. A Dutch newspaper was chosen specifically since The Netherlands has allowed PKK training camps to function within its borders and allow broadcasts of the pro-PKK Firat News Agency from Amsterdam. These three newspapers were selected because of their high readership and because they are influential in setting the tone for coverage in their respective countries. *The New York Times* and the *Rotterdam NRC Handelsblad* were specifically chosen due to their widespread readership among policy makers and opinion makers of their respective countries.

The sample was assembled by searching in the archives of the newspapers' websites. 'PKK' was used as the keyword to yield the most comprehensive sample. Articles from April 6, 2009, to December 31, 2009, were analyzed. The starting date was specifically chosen as that was the day President Barack Obama delivered a speech at the Turkish Grand National Parliament during his first overseas presidential visit to Turkey.

President Obama assured the U.S.'s support to Turkey in Turkey's fight against the terrorist PKK during his 26-minute speech by noting

Iraq, Turkey, and the United States face a common threat from terrorism. That includes the Al Qaeda terrorists who have sought to drive Iraqis apart and to destroy their country. And that includes the PKK. There is no excuse for terror against any nation. As President, and as a NATO ally, I pledge that you will have our support against the terrorist activities of the PKK. These efforts will be strengthened by the continued work to build ties of cooperation between Turkey, the Iraqi government, and Iraq's Kurdish leaders, and by your continued efforts to promote education and opportunity for Turkey's Kurds.⁵⁵

Another factor which increases the importance of this period, especially from the media coverage point of view, is the announcement of the 'democratic initiative' – a reform plan announced by the Turkish government consisting of a series of political solutions to address the Kurdish issue in Turkey. This reform plan was initially announced by President Abdullah Gül in May 2009 who said 'positive developments will happen about the Kurdish issue.' Soon after, the government announced it was working on a reform called the 'democratic initiative' to address the Kurdish issue. Although none of the officials announced the details of the reform package, the issue occupied the agenda for months due to its importance.

The analysis proceeded in four steps: first, analyzing comparison of coverage between sample

55 <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/11376661.asp> (Turkish Daily News in English).

newspapers; second, analyzing how the PKK as an organization is described in newspaper reporting, i.e. as ‘terrorist’, ‘rebel’, ‘insurgent’ or ‘guerilla’; third, how the PKK is delineated in headlines; and fourth, where in the story the references to the PKK as a terrorist organization are found, if present at all. All articles included were screened to verify they were fit for inclusion, thus yielding a sample of 2,474 articles: 2,455 from the *Hürriyet*, 17 from *The New York Times*, and two from the *NRC Handelsblad*.

Analysis

It is generally accepted that choice of words in news reports is not random. In fact, wording is the representation and/or reflection of the political and social ideas of the group to which the journal belongs. Therefore, the selection of words on a specific issue can be considered as a reflection of the belief/ideology of the group the journal represents.

This study examined media coverage and wording describing the PKK by three national newspapers in three countries. The comparative review of coverage of the issue in three newspapers from April 6 to December 31, 2009, shows considerable quantitative difference in terms of coverage by the Turkish newspaper involved, a national newspaper reporting domestic terrorist issues, and the U.S. and Dutch newspapers. ‘PKK’ appeared in 2,455 reports of *Hürriyet* within the examined period, while *The New York Times* reported 17 stories, and the *Handelsblad* reported two times within the same period.

Hürriyet daily published, in total, 2,455 articles from April 6 to December 31, 2009, on or related to the PKK. Of the 2,455 reports, 1,852 were news while 603 were commentaries (see Table 2 for more details).

From April 6 to April 30, 2009, *Hürriyet* covered 258 reports related to the PKK. Of the 258, there were 214 news and 44 commentary stories. The PKK was mentioned in 42 (of the 214) headlines, and three times in the commentary (out of 44) headlines.

Hürriyet covered 262 reports related to the PKK during May 2009. Of the 262 stories, 201 were news and 61 were commentaries. The PKK was mentioned in 48 headlines of the 201 news stories, and six times in the headlines of the 61 commentaries on the PKK in the same period.

Hürriyet published 188 reports related to the PKK in June 2009. Of the 188, 161 were news stories and 27 were commentaries. The PKK was mentioned in 39 headlines of the 161 news stories, while it was mentioned once in the commentary headlines during the month.

In July 2009, *Hürriyet* published 160 reports related to the PKK. Of the 160, 115 were news stories, while 45 were commentaries. The name of the PKK did not appear in any of the commentary headlines in July, while it appeared 26 times in headlines of the 115 reported news pieces during the month.

In August 2009, *Hürriyet* published a total of 283 reports related to the PKK. Of them, 197 were news stories and 86 were commentaries. The name PKK appeared in 43 headlines of the 197 news reports, while it appeared in three of the 86 commentaries in the same period.

Hürriyet covered 248 reports related to the PKK in September 2009. Of the 248, 186 were news stories and 62 were commentaries. The name PKK was noted in 35 news headlines, and four times in the commentary headlines.

In October 2009, *Hürriyet* published a total of 382 reports related to the PKK. Of them, 276 were news stories and 106 were commentaries. The name of the PKK appeared in 65 headlines of the 276 and eight headlines of the 106 commentaries during the month. Although October did not have the highest coverage in the examined period, the name of the PKK appeared in the news/commentary headlines more than other months.

In November 2009, *Hürriyet* published 234 PKK-related reports. Of the 234, 174 were news stories and 60 were commentaries. The name of the PKK appeared in 44 headlines of the 174 news reports, while it appeared in three headlines of the 60 commentaries within the month.

Hürriyet had the highest PKK coverage in December 2009 with 440 reports. Of them, 328 were news stories and 112 were commentaries. The name PKK appeared in 49 headlines of the 328 news stories, while in six of the 112 commentaries during the month (Table 2 and Figure 1).

The New York Times daily published 17 articles from April 6 to December 31, 2009, on or related to the PKK. Of the 17 reports, one was a transcript of a speech, one was a news blog, three were editorial/op-ed pieces, and 12 were news stories (see Table 1 for more details).

From April 6 to April 30, 2009, *The New York Times* ran three reports related to the PKK. Of the three, there was one news story, one transcript, and one news blog. The PKK was not named in any of the headlines.

The New York Times had one story in June 2009, an op-ed⁵⁶ piece. The PKK was not named in the headline.

The New York Times published one story in September 2009, a news story. The PKK was not named in the headline.

In October 2009, *The New York Times* ran one story related to the PKK. It was a news story that did not name the PKK in the headline.

In November 2009, *The New York Times* carried five stories related to the PKK. Of them, there were three news stories, one op-ed piece, and one editorial. The PKK was not specifically named in any headline.

The New York Times carried six reports related to the PKK in December 2009. All were news stories, none of which named the PKK in the headline.

NRC Handelsblad reflected far less interest in the PKK organization as there were only two stories published in the newspaper within the stated time period (see Table 1 for details). One article was a news story while the other was an editorial. The news story, published in October 2009, uses the name PKK in the headline, while the editorial, published in December 2009, did not.

The newspaper articles were also analyzed to detect the most influential words in each newspaper's coverage of PKK.

In all of the *Hürriyet* reportings, the 'PKK' is directly referred to as "terrorist" and a "terrorist organization" throughout the body of each individual article, while *The New York Times* uses a

⁵⁶ In this context, an "op-ed" piece is an opinion piece written by a guest author who is typically not a professional journalist.

variety of synonyms when referring to the organization. Figure 2 demonstrates the words used, and how often, in the 17 stories published by *The New York Times*, with the words often interspersed seemingly at random through a given story. The most common references seem to be to “separatists” and “rebels,” often combining them with other descriptors, such as “separatist militants,” or “guerillas of the PKK, a rebel movement.” In only three instances is the PKK specifically called a “terrorist organization,” with one of those comments found in a quote by a Turkish politician. There were four references made to the fact that Turkey, the U.S. and the European Union have listed the PKK as a terrorist organization.

The *NRC Handelsblad* was equally creative in its descriptors of the PKK. While calling PKK members “separatists” and “warriors,” it only uses the word “terrorism” in noting that the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, was imprisoned “because of terrorism.”

