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Defence Against Terrorism Review

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Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism
Operations in Nigeria

Adewunmi J. Falode, Ph.D.

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Systems? A Cautionary Tale for A.I. Systems Proponents

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Giray Sadık, Eda Bekci Arı

The enemy of my enemy: Strategies aimed at
co-opting irregular forces.

Chris Murray

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The Defence Against Terrorism Review (DATR) is calling for papers for coming issues. The DATR focuses on terrorism and counterterrorism. All of the articles sent to DATR undergo a peer-review process before publication. For further information please contact datr@coedat.nato.int

Editor's Note

Dear Defence Against Terrorism Review (DATR) Readers,

The Centre of Excellence-Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT) proudly presents 11th Volume of DATR which features four articles on a wide range of aspects of terrorism.

The current issue begins with an article by Alan Brill and Elaine Wood titled "*Can Cyber Terrorists Influence Artificial Intelligence (A.I) Systems? A Cautionary Tale for A.I. Systems Proponents*". In this article Brill and Wood describe the threat of cybercrime and cyber terrorists and outline a plan for preventing the misuse of A.I. systems. The authors examine some basic definitions and assumptions about cyberspace, as well as illustrating both the capabilities and the inherent issues and threats that go hand in hand with A.I.'s new powers and functions. The authors have found that the people or organizations such as Project Leader, Systems Developers, Subject Matter Experts, Chief Information Security Officer, Internal Auditors and Compliance Specialists and General Counsel share in the overall responsibility for the integrity of the A.I system. They conclude that A.I. is essential today not only to function effectively and competitively, but also to detect and defend against outside attacks.

The second article of this issue by Chris Murray focuses on long-term strategies aimed at confronting present challenges. In his article entitled "The enemy of my enemy: Strategies aimed at co-opting irregular forces", Murray discusses that despite their fluid nature, addressing conflicts requires nuanced understanding and a long-term in-depth approach. For him, demands for rapid action and rapid results hold tremendous implications for the formulation and execution of strategies. These demands create a focus on short-term strategies that are inherently reactionary and can, in fact, be counter to long-term interests. Political forces are motivated to seek low-impact solutions, such as co-opting local rebels as proxies to address immensely complex international issues such as civil wars, terrorism, resource competition, and the power vacuum of failed states. These local proxies are poorly understood and the result is often underdeveloped, short-term strategies. These strategies lack the required knowledge base to adequately appreciate the situation and develop sound long-term policies necessary to obtain goals and insure they remain sustainable. He concludes that there is a need to develop a larger emphasis on the social knowledge required for both immediate military and long-term political success. With this emphasis in place there is a need to establish a permanent physical commitment to the development of and preservation of this social knowledge in the context of conflict.

Adewunmi J. Falode discusses security-related challenges of Nigeria and Nigeria's Counterterrorism Response in the third article of this issue titled "Hybrid Doctrine: The Grand Strategy for Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism Operations in Nigeria". The most significant of these challenges are terrorism and insurgency. Nigeria has been battling insurgency in one form or the other since the 1980s, while terrorism became a major threat to the existence of the state in 2010. To tackle these problems, Nigeria came up with a national counter-terrorism strategic document, NACTEST, in 2014. However, this has failed to combat and contain the spread of terrorism and insurgency in the country. Using the qualitative research methodology and a multi- and trans-disciplinary approach, Falode shows that what is needed to bring insurgency and terrorism to an end in the country is a Grand Strategy. He describes some basic characteristics of the Grand Strategy. This strategy will have as its bedrock what the author has called the Hybrid Doctrine. The Hybrid Doctrine is a counterinsurgency and counterterrorism manual and has at its core the 4D concepts: Degrade, Depower, Defang and Detox. Falode advocates the use of the Hybrid Doctrine as a comprehensive, cohesive and holistic tool that Nigeria can use to effectively curb and contain terrorism and insurgency in both the short- and the long-term.

In the last article of this issue entitled “NATO Capacity Building in Counterterrorism and Transatlantic Cooperation”, Giray Sadık and Eda Bekci Arı examine the role of Capacity Building (CB) in Transatlantic counterterrorism (CT) between 2010 and 2016. The authors used Official NATO documents as the main sources of the analysis process. Accordingly, they address the question: What is the role of CB in Transatlantic CT? To this end, the authors critically analyze what activities have been performed in CB-CT since the adoption of the new policy guidelines on CT entitled “Aware, Capable and Engaged for a Safer Future” in 2012 at the Chicago Summit. Since then, NATO has been including CT - as a mission - into the CB activities to enhance its role in Euro-Atlantic CT through education and training and civil science and technology cooperation.

As DATR team, we would like to thank all authors and referees for the contributions they have made to this issue and encourage readers to send us comments and suggestions. DATR always welcomes and encourages contributions from experts, civil and military officers as well as academics to send us their best work on defence against terrorism.

Sincerely yours,

Uğur GÜNGÖR, Assoc.Prof.
Editor-in-Chief



Hybrid Doctrine: The Grand Strategy for Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism Operations in Nigeria

Adewunmi J. Falode, Ph.D.¹

***Abstract:** Nigeria is confronted with a number of serious security-related challenges. These challenges include terrorism, insurgency, an ethno-religious crisis, kidnappings and farmers-herders conflicts. The most significant of these are the challenges of terrorism and insurgency. Nigeria has been battling insurgency in one form or the other since the 1980s, while terrorism became a major threat to the existence of the state in 2010. To tackle these problems, Nigeria came up with a national counter-terrorism strategic document, NACTEST, in 2014. However, this has failed to combat and contain the spread of terrorism and insurgency in the country. Using the qualitative research methodology and a multi- and trans-disciplinary approach, this work will show that what is needed to bring insurgency and terrorism to an end in the country is a Grand Strategy. This Grand Strategy will have as its bedrock what the author has called the Hybrid Doctrine. The Hybrid Doctrine is a counterinsurgency and counterterrorism manual and has at its core the 4D concepts: Degrade, Depower, Defang and Detox. The paper concludes that the use of this Grand Strategy will effectively, proactively and holistically tackle the twin challenges of terrorism and insurgency that confront the country.*

***Keywords:** Grand Strategy, Hybrid Doctrine, Terrorism, Nigeria, Insurgency, Counterterrorism, Counterinsurgency*

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Introduction

Nigeria became an independent state in 1960 and it has faced various challenges ever since. Insurgency and terrorism are two key security-related challenges that have made it impossible for Nigeria to achieve its dream of becoming a functional and viable political entity. The insurgency that is now a regular fixture on the Nigerian scene in the 21st century has existed in one form or another since the late 1960s. Terrorism, and the overt religious and ethnic intolerance that accompany it, became a significant issue in the 21st century. These two challenges now define the Nigerian socio-political, economic and religious scenes. Non-state actors like Boko Haram now combine the two to destabilize the country. The activities of Boko Haram and the now quiescent Niger Delta militants have plunged Nigeria into a type of ruinous asymmetric conflict that the country is poorly prepared for.

In spite of the best efforts of its rulers, Nigeria has not been able to evolve proactive and holistic strategies that could curb and contain the two challenges.

- A major factor in this failure is the fact that the military is using conventional tactics and strategies in an asymmetric environment.
- A second factor is the constantly changing and dynamic interactions between terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria. The fact that the non-state adversaries of Nigeria constantly switch between the tactics and strategies of terrorism and insurgency and the inability of the security forces to come to grips with this has made these challenges seem insurmountable. For example, in 2014, Boko Haram launched a successful conventional attack using its irregulars division, motorized infantry and a swarming tactic against the highly fortified Giwa Military Barracks, the headquarters of the Nigerian Army's 21 Armoured Brigade in Maiduguri.² At other times, the group relied on suicide-bombings and the use of improvised explosive devices in its confrontations with the Nigerian government/security forces. This was the situation prior to the outbreak of the major clash between Nigeria and the group in 2010 and intermittently, during the major phase of the conflict from 2015. The Nigerian Army that is trained in conventional warfare has found it difficult to adapt and respond to the 'dual' tactics that Boko Haram employs in its engagements with the security forces.
- A third factor is the fact that the army is confronted with a Boko Haram that is now hydra-headed in both its operations and its affiliations. On the one hand is the Ibrahim Shekau faction which is loosely affiliated to Al-Qaeda and carries out unrestricted destructive campaigns against both civilian and military targets in Nigeria and her west African neighbours. At the other extreme is the Abubakar led faction, an ISIS franchise known as Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP). This group combines terrorism and guerrilla tactics in its campaigns. The two groups, though they share the same origin, use different tactics and strategies in their incessant but uncoordinated attacks against the Nigerian state.

² Akali Omeni, "Boko Haram's Increasingly Sophisticated Military Threat," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 29(5) (2018), p. 890. Available at <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2018.1519299> (accessed 6 May 2019)

This presents a clear and present danger to the existence of the country. This paper argues that Nigeria needs a Grand Strategy to tackle these two challenges. This paper posits that the Hybrid Doctrine, with the 4D concepts therein, will tackle the problems of terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria in a holistic, proactive, integrated, synchronised and effective manner.

Conceptual Framework: Grand Strategy and Hybrid Doctrine

The concepts of Grand Strategy and the Hybrid Doctrine are the two tools that will underpin this research. It is the contention of this research that a Grand Strategy is needed for Nigeria to be able to effectively contain insurgency and terrorism in its territory and Hybrid Doctrine is that tool that will achieve this aim for the country. Grand Strategy is the forest while Hybrid Doctrine and its core tenets are the trees, or Grand Strategy is the tree while Hybrid Doctrine and its tenets are the branches. So what, then, is Grand Strategy?

Grand Strategy

“Grand Strategy” is a contested term. To Barry Posen, it is about a political-military means-ends chain that is designed to guarantee the comprehensive security of the state.³ Paul Kennedy sees Grand Strategy as something that deals with both war and peace. It is about the environment and the integration and creation of long term policies designed to operate within a state.⁴ According to Williamson Murray, Grand Strategy demands an intertwining of political, social and economic realities with military power and the recognition that politics must drive military necessity.⁵ Liddell Hart defined Grand Strategy as the coordination and direction of all the resources of a nation or band of nations toward the attainment of the political objective of the war.⁶

The political objective is usually ensconced in the state’s policy. Policy is what the state uses to define its goals, both short and long term. It defines the goals of governments and Grand Strategy is simply instrumental and being directed by policy rather than being part of or indistinguishable from it.⁷ Liddell Hart further avers that Grand Strategy is a plan devised by commanders to win the war but it also extends beyond the war to prepare for the future peace and includes consideration of all the state’s resources.⁸ Liddell Hart’s definition establishes some important distinctions in Grand Strategy. The first is that it is defined by policy. The second is that it considers both war (the present) and peace (the future). The third is that emphasizes the use of all resources, both military and non-military, at the disposal of the state to achieve its goals. Edward Luttwak on his part sees Grand Strategy as the employment of the state’s resources including military strength, diplomacy

³ Barry Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,” *International Security*, 28(1) (2003), pp. 19-20. Available at <https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/016228803322427965> (accessed 5 March, 2019)

⁴ Paul M. Kennedy, “Grand Strategies in War and Peace: Toward a Broader Definition”, in *Grand Strategies in War and Peace* (Paul Kennedy, Yale University Press, 1991), pp. 1-10

⁵ Williamson Murray, “Thoughts on Grand Strategy”, in *The Shaping of Grand Strategy: Policy, Diplomacy and War* (Williamson Murray, Richard Hart Sinnreich and James Lacey, ed., Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 3.

