



CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE  
DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM



# EXECUTIVE LEVEL DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM

“The Interaction between Civilian and Military Authorities  
when Countering Terrorism”

Seminar Report by the NATO Centre of Excellence Defence  
Against Terrorism



# EXECUTIVE LEVEL DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM

“The Interaction between Civilian and Military Authorities  
when Countering Terrorism”

Seminar Report by the NATO Centre of Excellence Defence  
Against Terrorism

## CONTENTS

Acknowledgements .....	3
1. Introduction .....	4
2. Opening Remarks .....	5
3. Presentation Summaries.....	8
3.1. Civilian-Military Challenges In Countering Terrorism.....	8
3.2. The Interface Between The Military And The Police .....	11
3.3. The Military And The Intelligence Services .....	13
3.4. Nato And Its Mediterranean Partners.....	15
3.5. Civil-Military Engagement In Theatres Of Conflict: The Case Of Colombia.....	18
3.6. Civil-Military Engagement In Theatres Of Conflict.....	19
3.7. The Challenge Of Cyberspace .....	21
4. Key Findings .....	22
5. Reccomendations .....	22
Annex-A: Workshop Program.....	23
Annex-B: Biographies Of The Speakers.....	25

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

The seminar 'The Interaction between Civilian and Military Authorities when Countering Terrorism' (Ankara, 25-26 November 2019) was a success due to the work of several groups of people.

Thanks are due to the seminar hosts, the 'NATO Centre of Excellence: Defence against Terrorism' (COE-DAT), its Director Colonel Mustafa Ozgur Tuten, its Activity Director Colonel Pavlin Raynov, its Deputy Seminar Director Major Mustafa YAĞBASAN and its Seminar Assistant Mrs. Aslihan SEVİM. Thanks are extended to the staff of COE-DAT who made the arrangements for the event and the two seminar Rapporteurs, Ms Alice Lohmus and Ms Eylül Ozyurt.

In addition, thanks are due to the speakers at the seminar who were drawn from a range of NATO member countries. They have kindly agreed that their presentations may be included in this booklet. Lastly, gratitude is expressed to the seminars participants who shared their insights and expertise.

Professor Wyn Rees  
Academic Advisor

## 1. INTRODUCTION

A huge amount of scholarly and practitioner attention has been paid to the phenomenon of terrorism over the last twenty years. The focus has often been on the various groups that perpetrate terrorism and the way that they have evolved over time. A sub-set of the field of terrorism studies has been the way in which states and international organizations counter the threat from terrorism. Within this sub-set, very little attention has been paid to the interaction between civilian and military authorities when countering terrorism.

This seminar was designed to address this neglected subject. It is a popular misconception that terrorism, because of its violent nature, is countered largely by military forces. In reality, terrorism is countered predominantly by the civilian agencies of national governments. Nevertheless, an international governmental organization such as NATO has responsibilities in the area of counter-terrorism and it was the objective of the seminar to explore how military and civilian agencies interacted together. This topic was explored in relation to both the internal security of NATO member states as well as the overseas activities of Alliance countries.

The seminar was held on the 25-26 November 2019 and was a particularly propitious moment to discuss this subject. The self-proclaimed Caliphate of so-called 'Islamic State / Daesh' had recently been overthrown and there is a widespread expectation that terrorism may be entering a new and unpredictable phase. Whilst the jihadists have been dispersed or killed within Syria, there is acknowledgement that the ideology that underpins such radicalism has not disappeared. At the same time, new manifestations of terrorism have emerged from Right-Wing Extremists that are giving the international community cause for concern.

The seminar, entitled 'The Interaction between Civilian and Military Authorities when Countering Terrorism', was held on in Ankara, Turkey under the auspices of the 'NATO Centre of Excellence: Defence against Terrorism' (COE-DAT). The seminar assembled a group of senior military and civilian representatives from NATO states, as well as representatives from countries outside of the Alliance. Six substantive sessions were organized in which either academics or officials were invited to give presentations to the audience. Each of these sessions were followed by periods of time in which the participants were able to discuss the issues and to share their experiences.

This booklet has been compiled in order to capture the main issues that were discussed in both the presentations and the accompanying discussion. It is hoped that the booklet will shed light on civil-military interaction in countering terrorism and will be of benefit to a wider audience.

## 2. OPENING REMARKS

Col. Mustafa Özgür Tüten

Director

COE-DAT

Dear Generals and Admirals,

Dear Distinguished speakers and seminar participants,

Ladies and gentlemen,

It is my honor and great pleasure to welcome you to our Executive Level Seminar hosted by the Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism. That many of you have travelled long distances just means how much terrorism matters to our professional Agenda and how important our work is. Your presence and commitment to this Seminar is very much appreciated. Thank you for coming.

We are all aware that the global threat of terrorism knows no border, nationality, or religion. Terrorists act transnationally and operate in implicit networks. Terrorism is a phenomenon with psychological, ideological and strategic aspects. For military forces, it has impact at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The drivers of terrorism are complex, with economic, social, political and ideological factors as well as poor governance, limited opportunity, dispossession, corruption and high unemployment; providing fertile ground for recruitment and radicalization. The widely recognized fact, that counter-terrorism is not only the duty of the military or the police or of any single state institution, both internationally and nationally has brought us together around the topic of “The Collaboration and Coordination between Civil and Military Institutions in Countering Terrorism”.

Unfortunately, terrorism will likely continue to exist in the future, possessing the features of a changing phenomenon. With the enhancement in technology and weapons, terrorism will likely continue to evolve in new dimensions. Terrorist groups in the future will have easier access to more lethal and sophisticated weaponry. Governance gaps will cause regional instability and unrestrained circulation of sophisticated weaponry. There will be greater use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), snipers and localized ‘swarm’ attacks, suicide attacks as well, particularly in urban centers. Some contemporary terrorist organizations may aspire to use chemical, biological, radiological weapons, with a ‘nightmare scenario’ being their employment to cause civilian mass casualties. New types of communication systems offer the terrorists more opportunities to exploit. The rise of the “lone wolf, free-lance terrorism, or leaderless resistance” phenomena carry the war to their distant enemies. Such actors are extremely difficult to detect and counter because there is little or no warning. Radical ideologies easily exploit suitable breeding grounds for terrorism.