Again, as *Hürriyet* is so liberal in its use of the words “terrorists” and “terrorist organization,” one can find them throughout the body of each *Hürriyet* article, from the headline, to the lead, to the final paragraph of the story. A reader does not have to get far into the story to perceive that the writers and editors of *Hürriyet* are quite comfortable naming the PKK as terrorist. There is more reluctance on the part of the U.S. and Dutch newspapers to draw that conclusion for their readership. “To the disdain of some conservative writers in the USA, certain segments of the media (namely the BBC) are decidedly reluctant to use the term ‘terrorist,’ referring only to terrorist attacks and instead labeling these perpetrators as ‘militants’ or ‘rebels.’”⁵⁷

The plethora of word choices will appear almost anywhere in a given story, from the lead to later in the story. In *The New York Times* articles, the words “terrorist” or “terrorist” organization are never used in the headlines, although “militants” and “rebels” are each used once. The more typical reference in the headlines is to “Kurds.” If the story is specifically about an action taken by the PKK, the descriptors will be used in the bridge (second) paragraph or the top third of the article. If the article is a more general story that mentions the PKK in a more general way when discussing the political environment in Turkey, the descriptors are found lower in the story, near the middle or bottom third. The *NRC Handelsblad* articles use the word “separatist” either in the first or second paragraph of the stories.

Again, this variety of words can certainly evoke different feelings in the media readership than using the word “terrorist” because these words have more defined meanings that differ from that of a terrorist. For example, a separatist is one who fights for cultural, ethnic, or racial separation, as “[t]he cause of separatist nationalism is simply the violation of the principle of self-determination for some proper nation.”⁵⁸ The use of the word “warrior” brings to mind an honorable fighter, while similarly, a “rebel” is often thought of as the underdog fighting against a tyrant. And a “guerilla” is considered a pseudo-military member fighting a regular war in an irregular manner, not one who plants a bomb on a bus killing innocent civilians.

57 Bhatia, p. 11.

58 Fearon, James D., *Separatist Wars, Partition, and World Order*, “Security Studies,” Stanford University, May 21, 2004, p. 7, found at <http://www.stanford.edu/%7Ejfeaton/papers/partifinal.pdf>.

Conclusion

Despite President Barack Obama's clear message on the U.S. government's determination in supporting Turkey in its fight against the terrorist organization PKK during his visit to Ankara on April 6, the U.S. media has not paid substantial and persistent attention to President Obama's words, which reflect the U.S. government policy toward Turkey. Similarly, despite the fact that the PKK is defined as a terrorist organization by the European Council, the issue has received penurious attention of the Dutch media.

There are a few major related incidents which had the possibility of affecting media coverage of the PKK: President Barack Obama's visit to Ankara on April 6, announcement of the Turkish government's 'democratic initiative' in May, repatriation of the first Kurdish group from northern Iraq in October, and the Turkish Constitutional Court's decision to close the Kurdish party DTP.⁵⁹ The coverage of *Hürriyet* increased in parallel with the political developments as noted above. However, a similar connection has not been observed in the coverage by *The New York Times* and the Dutch *Handelsblad* (see Table 1 for details).

The U.S. and Dutch media show a marked reluctance to directly name the PKK as terrorist, although they do not necessarily show that same hesitancy for other groups that may have a more direct impact on the daily lives of the men and women in their countries. This result should not come as a surprise.

But these words chosen to be used can evoke a variety of emotions, not just a negative one. A "rebel" can connote a positive image in a country that was founded on revolution while a "guerilla" might conjure up images of an organized military that fights "dirty." These words have meaning and the readership forms its perceptions of an organization or issue based on those words. Public opinion goes a long way to persuading governmental action in a country that prides itself on its democratic process. And as defined, a terrorist organization thrives on its ability to persuade a government.

As the results of this study affirm, media do not show much attention to terrorist activity taking place in another region of the world, especially when the terrorist act does not pose a direct threat to the society the media represents. This lack of attention by media and its selection of not calling a declared terrorist group as 'terrorist' can cause a lack of support for the policies of the individual media's governments. Furthermore, the deliberate usage of words other than "terrorist" contributes to the terrorist organizations reaching their aims, which allows the media to ultimately play a more biased role in forming/informing public opinion.

59 Democratic Society Party

Table 1: Breakdown of Media Reports

	April(as of 4/6)	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December
Hürriyet	258	262	188	160	283	248	382	234	440
The New York Times	3	-	1	-	-	1	1	5	6
Handelsblad	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1

Table 2: Breakdown of PKK Reports in Hürriyet

	April (as of 4/6)	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December
News	214	201	161	115	197	186	276	174	328
Commentary	44	61	27	45	86	62	106	60	112
Total	258	262	188	160	283	248	382	234	440

Figure 1: Monthly Breakdown of Hürriyet Articles





Figure 2: Word descriptors used by The New York Times





The Challenges of NATO-UN Interoperability to Better Fight against Terrorism

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Abstract: *The mutual defense pledge in Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty was based on the UN Charter's recognition of the inherent right of states to individual and collective self-defense. However, during the Cold War, the Alliance had no significant interactions with the UN Security Council or UN agencies. The Allies focused on collective defense and deterrence as the basis for diplomacy with their adversaries to the East. From NATO's engagement in Afghanistan since 2002-2003, there have been the significant drivers of the Alliance's increasingly extensive cooperation with other international organizations, as UN belong definitely to aiming, among others objectives, better approach to fight terrorism.*

Keywords: *United Nations, Comprehensive Cooperation, Fight against Terrorism, Security Council, NATO Response Force, North Atlantic Treaty Organization.*

Introduction

Prior to September 11, 2001, terrorism was only one among a large and growing number of international security concerns. Since then it has moved to the center of concerns of the international community. Terrorism is considered to be a force hindering the development of liberal, open and democratic societies governed by the rule of law. It is a global threat affecting virtually every country but there is no commonly agreed definition of terrorism. Between the 1930s and the end of the Cold war, over 100 definitions have been published. The total today is no doubt considerably greater. Any

definition has to be acceptable by all, but the deep subjectivity of the word explains that no definition has received universal approval thus far. However, some universal norms and characteristics that are largely accepted to define terrorism are the use of illegal violence or force (today this includes the use of WMD-devices as well); a non-governmental phenomenon and violence used against civilians, who are per se innocent.

Irrational terrorism does not exist; terrorists are always seeking to achieve certain goals. Terrorism is intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, ideological or economical/social. However, UNSC Resolution 1373, adopted soon after 9/11 terrorist attacks, implicitly defines terrorism as consisting of terrorist acts irrespective of their causes and goals. Hence, goals and motives of the terrorist cannot justify terrorist acts. Terrorism is about power, a kind of power that makes change happen in the long term rather than instantly. Terrorism never loses its essential nature, which is the abuse of the innocent in the service of political power. The ingredients of “international terrorism” are: group commitments to international revolution, the willingness of foreign governments and populaces to help and the sympathies of national diasporas. The ingredients vary in different phases or waves of international terrorism and do not always mix well.

Contemporary terrorism reveals new trends and dangers, which were tragically demonstrated by the unprecedented attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001. Not only did this show the terrorists’ ability and willingness to use new methods of killing and destruction but also that the nature of terrorism is changing in terms of organization and operational approach. Terrorists are organized in dispersed units that are interconnected within networks attuned to the information age. Religion is a particular part of contemporary terrorism. Religious terrorists feel divinely justified and entitled to commit terrorist acts. Therefore they can be more savage, suicidal, etc. In this context, a distinction needs to be made between the word ‘Islamic’ and the word ‘Islamist.’ The former signifies religion whereas the latter signifies a political ideology inspired by religion. Although nothing in Islam advocates terrorism even implicitly, small groups of adepts of Islamist ideology resort to terrorist acts. However, it should be kept in mind that other religions have their fundamentalists and terrorists as well. Efforts by the international community to combat acts of terrorism have led to the conclusion of several multilateral conventions. These conventions are directed at specific types of terrorist conduct, such as sabotage, hijacking, attacks on diplomats and hostage taking. They oblige states to prosecute an alleged offender found within their territory or to extradite them. None of the current multilateral anti-terrorism conventions provide for economic or other sanctions against states that assist terrorists or offer them a safe haven.

In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States, the international community realized that terrorism, as a global phenomenon, must be combated in a spirit of solidarity. Following these attacks, NATO invoked Article 5, its mutual defense clause, for the first time in its history, declaring the attacks to be an attack against all member countries. This landmark decision was followed by practical measures to assist the United States. In this context the Allies agreed to take measures, individually and collectively, to expand the options available in the campaign against terrorism and to commence the establishment of cooperation with international organizations, specifically with the United Nations.

Legitimate Compliances

The preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty begins with the statement that “The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.” The North Atlantic Treaty refers repeatedly to the UN Charter, and UN Security Council resolutions have furnished the basis for almost all non-Article 5 NATO operations. Moreover, the Allies have reported to the Security Council about all their operations involving the use of force, including the Operation Allied Force air campaign in the 1999 Kosovo conflict, even though the Allies undertook this operation without benefit of an explicit UN Security Council resolution. While the UN Security Council’s exceptional responsibilities in international security constitute a central aspect of the NATO-UN relationship, the UN offers much more than a framework of legitimacy for the actions of the Alliance and other international organizations. Since the early 1990s, the UN’s specialized departments and agencies have worked closely with the Alliance in coordination with other international organizations and non-governmental organizations. NATO-UN coordination has sometimes been sub-optimal, notably in the Balkans in the early 1990s, but significant lessons have been learned.