⁶ Basil H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 2nd ed, (Praeger, 1967), pp. 321-322

⁷ Colin S. Gray, *War, Peace and Victory: Strategy and Statecraft for the Next Century*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), p. 29.

⁸ Nina Silove, “Beyond the Buzzword: The Three Meanings of Grand Strategy”, *Security Studies*, 27(1) (2017), p. 9. Available at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2017.1360073> (accessed 4 March 2019)

and intelligence and the coordination of these resources with those of other states.⁹ It should be pointed out here that Luttwak also brought a unique dimension to the conception of Grand Strategy. This is the idea that Grand Strategy is not made in isolation based on the resources that are available to the state. The state must also consider those resources of its neighbours that could be harnessed to achieve its objectives. To put it succinctly, it means State A, that has made Grand Strategy an integral part of its national defense, must look for ways to coopt all the resources of State B, C, D and E in the realization of A's objectives.

It should be further pointed out that Grand Strategy is broader than strategy; it is distinguished by a more expansive scope. It is more that the application of resources (strategy) but also involves the development and creation of these resources and their allocation.¹⁰ It is concerned with assembling the manpower, money and material necessary to build and sustain the means needed. Grand Strategy therefore seeks to define the way in which the resources needed to carry out the strategy can be made available. Although one can see that there is no generally accepted definition for Grand Strategy from the ideas reviewed so far, there are some basic characteristics of the term that are easily identifiable.

- The first is that Grand Strategy is long-term in scope.¹¹ It is about the environment and integration of policies that are designed to run for decades or even centuries. It covers both the present war being fought and the future peace that is desired.
- The second characteristic is that the concept of Grand Strategy requires the use and deployment of all the resources at the disposal of the state in a holistic manner. This involves the use of all the elements and resources, both military and non-military such as diplomacy and economics that a state could muster.¹²
- The third characteristic is that Grand Strategy is concerned with making trade-offs to advance the state's most important interests.¹³ These interests for most states are the preservation of sovereignty, safety, territorial integrity and power position.¹⁴
- A fourth characteristic is that it is more comprehensive and wider in scope in its operational environment. It is more focused on the whole-of-nation with a large support base from external commercial and governmental sources.¹⁵
- A fifth characteristic is that Grand Strategy is concerned with integrating the diverse resources at the disposal of a state, and creating needed ones when necessary, into a coherent and cohesive whole.¹⁶ This means that integration is an important essence of Grand Strategy.
- A sixth and final characteristic is that Grand Strategy seeks to impose a preferred state of order on the future. This entails the creation of order in time and space with the intention of creating

⁹ Edward N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire*, (Harvard University Press, 2009), p. 409

¹⁰ Peter Layton, "The Idea of Grand Strategy," *The RUSI Journal*, 157(4) (15 August 2012), pp. 56-61. Available at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2012.714193> (accessed 2 February 2019).

¹¹ Silove, "Beyond the Buzzword", p. 20

¹² Kennedy, "Grand Strategies in War", p. 5

¹³ Silove, "Beyond the buzzword", p. 20

¹⁴ Barry R. Posen, *Restraint: A New Foundational for U.S. Grand Strategy*, (Cornell University Press, 2014), p. 1

¹⁵ Layton, "The Idea of Grand Strategy."

¹⁶ Layton, "The Idea of Grand Strategy."

coherence and predictability in an inherently disorderly environment made-up of thinking, competing, reacting and conflicting entities.¹⁷

It is clear that there is no universally acceptable definition of Grand Strategy. To get around this and to make the concept relevant to the author's work, an operational definition is provided:

Grand Strategy is the comprehensive, cohesive and synchronised deployment of all military and non-military assets and resources by a state for the purpose of achieving short- and long-term political objectives.

A careful reading of this definition will show that it meets all the characteristics earlier identified as belonging to Grand Strategy.

- The military resources and assets are such things as weapons, military personnel (all tiers), and alliances (with foreign powers) to provide the operational and theatre support that is needed to successfully prosecute the war and also create the condition for peace in both the short- and the long-term.
- Non-military assets and resources include the political will of the government and the people, courage, resilience and discipline of the armed forces, intelligence, diplomacy and an economy that is geared towards meeting the needs of the state
- Strategic Communications for both internal and external audiences.

By considering both short- and long-term goals, Grand Strategy demonstrates that it is not only focused on winning the war but also in creating the desired peaceful political future. This goes beyond immediate military aims and also tries to create and shape the future in the post-war era. Strategy is about the engagement of the war, but Grand Strategy is about engagement before, during and after the war. Grand Strategy is about using available means, and addressing those means that are not available, to meet present and future ends, while strategy is about using available means to meet present needs. The cohesive aspect of the definition shows that the resources and assets must be deployed in an integrated and synchronised manner to achieve synergistic effects. Thus, for Nigeria to be able to curb and contain the twin menace of insurgency and terrorism that threatened the territorial and corporate existence of the country, a Grand Strategy is sorely needed. The author believes that the Hybrid Doctrine is the Grand Strategy that is needed by Nigeria to counter both insurgency and terrorism in the country.

Hybrid Doctrine

Hybrid Doctrine (HD) is the name of the Grand Strategy that Nigeria could use to curb and contain insurgency and terrorism in the country. Hybrid Doctrine is the synchronised, cohesive and comprehensive use of resources and assets by a state to achieve synergistic effects in a combat and non-combat environment. It is the extensive use of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency measures in an integrated manner in a combat and non-combat environment to achieve short- and long-term political objectives.¹⁸

¹⁷ Steven Metz, *Iraq and the Environment of American Strategy*, (Potomac Books, 2008), p. xviii

¹⁸ Adewunmi J. Falode, "Countering the Boko Haram Group in Nigeria: The Relevance of Hybrid Doctrine," *Small Wars Journal*, (4 August, 2016). Available at smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/countering-the-boko-haram-group-in-Nigeria-the-relevance-of-hybrid-doctrine-0 (accessed 9 March 2019).

Terrorism is the systemic use of violence by non-state actors to instil fear with the aim of achieving stated social, religious and political objectives.¹⁹ Some of the tactics used by terrorists include the use of Improvised Explosive Devices, sometimes constructed as car bombs, sometimes operated by suicide attackers, or beheadings. Counterterrorism (CT) is a mix of public and foreign policies designed to limit the actions of terrorist groups and individuals associated with terrorist organizations in an attempt to protect the public from terrorist violence.²⁰ CT encompasses a range of actions such as the freezing of the financial assets of terrorist organizations; specific decisions like signing international treaties aimed at targeting different aspects of terrorism; provisions like collective self-defence agreements that allow the use of military forces to operate in the territories of other states; and the supply of technical, military and economic aid to other states coping with terrorism. There are various approaches and models in CT and Ronald Crelinsten's "Perspectives on Counterterrorism: From Stovepipes to a Comprehensive Approach" has dealt with the various approaches and models exhaustively.²¹ These approaches can be divided into two broad categories: soft approaches and hard approaches.²² The soft approach includes the use of diplomacy, negotiation, amnesty, intelligence analysis and social reforms. The hard approach involves the use of military forces, legal-repressive means and economic sanctions.

Counterinsurgency (COIN) is a blend of comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes.²³ Insurgency is a protracted violent conflict in which one or more groups seek to overthrow or fundamentally change the political or social order in a state or region through the use of sustained violence, subversion, social disruption and political action.²⁴ COIN is an integrated set of political, economic, social and security measures intended to end and prevent the recurrence of armed violence, create and maintain stable political, economic and social structures, and resolve the underlying causes of an insurgency in order to establish and sustain the conditions necessary for lasting stability.²⁵

Hybrid Doctrine is a blend of the hard and soft approaches and its emphasis is on the integrated, cohesive and synchronised deployment of the approaches to resolve Nigeria's particular situation. The ultimate aims of HD are twofold: to compel, deter and persuade the 'terrorist-insurgents' to end the conflicts on terms favourable to the state and to enable the state to create a

¹⁹ Adewunmi J. Falode, "Terrorism 4.0: A Global and Structural Analysis", *Open Political Science*, 1 (7 December 2018), pp. 153-163. Available at <https://doi.org/10.1515/openps-2018-0013> (accessed 6 May 2019).

²⁰ Omelicheva Mariya, "Counterterrorism: The State of Scholarship, Direction for Future Data Collection and Analysis." Available at [http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/files/ISN/163674/ichaptersection_singledocument/be35d0dc-2972-437d-8526-9492b5af111f/en/Article1\(8\).pdf](http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/files/ISN/163674/ichaptersection_singledocument/be35d0dc-2972-437d-8526-9492b5af111f/en/Article1(8).pdf) (accessed 12 February 2017)

²¹ Ronald Crelinsten, "Perspectives on Counterterrorism: From Stovepipes to a Comprehensive Approach", *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 8(1) (February 2014). Available at <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/180128/332-2270-6-PBFull.pdf> (accessed 14 April 2017)

²² Taiji Miyaoka, "Terrorist Crisis Management in Japan: Historical Development and Changing Response (1979-1997)," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 10 (1998), pp. 23-53. Available at <https://doi.org/10.1080/0954659808427456> (accessed 23 May 2018)

²³ Joint Publication 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, (November 22 2013), pp. III-1. Available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_24.pdf (accessed 14 August 2016)

²⁴ Scott R. Moore, "The Basics of Counterinsurgency," *Small Wars Journal*, (May 4 2007). Available at <http://small-warsjournal.com/documents/moorecoinpaper.pdf> (accessed 21 April 2018)

²⁵ *Ibid.*

lasting peace that will establish a desired political future. Terrorist-insurgents are non-state actors that combine the tactics of terrorism with organized armed and protracted conflict to bring about fundamental social and political change. HD has four important concepts at its core collectively known as the 4D: degrade, defang, depower and detox.

- To *degrade* means to nullify the ability of the terror-insurgents to launch attacks in a combat and non-combat environment. This involves the synchronised and integrated deployment of all military assets and resources, internally and externally (in collaboration with foreign nations), in the environment. The aim of this phase is usually short-term and it is operationally restricted to the combat environment.
- To *defang* means the comprehensive and cohesive use of non-combat assets and resources to nullify the ability of the terror-insurgents to get new recruits. The goals of the phase are both short- and long-term: to deny the terror-insurgents new recruits to permanently cut off the supply of new foot-soldiers, and more importantly, to cut off the access of the group to both internal and external sources of funds
- To *depower* means the use of internal and external resources in a comprehensive and integrated manner to curb and contain terror-insurgency threats in both the internal and external territorial environment of a state. It involves the synchronised and comprehensive deployment of specific tactics, techniques, procedures and strategies by internal and external forces to counter terror-insurgency threats in a holistic and synergistic manner. This phase involves the use of combined resources and assets to achieve short- and long-term objectives.
- To *detox* means the extensive, comprehensive and holistic use of local assets and resources to counter the spread of extremist ideology in the short- and long-term. This phase is more useful in a non-combat environment and it will need the deployment of political, social, economic and religious assets and resources to counter the spread of violent extremism in a holistic and effective manner.

These will be discussed in detail later in this paper.

Hybrid Doctrine has five basic characteristics.

- It is a combination of both counterinsurgency and counterterrorism measures.
- HD emphasizes the importance of both integration and synchronicity in the deployment of assets and resources.
- It deals with both short- and long-term goals. That is, the doctrine is both operational in an active combat environment and in the post-combat environment to create a desired future.
- HD is systemic and mechanistic in nature. Each of the concepts reinforces one another to deliver optimal, synergised effects. The more the concepts are deployed in a synchronized manner, the greater its efficacy and effects.
- Because of the duality at its core, HD can be used to simultaneously confront and contain both terrorism and insurgency.