Otherwise, as you very well know, terrorism will continue to be an extremely complex set of phenomena, covering a great diversity of groups with different origins and causes. And it will be, as it is right now, one of the most important components that make up the challenge posed by hybrid war encompassing a set

of relationships, dynamics and processes. And, as a result, hybrid war belligerents may continue to use terrorism in its traditional capacity to force populations through fear as a way of reducing an opponents' motivation to fight back.

So, we are well aware of the fact that there is no magic wand. Counter-Terrorism can take a variety of forms. Each approach conceives of terrorism differently, though there are some overlaps and gaps, as well. Some are more traditional, others are not. The tools that any CT approach uses can often reflect specific conception of terrorism and the threat it poses. As the terrorist violence is rising today, the nations have to do what they can to defeat and eliminate terrorism.

It is also worth mentioning that in the current framework, NATO members have principal responsibility for the protection of their own populations and territories against terrorism. The ways and means allies use to Counter-Terrorism, may be different. Because terrorism necessitates a comprehensive approach, there is much room for different interpretations and variance in the main focus of CT campaigns.

We, at the COE-DAT have already taken this challenging commitment to investigate, examine and explore the terrorism as a phenomenon from various perspectives and to provide the NATO and Nations of interest to meet potential and future security challenges.

To bring different views on terrorism together and to benefit from multinational experience, COE-DAT has developed relationships with numerous international organizations and institutions all over the world. These relationships include education and training bodies from NATO and from some nations, international organizations, as well as relevant institutions, academies and universities, working on defence against terrorism related topics. The Centre also collaborates with Partnership for Peace, Mediterranean Dialogue, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative countries and Global partners amongst others.

Our executive level seminar is designed for senior military officers and civilian equivalents working in spheres such as counterterrorism, intelligence operations, cyber security, media and CIMIC. We are trying to provide attendees with an opportunity to develop their understanding of the complexities of the civil-military interface in relation to countering terrorism so that they can be better prepared to make sense of international developments and respond with better policy and strategy.

Behind the topic of "The Collaboration/Coordination between Civil and Military Institutions in Countering Terrorism" the aim of this seminar is for attendees to get an opportunity to develop their understanding of the complexities of the civil-military interface in relation to countering terrorism so that they can be better prepared to make sense of international developments and respond with better policy and strategy.

Additionally, with the assistance of our speakers we changed the format of the seminar. Instead of the routine, lecture-questions and answers cycle, the current seminar is appointed to giving the participants a chance to exchange experience and opinion as well as making a good networking through presentations and discussions. During the sessions, the speakers will introduce the matter of the civilian-military relations within the area of the subtopic and will moderate a discussion right after. Therefore, your active involvement during the discussions is highly appreciated.

I am very pleased to present you our lecturers who will moderate the discussions:

- ❖ Professor Wyn Rees, from University of Nottingham, UK, who is also the Seminar academic advisor,
- ❖ Admiral Orlando Grisales, from Colombia.
- ❖ Professor Alan Brill, Texas A & M University School of Law, USA.
- ❖ Dr. Afzal Ashraf, United Kingdom, University of Nottingham.
- ❖ Assistant Professor Murat Tinas, from Turkish National Police Academy, Department of International Security.
- ❖ Mr. Ferenc Hegyesi, from Hungary, representing the Emerging Security and Challenges Division at NATO International Staff, especially focused at the relations with the countries from North Africa.
- ❖ Dr Andreea STOIAN KARADELI, independent researcher, from Romania.

I am confident that through this diverse presence of expertise and contribution, we are going to achieve the level of ambition of the Seminar Afterwards, we will not only have insights on new ideas, perspectives and strategies to better confront terrorism, but we will have an enhanced network of counter-terrorism friends and counterparts.

Generals and admirals, ladies and gentlemen, distinguished participants,

To conclude my words, I would like to wish all of us to have an interesting, dynamic and fruitful Seminar. Prepare yourself to be challenged, excited and inspired. Your experience, thoughts and opinions are valuable and priceless for us.

Thank you for your attention.

Seminar started.

### **3. PRESENTATION SUMMARIES**

#### **3.1. CIVILIAN-MILITARY CHALLENGES IN COUNTERING TERRORISM**

Prof. Wyn REES

International Security Studies

University of Nottingham

The first session, delivered by the Academic Advisor, Professor Wyn Rees, was designed to lay out the principal themes that would underpin the two-day seminar. The aim of the seminar was to investigate how military forces within NATO interact with civilian agencies in counter-terrorism. All NATO member states wrestle with lines of demarcation between the powers of their civilian and military agencies. It was noted that although there is a wide literature in regard to terrorism and counter-terrorism, there is relatively little written about military-civilian interaction in counter-terrorism.

Prof. Rees highlighted the evolving threat of terrorism. Since 9/11, there has been a changing phenomenon of violent movements, like Al-Qaeda and its franchises, as well as the rise of ISIS in Syria and in Iraq. The way that these threats have been manifested has evolved, from the Madrid and London bomb attacks to the phenomenon of marauding gunmen in Paris in 2015. Moreover, domestic radicalization has led to localized attacks utilizing knives and vehicles.

The police, rather than the military, are the primary instruments of counter-terrorism. The role of the police is to obtain evidence by which prosecutions can be undertaken: whereas the military are specialists in the application of force. In the domestic context, the military may be called upon for the routine guarding of borders; for critical infrastructure protection and for specialist chemical, bacteriological and radiological expertise. In an emergency, the military may be called upon to provide assistance to the civil power, such as hostage rescue, and, in the event that the emergency is prolonged, long term support to the police. For example, in France the military have acted in sustained support of the police.

The military can play a role in conducting both defensive and offensive operations in cyberspace. Western governments have been devoting progressively larger resources to enable their militaries to undertake operations against adversaries in the cyber domain.