While the framers of the North Atlantic Treaty reaffirmed in Article 7 “the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security,” they deliberately excluded any reference to any of the articles in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Article 52, part of Chapter VIII, refers to “regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action.” Article 53, also part of Chapter VIII, declares that “regional arrangements or agencies” are unable to undertake enforcement actions without the approval of the UN Security Council: “no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.”

According to Article 24 of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council bears “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.” Moreover, Article 103 of the UN Charter asserts its supremacy in relation to all other treaties: “In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.” However, the authors of the Charter recognized that the UN Security Council might be incapable of timely and effective action, and for this reason referred explicitly in Article 51 to “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense.” Article 51 furnished the basis for the collective defense pledge in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Allies have agreed since 1949 that the Alliance is not a regional arrangement or agency under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, and that the Alliance is not subordinate to the Security Council. Subordinating NATO to the Security Council could in practice mean subordinating it to Russia and China.

Another problem with defining NATO as “a regional arrangement or agency,” one that has become apparent since 9/11, is that this would contradict the potentially global reach of its defense and security tasks. Because the Allies have always rejected the idea of a Chapter VIII-style dependence on the UN Security Council, it was not entirely surprising that they were prepared to use force in the 1999 Kosovo conflict in the absence of an explicit UN Security Council mandate to do so. The Allies have not agreed, however, on how to formulate the justification for using

force in non-Article 5 operations: that is, for purposes other than self-defense without an explicit mandate from the UN Security Council. They finessed this issue in the 1999 Strategic Concept: NATO recalls its offer, made in Brussels in 1994, to support on a case-by-case basis in accordance with its own procedures, peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise. In this context NATO recalls its subsequent decisions with respect to crisis response operations in the Balkans. In the latter sentence the Allies acknowledged obliquely that they had used force in the Kosovo conflict without an explicit authorization from the UN Security Council. In the same document, however, the Allies also reaffirmed among the “fundamental security tasks” of the Alliance the following definition of “Crisis Management: To stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in conformity with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations.”¹

This was noteworthy because, according to Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, “This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.” In other words, the Allies referred in the 1999 Strategic Concept to both their strong preference that the UN Security Council effectively bear “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” and to the fact that they had been chosen to use force in the absence of an explicit UN Security Council mandate. While all Allies held that Operation Allied Force (the air campaign in the Kosovo conflict) was justified on grounds of humanitarian necessity, some Allies also based their policy on interpretations of relevant UN Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 1199 of 23 September 1998, although no UNSC resolution explicitly authorized the Alliance’s use of force in the Kosovo conflict.

The Allies agreed that they had an “appropriate” or “sufficient legal base in international law” for their use of force, but they did not agree on its specific content. The Allies were therefore not able to make a common declaration about the official legal basis for their use of force. Each Ally was responsible for formulating its own national justification, and some Allies chose to make reference both to humanitarian necessity and UN Security Council resolutions.² Some declared that NATO’s use of force in the Kosovo conflict was an exceptional case that should not be regarded as a precedent, but no such statement was included in the 1999 Strategic Concept. As long ago as 1993, Manfred Wörner, then the Secretary General of NATO, said that “NATO cannot be regarded as an instrument or as a military sub-contractor to the United Nations. Nor do we expect that the United Nations should accept NATO’s leadership. Both must retain the possibility to act independently.”³ The Allies generally agree that NATO’s legal bases for action, including the use of force, are not limited to UN Security Council resolutions, and encompass “humanitarian necessity” and other principles in addition to the inherent right to self-defense recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter.

1 North Atlantic Council, *Strategic Concept*, 24 April 1999, para. 10.

2 Leurdijk, Dick A., “*NATO as a Subcontractor to the United Nations: The Cases of Bosnia and Kosovo*”, pp. 130-132, 135-137.

3 Wörner, Manfred, “*Speech at the annual conference of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Brussels*”, 10 September 1993.

Collaboration Dilemmas

NATO needs the UN because the Allies would strongly prefer to rely on UN Security Council resolutions as a legal basis for non-Article 5 operations and a political framework of legitimacy for such operations. This legal basis and political framework help the Alliance by furnishing a context for the contributions of other international organizations and non-governmental organizations in demanding tasks such as stabilization and reconstruction, state-building, and promoting sustainable security. The political legitimacy provided by a UN Security Council resolution creates a “moral atmosphere” in which NATO is more readily perceived as part of the solution. The UN framework enables NATO and its diverse partners, including NGOs and other international organizations, to justify their actions as consistent with the will of “the international community.”

This has been politically helpful with regard to sensitive missions such as the training of Iraqi security forces.⁴ Aside from its legitimization functions, the UN has been significant to NATO in the conduct of operations. Since the dysfunctional “dual key” episode of 1993-1995, the Alliance has learned how to define the terms of reference for NATO-UN interactions concerning command and control in a more productive fashion. The three NATO Allies that are permanent members of the UN Security Council have played an important role in this regard. Moreover, the NATO Allies regard UN leadership in the coordination of multilateral stabilization and reconstruction efforts as highly desirable, as with the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). UN offices and agencies such as the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO), the Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the UN Development Program (UNDP), and the Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) have capabilities unmatched by any other organizations.

Operations in the field have clarified the functions of the Special Representatives of the UN Secretary General in interacting with NATO and the roles of staff from UN agencies and departments, including the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) and the Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The UN needs NATO because the Alliance has resources, expertise, skills, and capacity. NATO’s ‘capacity’ resides not only in its military capabilities but its experience in preparing and leading nations to work together in complex multinational and multi-service operations. NATO has an unrivaled capacity to offer large-scale support and to sustain a long-term commitment. NATO has also developed expertise in defense and security sector reform through its partnership and enlargement programs. For NATO to act in non-Article 5 contingencies, many Allies would prefer that NATO receive a request from the UN and another international organization, such as the African Union, or from a specific government, such as Iraq. NATO military authorities cannot formulate plans without a tasking from the North Atlantic Council, which has to agree on the need for a plan of action or preliminary concept of operations, and many Allies would prefer that the request come before military authorities begin to devise solutions involving action. Some observers have described this as a chicken-and-egg problem, with people in various nations and organizations

4 In response to the request of the Iraqi Interim Government, and in accordance with [UN Security Council] Resolution 1546 which requests international and regional organizations to contribute assistance to the Multinational Force, NATO’s assistance was offered to the government of Iraq with the training of its security forces.” Statement on Iraq Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Istanbul, 28 June 2004.

wondering how a question is viewed at NATO HQ and waiting for external requests and/or planning tasking from the North Atlantic Council. Some observers argue that, if the North Atlantic Council is to make more informed decisions, with sound military advice, methods have to be devised to commission planning for potential operations while making it clear that no decision to undertake operations will necessarily follow. The main obstacle to devising such methods is political.

Some Allies are opposed in principle to expanding the number and scope of NATO operations, particularly in areas far from Europe, such as Africa and Asia. However, these Allies found it politically impossible to say no when the African Union requested transport assistance in the Darfur crisis and the UN requested help with earthquake relief in Pakistan. Political factors influence decision-making on the requesting side as well. In Darfur decision-making, the UN has often taken an “arm’s length” attitude toward NATO and has endeavored to maintain the UN’s primacy. UN officials have understood that the UN will need further NATO assistance in the Darfur crisis, but have been cautious about giving it much visibility, owing to persistent perceptions of NATO as a US-led Cold War military organization. The political problems as well as the chicken-and-egg sequencing difficulty in planning might be surmounted to some degree, Allied experts hope, through the “comprehensive approach.” If inter-institutional contacts are cultivated through regular exchanges, and greater mutual knowledge is developed, planning requests might be anticipated and dealt with more expeditiously.

Lessons Learned?