One can say that the importance of HD as a Grand Strategy in a combat and non-combat environment is that when applied holistically, it should effectively take care of the different stages and processes that are involved in any insurgency or terrorist campaign. The doctrine will not just bring terrorism and insurgency-related wars to an end, but it could also prevent the outbreak and spread of violent extremist ideology. This point is important. Stopping insurgency and terrorism from breaking-out in the first instance is more important than trying to contain them militarily later. This is where the HD becomes invaluable. It should care of both the “hearts and minds” and “guns and bombs” phases of the two situations *simultaneously* and *in a synchronized manner*. Therefore, the author believes the HD is the Grand Strategy that Nigeria needs to effectively curb and contain terrorism and insurgency in the country. The concepts of the HD are comprehensive and holistic enough and can be easily adapted to contain the particular nature of terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria.

Insurgency and Terrorism in Nigeria: A Conspectus

Insurgency is not a new phenomenon in Nigeria. Seven years after independence in 1960, Nigeria saw its first in a series of insurgencies

The Nigerian-Biafran War of 1967-1970

The reasons for this war are multifaceted. It had political, social, economic and religious factors at its root.²⁶ The major one was the desire of the people of the southeast of the country to secede from the Nigerian federation because of perceived political and economic marginalization within the federation. The war pitched the people of the southeast, known as Igbos, against the forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Unlike the war between Nigeria and the Boko-Haram, the war between Nigeria and the Biafrans (‘Biafra’ is the name the Igbos gave their republic in 1967) was a ‘conventional war’. It involved pitched battles and military manoeuvres and tactics. Efforts were made by the two adversaries to spare non-combatants as much as possible. Military engagements were limited to counterforce targets. This is not surprising since most of the officer cadres in the Biafran army were former officers in the Nigerian armed forces.

The Biafran War started in 1967 with the declaration of secession by the forces of Biafra.²⁷ To bring the Igbos back into the federation, the Nigerian State launched a series of military campaigns. Apart from this, the State also imposed an economic blockade on the region.²⁸ The Federal forces blocked land and sea routes into Biafra. The blockade was designed to starve the region into submission and at the same time stop the region from accessing external assistance and materials vital for the prosecution of the war. This act on the part of the State had a devastating impact on the people

²⁶ James Adewunmi Falode, “The Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970: A Revolution?”, *African Journal of political Science and International Relations (AJPSIR)*, 5(3) (March 2011), pp. 120-124. Available at www.academicjournals.org/journal/AJPSIR/article-abstract/E70BD3B40546 (accessed 3 December 2018).

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ James M. Clevenger, “The Political Economy of Hunger: Famine in Nigeria, 1967-1970” (Unpublished Master of Science Thesis University of Birmingham London June 1975). Available at theses.bham.ac.uk/279/1/clevenger75msocsci.pdf (accessed 12 July 2018)

of the region.²⁹ This has been described by some scholars as a war of attrition. Millions of people died as a result of this policy and it was because of the effect of the blockade, coupled with the mass killings of Igbos in northern Nigeria by northerners in 1966 that the Nigerian government has been accused of committing a genocidal act against the people of the region.³⁰

By 1968, due to the intractable nature of the conflict, and the resilience and ingenuity of the Biafran forces, Nigeria was forced to use mercenaries from both Germany and Egypt in its campaigns against the secessionists. This ultimately tilted the war in Nigeria's favour. Egyptian mercenaries were especially useful because they piloted the bombers the air force used to bomb Biafran territory.³¹ Biafra also made use of foreign mercenaries from both France and Sweden. For example, former legionnaire, Roger Faulques, along with 100 French mercenaries came to the aid of the Biafrans.³² The Biafran air force was created, trained and operated by a Swede, Count Gustav Von Rosen.³³ The Nigerian-Biafran war came to an end in 1970 with the surrender of the Biafran forces to the Federal troops in the heartland of the rebellion in the East.

The Maitatsine Rebellion – 1980's

The second insurgency to confront Nigeria was the Maitatsine rebellion in the 1980s. In 1980, the Maitatsine sect, led by a religious scholar, Muhammadu Marwa, declared a religious war on the northern part of the Nigerian state. Marwa's Maitatsine espoused an extremist view of Islam that contrasted sharply with what was practiced in Nigeria in the 1980s. He was strictly anti-western, anti-orthodoxy, anti-establishment and anti-affluence in his teachings. Marwa claimed to be the only recognized prophet of Islam.³⁴ He believed he had a divine mission to revolutionize Islam and Muslims in Nigeria. The sect deliberately recruited its members from among the poor and artisans in the society, including cobblers, tailors, mechanics and barbers. Maitatsine adherents were mostly young men from northern Nigeria and neighbouring countries such as Niger and Chad.³⁵ The desire of the Maitatsine to impose its brand of Islam on northern Nigeria led to frequent confrontations between the sect and the Nigerian security forces.

Between 1980 and 1985, the Maitatsine sect clashed with the Nigerian security forces five times in different states within the federation.³⁶ The first was at the base of the Sect in Kano in 1980. Marwa was killed along with some of the sect members in this first encounter with the security forces.

²⁹ Intelligence Memorandum, "Impact of the Civil War on the Nigerian Economy," Directorate of Central Intelligence, Copy No. 17, ER IM 68-61, NLJ.001.076.002/4 (June 1968). Available at http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversations/89801/DOC_0000568299.pdf. (accessed 3 April 2017)

³⁰ "The Genocide in Biafra," The Combat Genocide Association. Available at combatgenocide.org/?page_id=90 (accessed 24 January 2018) and Chidi Obineche, "Gowon, Awo behind Genocide- Col Achuzia", The Sun, (October 8 2012). Available at sunnewsonline.com/new/gowon-awo-behind-genocide-col-achuzia/ (accessed 24 January 2018)

³¹ A. J. Venter, *War Dog: Fighting Other People's Wars: The Modern Mercenary in Combat* (Casemate, 2006), p. 335.

³² *Ibid.*, p. viii

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 322

³⁴ Elizabeth Isichei, "The Maitatsine Risings in Nigeria 1980-85: A Revolt of the Disinherited", *Journal of Religion in Africa*, XVII(3) (1987), p. 196. Available at https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/attach/10/10138_The%20maitatsine%20Risings%20in%20Nigeria%20-%201980-1985.pdf (accessed 24 August 2017)

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 202.

³⁶ A. O. Omotosho, "Religious Violence in Nigeria- The Causes and Solutions: An Islamic Perspective," *Swedish Missiological Theme*, (2003), p. 15. Available at <https://nairametrics.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Religious-Violence-in-Nigeria.pdf> (accessed 12 July 2017).

In the second clash that occurred in Maiduguri in October 1982, the security forces killed over 3,350 sect members. The third confrontation occurred in Kaduna in 1982. During the fourth and fifth clashes between the Maitatsine and the Nigerian security forces in Gongola (Yola) and Bauchi states in February 1984 and April 1985 respectively, close to 1000 sect members were killed. Nigeria used extreme force in the pacification of the sect. The army and the air force launched a series of coordinated attacks before the State could quell the Maitatsine in the north. For instance, in the 1984 encounter in Yola, the Nigerian air force bombed the Sect's enclave in Jimata. The resultant collateral damage was immense: the central market in the area was destroyed and over 60,000 inhabitants of Jimata were made homeless.³⁷

The Niger Delta Conflict

The Niger Delta conflict was the third major insurgency to confront Nigeria. The insurgency came about because of both political and economic marginalization of the people from the region as well as the damaging effect of oil exploration on their environment. The Niger Delta is in the southeast of Nigeria. It comprises of Bayelsa, Ondo, Delta, Akwa Ibom, Rivers, Edo, Imo, Cross River and Abia states.³⁸ The Delta is home to Nigeria's crude oil reserves, a major revenue earner for the country. To actualize its aim of economic redistribution and political integration into the mainstream of Nigeria's politics the people of the region formed militant organizations, including the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) and the Niger Delta Vigilante Force (NDVF).³⁹ The long years of neglect by the State and the insensitivity of the oil companies to the environmental concerns of the people of the region created a volatile atmosphere by the 1990s. This volatility became a full-blown insurgency by 2006.⁴⁰

The MEND was at the forefront of the insurgency. The rebellion severely disrupted Nigeria's oil industry, slashing revenue from its export. Apart from devastating disruptions to the oil sector activities, the MEND also used kidnappings, hostage-taking, bombings and guerilla tactics to cripple economic activities in the region. The Nigerian state responded with force to quell the rebellion. The State established a joint task force, comprising the armed forces and the police, to tackle the insurgency. The difficult terrain of the Delta (the bulk of the region is made-up of creeks and mangrove forest) and the equipment-starved federal naval forces made it impossible for the State to defeat the militants militarily. The conflict dragged-on until 2009 when the State instituted an amnesty program for the militants.⁴¹ This amnesty program ended the conflict in the region. The amnesty program stipulates the payment of monthly stipends to militants ready to renounce violence and also established avenues by which former militants can be reintegrated back into society. Apart from this, the State also established two agencies, Niger Delta

³⁷ Isichei, "The Maitatsine Risings in Nigeria", p.199.

³⁸ Udeme Ekpo, *The Niger Delta and Oil Politics*, (Orit-Egwa Ltd, 2004), p. 1

³⁹ Judith Burdin Asuni, "Understanding the Armed Groups of the Niger Delta," Council on Foreign Relations, (September 2009). Available at www.cfr.org/nigeria/understanding-armed-groups-niger-delta/p20146 (accessed 10 April 2016)

⁴⁰ "Curbing Violence in Nigeria (III): Revisiting the Niger Delta," Crisis Group, Africa Report, 231 (September 29 2015). Available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/-/media/files/africa/west-africa/nigeria/231-curbing-violence-in-nigeria-iii-revisiting-the-niger-delta.pdf> (accessed 20_May 2017)

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

Development Commission (NDDC) and the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA) to drive economic and social development in the region.⁴² These efforts effectively brought the insurgency to an end.

The Boko Haram Insurgency

The Boko Haram insurgency is the fourth and most damaging conflict to confront Nigeria in modern times. The conflict started in the 1990s as a social cum religious misunderstanding between the state and the group became a full-scale war in 2010. Boko Haram, whose full Arabic meaning is *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad* (in English 'western education is sinful,') was formed by Mohammed Yusuf, an itinerant Islamic cleric from Yobe State in the northeast of Nigeria in 2002.⁴³ The group espouses an extreme and perverted version of Islam that believes in the use of wanton violence. The major goal of the group is the creation of an Islamic caliphate, governed by Sharia law, in Nigeria.

In 2009, a violent altercation ensued between Boko Haram and the Nigerian security forces and in the process Yusuf and over 700 of his followers were killed. With the death of Yusuf at the hands of Nigeria security forces, his protégé, Abubakar Shekau then took over the leadership of the group. Shekau escalated the conflict between Nigeria and Boko Haram to a full-scale war in 2010. Using a mix of conventional (full infantry attacks, scorched-earth attacks on villages and kinetic attacks on military installations) and unconventional (Improvised Explosive Devices for use in personnel-borne and vehicle-borne suicide bombings) tactics and strategy, Shekau turned what was initially a terror campaign between 2010 and 2014 to a full-blown insurgency between 2014 and 2016 and back to a terrorist campaign between 2017 and 2019.⁴⁴ Largely eschewing the local focus of his predecessor, Abubakar Shekau widened the objectives of the group to include a global jihad that was to start with the conversion of the entirety of Nigeria into an Islamic caliphate. In 2014, Shekau turned the conflict to an insurgency and succeeded in wresting swathes of territory from Nigeria in the northeast. However, by 2017, Nigeria had taken back most of these territories from the group with the help of foreign mercenaries and a multinational military force.