In overseas operations, the military can fulfil several counter-terrorism roles. In relation to allies, NATO militaries are called upon to provide assistance, training and guidance for military and civilian actors in its neighborhood. NATO has successfully been reaching out to partnership countries, in North Africa and parts of the Middle East, to build their capacity and seek new ways of working together. The military may also face threats of terrorism during interventions as well as in periods of post-conflict stabilization. For example, in Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has faced a persistently hostile environment. Some NATO militaries have also been tasked by their governments with the killing of high-profile terrorists.

The use of the military domestically can be seen as a sign of weakness that governments have not been able to deal with the threat. In the history of 'The Troubles' in Northern Ireland, the British Army provided

Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP) but it was quickly recognized that a key objective had to be to restore the primacy of the police. The Army were tasked to use only minimum force and respect civil liberties. The British learned hard lessons as to how to use the military in a domestic context. Soldiers, who have been trained for war, are ill-suited to serve in a policing function on the streets of their own country.

When the military are used in counter-terrorism, at home and abroad, they come into contact with a range of civilian agencies. This raises governance issues about how the military will operate in relation to civilian structures. Such civilian agencies include elements of the police, from routine domestic law enforcement to specialist counterterrorism units. It involves interfacing with government departments: for instance, after 9/11, the USA created a new Department of Homeland Security. It may also lead to cooperation with judicial agencies involved in the prosecution of terrorist suspects. Civilian agencies will possess their own attitudes towards cooperation with the armed services. In overseas conflicts, militaries may find themselves working with non-governmental agencies such as charities. Such agencies often want to keep their impartiality and do not want to be seen as aligned with militaries.

A particularly important relationship is that between the military and intelligence agencies. This relationship requires coordination, a willingness to share information and the need to work together. Intelligence agencies have increasingly developed fusion centres that bring under one roof a whole range of agencies. The interaction of the military with domestic and overseas agencies necessitates clarity about roles and missions. It is important that all sides understand their respective responsibilities and the legal basis on which these are carried out.

Furthermore, strategic cultures vary among NATO member states. The way states think about problems like terrorism is based on their history, economic and political systems and their past experience of conflicts. Some governments treat terrorism as war, whilst others regard it as crime. In the case of the USA, for example, fear of weapons of mass destruction after the 9/11 attacks shaped its response to terrorism. Countries with different experiences view counter-terrorism in various ways making a common approach amongst NATO countries more challenging.

Some NATO members possess para-military forces, such as the Italian Carabinieri. These forces occupy the space between the police and the military and offer potentially significant counterterrorism capabilities. Such forces have been highly sought-after to participate in stabilisation operations following western military interventions.

## **Discussion**

The discussion began by considering how NATO countries differ in their approaches to terrorism. It is important to identify best practices and to learn from each other. The West has tended to have a reactive approach to terrorism and it is difficult to develop a proactive strategy.

It was noted that the use of militaries depends on the policies of NATO nations and these result from how issues are perceived. Countries tend to be reluctant to utilize their militaries domestically, unless their politicians want to showcase the capabilities of their special forces. There was discussion of the different cultures within both militaries and law enforcement agencies.

The case of Nigeria's fight against Boko Haram was raised. This has been an intense struggle that has placed considerable pressures on the Nigerian military

In overseas interventions, NATO militaries have recognized the value of adopting a 'Comprehensive Approach' that seeks to integrate all agencies into an agreed strategy with a small military footprint. Such operations have demonstrated the need for close collaboration amongst sovereign nations and the importance of single points of contacts. There was a call for network building and regular exercises.

## 3.2. THE INTERFACE BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND THE POLICE

Assist. Prof. Murat Tinas  
Security Sciences  
National Police Academy

The second session, by Assistant Professor Murat Tinas, explored the intricate relationship between the police and the military in the context of terrorism. It also covered the legal framework in which various policing structures exist amongst NATO members.

Assistant Professor Tinas started his presentation by noting the complex challenges presented by terrorism that ranges from groups like Al Qaeda and DAESH through to the PKK, YPG and FETÖ. These challenges transcend traditional boundaries and therefore require cooperation between security agencies. Different strategic cultures exist amongst NATO members but all agree on the central role that law enforcement authorities play in domestic security.

Terrorism has links to other forms of criminality: narcotics, human smuggling and organized criminal gangs that frequently have international networks. Law enforcement also needs to take into account the different circumstances that can exist between rural and urban areas in terms of the authorization of the police and gendarmerie and the cooperation between the police and the military.

Police authorities have more opportunities than the military to apprehend terrorists in certain cases because they may be called to investigate suspicious activity and traffic violations that may be linked to a terrorist plot. Comprehensive training gives police officers a chance to interdict and stop an attack before it starts. It is important that the military and police have clearly defined roles and legal bases on which to act and that they cooperate with each other on both an international and domestic level. The boundaries between the military and law enforcement can become blurred in practice, hence the need for the maximum amount of clarity beforehand.

One of the keys to the success of the police-military relationship in counter-terrorism is technological advancement. Both sides have to invest in the technological infrastructure to allow them to share the information they have. The standardization of data sets and an efficient communication between them is also crucial.

Some countries have special police forces within the law enforcement agencies. These police tactical units are tasked with resolving high risk and critical incidents such as domestic counter-terrorism incidents. These units are in-between the operational responsibilities of the police and the military. Their recruitment, selection, training, equipment and assignments are hybrid in nature and can be a good example of bridging the gap between the police and the military in countering terrorism. Such units have been highly sought-after in post-conflict stabilization roles.

There is a need for a strategic culture which recognizes the importance of cooperation between the police and the military in countering terrorism. Cultural differences between the military and the police, in terms of doctrine and training, can present obstacles to effective cooperation.

Assistant Professor Tinas concluded his presentation by outlining some questions that might guide discussion. What challenges exist in the counter-terrorism interface between the police and the military? What is the role of special police forces within law enforcement agencies in counter-terrorism operations? How effective is information sharing between different organizations?

## **Discussion**

The discussion mostly focused on the issues around police-military cooperation, especially when it comes to information sharing. The participants pointed out that joint exercises and press conferences could be a way to explain policies to the public.