The dysfunctional “dual key” experience has been a factor contributing to close attention by NATO Allies to negotiations within the UNSC about the formulation and renewal of UNSC resolutions mandating operations, notably with respect to command and control arrangements. NATO governments have been concerned that the UNSCRs be practical and consistent with projected NATO operations, such as KFOR and ISAF. The “dual key” debacle in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992-1995 helps to explain the reference to “unified command and control” for an “international security presence with substantial North Atlantic Treaty Organization participation” in the pivotal resolution concerning Kosovo.⁵ Practical NATO-UN coordination in the field has benefited from the many operational lessons learned since the early 1990s. The NATO commanders of KFOR and ISAF meet regularly for substantive information exchanges with the local Special Representatives of the Secretary General (SRSG) of the UN. The UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) coordinates the work of other UN bodies, such as the UNDP and the UN drug control effort. NATO works with UNAMA via the Commander of ISAF and his subordinates and via NATO’s Senior Civilian Representative (SCR). NATO has been trying for years to establish a continuing relationship with the UN instead of an ad hoc crisis relationship based on a “reactive” perspective. Ad hoc case-by-case arrangements may be too dependent on individual personalities. In setting up operations, it would be advantageous to rely on a relationship based on mutual knowledge and confidence instead of ignorance or mistrust. The miscommunications regarding the Pakistan and Darfur operations show that the two organizations could benefit from a regular dialogue at senior and staff levels and an established pattern of cooperation, and enhance the fight against terrorism.

5 UNSC resolution 1244 (1999), Annex 2, para. 4.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Adopted at the NATO Strasbourg / Kehl Summit, the Heads of the State reaffirmed the Alliance's support to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and recognized the value of enhancing cooperation between the two organizations.⁶ The dialogue between NATO and UN representatives has taken place regarding peacekeeping, disarmament, counter-terrorism, human trafficking, crisis management, security sector reform, stabilization and reconstruction, women in armed conflict, arms control, small arms disarmament, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and actual cooperation has taken place regarding some of these challenges. NATO is particularly interested in improved coordination concerning operations, small arms disarmament, and humanitarian and disaster relief, as in Pakistan after the 2005 earthquake. NATO involvement in the UN Peacebuilding Commission may therefore be advisable at some point. The UNSC's Counter-Terrorism Committee might also benefit from NATO contributions. In order to cultivate more permanent and institutionalized relationships, some observers have suggested that it might be advantageous for NATO to become an observer in the UN General Assembly. The Alliance is also engaged in a far-reaching transformation of its forces and capabilities to better deter and defend against terrorism, and is working closely with partner countries and organizations to ensure broad cooperation in the fight against terrorism.

At present NATO has no institutional status at the UN. Unlike the European Union, the OSCE, and many other organizations, NATO is not an observer in the UN General Assembly (UNGA). In view of the fact that the General Assembly's rules of procedure call for "a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting" for decisions "on important questions,"⁷ some observers maintain that such a vote would be required for NATO to become an observer in the General Assembly. However, other international security organizations have in the recent past been accorded such status without a vote. A more significant step forward might be to expand NATO representation at UN HQ. From 1992 to 2007, there were temporary NATO representatives at UN HQ from the Operations Division of the International Military Staff. Adding a civilian representative would double the number of NATO personnel at UN HQ. This could be advantageous because, whether temporary or permanent, the NATO representative has always been a military officer. This has backed the widespread and incorrect impression in the UN that NATO is simply a military organization. Adding a NATO civilian representative at UN HQ could help to counter that impression and enhance NATO's ability to contribute to deliberations concerning terrorism, disarmament, and other issues.⁸ Experts have estimated that around 75 percent of the work done by the NATO representative is political and only 25 percent requires military expertise. By the same token, it would be beneficial to restore UN representation at NATO HQ.

6 Strasbourg / Kehl Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg / Kehl on 4 April 2009.

7 *Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly* (New York: United Nations, 2006), A/520/Rev. 16, p. 23, Rule 83. There are no provisions relating to UNGA observer status in these rules of procedure or in the UN Charter.

8 Benedikta von Seherr-Thoss, "A New Strategic Partnership? Deepening UN-NATO Relations," presented at the DGAP (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik) New Faces Conference, Oslo, 20-22 October 2006, p. 6.

The UN office in Brussels appears to be oriented mainly to working with the EU, and its interactions with NATO have been limited to matters such as arranging for the UN Secretary General's visit to NATO Headquarters. Since inaccurate perceptions of NATO constitute one of the major obstacles to better relations with the UN, the Alliance might be well-advised to pursue more effective public diplomacy regarding its contributions to operations. NATO has, for example, unique skills in defense sector reform and genuine achievements in helping to build defense ministries with democratic oversight mechanisms conforming to international conventions, but its non-military tools and accomplishments are little-known. As one expert has noted, many people in the United Nations and other international organizations have yet to learn that "NATO is not just bombing" and that NATO can make contributions in areas in addition to conducting military operations and establishing a secure environment for the activities of other organizations. Observer status in the UN General Assembly for NATO and increased NATO representation at UN HQ might furnish means to clear up at least some misperceptions about NATO. Distorted images of the Alliance in the UN probably reflect differing organizational histories and cultures as well as ignorance.

The tasks of communication in the interests of improved cooperation facing the Alliance are accordingly formidable. Some NATO Allies might also have reservations about arrangements that could imply a degree of automation in Alliance commitment to UNSC-requested action. In 2002-2003, during early discussions of the possible roles of the NATO Response Force, some Allies raised the idea of making the NRF available as a rapid reaction force for the UN, but this did not win consensus in the Alliance. Despite the mutual needs of NATO and the UN, questions of autonomy in the use of force and its legitimate basis will probably continue to complicate the relationship. The Allies have often repeated the reference in Article 7 of the North Atlantic Treaty to "the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security."

However the Alliance has retained a "right to decide autonomously on the use of force, without a formal authorization by the UN Security Council, given its character as a collective defense organization."⁹ Respect for the principle of collectivism would impel a state to remain passive in the face of what it regarded as aggression, if no collective determination of the fact of aggression and authorization of counteraction were forthcoming. Adherence to the collective security maxim that anybody's aggression threatens everybody's stake in world order would impel a state to take action on the basis of its own judgment that aggression had occurred, even without benefit of collective legitimization.¹⁰

The principle confirming a state's right to take action against aggression, terrorism and in support of collective security, even in the absence of an explicit authorization from a universal international organization, would seem to apply to the Alliance as well. In some circumstances, the only available means of pursuing collective security may be outside the framework of an authorization to act granted by an organization nominally committed to that purpose. Regrettably, differences in interests and national caveats among the major powers, including the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, constitute a major factor constraining prospects for NATO-UN cooperation and consequently for enhanced and join fight against terrorism.¹¹

9 Leurdijk, Dick. A., "UN Reform and NATO Transformation: The Missing Link." Egmont Paper 10, p. 7.

10 Inis L. Claude, Jr. The Collectivist Theme in International Relations, *International Journal*, p. 655.

11 Yost, David S., "NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security", pp. 251-259.

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Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe

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Address to the “Third International Symposium on Global Terrorism and International Cooperation” organized by COE-DAT in Ankara on 15-16 March 2010

If I would have chosen a subtitle for my presentation today, it would be “Who could have imagined?” Obviously today, we live in an environment in which, as the previous speaker has said, we face conceptual challenges in addressing a national and international security context different than the Cold War context that provided the framework for most of us, for most of our professional lives. But today to try to imagine something hugely worse than any of the terrorist attacks we have seen so far, something that seems actually incredible and is incredible, my objective is by the end of the presentation to persuade you that this almost most incredible thing is in fact real and indeed

is a present danger. The danger that must be included in the spectrum of threats by any defence and security establishment that is serious about counter terrorism. Before turning to this topic, though, let me say just a couple of comments in introduction. First, let me commend the Centre of Excellence – Defence Against Terrorism for the excellent work that you have been doing, and the command and leadership of the Turkish Armed Forces and the government for their initiative in establishing such a center. I have been familiar with the work of the center from a colleague, Dr. Mustafa Kibaroglu, who is at Bilkent University but who spent a year at the Belfer Center that I am the Director of at Harvard. Looking through the themes of the center’s work last night, I found a huge number of lines that I agree with or applaud.

So just in the material that was provided for us, terrorism is chaos, absolutely. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon, terrorism is all this history, but terrorism continues to have a changing face. And in this proposition, which will be central to my presentation, the sine qua non - I am quoting now from the material of the Centre of Excellence – Defence Against Terrorism is to establish a conversant and cooperative mechanism at the global level. So I am pleased and applaud the work of the Center, and especially the work that has taken account, recently, of weapons of mass destruction terrorism and other high-end threads, which will be what I am talking about today.

I was at the dinner last week in Washington in which Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was being honored and he was being introduced by a long-time colleague of mine, James Schlesinger, another former Secretary of Defense and at the table we were teasing about a comment of another of our colleagues who for many years wrote the US Defence’s Posture Statement, which is the annual report issued by the Secretary of Defense. This colleague, William Kaufman, was asked about how different it was writing the annual report for Secretary Schlesinger when he was Secretary of Defense as compared to his predecessor Harold Brown, who had been Secretary of Defense just before him. Bill said: “That’s a good question. Jim Schlesinger is actually a big picture man. He focuses on the forest. So in the Defense Posture Report I had to think about the forest, whereas with Harold Brown, who is a nuclear physicist, he actually is a tree man, he focuses on the trees, this tree then that tree and that tree.” But he said: “But you know President Jimmy Carter, he is a leaf man. He likes the leaves.”