With the loss of its territories, Boko Haram reverted to asymmetric warfare against the Nigerian state. In 2015, Shekau aligned Boko Haram to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and changed its name to Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP).⁴⁵ Following major ideological and operational disputes within the group in 2016, ISWAP became factionalized and Abu Musab al Barnawi, a son of Yusuf, the original founder of Boko Haram, became the leader of one wing

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ For an excellent account about the origin of the group see Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclos, ed., *Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria*, (African Studies Centre, 2014)

⁴⁴ For an excellent account of the conventional and unconventional tactics of Boko Haram, see Adewunmi J. Falode, "The Nature of Nigeria's Boko Haram War, 2010-2015: A Strategic Analysis", *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 10(1) (February 2016). Available at www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/488 (accessed 16 September 2017).

⁴⁵ Martin Ewi, "What Does the Boko Haram-ISIS Alliance mean for Terrorism in Africa", *Institute for Security Studies (ISS)*, (March 17 2015). Available at <https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/what-does-the-boko-haram-isis-alliance-mean-for-terrorism-in-africa> (accessed 16 January 2018).

and Shekau the other.⁴⁶ This in essence meant that there now exist two major parallel terrorist organizations in Nigeria: the original Boko Haram headed by Shekau and the ISWAP faction now headed by Barnawi. The two groups actively compete in the Nigerian space for religious and political relevance. While the Shekau faction carries out indiscriminate and countervalue attacks against combatants and noncombatants, the Barnawi group restricts itself to counterforce attacks on military targets and infrastructure. Ultimately, the two groups hope to turn Nigeria into an Islamic caliphate and use the country as a launching pad for their transnational and global jihad.

Nigeria's Counterterrorism Response: A Summary

Nigeria's response to the waves of terrorist attacks and insurgency that plagued the country was the 2014 National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST).⁴⁷ Prior to the release of NACTEST under President Goodluck Jonathan's administration, Nigeria had no coherent policy in place to counter the terrorist threat. On the appearance of the Boko Haram threat, Nigeria relied heavily on conventional military means to tackle and curb the activities of the group. Foremost of these conventional military means was what was known as 'kinetic strategy.'⁴⁸ This strategy focuses on the employment of hard military power through kinetic operations against the group. The tactics and strategies in kinetic operations are comparable to how conventional engagement is conducted between state actors in conflict. This involves the use of manoeuvres, massed movement of infantry and the observance of rules of engagement in war.

When it could not make substantial headway against Boko Haram, Nigeria formed a Joint Task Force (JTF) that launched 'Operation Flush' to contain the group in 2007.⁴⁹ The JTF was made up of security personnel from both the military and police force. Owing to the inability of the JTF to contain Boko Haram's activities, Nigeria established the Special Military Joint Task Force (SMJTF) in 2011.⁵⁰ The SMJTF comprised all the military, paramilitary, intelligence and security agencies in the country. However, despite the best efforts of this security outfit, Nigeria could not contain the incessant attacks of Boko Haram on combatants and non-combatants in the northeastern states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. In 2013, Nigeria created the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) to complement the counterterrorism efforts of the security agencies and act as first responders to any incursion of Boko Haram fighters to vulnerable villages and town in the northeast.⁵¹ The CJTF is predominantly made up of young men armed with weapons like bows and arrows, indigenously-made firearms, clubs, swords and daggers.

⁴⁷ "National Counter Security Strategy (NACTEST)", Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA), Abuja, Nigeria, (1 August 2014). Available at ctc.gov.ng/Nigerian-national-security-strategy-2014/ (accessed 3 March 2019)

⁴⁸ Solomon Effiong Udounwa, Col., "Boko Haram: Developing New Strategies to Combat Terrorism in Nigeria" (Unpublished Master of Strategic Studies Thesis United States Army War College 2013). Available at www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a590264.pdf (accessed 21 July 2018)

⁴⁹ Rafael Serrano and Zacharias Pieri, "By the Numbers: The Nigerian State's Efforts to Counter Boko Haram", in Montclos, Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria, p. 200.

⁵⁰ Oluwafemi Bamidele, "Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) – A Community Security Option: A Comprehensive and Proactive Approach to Counter Terrorism", *Journal for Deradicalization*, 7 (2016), p. 131. Available at <http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/viewFile/40/55> (accessed 13 March 2019).

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

All these counter terrorism measures failed to contain the activity of the group. By 2015, Boko Haram had succeeded in wresting two northeastern states (Borno and Yobe) from Nigeria and established the administrative, social, political and religious rump of its desired Islamic caliphate.⁵² In 2015, Nigeria employed foreign mercenaries from South Africa to help in its fight against Boko Haram.⁵³ By this time, Boko Haram had already established bases of operations on territories in Chad, Niger and Cameroon. This meant in essence that it became easier for the group to launch cross-border attacks into Nigeria and vice versa. The realization that Boko Haram now had a transnational capability pushed Nigeria to expand the mandate and operational activity of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in 2015.⁵⁴ The MNJTF is made up of forces from Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger and it played a prominent role in the country's counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. With the help of both foreign mercenaries and the MNJTF, Nigeria was able to turn the tide against Boko Haram. The country succeeded in reclaiming most of the territory lost to Boko Haram.

One can say the insurgency phase of the war that started in 2015 came to an end in 2017. From this period onward, Boko Haram reverted back to the tactics of terrorist attacks. On the legal front, Nigeria fast-tracked the passage of the 'Anti-Terrorism Act' in 2013 to empower the state to execute convicted terrorists and insurgents and thwart terrorist financing operations.⁵⁵ What is noticeable about Nigeria's response to terrorism and insurgency since 2010 is the fact that the country has relied heavily on conventional military measures and techniques in its CT and COIN operations. This has hampered its ability to effectively tackle the threat of terrorism and insurgency in the country.

NACTEST: A Strategy Sans Strategy

In 2016, Nigeria revised NACTEST, its preeminent CT strategic manual. NACTEST has five important pillars at its core: forestall, secure, identify, prepare and implement.⁵⁶

- Forestall aspects of NACTEST have to do with issues of deradicalization and workshops and seminars on security awareness and consciousness.
- The Secure aspect is concerned with the protection of critical national infrastructure (CNI) such as telecommunications equipment and airports; and all public spaces.

⁵² Sarah Ladbury, Hamsatu Allamin, Chitra Nagarajan, Paul Francis and Ukoha Ukiwo, "Jihadi Group and State-Building: The Case of Boko Haram in Nigeria", *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*, 5(1) (2016). Available at <http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.427> (accessed 10 February 2019)

⁵³ Caroline Varin, "Turning the Tides of War: The Impact of Private Military and Security Companies on Nigeria's Counterinsurgency Against Boko Haram", *African Security Review*, 27(2) (2018). Available at <https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2018.1489863> (accessed 14 March 2019)

⁵⁴ Lauren Ploch Blanchard, "Nigeria's Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions", Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report, (March 29 2016), p. 10. Available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43558.pdf (accessed 14 March 2019)

⁵⁵ "Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013", National Assembly, Abuja, Nigeria, (2013). Available at <http://www.sec.gov.ng/files/TERRORISM%20PREVENTION%20AMENDMENT%20ACT%202013.pdf> (accessed 4 March 2019)

⁵⁶ "National Counter Security Strategy (NACTEST)", Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA), Abuja, Nigeria, (1 August 2016). Available at ctc.gov.ng/Nigerian-national-security-strategy-2016/ (accessed 14 March 2019)

- The Identify aspect of NACTEST is about active, proactive and offensive counter measures designed to detect, prevent, investigate and prosecute terrorists and insurgents. It is also meant to deepen civil society, foreign government and multinational organizations' involvement in Nigeria's CT program.
- The Prepare aspect is about ensuring the capacity and capability of designated federal and state agencies to respond to any potential or actual outbreak of terrorism in the country.
- The final aspect, Implement, is meant to ease inter-agency operationality and cohesion in Nigeria's response to any terrorist threats.

In practice, however, Nigeria has failed to effectively utilize NACTEST in its response against the activities of Boko Haram and other violent non-state actors in the country. Apart from this, NACTEST has some basic, critical flaws that have negatively impacted on the overall conduct of CT and COIN by the Nigerian security forces.

- First, NACTEST is long on ideals but short on details or actual strategy. It is a document without any actual 'operational or theatre' strategy to combat terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria.
- Second, NACTEST emphasizes CT to the detriment of COIN. It failed to see the interconnectedness of the two. NACTEST sees the conflict with Boko Haram strictly from the prism of terrorism and it did not provide any military, social and economic provisions to counter the insurgency phase of the conflict. This explains why there is no specific section in the strategic document devoted to COIN operations. The fluidity and dynamism of the conflict and the non-state actors involved meant that the nature of the war rapidly shifted from a terror campaign to insurgency and just as quickly back to terrorism. At the outbreak of hostility in early 2000, Boko Haram used the tactics of terrorism to confront the Nigerian state. The period witnessed the use of IEDs and suicide-bombings in its various formats. The nature of the conflict, however, changed into an insurgency between 2014 and 2016 with Boko Haram carrying out series of countervalue attacks against military and para-military institutions in the state. It was during this period that Boko Haram transformed itself from a bunch of rag-tag irregulars to something resembling an established conventional professional fighting force. The group succeeded in taking swathes of territories from three northeastern states in Nigeria and established administrative, religious and political control. However, by late 2017, Nigeria had retaken these territories and Boko Haram thereafter reverted to terrorism to fight the state. Thus, a strategy that focuses on just one aspect of the conflict, like NACTEST, is bound to fail in its mission to create a secured environment in Nigeria.
- Third, NACTEST emphasizes the use of non-combat strategy, such as strengthening of the anti-terrorism law, stimulation of the economy and inter-agency cohesion, to the detriment of the critical management and deployment of military resources assets. The country is currently in the throes of an active combat situation in the northeast that requires a clear-cut, short-term military strategy to bring the conflict to an end. An emphasis on 'passive' long-term goals that fail to take care of an active, violent and on-going combat situation is bound to be a failure. This disconnect has cost Nigeria dearly in its war against terrorism and insurgency.

- Fourth, NACTEST is an atomistic rather than a holistic strategic document. It fails to identify the resources and assets that Nigeria can use its CT and COIN operations. Importantly, NACTEST made no provision for the creation of critical but unavailable assets like drones, for both surveillance and combat, that would have enhanced the country's CT and COIN operations.
- Last, NACTEST failed to establish cohesion and integration for the different resources, assets and agencies that are involved in Nigeria's CT and COIN program. This has negatively impacted on the overall strategic objectives of Nigeria's CT and COIN operations. This explains why it has been difficult for Nigeria to effectively tackle and curb the activity of non-state actors in the country since 2010.

Therefore, the author suggests that what is needed to effectively curb and contain both terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria is not just strategy but a Grand Strategy. And, this Grand Strategy is based on what has been referred to as 'Hybrid Doctrine'. However, before considering the relevance of Hybrid Doctrine as the Grand Strategy for Nigeria's CT and COIN operations, it is important to review of some existing literature about the country's strategic doctrine.

Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency sans Grand Strategy

Quite a number of works have been written about Nigeria's CT operations. Eugene Eji's "Rethinking Nigeria's Counter-Terrorism Strategy," is a critical review of NACTEST.⁵⁷ Eji argues that NACTEST has some important flaws that have made it unsuitable in Nigeria's drive to effectively nullify and contain terrorism. Some of the flaws he identified include a lack of a national definition of Terrorism; non-assignment of roles and responsibilities to the different security agencies driving the CT operations; and a lack of a holistic strategy to tackle other violent non-state actors in the country.⁵⁸ In his conclusion, Eji asserts that Nigeria needs a mix of both soft and hard approaches in its CT initiatives. The approaches will be multifaceted, multi-pronged, people-centred, and whole-of-government.⁵⁹

In "Counter-Terrorism in Nigeria," Hussein Solomon analyzes the different responses of the Nigerian security forces to Boko Haram attacks in the northeast.⁶⁰ The study highlights the various factors that are responsible for Nigeria's inability to effectively tackle Boko Haram. These include the ease with which Muslims from the northeast get radicalized due to accessibility of jihadi information on the Internet; incapacity of the Nigerian Police Force to gather and process actionable intelligence; the inability of the security forces to win the hearts and minds of the people; and the failure of the country's CT programme to recognize and counter the range of assets and resources available to Boko Haram.⁶¹

⁵⁷ Eugene Eji, "Rethinking Nigeria's Counter-Terrorism Strategy", *The International Journal of Intelligence, Security and Public Affairs*, 18(3) (2016), pp. 198-220. Available at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23800992.2016.1242278> (accessed 15 March 2019).

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 205.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 209

⁶⁰ Hussein Solomon, "Counter-Terrorism in Nigeria", *The RUSI Journal*, 157(4) (2012), pp. 6-11. Available at <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2012.714183> (accessed 14 March 2019)

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9

In “Assessment of the Effectiveness of the Military Against Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria”, Awofeso and Iheanacho carry out a critical analysis of Nigeria’s CT efforts from those of President Goodluck Jonathan to that of President Muhammadu Buhari.⁶² The work conceptualizes the meanings of terrorism and insurgency within the context of the Nigerian environment and uses the concepts to explain the nature of violent non-state actors in Nigeria. However, rather than show the specific CT and COIN measures used by Nigeria to tackle the terrorism and insurgency that was spearheaded by Boko Haram, the work simply emphasizes some of the factors that have made it impossible for the security forces to successfully contain the group. The work is a chronology of events that methodically documents the different attacks launched by Boko Haram against Nigeria since the conflict began in 2009.⁶³

Akpan et. al. argue in “Boko Haram Insurgency and Counter-Terrorism Policy in Nigeria” that the country can only defeat terrorism and insurgency, and by extension Boko Haram, when it uses an approach that relies on hard military assets and resources.⁶⁴ They carry out a comparative analysis of the two major violent non-state actors in Nigeria: the Niger Delta militants in the south-south and Boko Haram in the northeast. Akpan et. al. claim that the amnesty and ‘monetary-inducement’ options that brought the Niger Delta insurgency to an end would not work in the case of Boko Haram. According to the writers, this is because insurgency in the Delta was based on the desire of the inhabitants to get the state to engage more in the economic development of the region. Boko Haram, on the other hand, is only interested in the establishment of a violent theocracy that would spell the end of Nigeria as both a state and a secular political entity.⁶⁵ Their paper concludes that the use of concerted and conventional military tactics will be enough to rout Boko Haram if this is effectively deployed.⁶⁶

Felbab-Brown in “Nigeria’s Troubling Counterinsurgency Strategy Against Boko Haram,” criticizes the country’s COIN operations against Boko Haram.⁶⁷ She argues that the extrajudicial killings, human rights violations and the disproportionate response of the security agencies to terrorist attacks are major drivers of the uptick in religious extremism in the country. Felbab-Brown concludes that only a COIN strategy that emphasizes issues like disarmament, demobilization, justice, equity, accountability and genuine reconciliation that can effectively bring the conflict to an end.

Although the reviewed works do not capture all the extant literature on the CT and COIN measures that has been deployed against Boko Haram, they are of sufficient breadth and scope to have shown the missing aspects in most studies when it comes to the analysis of how to counter terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria.

⁶² Olu Awofeso and Ebirim Samuel Iheanacho, “Assessment of the Effectiveness of the Military Against Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria under President Muhammadu Buhari”, *Research in Humanities and Social Sciences*, 7(14) (2017). Available at <https://www.iiste.org/Journals/index.php/RHSS/article/viewFile/38132/39211> (accessed 5 March 2019)

⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26

⁶⁴ Felix Akpan, Okonette Ekanem and Angela Olofu-Adeoye, “Boko Haram and the Counter-Terrorism Policy in Nigeria”, *Canadian Social Science*, 10(2) (2014), pp. 151-155. Available at <http://www.cscanada.net/index.php/css/article/download/4259/5694> (accessed 5 March 2019)

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 151

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 154

⁶⁷ Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Nigeria’s Troubling Counterinsurgency Strategy Against Boko Haram”, *Foreign Affairs*, 2018. Available at <https://www.worldpittsburgh.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Nigerias-Troubling-Counterinsurgency-Strategy-Against-Boko-Haram-Foreign-Affairs-2018.pdf> (accessed 21 November 2018).

- First, most works on countering terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria focus mostly on CT to the detriment of COIN. This is an important strategic omission.
- Second, most of the works fail to provide any cohesive, comprehensive and holistic strategy that Nigeria can use to effectively curb and contain Boko Haram.
- Third, most of the works do not see the important links between terrorism, insurgency and guerilla warfare in the country. This myopia has made it impossible for researchers of the conflict to see the necessity for a strategy can *simultaneously* have and curb both terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria.
- Finally, none of the reviewed works emphasize the significance and centrality of a Grand Strategy to the creation of a holistic, proactive, offensive, cohesive and comprehensive CT and COIN measures that can effectively end terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria.

This is why the author has suggested at the beginning of this analysis that a Grand Strategy, with the Hybrid Doctrine as its core, that emphasizes cohesion, integration, synchronicity and synergy is what is needed to effectively curb and contain terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria.

Hybrid Doctrine: The Missing Link in Nigeria's CT and COIN

The important question then is how can Nigeria effectively counter and check terrorism and insurgency in both the short and the long term? To achieve these objectives, Nigeria will have to adopt what the author has called the *Hybrid Doctrine* (HD). The aim of the doctrine is to compel, deter and persuade the terro-insurgents to end the conflict on terms favourable to the state and to enable the state to create and maintain the desired future. This is the essence of Grand Strategy that it is proposed that Nigeria should adopt in its CT and COIN operations. The keys to the success of the HD are synchronicity, cohesion, creation and comprehensiveness.

To be successful, HD requires the simultaneous and synchronised deployment of soft and hard resources and assets. The military approach (hard) is deployed simultaneously with the political, social, cultural, religious and economic approach (soft) to provide a synergistic and effective solution to the conflict. For instance, this is what Columbia has done in its conflict with the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia) rebels. Columbia's military carried out its operations against the FARC in synchronisation with engagement with the FARC in strategic dialogues designed to end the conflict.⁶⁸ One should note that Columbia did not allow a pause in the military operations while the dialogue was ongoing. Rather, the two countermeasures were deployed concurrently to provide synergistic effect. This is the core of the HD. The U.S. is presently using the same strategy in its political and military engagements with the Taliban in Afghanistan. While its military regularly launches military operations against the Taliban on ground, American diplomats simultaneously explore political means to end the conflicts with the representatives of the group in a neutral country.⁶⁹

⁶⁸ Afeikhena Jerome, "Lessons from Columbia for Curtailing the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria", *Prism*, 5(2) (January 2015). Available at http://cco.ndu.edu/portals/96/Documents/Prism/Prism_5-2_Lessons_From_Columbia_2015031902.pdf (accessed 12 July 2018)

⁶⁹ "Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy Brief", Congressional Research Service, (26 February 2019). Available at <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45122.pdf> (accessed 16 March, 2019).

It is important to stress that the aim of the HD is not the destruction of Boko Haram. This is militarily and strategically impossible. To destroy the group will mean the annihilation of the whole of the northeast. The reason for this is not because the Nigerian forces will not be able to annihilate members of Boko Haram in the long run, for the simple fact that most of the members of Boko Haram are northern *talakawa* (the masses or the underprivileged) and mainly youths and artisans.⁷⁰ They are ordinary citizens of the Nigerian state. They are not a military adversary that can be easily identified and destroyed on the battlefield. These people can easily blend into the general population when the situation demands. This factor explains why it has been extremely difficult for the Nigerian forces to effectively deal with the group in the contested zone.⁷¹ The operational strategy of Nigeria against the group should be containment and emasculation and, through the deliberate creation and deployment of specific assets and resources, the creation of the desired future. Thus, destroying the group is not an option.

The effective alternative is to render the group powerless and unattractive in both the short and the long run. This is the core of the HD. The war between Nigeria and Boko Haram is not strictly a war on terror or an insurgency. The war has the characteristics of both terrorism and insurgency. Here is a non-state actor taking a state actor to task; a non-state actor skillfully using conventional and unconventional tactics and strategies in its conflict with a state actor. This means that any strategy that will work will have to be as dynamic, proactive and fluid as the different phases of the conflict itself.

To effectively curb rather than destroy Boko Haram, it is important for Nigeria to identify its Centre of Gravity (COG). The COG is that crucial part of any military force that will make it impossible for it to function effectively in any engagements once the COG has been identified and immobilized. The Boko Haram's COG is the population in the Contested Zones (CZ). The CZ is the epicenter of the conflict and it comprises the three northeastern states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. The conclusion that the people are the COG of Boko Haram operations in Nigeria is based on a number of factors. The first is that the bulk of Boko Haram fighters are people from the CZ: male, female and children. Second, the group normally requisitions its food and materiel from the communities and areas within the CZ. Thirdly, and more importantly, the group's HQ and operational bases are within the locale of the CZ. Thus, to effectively curb the activity of the group, Nigeria must evolve targeted measures that will pry the COG (population) away from the grasp of the group in the CZ.

This is where the relevance of HD and its 4D concepts comes to the fore. These concepts were listed earlier and consist of Degrade, Defang, Depower and Detox.

The **Degrade** phase will require the comprehensive and coordinated use of all assets of the armed forces, the internal security agencies, along with external militaries and resources. The military will conduct continuous and relentless air and land campaigns on seized territories in the CZ. Since a major problem Nigeria had in previously liberated zones is the rapidity with which

⁷⁰ "Motivations and Empty Promises: Voices of Former Boko Haram Combatants and Nigerian Youth," Mercy Corps, (April 2016). Available at <https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/Motivations%20and%20Empty%20Promises%20Mercy%20Corps%20Full%20Report%200.pdf> (accessed 16 March 2019).

⁷¹ The Contested Zones are those regions in the northeast of Nigeria, Borno, Yobe and Adamawa, that have borne the brunt of the conflict between Nigeria and Boko Haram.