It was mostly agreed that the military have only a supporting role alongside the police in domestic counter-terrorism. But law enforcement institutions cannot fight alone against terrorism and need structures to coordinate with different organizations.

Participants agreed that counter-terrorism should include civil workers and psychologists, not only the security services. It was noted that information sharing is important and the issue of the classification of the information is important because it needs to be shared as widely as possible.

Some participants elaborated on their national perspectives. In Ukraine, counter-terrorism operations were going on from 2014-2018. Securing law and order is crucial for Ukraine, especially from a police perspective. In Bangladesh, there is a special type of police unit dedicated to counter-terrorism. There is also special legislation that is relevant to dealing with the threat from terrorism. In Spain, the military does have a domestic role in counter-terrorism and it is important to strike a balance between the values of security and democracy. In the case of Iraq, there has been long experience of military-police cooperation as well as coordination with international forces. The Iraqi military has suffered from a lack of resources and weapons, at times only operating with 4 helicopters. As such, Iraq was relying on international partners and the U.S.

A further dimension that arose in discussion concerned the challenges around battlefield evidence collection. This is an important area for NATO that involves the question of who best is trained and equipped to deal with this issue. For example, special operations forces are frequently first on the scene but may not have the requisite training. Evidence such as fingerprints can be vital for prosecutions but this raises the issue of the relationship between counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency in a conflict zone.

The participants further elaborated on issues such as 'proxy wars'. It was observed that we need to be careful about using the language of 'proxy wars' when we often mean counter-terrorism operations.

### 3.3. THE MILITARY AND THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

Dr. Afzal ASHRAF

Centre for Conflict, Security and Terrorism

Nottingham University

The third session raised the question of the relationship between the military and intelligence agencies. Dr. Afzal Ashraf argued that some counter-terrorism operations are intelligence-led whilst others are intelligence-supported. The objective of counter-terrorism operations is to provide warning of an attack in a way that it can be prevented. It is also to provide judicial authorities with sufficient evidence to prosecute people involved in terrorism. He noted that Western governments have poured considerable resources into developing fusion centers that bring together intelligence from a variety of domestic agencies and mandate them to cooperate together. It takes time, however, to establish such sharing arrangements and make them effective, primarily because of the significant cultural changes necessary. Intelligence information tends to be derived from national collection sources so sharing it with overseas partners is a sensitive matter.

Current intelligence challenges for Western governments include post-Cold War geopolitics, religiously motivated and right-wing terrorism. The military have a predisposition towards technological solutions as it is an approach with which they are familiar. Nevertheless, there is a need to be cautious about reliance on technology. For example, weapons systems have become remarkably precise yet they rely upon intelligence to attack the correct targets. Casualty data indicates that the precision of weapons due to technology has outpaced the precision of our intelligence systems, resulting in the wrong people being harmed.

During the Cold War intelligence organizations were focused on specific threats. For example, the UK focused on the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Now threats are more diffuse: it is harder to know where terrorists are located, their numbers, the extent of radicalization and their global linkages. Current terrorism emphasizes the need for human sources compared to technical intelligence.

Intelligence can be at risk of politicization. For example, intelligence efforts can be directed more towards some states rather than others. Intelligence seems to be optimized for inter-state threats and needs to be adapted to dealing with terrorist organizations which can simultaneously operate nationally and internationally. Sharing information is crucial but national intelligence structures are poorly designed to facilitate this goal. In order to share with greater confidence, Western governments need to be confident that appropriate safeguarding protocols are in place. There needs to be a common understanding between NATO allies as well as efforts to educate our own publics about the challenges.

The West needs diversity amongst its intelligence analysts. We require analysts who are highly educated, with a broad range of skills. But we also require our people to be sensitive to different cultures and to recognize how people think differently from ourselves. At the strategic level, these should feed an assessment capability to support a broader government response to terrorism.

Politicians have to be more involved in intelligence and not just briefed on the results. They must understand the strengths and limitations of the intelligence system and they must offer leadership to intelligence services. Political leaders particularly need to understand how to transform intelligence amidst a period of technological and societal change.

### **Discussion around the theme of intelligence**

The participants reflected on the evolving nature of the challenge: on how lone wolf attacks, for example, have become a contemporary reality. In today's context, there is a blurred line between state and non-state actors and proxies. Amidst examples of regime change, this has often been accompanied by an increase of terrorism.

The participants emphasized the need to collaborate with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), both on a tactical and on an operational level. This led on to a discussion about how classified information should be managed in relation to civil organizations: whether it was possible to share intelligence with third parties. There was widespread recognition that a 'Comprehensive approach' that engages the military with a variety of civilian actors is necessary but there are few examples of successful or sustained delivery of such an approach within NATO countries. Both threats and intelligence 'customers' have changed. It was also noted that while military leaders rarely hesitate to risk their lives, they are often reluctant to risk their careers, rendering them averse to refusing the unrealistic demands of politicians. We have to educate our leaders about the constraints facing the military, so that they are able to take the right decisions. In regards to Turkey, participants agreed that it could offer insights of civil-military practices from its operations in Syria.

### 3.4. NATO AND ITS MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERS

Mr. Ferenc Gyula Hegyesi  
Diplomat  
Hungarian Diplomatic Service

The presentation looked at the history of counter terrorism activities of the Alliance to provide a better understanding of what NATO - within its mandate and as part of the wider international effort – is doing to address the terrorist threat and what is beyond its remit.