So what I am going to do in the presentation today is, first start off with a little bit about the forest, then very quickly turn my slides which focus on one central tall tree namely Nuclear Terrorism. But first a few words about the forest.

As my predecessor said, in the aftermath of the Cold War, one of the biggest challenges for us is a community, and an international security community is the conceptual challenge. And my candidate for one of the new items in the conceptual geography of security in the 20th century, my candidate is the paradigm shift that comes in recognizing that the function of armed forces is no longer only to secure its population against the armed forces attacks of other countries. For the last 2000 years the principle task of the armed forces of a country has been to defend the population against the armed forces of other countries, not the only task but the principle task. But I take 9/11 to be the introduction to the 21st century that requires a paradigm shift that will expand this set of challenges. On 9/11, the attack on the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon by a group of 19 individuals who were part of a non-state killed twice as many Americans as the Japanese did in the attack on Pearl Harbour that initiated the entrance of the US into World War II. Think about it! A non-state

actor killed at a level that was previously the preserve of states and organized violence that states are capable of. Today, and for the foreseeable future, technology has super-empowered individuals and small groups, giving them the capacity to kill at a level that was previously only possible and could only be done by organized states. So when one thinks about the challenges of a defense community or an intelligence community or special services, we now have to include in our spectrum of threats and even high-end threats, the possibility that our populations could suffer casualties at a level that were previously inconceivable, to have been perpetrated by anything other than the state, but that was actually conducted by a small group of individuals, individuals who might be global citizens, or who might even be our own citizens. So on the spectrum of threats, of terrorism, they are at a high end. There is what Eisenhower referred to as mega terrorism, that is terrorist acts that can kill thousands and tens of thousands of people in a single blow.

And today, what I am going to focus on is actually the first hint of that spectrum: nuclear terrorism, which is the only form of terrorism that could kill hundreds of thousand of people. Hundreds of thousands of people in a single event!

So let me turn now from comments about the forest to the specific issue of the trees, which is the subject of this Powerpoint slide presentation. President Obama has said that nuclear terrorism is the single most important national security threat that the US faces today. Nuclear weapons are in the hands of terrorists. This is precisely the same view that George Bush, his predecessor, had. When the UN was preparing for its 60th anniversary celebration, it invited a group of a dozen wise men and women from around the world and asked them to think about threats to international security in the next quarter century. They identified 6 major threats of which they gave quite a place to nuclear danger; and about nuclear danger they said – and this is the bottom line – “we are approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation.” Mohamed El Baradei, who along with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2005 argues similarly: “nuclear terrorism is the most serious danger the world is facing today.” Not just for the US, the world!

Kofi Annan, again a former Secretary General of the United Nations, notes that: “A nuclear terrorist attack can occur anywhere, in London or Delhi or New York, it would cause not only widespread death and destruction at that one target city, but it would stagger the world economy and thrust tens of millions of people into poverty, creating a second death toll throughout the developing world.”

What if? Those of you who were old “Cold Warriors,” who include many in this room, will be familiar with target maps. This is a map of New York City and it imagines that a bomb that was thought to be in New York City a month after 9/11 was exploded in Times Square. I tell the story of this episode in my book “Nuclear Terrorism,” where an agent called “Dragonfire” was reporting just a month after the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center that Al-Qaeda had acquired a small nuclear bomb out of the former Soviet arsenal and had that bomb now in New York City, perhaps about to explode. This was an occasion when George Tenet, at the time the director of CIA, came to see President Bush with warnings for the President’s daily intelligence briefings and informed him that this agent, who had generally been a reliable source, had produced this report. There were then a few moments to catch our breath and an interrogatory that winds up thinking like this: did the former Soviet arsenal include weapons of the description that Dragonfire had given, and guess? Were all

these weapons adequately accounted for? Answer: No! Could Al Qaeda have acquired one of these weapons and brought it to New York City and be about to explode it, and the US not otherwise know anything about it? Answer: Yes! So on the basis of this interrogatory, there was the bottom line conclusion that there was no basis for dismissing Dragonfire's report that there was a live nuclear bomb in New York City about to be exploded. This was the occasion when President Bush ordered Vice President Cheney to leave Washington, because the fear was there might also be a bomb in Washington. And if that bomb should explode in Washington, the US has a plan back from the old Cold War days, that I worked on under the Reagan administration, for continuity of government in which there is an alternative government where Cheney, together with a couple of thousand people from different agencies of the US government, would be the government if the first government were destroyed in the decapitation attack.

Nuclear test teams, nuclear experts from the labs, were sent to New York City, where they looked for signs of radioactivity. The bottom line of this story turns out to be the good news that this was a false alarm. But the message for us is that on the basis of science, technology, and logic, there were no grounds to dismiss Dragonfire's report that there was now a live nuclear bomb in New York City. If this bomb had been put into the back of a SUV, a small bomb that was assumed to have about ten kilotons' explosive power, which is slightly smaller than the Hiroshima bomb, then drive the SUV to Times Square and blow it up on a work day. The result would have been a half million people killed in the first few minutes, and another half million could have died in the week or so after. So the red zone here you see going around Times Square, which is about a third of a mile wide, all of that disappears instantaneously. In this vast release of energy that accompanies the explosion of a nuclear bomb, vaporizes in a blast heat of about 540,000 degrees Fahrenheit, and everything up to a mile away, which is the blue line – all the bridges, the UN Building, the tunnels – look like Oklahoma City after a home-grown American terrorist bombed a federal office building there back in 1995.

If that seems too far away, here is Dragonfire's bomb in Ankara. You can look at the locations. So as President Obama said in September, just one nuclear bomb, just one nuclear bomb exploded in Moscow, New York, Tokyo, Beijing, Paris, London or Ankara, could kill hundreds of thousands of people in a single event. It will not only destabilize our security and our economy, it would change our very way of life.

In the book *Nuclear Terrorism* that was referred to, I have two parts: part one and part two. Part one says inevitable, part two says preventable. The juxtaposition of the two is somewhat paradoxical and requires explanation. So part one of the book argues that on the current track, on the current trajectory, nuclear terrorism is inevitable. Proposition two says, and part two of the book argues, nuclear terrorism is preventable; indeed the subtitle of the book *Nuclear Terrorism* here is called the "Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe." That is the most important proposition. Nuclear terrorism is preventable by a feasible, affordable agenda of actions, some of which we are not taking, some of which we are not taking fast enough.

So proposition one: inevitable. If the US government and the Turkish government, and the Russian government, and the Pakistani government, and every other government, and the UN, and the IAEA -- all the other actors just keep doing what they are doing today – a nuclear terrorist attack in a major city, somewhere in the world is more likely than not in the decade ahead. I wrote that in 2004, that means that in my view, my own best judgment, by the end of 2014 there still remains a

better than even chance, that is 51%, that is, on the current trajectory, a terrorist will successfully explode a nuclear weapon somewhere in the world in the next five years.

Interestingly for some of you may be, there was a commission established by the US Congress as a successor to the 9/11 Commission, called the Commission on Preventing WMD, Terrorism and Proliferation. And it was co-chaired by two former senators, a Democrat, Bob Graham from Florida, and a Republican, Jim Talent from Missouri. That Commission issued its report in December 2009 and in its report it says “In the view of this commission, Republicans and Democrats who were looking at the issue and giving their best judgment, they believe that on the current trajectory by the end of 2014 it is more likely than not that a nuclear or biological terrorist attack will occur somewhere in the world.” That does not mean it is correct, but that is a judgment. Warren Buffett, the world’s most successful investor, is also extremely smart in thinking about risks, because he is in the insurance and the reinsurance business. This is his view; he says, he believes nuclear terrorism is inevitable. I do not see any way it will not happen as he says. And then he gives us this interesting mathematical identity just to help those of us who are not accustomed to thinking about the way in which probabilities mount up. He says “If the chance of a nuclear weapon being used in a given year is 10% -- he is not saying it is 10%, but if that were how likely it was – and that same probability persists for 50 years, the probability of it happening at least once during those 50 years is 99.5 %.” So with a 10% probability for a year, roll that over 50 years and it becomes almost one hundred percent.