Boko Haram regroups in such areas, the non-military security agencies like the military police, civilian police and state security services will move in immediately to secure the environment. This is crucial. This means that the military and non-military security agencies will be simultaneously deployed to the CZ, but the non-military arm will wait in the rear and move in immediately after the military wing has accomplished its mission. The military will be free to move ahead to clear the other zones of terrorist-insurgents while the non-military arm will stay behind to ensure legitimacy for the government, maintain law and order and guarantee protection for those citizens who would want to come back. This phase will also require active, comprehensive and coordinated collaboration between the armed forces of Nigeria and its immediate neighbours directly affected by the conflict. Non-available materiel like modern tanks, aircraft as well as combat, reconnaissance and surveillance drones that are required to successfully prosecute the war against Boko Haram will be sourced from foreign partners like the U.S., Russia and China. This is where the soft approach will come into play. Nigerian diplomats will be sent to these foreign countries to convince them of the necessity to provide the required military hardware to Nigeria. Again, all these will be done cohesively, in a synchronised manner and simultaneously to create synergistic effects.

The **Defang** phase will make it impossible for the terrorist-insurgents to get new recruits from the villages, towns, schools, churches, mosques and madrasas in the CZ. This phase has both short and long-term goals. The short-term goal is to critically reduce the ability of Boko Haram to deploy new recruits into active engagements with the Nigerian military. This is achieved through the coordinated and comprehensive use of cordon operations, human intelligence gathering, house-to-house searches, intensive military patrols, and a conscious effort to reorient the perception of the people in the CZs as to the illegality of the insurgents. The Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) will be critical to the success of this mode. Apart from acting as first responders in case of any terror attack, as they have done in the past, the CJTF will constitute the bulk of the human intelligence (HUMINT) gathering capability that is needed to gather raw and real-time information about the activity of the Boko Haram in the CZs. CJTF members will know the terrain since they live and work within the affected zone.⁷² The CJTF as it is presently constituted should be disbanded and retooled to a supernumerary force with the sole aim of gathering intelligence. The Nigerian army made a mistake in 2018 by absorbing some members of the group into the regular army. It is the author's considered opinion that the members of the group will function optimally as HUMINT collectors and they should not be accorded any special recognition or identifying features (such as uniforms) so as not to compromise their safety. The information supplied by HUMINT will then be submitted to a central intelligence unit of the military and non-military security forces. This will constitute actionable intelligence that Nigeria can then use to curb and contain the insurgents in both the combat and non-combat zones.

The **Depower** phase is critical to the overall COIN and CT strategy of Nigeria. In this mode, specific and comprehensive non-military and para-military assets and resources are deployed to cut off the pool of foot soldiers and new recruits available to the Boko Haram. This is a long-term

⁷² Idayat Hassan and Zacharias Pieri, "The Rise and Risks of Nigeria's Civilian Joint Task Force: Implications for Post-Conflict Recovery in Northeastern Nigeria", in *Boko Haram Beyond the Headlines: Analyses of Africa's Enduring Insurgency* (Jacob Zen, ed.) Available at https://etc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2018/05/Boko-Haram-Beyond-the-Headlines_Chapter-4.pdf (accessed 16 march 2019).

objective. The long-term goal is to starve Boko Haram of new recruits and create the desired future state via the use of economic, political, religious and social means. During this phase, Nigeria will use all the political, economic and religious assets and resources that are available to the state. Political and educational reform, popular mobilization and economic development must be synchronised and simultaneously deployed to achieve synergistic effects.

Under political reform, Nigeria will strive to establish its legitimacy in the CZ. The absence of this has created ungoverned spaces in the northeast (Borno, Yobe and Adamawa) that the terrorists exploited. Boko Haram established its own form of legitimacy through the introduction of Sharia and the provision of some basic administrative, social and economic services.⁷³ The provision of security is key to the establishment of the government's legitimacy. This is where the non-military state security agencies such as the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), the Peace Corps and the federal aid agency, National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), will all move in to provide basic security and social services. This will gradually create a positive impression of the government in the hearts and minds of the people. The state must show interest and be seen to be actually interested in the welfare of the citizens in the affected zones to reestablish its lost legitimacy. This is a long-term goal and it must be done in a cohesive and coordinated manner among all the agencies involved.

Under popular mobilization, Nigeria will co-opt locally respected and influential Islamic clerics, equip them with bull-horns and ferry them around the towns and villages in the affected zones. Their job will be to counter the nihilistic messages of the terrorist-insurgents based on the correct interpretation and quotation of the relevant section of the Quran. The aim of this strategy will be to change the mind-set of the citizens in the CZ using the most potent weapon of the jihadi group - the Quran. Under educational reform, Nigeria will compel parents in the affected zones to send their wards to government-run formal schools and madrasas. This will deny Boko Haram a steady stream of teenage suicide-bombers since the age-bracket of most individuals that carry out this kind of attacks fall within the 9-to-20-year-old range. To ensure that reluctant parents comply with this compulsory education, a stiff penalty in the form of a special tax would be imposed on defaulters. Forcing the children to go to these government-run schools will deny Boko Haram the opportunity to radicalize them and at the same time, present the state with the opportunity to give them proper social, political and religious orientation.

Under economic development, Nigeria will aim to empower the citizens in the region economically. This will be done to stop the terror-insurgents from making inroads into the affected communities due to the lack of economic opportunities. The provision of economic opportunities and the stimulation of the moribund economic sectors of the region will reestablish government legitimacy and gradually switch the allegiance of the people away from Boko Haram. Economic empowerment has been a key recruitment tool in the hands of Boko Haram. This is a long-term aim and it requires the comprehensive and integrated deployment of all assets and resources by Nigeria. The country will use the services of foreign and local development financial institutions such as the UNDP and ADB to reconstruct and re-develop the economies of the region. By providing such infrastructure

⁷³ Ladbury et. Al., "Jihadi Groups and State Building".

and making opportunities available for economic advancement in the CZs, the citizens' loyalty to the Nigerian state will be further solidified. This will further deny the Boko Haram a platform for recruitment since the issue of economic deprivation of the citizens of the CZ would have been taken care of.

The **Detox** phase deals with the issues of de-radicalization or Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) This phase is crucial to both preventing the spread of extremist ideology and the creation of a peaceful future Nigeria devoid of violent extremism. Nigeria will use its resources and assets to create a comprehensive, integrated and holistic programme that is designed to reintegrate former fighters back into the society; deter would-be fighters from joining terrorist-insurgents groups; and, use de-radicalized former fighters as a bait to lure others out of the grasp of Boko Haram. This is what the Ugandan military and its American ally did in its fight against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) of Joseph Kony.⁷⁴ Churches, mosques, schools, madrasas, families, age-grade groups and non-governmental organizations, both local and foreign, must be co-opted by Nigeria to play important roles.

Conclusion

The conflict between Nigeria and the terrorist-insurgents is a long, drawn-out one. Since the outbreak of major hostilities in 2010, Nigeria has evolved different means and poured huge resources into the prosecution of the war. However, these efforts have failed to effectively contain Boko Haram and stop its incessant and deadly attacks. This research has shown that it is the lack of a coherent, comprehensive, integrated and holistic Grand Strategy that is a major barrier to the effective prosecution of the war. The study has shown that the preeminent document on Nigeria's CT and COIN operations, NACTEST, contains some important flaws that has affected its effectiveness as a crucial tool in the fight against terrorism and insurgency in the country. In its place, the study advocates the use of the Hybrid Doctrine as a comprehensive, cohesive and holistic tool that Nigeria can use to effectively curb and contain terrorism and insurgency in both the short- and the long-term.

⁷⁴ Kevin Maurer, "Joseph Kony's Former Bodyguards are now Helping U.S. Troops Hunt Him", *The Daily Beast*, (May 14 2016). Available at www.dailybeast.com/articles/2016/05/14/joseph-kony-s-former-bodyguards-are-now-u-s-troops-hunt-him.html. (accessed 17 April 2017)

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Can Cyber Terrorists Influence Artificial Intelligence Systems? A Cautionary Tale for A.I. Systems Proponents

Alan Brill and Elaine Wood ¹

Abstract: *A.I. (Artificial Intelligence) systems today are being created at increasingly rapid rates. Innovation is being driven by an elite group of skilled developers who are applying A.I. to create new services and solutions to meet commercial, military and government agency demand. Both public and private enterprise see the revolutionary potential: A.I. systems are able to digest and analyze enormous volumes of live data; to ‘learn’ and refine internal analytics as they operate; and to act, all at dizzying speeds. Exciting innovations range from self-driving cars to gene testing to nuclear defense alert systems. But innovation is happening so fast that new designs are beginning to outpace the supply of skilled technicians needed to maintain, protect and even understand these systems in operation. This limited skill base provides an opportunity for commercial adversaries - and for terrorist groups and nation-state actors – to misuse and modify the activity of A.I. systems to meet their own nefarious objectives. We need A.I. to function efficiently and competitively. And paradoxically, we need A.I. to defend against outside attacks that take advantage of the vulnerabilities that A.I. creates. In this paper, the authors describe the threat of cybercrime and cyber terrorists and outline a plan for preventing the misuse of A.I. systems.*

Keywords: *Artificial Intelligence, A.I., cyberterrorism, cybercrime, systems development*

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Introduction²

In the last several years outside threats against all cyber systems have accelerated and become highly sophisticated. Attacks can overwhelm a system with hundreds of thousands of requests transmitted to the target every second. Each copy of malware also can be unique, designed to defeat pattern-based recognition systems. Defending a network system against these attacks requires not only skill, but also incredible speed. Threats must be identified, analyzed and acted on in real-time. The threats arrive far faster than the human brain can react.

At the same time, intelligence analysts face massive and fast-growing mountains of data. Identifying trends, isolating actionable intelligence and finding connections between disparate pieces of data have become orders of magnitude that are impossible to process. The challenge has overwhelmed the capability of the human mind to cope with the data volumes that characterize modern data science.

A.I. is essential today not only to function effectively and competitively, but also to detect and defend against outside attacks. This makes it ‘mission critical’ that the vulnerability of our AI systems be addressed.

A.I. systems require specialized knowledge and sophisticated training that traditional cyber systems analysts typically do not possess. The tools differ, the paradigms differ, the testing differs. But not everything differs. The need to monitor functioning is the same. The requirement to comply with applicable laws and regulations is the same. The need for appropriate oversight, internal audit, and compliance assurance is the same – or at least it should be. And therein lies the problem.

The authors will examine some basic definitions and assumptions about cyberspace, as well as illustrating both the capabilities and the inherent issues and threats that go hand in hand with A.I.’s new powers and functions.

The Definition of A.I.

Artificial intelligence refers to “a system’s ability to correctly interpret external data, to learn from such data, and to use those learnings to achieve specific goals and tasks through flexible adaptation.”³

While there are many ‘flavours’ of A.I., this paper focuses on what Kaplan and Haenlein have referred to as “analytical A.I.” with “characteristics consistent with cognitive intelligence generating cognitive representation of the world and using learning based on past experience to inform future decisions.”⁴

² Some of the concepts presented in this paper are derived from a three-part article by the authors published December 2018 through February 2019 entitled “Does Artificial Intelligence Need a General Counsel?” on law.com.

³ Andreas Kaplan and Michael Haenlein, “Siri, Siri in my Hand, Who’s the Fairest in the Land? On the Interpretations, Illustrations and Implications of Artificial Intelligence”, *Business Horizons*, 62(1), 2019, pp. 15-25.

⁴ *Ibid.* This definition differentiates analytical A.I. from “human-inspired” and “humanized” A.I., which have emotional, and social intelligence aspects and can, to some degree, simulate consciousness or self-awareness. It is yet to be determined whether humanized A.I. has a contribution to make to the analytics – whether calculations can be made that take into account human spirit.