- 1) Many Allies had already had their own experience with terrorism before September 2001, but the terrorist attack against the United States of America marked a clear turning point for NATO. The Alliance responded rapidly and decisively by launching NATO's first counter terrorism operation, Eagle Assist deploying AWACS aircrafts to patrol American airspace and enabling the use of U.S assets in Afghanistan. This was followed by the second operation, Active Endeavour, a naval patrol mission targeting terrorist activity in the Mediterranean.
- 2) Following the clear recognition of the terrorist threat in the 2010 Strategic concept, NATO's leaders tasked the Alliance to improve its counter terrorism capacity. NATO's Policy Guidelines on Counter Terrorism adopted in 2012 identified the key principles guiding NATO's efforts. Firstly, NATO initiatives must be in line with international law and the principles of the United Nations charter and this is exactly how NATO interacts with its partners. Secondly, being in a supporting rather than leading role, NATO has no mandate to involve itself in areas, which remain in the hands of individual nations such as border control and the judicial system. Therefore, each member of the Alliance is primarily responsible for the protection of its own population and territory against terrorism. Finally, NATO cannot act in isolation and thus collaborates with other actors including individual partners as well as other regional and international organizations in countering terrorism on a complementary basis and avoiding unnecessary duplication.
- 3) On 25 May 2017 at their meeting in Brussels, Allies adopted an Action Plan to do more in the international fight to counter terrorism with: more AWACS flight time, more information-sharing and air-to-air refueling; NATO's participation in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIL/Daesh; the establishment of a new terrorism intelligence cell at NATO Headquarters, and the appointment of a coordinator to oversee NATO's efforts in the fight against terrorism. This Action Plan has been updated several times in the past years in order to catch up with the constantly evolving security trends and NATO's adaptation to the fight against terrorism; including for instance through the Atlantic Alliance's continued engagement in Afghanistan with its Train/Advise/Assist Resolute Support Mission in support of the Afghan security forces and through the establishment of the NATO Mission Iraq. Although counter terrorism is not a core or standalone NATO task, by 2019 it contributes to NATO's all three core tasks. It is an integral part of deterrence and defence and projecting stability, its overall political/military relations, and capacity building of partners.

To address the common challenges of terrorism, NATO engages in tailored counter terrorism dialogues with partners (mostly from the MENA region) to mutual benefit and matching NATO strengths to their requirements. The goal is to help partners defend themselves and to better face the terrorist threats by strengthening their institutions in line with transparency and accountability standards. Allies have agreed on a non-exhaustive list of expert areas that are counter terrorism related and in which NATO has the ability to provide support to others.

NATO's added value lies at the interface between civilian and military domains. NATO offers to provide support to good governance through defence institutional capacity building and security sector reform, including in the fields of resilience, civil preparedness and consequence management. This also includes identifying institutions' potential vulnerabilities, such as corruption, and contributing to Rule of Law, respect for Human Rights, as well as promotion of good governance.

Partners in the MENA region not only face the threat posed by terrorism, and hence have prioritized counter terrorism in their respective requirements for partnership with NATO; they can also provide rich expertise, best practices and relevant capabilities to build on, and lessons learned from the implementation of their national CT strategies. This invaluable buy-in from regional partners was essential in the process of developing the NATO Reference Curriculum for Counter Terrorism, which is scheduled to be launched in 2020 for the use of the wider community of interest.

In conclusion, NATO's determination and solidarity to fight the emerging challenge posed by terrorism has constantly increased since it invoked its collective defence clause for the first time in its history in response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States of America. The level of ambition and preparedness of both NATO and its member have been significantly improved over the past years, supported by a dedicated counter terrorism doctrine and structure.

NATO as a political-military alliance may not be able to address all aspects of terrorism, but in the areas where it has strengths, it can bring a significant contribution to the global fight against terrorism.

These strengths lie, for example, in training and advice, conducting exercises, providing targeted specialized assistance countering inter alia Improvised Explosive Devices, or building resilience against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear agents, and by establishing common standards and operations. NATO is also a platform for improving awareness, sharing best practices and lessons learned.

NATO can assist partners in a tailored way by building sustainable counter terrorism capacity in line with transparency and accountability standards. At the same time, NATO is not looking at its counter terrorism engagement with partners as a one-way street, but it also builds on partner's expertise, capabilities and knowledge to address a persistent global threat that knows no border, nationality or religion. At the end of the day, when our neighbours are more stable, we are more secure.

## **Discussion**

In the discussion session following Mr. Hegyesi's presentation on NATO and its Mediterranean partners, a number of points were raised by participants. The first comment was whether NATO needs a new understanding as to how terrorism is evolving, as well as the appropriate range of counter-terrorism capabilities that it can offer.

Another contributor talked about the importance of lessons learned and best practices when it comes to the implementation area of counter-terrorism, and questioned how Allied Command Transformation (ACT) could acquire the best counter-terrorism responses. Mr. Hegyesi replied that coordination among all the stakeholders and member states is a necessary process.

A third contributor questioned NATO's place as a military organization in the process of countering terrorism as 90% of the counter-terrorism measures are non-military related. He also questioned how to move people from radicalization to de-radicalization. It was agreed that de-radicalization was the responsibility of civilian governments who needed to make the necessary resources available. NATO could help to advise partners countries about these processes and the range of institutions, civilian entities, and ministries of the interior that need to be involved. Vulnerabilities to terrorism must be addressed by the common effort of all states in the form of promoting anti-corruption and good governance.

A last contributor drew attention to the necessity of a comprehensive approach in counter-terrorism where many different aspects need to be taken into account, such as improvement in infrastructure, fighting corruption and enabling state building. It was agreed that collateral damage needs to be prevented when fighting terrorism. Therefore, measures must be in place to protect civilians, especially children, as well as the cultural heritage of a country.

### **3.5. CIVIL-MILITARY ENGAGEMENT IN THEATRES OF CONFLICT: THE CASE OF COLOMBIA**

Rear Adm. Orlando Grisales Franceschi

Director

Escuela Superior de Guerra - Colombia

This presentation, by Rear Admiral Orlando Grisales Franceschi, on the experience of Colombia, was designed to serve as a case study of some of the issues associated with civil-military engagement in conflict zones.

The presentation made the point that the conflict in Colombia became highly transnational in nature. The conflict started in the 1960s with an insurgency but by the 1980s money was being used from illegal drugs to finance the violence. Drug cartels gradually came to dominate and the nature of the conflict changed. By the 1990s, the government found itself fighting a mafia-like structure, known as FARC, that was financed by the cocaine industry. The group subverted the democratic and administrative systems of the Colombian state and undermined its legitimacy.