Another way to think about this issue, which I know is incredible, especially to many European audiences, is to ask the views of the individuals who shouldered responsibility for trying to think about this issue, and who themselves take responsibility for dealing with it. Robert Gates, our only Secretary of Defense who has served both a Republican and a Democratic President, repeatedly says that he wakes up at 3 o’clock in the morning and thinks ‘Oh, my God! Things could be worse.’ What is he worrying about? It is the thought of a terrorist with weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear. Watson, who was the American intelligence analyst who spent the most time working on the nuclear question, argues that the 21st century is going to be defined by the desire and then the ability of non-states to develop crude nuclear weapons, which remains Al-Qaeda’s preoccupation. Former Russian Prime Minister and former Head of Intelligence, Yevgeny Primakov, notes that “International terrorists have been especially interested in getting their hands on nuclear weapons in the black markets for nuclear materials technology and expertise.”

The current Foreign Secretary of India, Ms. Rao, says “The challenge of nuclear terrorism is a serious nuclear security issue we address. We have been affected by clandestine nuclear proliferation in our neighborhood and we are naturally concerned about the possibility of nuclear terrorism.”

Secretary Clinton: “The biggest nightmare, all of us have, is that one of these terrorists will get their hands on weapons mass destruction.” Jim Jones, a former general, now National Security Advisor, says his biggest nightmare scenario is acquisition by terrorists of a nuclear weapon; it would be a game-changer.

How would we think about the likelihood of an unprecedented catastrophic event? I looked at the various methodologies for doing this. There is no scientifically-based methodology for estimating, but there are various algorithms and approaches for presentational purposes. I settled on what is basically the journalist’s checklist – who, what, where, when, and how.

Who could be planning a nuclear terrorist attack today? What nuclear weapon would they use? Where could terrorists acquire a bomb? When could terrorists launch the first attack? How could terrorists get a nuclear weapon to its target? Who? Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda is the top of my list. But in the book, I give you a list of a dozen other potential perpetrators. Osama Bin Laden has set out the agenda for his group, to prepare as many forces as possible to terrorize the enemies of God. Abu Ghaith, his spokesman said: "We have the right to kill 4 million Americans." In 2003, two years after the 9/11 attack, Osama got a fatwa from a radical sheik justifying the killing of 10 million Americans with a nuclear or biological weapon. As the 9/11 Commission report says: "Al-Qaeda is trying to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least a decade and continues to pursue its strategic goal." Bin Laden has been overheard referring to the objective as 'Hiroshima.' Al-Qaeda has clearly not only expressed aspirations but it is engaged in activity that would be aimed at realizing these aspirations. It is trying to recruit nuclear experts. I described in the book two Pakistani nuclear weapon scientists who met with Osama Bin Laden and his deputy al-Zawahiri in Afghanistan to talk about nuclear weapons. The IC Commission, another of this post 9/11 Commissions, concluded that Al-Qaeda probably had access to nuclear expertise and facilities, and that there was a real possibility of their developing a crude nuclear device. Fabrication of such a device is within their capabilities if only they could obtain material.

So that is the who, now the what. What bomb could a terrorist use? A ready-made weapon from the arsenal of one of the nuclear weapon states, or what is called an IND, an improvised nuclear device, constructed from highly enriched uranium or plutonium stolen from a state stockpile. This is the analogue of the IEDs, the improvised explosive devices, which have been used successfully in Iraq and now in Afghanistan. As Johnny Foster, a former director of one of the US weapons labs and a famous bomb designer, now back more than one quarter century ago, 25 years ago, said: "If the essential nuclear materials are at hand, it is possible to make an atomic bomb using information that is available in the open literature." Another former lab director Harold Agnew has said: "If you believe that it is easy to make an improvised nuclear weapon, you are wrong. But if you believe it is impossible for a terrorist group to make an improvised nuclear bomb, you are dead."

Where could a nuclear weapon come from? Well, I would still say the most likely source of weapon material is Russia or the former Soviet Union. Not because Russia would want a weapon or material to be stolen. Indeed, a huge amount of work has been done extremely positively by the Russian government and Russian security services to secure Russian and former Soviet weapons and materials in the period since 1991. But because there are so many weapons and so much material, I would still say that it is high up on a list.

North Korea is also a possible source of weapons or a weapon for a terrorist group with today having ten bombs worth of plutonium and having conducted two tests. In my course at Harvard I asked the students "Could Kim Jong-il, the leader of North Korea, imagine that he could sell a nuclear bomb to Osama Bin Laden and get away with it?" For many this seems incredible. And then I asked them "Could Kim Jong-il imagine that he could still be doing something thousands of times larger than a nuclear bomb, selling a plutonium-producing reactor to Syria? Which in fact he did, and which would have been operating today if it had not been destroyed in an air attack by the Israelis.

Pakistan is the world's most dangerous country. I am extremely heartened by the efforts that the Pakistani government has made in recent days, and especially the Pakistani army. But I would still say Pakistan remains the world's most reticent country, having tripled its arsenal of nuclear bombs and materials since 2001, as the state is challenged internally by a set of ongoing challenges that threaten to overwhelm the forces of order.

And in addition, there are more than a 100 research reactors around the world, 40 in developing and traditional countries that hold either highly-enriched uranium or plutonium. Here a piece of very good news. The last element of highly enriched uranium in Turkey that was in one of the research reactors was repatriated in December 2009.

When could a terrorist conduct this nuclear attack? If Dragon had been correct, a month after 9/11 a nuclear bomb would have exploded in New York City. If terrorists acquire a hundred kilograms of highly enriched uranium, the task of making it into a nuclear bomb will take less than a year.

And how would a terrorist get the weapon to the target? The same way illegal items come into our countries every day. I don't need to lecture to folks here about the challenges Turkey has with its huge borders and very difficult neighbours, including in particular folks in the Caucasus. The large numbers of ships that pass through the Bosphorus include some who carry cargoes of uncertain character. I would say terrorists who have got a bomb or materials to make a bomb, and who are going west; if they are coming out of the territories to Turkey's east, Turkish borders and even Turkish territory are among the most attractive transit routes. And it is Robert Oppenheimer who was the head of the famous Manhattan Project, that made the first nuclear bomb, who said, if you try to ask how you find the weapon or the material that was being smuggled, you basically have got to go into each cargo container, into each unit to get a good read of what might be in it.

So who, what, where, when, and how? I do this calculation in the days when I am pessimistic. I said the current trajectory, God forbid, we would live to see a successful nuclear terrorist explosion somewhere in the world. So that's the bad news.

Now the good news! The good news is that this is a preventable catastrophe, that the only terrorist attack that could kill thousands of people in a single blow, tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands in a single blow, is preventable by a feasible, affordable agenda of access. Warren Buffett again comes to the rescue to remind us that if our actions that we take to reduce a probability that has been 10% a year to just 1% a year, and if we run that over 50 years, there is a 60% chance this never happens. So let it be clear. Our actions affect the likelihood of this event, and if we took the actions that we could take, and reduce the chance to 1% a year, then it would be 60% that over 50 years this did not happen. And there is nothing magic about 1%. How about 0.10%. Then it becomes unlikely to happen in several hundred years. So our focus should be on the actions we could take to shrink the likelihood of this to nearly zero. How to prevent it? Obviously this is a challenge that requires multi-way defense. So there is not just one thing to do. Obviously it requires a 360-degree approach. But fortunately there is a strategic environment now that allows us, if we were able to focus on the supply side of this issue in a way that would allow us to be successful in preventing nuclear terrorism. And this good fortune occurs because of a happy syllogism from physics. So the syllogism from physics is no fissile material, no mushroom cloud, and no nuclear terrorism.

Let me explain. Fissile material comes in only two brands: highly-enriched uranium or plutonium, neither current in nature. So you cannot just find them and dig them up. Each requires huge manufacturing efforts, a multi-billion dollar dedicated effort to make highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Therefore, this will not be done successfully by terrorists running around in villages or caves. So only states make highly-enriched uranium and plutonium. So no fissile material, no possibility of this release of energy that makes a mushroom cloud and therefore no nuclear terrorists. So as a consequence, all that we have to do – it is a big goal, but still it is clear – all that we have to do is prevent terrorists from getting fissile material either in the form of a bomb or from which they can make a bomb. So by denying them the means for their deadly aspirations, we can actually defeat nuclear terrorism. Now, how to do that?

I try to organize a strategy for that under a doctrine of three NO's:

1. No loose nukes;
2. No new nascent nukes;
3. No new nuclear weapon states.

Let me say a word about each. “No loose nukes” requires securing all nuclear weapons and all weapon-usable material as fast as possible. In America when I made this presentation I asked how much gold does the US lose from Fort Knox, which is the place where the US keeps its gold reserves. And the answer is: “not one ounce.”