The Myth of Cyberspace

In dealing with incidents of potential fraud involving both traditional networks and A.I. systems, the authors are frequently told that the action is taking place in a mythical world called ‘cyberspace.’

In his book “Hacker Crackdown,” Bruce Sterling vividly describes this conception of a mythical place:

Cyberspace is the “place” where a telephone conversation appears to occur. Not inside your actual phone, the plastic device on your desk. Not inside the other person’s phone, in some other city. The place between the phones. [...] in the past twenty years, this electrical “space,” which was once thin and dark and one-dimensional—little more than a narrow speaking-tube, stretching from phone to phone—has flung itself open like a gigantic jack-in-the-box. Light has flooded upon it, the eerie light of the glowing computer screen. This dark electric netherworld has become a vast flowering electronic landscape. Since the 1960s, the world of the telephone has cross-bred itself with computers and television, and though there is still no substance to cyberspace, nothing you can handle, it has a strange kind of physicality now. It makes good sense today to talk of cyberspace as a place all its own.⁵

Unfortunately, while many in the cyber-development community may treat cyberspace as “a place all its own,” it is not. Everything that a system does occurs in a physical location. And those physical locations (and the systems that are operating in them) are subject to the laws of the jurisdiction. While there have been instances of entrepreneurs trying to create extraterritorial jurisdictions free from regulatory authority, they have not been particularly successful. For example, from 2000 to 2008, an entity named “HavenCo” attempted to operate a “data haven”⁶ outside of the jurisdiction of nations, on a former World War II artillery platform located six miles off the coast of England. Paddy Roy Bates, the company’s founder, named his domain “The Principality of Sealand”⁷ and claimed it as an independent country. The HavenCo venture ultimately failed and Sealand today operates as an entity run by – Bates would say ruled by – Bates’ son Michael. The entity sells souvenirs like tee shirts and mugs, a titles forknighthoods, counts, barons, and dukes – and their female counterparts.^{8 9}

It is important to remember that operations involving computing devices take place in real locations, subject to laws and regulations. And those systems must comply with the law.

Defining and Assuring Functionality

Every organization that undertakes the development of an A.I. system can describe what they want the system to do. Here are some project description examples from both the private and public sectors:

⁵ Bruce Sterling, *The Hacker Crackdown: Law and Disorder on the Electronic Frontier*, Bantam Books, 1992.

⁶ “Data haven,” Wikipedia, at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_haven (accessed 22 January 2019).

⁷ Frank Jacobs, “All Hail Sealand,” *The New York Times*, 26 March 2012 available at <https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/20/all-hail-sealand/> (accessed 22 January 2019).

⁸ See the “Principality’s” online store at <https://www.sealandgov.org/shop/>.

⁹ “HavenCo “data center” offline?” *Security and the Net*, at securityandthe.net/2008/11/18/havenco-data-center-offline/ (accessed 22 January 2019).

Private Sector Examples:

Loan applications: “I want the system to review loan applications and through analysis of the applications determine whether to grant or reject the application based on the likelihood that the borrower will default on a loan.”

Pharmacy orders: “The system should do two things. First, on a daily basis, look at the pharmacy orders for all patients in our hospital and identify any potential negative drug interactions. Second, when a new prescription is written, determine if it will cause a negative interaction with any drug that the patient is currently taking and notify the prescriber in real time.”

Public Sector Examples¹⁰:

Terrorist Alerts: “Track the changes in communication between known members of Terrorist Group 1 through analysis of intercepted text messages to and from the known members with the objectives of identifying additional members and identifying those who are enabling Terrorist Group 1 to carry out kinetic operations.”

Electricity Grid Alerts: “Identify anomalies in electrical supplies with the objective of minimizing outages by isolating problem areas so that they do not affect the otherwise unaffected portions of the electrical distribution grid.”

These job descriptions appear straightforward, but are they sufficient for A.I. A.I. systems incorporate machine learning capabilities at the start that are designed to change how they operate: they are designed to ‘learn’ from the information provided and get better at doing their job. Learning in this context creates vulnerabilities and unintended consequences when ‘getting better at the job’ is not delineated and defined properly. Making certain that the functions to be performed are properly defined is vital. Job descriptions without safeguards that do not consider future complications can cause failures or worse: consider what can happen if an adversary is able to mis-code or modify the rules of the system and remains undetected. Consider the consequences that arise simply from failing to consider what will happen when the system begins to ‘learn’ and adapt its code to maximize job performance.

The application of A.I. to loan applications is one illustrative case. The defined objective is to minimize problem loans. The system is provided with ten years of loan applications and a code identifying accounts that have failed to properly repay the amounts owed. Based on this data and input, the A.I. system determines that the borrower’s postal code is highly predictive of future loan defaults. The system, as a result, puts significant weighting on the postal code in its decision-making process. When combined with other factors, the net result is that the system rejects virtually every application where the postal code of the potential borrower is on its list of high-probability defaulters.

Unfortunately, in this instance, simply following the rules and the data provided results in racial discrimination: there are social economic factors and legal prohibitions not provided to the system – known as “redlining.”

¹⁰ These examples were derived from concepts presented in Tejaswi Singh and Amit Gulhane, “8 Key Military Applications for Artificial Intelligence in 2018,” Market Research Blog, at <https://blog.marketresearch.com/8-key-military-applications-for-artificial-intelligence-in-2018> (accessed 22 January 2019).

Redlining is defined as “the systematic denial of various services to residents of specific, often racially associated, neighborhoods or communities, either directly or through the selective raising of prices.”¹¹ Because of the link between poverty and minority racial status, redlining generally results in racial discrimination in lending. In the U.S., such discrimination was outlawed by the Fair Housing Act of 1968.¹²

There are two ways to protect the system from producing results that violate this law. First, the system could be programmed with knowledge of the law that would limit the weighting applied to a given postal code. Alternatively, compliance officers could review the approve/deny recommendations of the system, take notice of the problem and override decisions that would have an adverse impact on minority neighborhoods. But without either of those actions – fixing the system rules or monitoring and overriding potentially illegal actions – the result will be redlining, with financial and reputational consequences to the lender.

Now, consider how an A.I system designed to identify and detect terrorist group communications and recruiting efforts.

For this case study, a military system has been designed to review huge volumes of intercepted calls and text messages in order to identify communications within an organization designated as “terrorist.” The system developer recognizes that not everyone who communicates with a terrorist or terrorist group is necessarily a terrorist, accordingly the system is designed to determine whether a contact is innocent, related to recruitment, related to logistics, or communication between members. The system, in early trials, works well.

Unfortunately, while the system works well, the network on which the system runs is not sufficiently secured. The physical office housing the A.I. systems runs an environmental program on its network to control for office temperature and lighting. The environmental program is provided by a vendor that is hacked by cyber terrorists. Using stolen credentials, the cyber terrorist can now log into the environmental control system. . Once in the system, the intruder identifies an architectural weakness that allows the terrorist to navigate from the environmental application to the military network — and gain privileged access to the analytic system tracking the terrorist group.¹³

Using the privileged access, the cyber-terrorist is now able to review the program code, install some changes, and erase many of the logs that would record the change. (There would still be a record, but it would take serious forensic analysis to find it.) The intruder now creates a “reference list” containing the mobile numbers of terrorist group members seeking new recruits and instructs the system to disregard these numbers. The system will continue to operate, but it will no longer be

¹¹ “Redlining,” Wikipedia, at <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Redlining> (accessed 16 January 2019). For a more detailed discussion of the redlining phenomenon, see Yves Zenou and Nicolas Boccoard, “Racial Discrimination and Redlining in Cities,” *Journal of Urban Economics* 48(2) (2000), pp. 260-285.

¹² Tracy Jan, “Redlining was banned 50 years ago. It’s still hurting minorities today,” *The Washington Post*, 28 March 2018 available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/03/28/redlining-was-banned-50-years-ago-its-still-hurting-minorities-today/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.52294028fb1b (accessed 22 January 2019).

¹³ This was the basis for the large-scale intrusion at U.S. retailer Target. See, for example, Jaikumar Vijayan, “Target breach happened because of a basic network segmentation error,” *Computerworld*, available at <https://www.computerworld.com/article/2487425/cybercrime-hacking/target-breach-happened-because-of-a-basic-network-segmentation-error.html> (accessed 17 January 2019).

capable of tracking recruiting efforts by the terrorists on the reference list.¹⁴ If done well, it might take a long time for the operators of the system to discover that they have been hacked. With some additional forethought, the terrorist hacker could also install a coded alert to warn the “reference list” that they have been discovered. The terrorist recruiters would then quickly destroy their mobile phones and escape without being apprehended.

Next, take the example of pharmacy orders. In New York City, one of the first federal cases prosecuting trafficking in prescription drugs was called the Gold Pill case: dozens of pharmacists were arrested for buying legal drugs literally through the back door at drastically discounted prices. The problem for the public was that trafficked merchandise no longer came with expiration dates or recall numbers or any way to safeguard how the drugs had been transported or stored. There was no way to know that the drugs were still safe and effective. Today A.I. promises not only to track prescription medicines but also cross reference drug prescriptions to protect patients against contra-indicated drug combinations and side-effects – but this system too can be manipulated for commercial gain or to spread harm and terror. The results in either case can be deadly.

These examples can be extrapolated to other cases: our health care system and our essential infrastructure systems – water, electricity, transportation – are similarly susceptible to the new vulnerabilities that accompany the new capabilities of A.I. systems. Many of these essential services combine both private and public elements, integrated together to create seamless operations – all vulnerable to corruption and attack and even ransomware: just last year, in January 2018, a hospital in the U.S. state of Indiana paid hackers \$55,000 to unlock their network systems following a ransomware infection. Employees in this instance noticed the attack immediately, but already were too late to prevent the infection from spreading to the hospital’s email system, electronic health records, and internal operating systems.

The attack reportedly originated in Eastern Europe. The hackers gained access to hospital system in Indiana by logging in with a third-party vendor’s credentials.¹⁵

Setting Responsibility

The real question is this: Who has the responsibility for assuring that a system is operating correctly and properly, and who is responsible for the cyber-security and for assuring that no internal or external unauthorized source has changed the code or the files that define the rules of operation?

The authors believe that responsibility for the proper secure operation of A.I. systems extends beyond the front-line teams that develop and operate these systems. Certainly, the organization’s data security team bears substantial responsibility for providing a secure environment (network, operating system), but experience indicates that this is not enough. The authors have found that the

¹⁴ This is one example of what an adversary with privileged access to an A.I. system could do. The reader can probably come up with many ways to interfere with a system. For example, if the system were in test mode, it could be manipulated to provide sufficiently wrong information to suggest to management that it was a failure and should not be placed into live operation.