In order to combat the threat effectively, the state had to recognise that the centre of gravity had become the population, rather than control over territory. The state had to win over the people and ensure the legality of its actions. It sought to promote welfare, education and justice and reached out to civic groups. Furthermore, the state gave enhanced powers to regional governors and created a High Commission for Peace. Security was treated as only a component part of a much broader strategy.

#### **Discussion**

The participants questioned the role that the US had played in the Colombian conflict. Due to the fact that several large drug cartels had been operating during the conflict, the focus of Colombian government efforts had been on fighting these organisations and they had received considerable material support from the US.

It was discussed whether comparisons could be drawn between the Colombian experience and contemporary Mexican drug cartels. The role of religion was similar in that the majority of the population in both countries are Catholics. It was observed that people engaged in illegal activity professed to be Catholics but did not try to use their faith to influence other people. In both cases criminality had accompanied the threat to state institutions.

It was noted that the ministries in Colombia had worked hard to convince the population to resist the armed groups. This had been achieved by giving operational control in the Unified Action plan to regional governors.

### **3.6. CIVIL-MILITARY ENGAGEMENT IN THEATRES OF CONFLICT**

Dr. Andreea Stoian Karadeli  
Independent Researcher

The aim of this presentation, delivered by Dr. Andreea Stoian Karadeli, was to explore NATO's experiences of conducting counter-terrorism activities in zones of conflict such as Libya and Afghanistan. The Alliance has in fact gone beyond that into developing a comprehensive approach to its activities in theatres of conflict. The presentation investigated what zones of conflict look like today. It also postulated what they might look like in 2022 and 2030, in terms of numbers of deaths, years of people living in extreme poverty and children living with malnutrition and without access to education.

A 'Comprehensive Approach' to a conflict refers to the synergy amongst civilian and military actors as well as the actions of the international community. Four principles guide NATO's comprehensive approach to conflict zones: namely, proactive engagement, shared understanding, outcome-based thinking and collaborative working. It is of vital importance to ensure that international organizations such as NATO, the EU and the UN work together for peace and security in a complementary manner. In relation to terrorism, there is a need to work with local communities because they are the most effective in addressing the problem of radicalization.

In order to address the root causes and drivers of a conflict, it is necessary to understand the civil environment. NATO's civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) principles seek to understand that civil environment. Language and discourse also matter in the framing of a civil-military engagement process. Rather than speaking of 'war', 'conflict', and 'victims', it is necessary to talk about 'peace'.

#### **Discussion**

There was discussion around the importance of language, internal communication, and local communities in combating terrorism. It was pointed out that lessons had been learned by NATO about the importance of integrated operations. In the areas of operation, it has been essential to use local forces since the local people tend to treat outsiders with suspicion. Thus, building intercommunal confidence, respecting women, and honoring tribal elders have been important considerations.

In order to conduct successful operations there needs to be careful planning, suitable structures for interfacing with the local population, training personnel through seminars and workshops, and planning phases of operations carefully.

The process of countering terrorism involves three different combat phases; preparation, combat and a stability phase. The preparation phase is the most important where partners should work together as well as collect and share intelligence. In the combat phase, the environment must be secured. The stability phase is the longest phase and involves reconstruction, human assistance, clearing mines, providing medical support, public security, and ensuring law enforcement. Objectives during each phase can vary although the long term objective must be for the host government to resume control.

Participants offered personal experiences of dealing with insurgencies and terrorism. A common viewpoint was that terrorism can remain within a community for a prolonged period. It can be an error to conclude that when the military phase is completed, that the terrorist problem has been defeated. Another view was that civilian casualties must be kept to the minimum.

The need for a comprehensive approach was reasserted. It necessitates a full spectrum of actors to be involved including the military, civilian agencies and local people. There is a danger that the military will accept whatever tasks they are given, regardless of whether they are equipped to succeed.

It was agreed that cultural intelligence is vital for success in such operations.

### 3.7. THE CHALLENGE OF CYBERSPACE

Prof. Alan Brill

Senior Managing Director

Cyber Risk Practice

The last presentation was delivered by Prof. Alan Brill, one of the founders, and senior managing director, of the Cyber Risk practice of Kroll, and adjunct professor in Texas A&M University School of Law. Professor Brill started by drawing attention to the trans nationality of the cyber domain and its capacity to cause massive disruption in the real world. What happens in cyberspace does not stay there but leads to physical damage and financial dislocation.

Cyber defence is a part of NATO's core task of collective defence. NATO recognized cyberspace as a domain of operation in 2016 and since then has sought to protect networks and enhance resilience across the Alliance. NATO must be able to defend itself as effectively as it does in the air, on land, and at sea. However, nations operate within the environment of their own law which creates operational differences in cyberspace and presents challenges for joint action. For example, the US has considered legalizing the activity of computer hacking, but such activity could be directed at a target such as a hospital, and this could violate another country's domestic law.

Professor Brill observed that terrorists have shown the ability to use sophisticated technological methods in cybercrime. They can operate on the dark web and use complex means of encryption. For example, many different organisations have been forced to pay Ransomware to retrieve stolen data. Virtual currencies such as Bitcoin have also been used by terrorists because they offer the advantages of being anonymous and global.

Terrorists use and misuse the internet as a vehicle for cyber-attacks against infrastructure or selected targets. They also use the internet for recruitment, radicalization, training and for the collection and transfer of funds. Social media companies have struggled to suppress terrorist propaganda and hate speech, because these activities can be conducted remotely without any need to cross borders. Cybercrime and cyberterrorism are overlapping concepts. Although cybercriminals are not terrorists, both sorts of actors utilise cyberspace for financial benefit. Both types of actors can infiltrate information systems and conduct malevolent activities over prolonged periods.

Counteracting cyber-terrorism has been disadvantaged by the disappearance of WHOIS, a compendium of internet domains that was maintained by the Internet Society. WHOIS has hitherto enabled law enforcement officers to submit speedy enquiries into the source of internet addresses. The loss of this facility greatly hampers efforts to combat crime conducted in cyberspace.