In 2006, I was invited to make a presentation on nuclear terrorism in Russia at the Kremlin. And I made basically a presentation like this, and I asked with all the chaos, all the confusion, and even the corruption that accompanied the collapse of the Soviet Union, “How many of the treasures of Russia that are kept in the Kremlin armory, the icons and crowns and other treasures, how many are missing?” The answer: Zero! So human beings know how to lock up things that we do not want people to steal. The challenge is to lock up all nuclear weapons and all nuclear materials to this gold standard.

The second no is “no nascent nukes.” Nascent nuke, I apologize, is a neologism for new national enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium. One should not think of a facility that produces highly-enriched uranium as a producer of fuel for a reactor which some would like to try to make us believe. In fact highly-enriched uranium or plutonium should be thought of as nascent nuclear weapons, that is nuclear weapons that are just about to hatch. In the second no, we should have “No new national enrichment of uranium or reprocessing of plutonium. It is urgent to challenge this “no” in Iran. In 2004 Iran had zero centrifuges and enriched zero new uranium. Today, right now, today Iran is running 4,000 centrifuges producing a new and additional 8 pounds of low-enriched uranium every day and it has accumulated a stockpile of over 4,000 pounds of low-enriched uranium which, when further enriched, would become the stuff for two nuclear bombs.

The third no is “No new nuclear weapon states” and proposes to draw a line under the current 8.5 nuclear powers and say unambiguously stop, no more. Let me say it clearly, the idea is not to maintain the current nuclear state for ever, but rather to stop the bleeding before we address the question: What should be done about the arsenals that are currently in existence? The huge challenge to this proposition is North Korea which again in the periods since 2001, 2002, 2003 indeed has gone

from having at most two bombs worth of plutonium to the situation where it has 10 bombs worth of plutonium and has conducted two tests. And the Yongbyon reactor is now being refurbished to be turned on again. But it is harvesting the spent fuel rods at that reactor for its 11th bomb.

Each one of these nos produces then the need for a strategy and an operational plan of action that becomes thick. But let me just give you a couple of the bullet points and then I will stop for short.

No loose nukes as a global gold standard, the principle of assured nuclear security that would be transparent enough to allow leaders of one country to assure their own citizens, and the terrorist will not get a nuclear weapon from another country. Signing up to this principle of assured nuclear security, and a global clean-out of all fissile material that cannot be secured to a gold standard. So this is: no loose nukes, no new nascent nukes. It says orchestration of the whole array of carrots and sticks to persuade, to postpone enrichment activity. I would say currently the best that could be done would be to stop where it is now. And I think the proposal made by the IAEA to trade the current stock piles of low-enriched uranium for the fuel rods that are needed for a research reactor, and make medical isotopes, is a very sensible proposal. And the international community should be pressing Iran to accept it. Turkey played a very important role in this, in offering to be the last resort for the transfer – a multi-laterally guaranteed fuel bank. This is another IAEA initiative that was actually just started by Warren Buffett, who provided just from his private fortune 50 million dollars to the IAEA to create a multi-lateral fuel bank managed by the IAEA as a supplier of fuel for peaceful civilian nuclear reactors of last resort. And then in five or ten years a moratorium on further enrichment to try to revitalize the non-proliferation regime.

The third no, “No new nuclear weapon states”, is concentrating all its efforts on North Korea. At this stage the only hope is that China should be motivated to persuade North Korea to freeze nuclear production and over time to work on verifiable dismantlement. I am also a strong proponent of a new principle of deterrent which I think will get a lot of discussion. I hope, I expect, this will be in the US Nuclear Posture Review, which is just forthcoming – the principle of nuclear accountability, according to which a state would be held accountable for the nuclear weapons and materials it makes no matter how those nuclear weapons or materials might come to be the stuff of a bomb that explodes in another state.

As to the current administration, I am not here as a spokesman for the Obama Administration or the US Government. I have many friends and colleagues in this administration whom I advised or to whom I offered my views, as I did to the previous administration. But what I would say about President Obama is that we have a president who gets it, in the sense, that this is a question and issue he has internalized. When he is given a chance to talk about it, he talks about it with some passion. In his first international speech, which was in Prague in April 2009, he gave a speech about nuclear weapons and nuclear danger in which he addressed, for instance, the issue of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the US national security strategy. This will be evident in the Nuclear Posture Review.

Securing all nuclear weapons and materials to this gold standard in four years, this will be the focus of the nuclear security summit which will be held in Washington with 42 heads of state just next month in the middle of April, negotiating new arms control agreements, in particular to follow START, which the US and Russia have been fooling around with, but will come to a conclusion here very shortly by ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), outlying future

nuclear weapons tests and stopping all production of fissile material and then with a strong IAEA, in particular with more authority and more resources.

So this nuclear terrorism, as was mentioned, offers my best attempt to make the case that first, this is a real present danger, and second that it is a preventable catastrophe. It has been reasonably well reviewed. And I would say, it is not necessarily correct, but it is closest to the proposition, that this is a threat, an ultimate threat that we face as part of the new security environment. But that is a preventable threat, preventable by a course of action that we could take if we get ourselves together, but then we can only take it if we do it in an international, cooperative fashion. There is no way this is a numeric agenda; no way can an American agenda of this topic succeed by itself. I would say lots have been done, particularly in the Russian-US relationship through Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR). A lot has been done through the global initiative to prevent nuclear terrorism and Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). A lot has been done by individual states. Lot of work has been done. That's the good news.

The bad news is that we face powerful adverse trend lines that continue eroding the regimes and continue increasing the likelihood that somehow, some day, somewhere a terrorist group, perhaps Al-Qaeda, perhaps even some other group, will get a nuclear weapon and will explode it to destroy one of our cities. And that will change our whole security environment that will change our whole notion of economic globalization that will change the whole way we think about the world.

So to conclude, I would say, this is the high end of a spectrum of threats. It is not going to go away. It is an issue for the foreseeable future. It is not the only thing at the high end. There is another topic of biological weapons, that's another big and complicated subject, and there are other things that are at the high end. This is at the high end, this I think is real. This I think is preventable.

So, thank you for the opportunity to present.

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Military Intelligence in Countering Terrorism

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Address to the “Third International Symposium on Global Terrorism and International Cooperation” organized by COE-DAT in Ankara on 15-16 March 2010

Military intelligence in countering terrorism is an extraordinarily complicated subject, and working with a number of countries and with an Alliance context in the past, I am also struck by how different the needs of given countries can be, depending on the nature of the threat and also on the nature of their neighbors, and depending on how they structure their efforts. But I think there are some clear messages that can be given. In that we have learned, and learned over a very long period of time.

First, there is a real danger in the phrase “military intelligence.” The fact is that particularly when we are dealing with asymmetric warfare terrorism and insurgency, military intelligence is not the approach any country should use to the problem of intelligence or any military should use in the approach to intelligence. We need what we call “fusion;” we need to understand that the military has to operate in a much broader context. They need to know what the civil authorities are doing. They need to work with law enforcement and police. They need to work potentially with things like the

public health services. To do this, you need to break down compartmentalization. You need to avoid the horrifying tendency to over-classify which seems to be one of the few universal human values. When in doubt, keep the secret no matter how much anyone else needs it. This is a challenge for all of us. And it is a challenge not only within countries, it is a challenge within alliances. It is far easier to talk about coordination than it is to create the structures which make it both possible and functional.

I think the creation of common counterterrorism centers that force you to bring together all the elements of intelligence, which bring in law enforcement, which bring in response. The breakdown of artificial bureaucratic barriers and classification is absolutely critical. If you have not done this, you have created the recipe for failure. If you have not practiced it in operation, you will probably fail the first time you encounter a truly serious challenge. When we talk about counterterrorism, it is not simply a military task, it is as much a problem of deterrence and response as it is active defense.

In a truly horrifying incident, many countries lack the civil capability to respond to the consequences of acts of terrorism. Biological warfare is a very good case in point. If you are not organizing your intelligence structure to support that response already, you will not be able to improvise in the narrow timeframe that would be involved in something like a serious biological or nuclear or other critical infrastructure incident.

Let me also say here, and perhaps my colleague will focus on this in more depth, two things about what I mean by practice. If you do not practice with the actual architecture or if you do not test the functioning system, you have not practiced. These are not academic exercises; these are not scenario studies for war colleges. You are either making a system you have actually tried and tested, or you are kidding yourself. You will produce false-positives or false priorities. This is particularly true with the use of computer and information structures. These are a recipe for failure unless they are actually and constantly tested, and even when they are. As we saw in the attempted attack on Detroit, the systems can break down either because of internal problems for the human interface.