Professor Brill concluded by discussing the shortage of resources to fight cybercrime. The challenge continues to grow whilst funds and expertise to counter it are in short supply. Different agencies of government can work together to permit more effective use of these scarce sources. It requires innovative thinking that overcomes organisational silos and barriers to cooperation.

## 4. KEY FINDINGS

- ❖ Because of the nature of terrorism, the military have only limited relevance. Their role is frequently specialised in nature, such as countering chemical or radiological threats.
- ❖ NATO's strength is its legitimacy derived from its breadth of membership and consensual decision-making.
- ❖ NATO can help to build counter-terrorism capacity for partner countries whilst simultaneously benefitting from partner experiences of terrorism.
- ❖ Western countries must be aware of the threat from right wing terrorism as well as jihadi terrorism.
- ❖ Trust and information sharing takes a long time to foster between military and civilian security agencies and is quickly squandered.
- ❖ Diversity within intelligence agencies is a source of strength that needs to be cultivated.
- ❖ Coordination between the military and civilian agencies is vital within zones of conflict. A 'whole of government' approach is the key to success.
- ❖ Cybercrime and cyberterrorism increasingly overlap and present a growing and evolving threat.
- ❖ Collecting evidence on the battlefield is a task of increasing importance and complexity.

## 5. RECCOMENDATIONS

- ❖ In overseas interventions, NATO militaries should be wary of becoming the dominant actors within complex environments and should seek close cooperation with other organisations such as the European Union and United Nations.
- ❖ In preparing for complex overseas emergencies, the Alliance must focus on the doctrine and training given to its soldiers and the coordination between its military and civilian agencies.
- ❖ NATO needs to pay increasing attention to the threats from cyberspace ranging from ransomware to terrorist recruitment and radicalisation.
- ❖ NATO members must not become overly reliant on technology and recognise the importance of human sources of intelligence.
- ❖ Militaries need to learn to say 'No' to civilian masters when their expertise is inappropriate for certain counter-terrorism roles.

## ANNEX-A: WORKSHOP PROGRAM

### EXECUTIVE LEVEL DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM

“The Interaction between Civilian and Military Authorities When Countering Terrorism”

(25-26 November 2019, Holiday Inn Hotel, Ankara/TURKEY)

**Academic Advisor:** Professor Wyn REES (UK)

**Seminar Director:** Col. Pavlin RAYNOV (BGR AF)

**Deputy Seminar Director:** Maj. Mustafa YAĞBASAN

**Seminar Assistant:** Mrs. Aslıhan SEVİM (TUR CIV.)

### SEMINAR PROGRAM

08.30 – 09.00	Registration and Welcome Coffee
09.00 – 09.10	Welcome address and Briefing on COEDAT Activities
09.10 – 09.30	COE-DAT and Administration Briefing
09.30 – 11.00	<b>Civilian-Military Challenges in Countering Terrorism</b> <i>This session is designed to elaborate and explore the themes of this two-day seminar. Civilian-military interaction helps to strengthen counter-terrorism yet all NATO members wrestle with lines of demarcation between the powers of their agencies. Strategic cultures vary across Europe and countries have evolved their own national responses to the threats that they face.</i>
11.00 – 11.30	Ice Breaking and Coffee Break
11.30 – 13.00	<b>The Interface between the Military and the Police</b> <i>“This will be the principal session for exploring the intricate relationship between the police and the military in the context of terrorism. It will cover the legal framework in which the two organisations operate, various policing structures in Europe as well as the authorisation process for the use of force. An important facet of this session will be appreciating the differences amongst NATO members in relation to this issue.”</i>
13.00 – 14.00	Group Photo and Hosted Lunch
14.00 – 15.30	<b>The Military and the Intelligence Services</b> <i>Countering terrorism should be intelligence-led and western governments have poured considerable resources into developing fusion centres and mandating agencies to cooperate together. This raises the question of the relationship between the military and domestic intelligence agencies.”</i>
15.30 – 16.00	Coffee Break
16.00 – 17.00	Rapporteurs summarize and discuss the main points that have emerged from the panels
08.30 – 09.00	Welcome Coffee

09.00 – 10.30	<p><b>NATO and its Mediterranean Partners</b></p> <p><i>“This session seeks to explore how NATO has sought to diffuse its counter-terrorism principles to states in its Mediterranean Dialogue: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. Concepts of civilian control over the military, defence capacity building, network analysis and judicial reform have been at the heart of NATO efforts to share counter-terrorism norms with states on its southern rim.”</i></p>
10.30 – 11.00	Coffee Break
11.00 – 13.00	<p><b>Civil-Military Engagement in Theatres of Conflict</b></p> <p><i>11.00-11.30: Briefing on Colombia’s experience in interagency collaboration in countering terrorism, presented by <b>R.Admiral Orlando Franceschi GRISALES</b>, Colombia</i></p> <p><i>1130-1300: This session will explore NATO experiences of conducting counter-terrorism activities in zones of conflict such as Afghanistan and Libya. NATO works with other international organisations, like the European Union and the United Nations, to address problems both during and after conflict.</i></p>
13.00 – 14.00	Hosted Lunch
14.00 – 15.30	<p><b>The Challenge of Cyberspace</b></p> <p><i>Cyberspace presents a unique challenge to counter-terrorism because it is de-territorialized and it blurs the division between military and civilian lines of responsibility. Terrorists use the internet to radicalise at home and overseas, as well as to disseminate their propaganda.”</i></p>
15.30 – 15.45	Coffee Break
15.45 – 17.00	<p><b>Roundtable Discussion and Lessons Learned</b></p> <p><i>“The final session will allow officers to share their experiences of countering terrorism as well as to reflect on issues that they have encountered on the course.”</i></p>

## ANNEX-B: BIOGRAPHIES OF THE SPEAKERS

### PROF. ALAN BRILL

Alan Brill is recognized as an international leader in the field of information security, privacy and computer forensics. He is Senior Managing Director and founder of the Cyber Risk practice at Kroll, a Division of Duff & PHelps and has conducted investigations for governments and corporations worldwide.

He has had the opportunity to study thousands of cyber-terror and cyber-crime cases and to understand what really happens in these incidents. He has also served as a Special Master in the U.S. courts.

Prior to joining Kroll, he was Director of the New York Department of Investigation, and Deputy Inspector General of New York City.

He was an officer in the United States Army during the Vietnam War, serving as a project officer on the Army General Staff and as an advisor on information security policy for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and a systems designer at NASA Houston, working on the Apollo moon landing project.

He has authored or co-authored more than 10 books and written numerous articles. He is a frequent on-air commentator for a number of broadcast and cable television networks. He has also been an instructor in computer investigation for the FBI, Secret Service and Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.

He holds professional certifications in information security, fraud investigation and privacy. He did his undergraduate and master's degrees at New York University. He is an honor graduate of the Eisenhower School at the National Defense University.



## **DR. ANDREEA STOIAN KARADELI**

Dr. Andreea Stoian Karadeli is an independent researcher based in Turkey and a collaborator with several institutions worldwide. Dr. Karadeli worked as a foreign lecturer in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Faculty of Political Sciences, Sakarya University, and she completed her PhD in National Security and Intelligence at Mihai Viteazul National Intelligence Academy, Romania. Dr. Karadeli is also a graduate from Exeter University, United Kingdom, where she studied a BA in Arabic and Middle East Studies and a Master of Research in Security, Conflict and Justice. During the BA degree, she did field research on Arabic Language, Literature and Culture at Damascus University for 10 months. Andreea Stoian Karadeli's research is multidisciplinary with the main focus on the evolution of religiously inspired terrorism after the Arab Spring, with expertise in Syria and Turkey, conflict resolution, intercultural communication, face reading techniques and profiling.



## **DR. AFZAL ASHRAF**

Afzal Ashraf was a senior officer in the British Armed forces with operational experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. He has served in the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office and has experience of counterterrorism and all-source information fusion and threat assessment in the UK. A Research Fellowship at St Andrews University's Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence led to a PhD in Al-Qaeda's Ideology Through Political Myth and Rhetoric. As a Consultant Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute think tank he designed and delivered a course in international diplomacy.



He is currently an Assistant Professor of International Relations at Nottingham University's Centre for Conflict, Security and Terrorism. He is a frequent commentator on global TV and the press as well as publishing several articles and Op Eds on international affairs and global security.

## **MR FERENC GYULA HEGYESI**

Ferenc G.Hegyési is a career diplomat, who has joined the Hungarian Diplomatic Service in 2008 as desk officer in the Department for Security Policy and Non-Proliferation dealing with NATO's and EU's engagement in Afghanistan. In 2011 he was posted to the Permanent Representation of Hungary to the NATO, covering ongoing missions of the Alliance in Afghanistan and Kosovo as well as NATO's maritime operations in the Operations Policy Committee. In this capacity he actively participated in the operational planning of the Resolute Support Mission, succeeding the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which was mandated by the U.N to enable the Afghan government to provide effective security across the country and develop new Afghan security forces to ensure Afghanistan would never again become a safe haven for terrorists. Before his current assignment, he held various positions in the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, including Head of Section and later Deputy Director for EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy and Deputy Director for North America, responsible for the oversight of bilateral relations with the United States of America and Canada. Ferenc has been seconded to NATO's Counter Terrorism Section by the Hungarian authorities in August 2019 as a voluntary national contribution.

## **SIST. PROF. DR. MURAT TINAS**

Dr. Murat TINAS works as an Assistant Professor at the Institute of Security Sciences, Turkish National Police Academy.

He received his Ph.D. in Area Studies at the Middle East Technical University (2016). His Ph.D. dissertation title is Sectarian Groups as Sub-state Foreign Policy Actors: The Case Study of Lebanon. He studied Arabic in Jordan during his graduate studies and also worked as an affiliate researcher at the Center for Arab and Middle Eastern Studies, American University of Beirut in Lebanon. He teaches 'Geopolitics of the Middle East', 'Politics in Lebanon', 'Radicalism, Violence and Terrorism' and 'Intelligence in International Relations.'

His major academic interests include the Middle East Politics, radicalization, terrorism, foreign fighters and foreign policy analysis in addition to Intelligence Studies.



## **REAR ADM. ORLANDO GRISALES FRANCESCHI**

He entered the Naval Cadet School “Almirante Padilla” in 1986, graduating Lt. Corvette 1st June 1990, in specialty surface executive. He rose to the rank of Rear Admiral by Decree of March 21, 2018.

He held the positions of Head of the Deck and Aircraft Division, Chief of the Anti-Submarine War Division of the Light Missile Frigate ARC (Antioquia) Plant Officer of the ARC Naval School of Non-Commissioned Officers (Barranquilla). Having served in the General Staff of the Specific Command of San Andres and Providencia, he is the Deputy Director of War College now.

He has got a diploma in “Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law” from the Ministry of National Defense. He attended to “Executive Seminar On Human Rights and Naval Operations” of the United States Defense Institute. He is the Professional Complementation in Electronics of the Naval School of Cadets “Almirante Padilla. He also holds a university degree in Naval Sciences for Naval Officers of the Naval Cadet School (Almirante Padilla). He got a master’s degree in Security and Defense of the Center for Naval Studies (CESNAV), Mexico and the Superior School of War.



## **PROF. WYN REES**

Wyn Rees is Professor of International Security in the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Nottingham, UK. He has just completed three years as the Head of School. Prior to working at the University of Nottingham, he taught at the University of Leicester, the College of Europe in Bruges and the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. Professor Rees researches, publishes and teaches on the subjects of transatlantic security relations, British defence policy and counter-terrorism.









Terörizmle Mücadele Mükemmeliyet Merkezi  
Devlet Mah. İnönü Bul. No: 65  
Kıraçlıdere, Ankara-TURKEY  
Phone : +90 312 425 82 15 PBX  
Fax : +90 312 425 64 89  
info@coedat.nato.int  
www.coedat.nato.int