This, I hope, is an obvious point, but it has been drummed home to me the hard way since 2001 because I have worked with the US and I have worked with countries in Africa, Latin America and in the Middle East. None of them have had common requirements either for military intelligence or counterterrorism intelligence. What I have said and I say it again: one of the first priorities is to be able to support the police and paramilitary. You do not want to put the military first if you can use normal law enforcement and paramilitary forces. But they often lack the assets and the intelligence capabilities they need. The best intelligence is often in the military, but then other variables become critical. Does the terrorist group have a secure base because of ethnic or religious or tribal or other support? Is it being hosted and supported by international movements or by a foreign country? Are you working with an alliance? If so, the rules change again. Are you dealing with terrorism in the real sense of the word terrorism? Or with a separate ethnic or religious or other group within your society which challenges national unity, sometimes for legitimate reasons. But calling them terrorists does not allow you to react to the remotest behavior. That is why the level of popular support for what we call terrorists is critical, as is their level of influence over the population. In most NATO countries, if not all, this is not an issue, but in many countries where NATO may be involved, it is critical. Where the government is not legitimate, calling its opponents terrorists does not solve the problem or characterize the intelligence task.

And the last point I will make with this slide is, if there is a lesson here on behavior it is basically that small hierarchical groups are easy to defeat, popular movements are not. No one has a common definition of terrorist. Even the United States government cannot agree how to count a terrorist incident. But there is, I suspect, something American with these figures, which are taken from the US Counter Terrorism Center. Why? Because we count every incident in Afghanistan, in Iraq, in Pakistan as international terrorism. What we do not count is serious domestic terrorism in many countries. This is endemic. The question of how you define the terrorist, how you react to it, is it a terrorist not an insurgent, is it a threat or not. Military intelligence has to resolve this. And it does not matter whether we call them terrorists. If they are asymmetric threats and they use terrorism or they use intimidation as only one tool, they still have to be dealt with much the same way. That is why it is critical to get your priorities right. If you can stop this by military support to paramilitaries, legally, you are far better off than letting it escalate. But if you cannot, you run into major problems fairly early.

Let me note here. If there is prior experience as to what can go wrong, it is not simply ignoring the threat. Many paramilitary forces are corrupt or incompetent for these missions. The same is true for many reserve forces. They were not designed for these tasks. If they are armed and if you cannot solve it legally, you may have to switch to the conventional military very quickly simply because they have the discipline and integrity. And that is why again characterizing this by country is critical to defining the military intelligence role, but once it escalates it becomes a very different situation. The truth is that we like to call insurgency terrorism. Unfortunately, when you do, the label does not describe the task. And once it escalates to that level, military operations have to take on the character of a very direct intelligence support, tailored to different types of roles and missions. And in simple terms, they are part of what we have chosen to call full spectrum or hybrid warfare. That is fine in theory as a label, but the problem with it is, you have to figure out what it means in practice. And as we look at this, what we have learned in Iraq, what we have learned in Afghanistan, what we should have learned in Vietnam, what we have seen in Columbia and countless other cases, is that you cannot win those wars by military means under most conditions. The military has to work with governance, it has to work with aid, and it has to address the population while it simultaneously has intelligence support to attack the threat. But that means the intelligence task must cover the civilian population. It must understand how the action of the military, the government and the civil side is perceived by the people. If we look beyond the threat and listen to what is happening in the field, it must listen to the aid workers, and it must listen to the small units operating in the field. It must listen to the people attempting to make governance work and it has to listen to allies. Because the moment we separate operations, as to some extent we have in Afghanistan, we cripple the intelligence task and we cripple the effectiveness of the mission.

Now, we talk about this in practical terms as full spectrum operations. Let me note here, the United States has spent now nine years trying to figure out how to reshape intelligence assets to do fundamentally different tasks and to support a whole range of government approaches as well as military operations. I cannot get into the full range of changes here but it is critical that you look at all your assets and all your major forms of collection, information systems and analyses. It is equally critical more and more that you open up the military to look at tools like open-source data, human terrain mapping and polling. You see these critical ways to learn about the population and popular perceptions. It is also critical, from some of the exercises I have seen, to understand the role of the

military in dealing with critical infrastructure protection. If you have not tailored your military structure to respond to critical incidents, or infrastructure destruction, there is no civilian alternative. You open up key aspects of your country, economy or society to the threat.

Now, very quickly because these are issues that I could spend a long time on, the targeting intelligence design for a regular military operation is the perfect way to lose in counter terrorism or counter insurgency. You must have a fundamentally different level of targeting. You must focus on collateral damage, you must focus on civilian casualties, and you must focus on popular perceptions. And you must calibrate what you are doing in terms of whether you are winning rather than destroying the enemy. We failed to do this early in Iraq. It took us some years to adapt. We failed to do it in Afghanistan for nearly eight years and the price was almost immeasurably high in empowering the Taliban.

One of the lessons we have consistently learned from Afghanistan is it was not the presence of foreign troops that the Afghans resented. It was two things: it was first civilian casualties, particularly from air strikes and artillery; and second, the failure to understand the technical victories that abandoned the people, that left them open to the Taliban, were dismal failures, because people saw no reason to regard the military as their protectors, as distinguished from the threat. We have seen similar results in other countries including Iraq.

Again, moving very quickly is a way of using extremely expensive toys. There are some countries which are rushing to acquire remotely controlled aircraft and combat vehicles. What they do not understand is, as is the case with many intelligence assets, if you do not have enough of the assets and enough of the people to use them properly, they actually blind you to establishing the military intelligence present with things like Special Forces on the ground. The person with the most toys does not win. The person with the best mix of military intelligence assets does.

Another critical problem here, one of the ones in which perhaps we have made the least technological progress, is understanding the impact of military strikes. Now, these core actions, may or may not be a military intelligence task depending on the country. Let me say it again and again. Two things happen: first, the battle damage assessment grossly exaggerates what happened in terms of the number of terrorists killed, the number of terrorists dispersed, the damage done by an air strike, and the damage done by the use of a missile. Very often there is confusion between blowing up a building, knowing what is inside the building, and knowing what killing a given group or unit may do. We need to fundamentally reassess battle damage assessment, both to be sure of the results of asymmetric and regular warfare, and, as was pointed out earlier today, to understand these are forms of strategic communication. When you kill people, deprive them of their living, drive them out of their homes and blow them up, you have sent a very powerful message in strategic communication. It is not a general message in strategic communication. It is not in general the one that defeats terrorism or insurgency.

The last point in terms of function: I hope this is clear to everyone; it is certainly a lesson the United States learned the hard way. Whether this is a task for military intelligence again varies by country, and the role of civilian intelligence for security forces and paramilitary forces also will vary by country. But let me say that what happens, when you abuse the military system and the role of military intelligence, is almost invariably you create more terrorists than you destroy or interrogate, and you basically alienate people into becoming terrorists that otherwise would not become terrorists. People debate this. This is my position, but I hope it is a clear one.

Finally, regarding what we do with this, we need to look at this in assessment terms. We cannot separate intelligence from plans and operations. We cannot separate the military from law enforcement and civil law and order. Either as a country or as an Alliance, we need to integrate our efforts, we must not create a situation where military intelligence follows and supports operations and plans, but plans and operations do not have the intelligence support to either defeat terrorism or prevent it from escalating to insurgency.

So just to conclude, fusion is everything. Begin by using military intelligence to support the police and paramilitary where this is possible, address the full range of tasks, understand the need for quick reaction civilian-military programs, focus on winning the population not tactical encounters or killing terrorists, and focus on key figures rather than the broad structure of terrorism so you can attempt to destroy the network, but above all understand the role of military intelligence. Like military operations, it is to shape the population's rejection of terrorism and insurgency. It is not to conduct operations as if the people were part of the landscape and could somehow be ignored.

Thank you very much!

Note for Contributors

The *Defence Against Terrorism Review* (DATR) is an inter-disciplinary, biannual journal, publishing in-depth analyses of the complex issue of terrorism in a changing and globalised security environment. It includes political, legal, sociological, economic, and psychological approaches to the terrorism predicament. DATR intends to reach academics as well as practitioners and aims to publish theoretical as well as policy papers. It also encourages contributions from different cultural perspectives.

Manuscripts submitted to DATR should be in the environs of 8,000 words and must be written in English. Each paper is screened at COE–DAT and then sent to referees for reviewing.

Manuscripts must be typed in 12 puntos and double spacing with *Times New Roman* font, and should be sent directly to the Editor-in-Chief (acad@coedat.nato.int) or Assistant Editor (datr@coedat.nato.int) by e-mail.

Manuscripts should be organized as the title page, an Abstract (around 200-300 words), and Keywords (up to 5), Footnotes, and a Bibliography as shown below:

FOOTNOTES

1. Mustafa Kibaroglu and Aysegul Kibaroglu, *Global Security Watch – Turkey: A Reference Handbook*, Praeger Security International, Greenwood Publishing Group, Westport, Connecticut, USA, 2009, pp. 87-109.
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