¹⁵ Samm Quinn, “Hospital pays \$55,000 ransom; no patient data stolen,” Daily Reporter, available at http://www.greenfieldreporter.com/2018/01/16/01162018dr_hancock_health_pays_ransom/ (accessed 22 January 2019).

following people or organizations share in the overall responsibility for the integrity¹⁶ of the AI system¹⁷:

- **Project Leader:** Every development project – both traditional and A.I., should have an identified project leader. This is the individual who has been delegated the authority to bring together the resources to get a system from concept to operation. For government projects, this person may be a serving officer or a civilian. Where a system is to be developed through a contracting process, it is the lead representative of the government agency for the development and success of the system. It is easy for a project leader to get so involved in the project that system integrity is downgraded in importance because of day-to-day issues. Experience shows that when this happens, there is no assurance that integrity will be given the focus that is needed. While there is no question that the role of the project leader is complex, it must never be forgotten that without an executed systems integrity plan, the chance of an integrity failure – whatever the reason – becomes greater. The role of the project leader, regardless of the actions of others, is key to assuring that the system does what it is supposed to; that it does it correctly; that it follows appropriate laws and regulations; and that control mechanisms are in place to detect and respond to intrusions or other problems.
- **Systems Developers:** Certainly, the developers of an A.I. system have a key role in assuring the integrity of the systems that they are developing. They understand the ‘how’ of building the A.I. application (although the ‘what’ of the system’s function will come from the subject matter experts). They understand the tools they will be using. It is important that these experts consider system integrity in their design and development activities. It can be useful to require that as part of development, there be a documented integrity management plan which can be reviewed and against which the system can be tested.
- **SMEs (Subject Matter Experts):** While the developers know the details of how A.I. systems are built, and the tools used to build them, they cannot be expected to be the experts on what each particular system is supposed to do. Subject matter experts should be selected to explain – in great detail – the job description and the functionality required., Subject matter experts should also partner to determine the controls, test the system, and provide updates to the developers as the requirements of the system evolve. They must also identify the logs and records that the system should maintain to document system activity.
- **CISO (Chief Information Security Officer):** Many organizations have a Chief Information Security Officer, often with a staff of specialists. Their focus is on the security of the organization’s systems, but sometimes they are so focused on protecting the infrastructure that they don’t get involved in application development. For A.I. projects – particularly early A.I. projects in an organization – the CISO’s involvement is critical. Most CISOs have limited or no experience

¹⁶ System integrity is defined in the Business Dictionary as the “state of a system where it is performing its intended functions without being degraded or impaired by changes or disruptions in its internal or external environments.” See “System Integrity,” Business Dictionary, <http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/system-integrity.html> (accessed 12 January 2019).

¹⁷ This section has been written by the authors in a generic way to allow for differences between different government and military organizations worldwide.

with A.I. systems, and it essential that they understand what the system does, how it does it, and the recordkeeping (including logging) associated with the A.I. system. The lack of experience of many A.I. developers with security makes the involvement of the CISO an even more important factor. Additionally, the CISO may also have responsibility for the real-time monitoring of all network systems operating in the organization's environment. In this case, the CISO's unit must understand what it will be monitoring, how to monitor the system, and what actions must be taken if monitoring indicates an anomaly.

- **Internal Auditors and Compliance Specialists:** Organizations, both military and civilian, have internal audit and/or compliance functions. At its simplest, a compliance officer's job is to make sure that a company is following all of the rules and regulations that it has been given. External rules might come from industry bodies, international standards organizations, or, of course, the government. There are many laws and potential regulations that a business might need to be compliant with, and they can become extremely complex. There may also be contractual limits or licensing issues with the software or the tools used to build and operate the A.I. application. And standards imposed by internal company policies and procedures. This is why the services of a compliance officer may be required. In many cases, it will take an entire department to make sure that everything is running as it should.¹⁸

Internal auditors also play a important role and may, in some cases, also be responsible for development of the audit plan for the A.I. application. This requires that the internal auditors have an understanding of the system, how it is monitored and the records and logs that the application maintains. An internal audit function may develop specific internal audit tasks associated with an A.I. system that are used on a regular, random or as-needed basis.

- **General Counsel:** The General Counsel or equivalent in a government or military organization, heads up the legal function. In conjunction with the compliance officer, the General Counsel can serve to assure that the compliance office has a full and complete set of laws and regulations – along with the contractual requirements with which the A.I. system must comply.

Because A.I. systems operate differently from more traditional systems, modifying their operation through deep learning and experience, we cannot rely on traditional mechanisms for controlling security and integrity, although similar controls will be useful. The authors' experience in hundreds of cases have led them to develop the following suggestions for avoiding situations in which A.I. systems can be modified or abused by cyber-terrorists or state-sponsored actors. While every situation is unique, taking the following steps will mitigate the risk associated with the project.

- **Make Documentation a Project Requirement.** Documenting how the system works, the databases involved, the logs generated, the input and output data, learning capabilities, etc. is vital. Too often, the authors have been called on to address a data breach only to discover that documentation either was never written or was never maintained. Without documentation, dealing with problems can be difficult. Without a secured code library, it can be difficult to determine whether a system

¹⁸ Alex Bateman, "What Does a Compliance Officer Do, and Why Are They So Important?" Virtual College, at <https://www.virtual-college.co.uk/news/virtual-college/2017/12/what-does-a-compliance-officer-do> (accessed 18 January 2019).

has been subject to unauthorized changes. Making certain that complete documentation is a requirement set for the systems developers and refusing to sign off on a system until complete documentation has been received and reviewed, is vital for the overall security and integrity of the A.I. application.

- **Make Audit/Compliance Personnel a Part of the Project.** Earlier, the role of internal audit and compliance personnel was reviewed. Making sure that such personnel are actually involved in a project from the start is also important. Audit and compliance specialists can provide counsel to the developers on the kinds of logs and records that the A.I. system should maintain, the controls and security features to be considered, and how to interface the system with the organization's monitoring environment. All in all, the objective should be to provide management with assurance that the system will be properly monitored, audited and reviewed for compliance.
- **Make the General Counsel a Part of the Project.** There are typically legal requirements associated with an A.I. system. Whether those are related to a specific law, regulation, or contractual provision, getting involvement from the organization's legal staff at the start of a project is critical. Specifically, contracts for development, software tools and development aids, and other items associated with the development or operation of the system must be reviewed. Even where a system is constructed with open source software, most open source code comes with requirements relating to the maintenance of license notices in the code, or limitations on use that require a legal review. Counsel must assure that every item to be used in the development is appropriately licensed or otherwise owned. The contracts should also cover ownership of the resulting code and documentation, use and ownership of trade secrets or other non-public information, limitations on who can be granted access to the development system, security clearances and similar factors. There is literally no more important task than making certain that the system is developed legally and operated in line with laws, regulations and contractual obligations. There is also no more important task than anticipating legal issues that can result when the A.I. system adapts and learns.
- **Make Logging and Evidence Preservation a Project Requirement.** Evidence preservation is one of the key elements that is not always considered by developers – it is critical to have logs that document the decisions made by a system (for example, the basis for identifying an individual as a potential member of a terrorist group). This is particularly important when the system involves machine learning that can dynamically change factors such as data weighting. Sufficient information to document why and how a decision is taken by the system is very important. In a case where unauthorized changes are made, the logs and audit trail reports may turn out to be vital in isolating when a change was made, the source of the change and the decisions made using the unauthorized changes to the system's programming. Where an attack focuses on one or more databases (as opposed to the system's code or weighting factors), the logs can help to identify which database was changed and when the alteration occurred.
- **Include Controls in System Testing.** It is important for the Project Manager to assure that testing is complete, including tests that exercise the controls over the system. Through the use of appropriate test sets (test databases, test parameter sets) the system should be exercised to

demonstrate that it operates properly under both expected and unexpected circumstances. The test results and test sets should be documented and maintained. Any remediation steps taken should be included in this documentation.

- Evaluate the Security of the Environment Within Which the System Operates. Virtually every A.I. system operates within a network environment. It may run on one or more traditional servers, or it may run on physical or virtualized servers through an Internet connection (sometimes called “operating in the cloud”). The A.I. system is dependent on the security of the network in which it operates. For example, if the environment contains the databases that the A.I. system uses, and weaknesses in the environment’s security allows changes to those databases without proper authorization, the A.I. system will provide incorrect results. For that reason, the Project Manager should assure that the system environment has been properly secured. It is not an oversimplification to state that the level of security and control of an A.I. system is no better than the security and controls of the systems environment in which the A.I. system operates.
- Evaluate the Monitoring Tools in the Environment for Compatibility with the A.I. System. Many system environments employ monitoring systems with software agents installed on all devices to track what is being done, what is running, and to look for unusual events. It is important that specialists evaluate the A.I. system and determine how to integrate new A.I. operations into the existing monitoring system. It is necessary to be able to identify anomalies and determine how and what to report.

In summary, the authors recognize that A.I. represents a resource that commercial, military and governmental agencies will and must utilize. The capabilities of A.I. systems in terms of speed, volume of processing, and the ability to adapt through machine learning are compelling. But these same capabilities provide new room for error and also make these systems clear targets for commercial adversaries and for terrorist groups and state and non-state actors. Defending these systems requires an investment in resources, but more than anything, it requires the will to build defences into the A.I. system, and to monitor the system and its environment to recognize attacks.

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NATO Capacity Building in Counterterrorism and Transatlantic Cooperation¹

Giray Sadık*, Eda Bekci Ari**

Abstract: *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been working on enhancing its capabilities to counter international terrorism since the adoption of the new Strategic Concept at Lisbon Summit in 2010. Following the agreement on the new policy guidelines on counterterrorism (CT) entitled “Aware, Capable and Engaged for a Safer Future” in 2012 at the Chicago Summit, Capacity Building (CB) became one of the key tools to contribute to NATO’s overall efforts to counter international terrorism. Since then, NATO has been including CT - as a mission - into the CB activities to enhance its role in Euro-Atlantic CT through education & training, civil science, and technology cooperation.*

This paper examines the role of CB in Transatlantic CT between 2010 and 2016. Official NATO documents are used as the main sources of the analysis process. Accordingly, this research addresses the question: What is the role of CB in Transatlantic CT? To this end, we will critically analyze what activities have been performed in CB-CT since the adoption of the new policy guidelines in CT.

Keywords: *NATO, Counter-terrorism Cooperation, Capacity Building, Education & Training, Civil Science & Technology Cooperation*

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Introduction

NATO has been trying to adapt to the new security challenges of the 21st century including international terrorism by developing broader definitions of threats, restructuring its forces and refining common operational doctrines, which are the constituent parts of NATO's broader transformation process. In describing NATO's transformation, E. V. Buckley, NATO's previous Assistant Secretary-General for Defense Planning and Operations, in a speech to the George C. Marshall Center Conference, stated that the transformation goes beyond military transformation, but it also "involves the adaptation of NATO's structures, capabilities, policies, doctrines, and relationships to better suit current and perceived security challenges"².

Regarding the ongoing transformation process, NATO is constantly working on enhancing the capacities of the member and partner states by performing various capacity building (CB) activities such as military exercises, educational seminars, conferences, and scientific projects. Additionally, after the agreement of the new policy guidelines on counterterrorism (CT), CB also became one of the key tools for NATO's efforts to contribute to the Transatlantic CT Cooperation (CTC). NATO's policy guidelines on CT emphasize the importance of CB to advance the members' and partners' readiness as well as the identification of their weaknesses and capability gaps and to help them to counter the threat posed by terrorism more effectively³. In parallel with this new approach, NATO has utilized various CB activities not only to develop the capacities of its members and partners but also to enhance its role in the fight against terrorism through Education and Training (E&T) including military exercises and Science & Technology Cooperation (STC).

Most of the research carried out on NATO's CT efforts focus on theoretical debates such as the divergent views among the Allies on how to respond the terrorist threat or on whether NATO has become a collective security organization in the Transatlantic area or remains committed to collective defense. However, little, if any, research has been carried out which examines to what extent can NATO provide practical content to its vision on CT in addition to the Transatlantic CTC. In this regard, this research argues, no matter whether NATO is a collective defense or collective security organization, CT activities remain among NATO's core tasks. Beyond the theoretical debates on NATO's CT vision, it is much more important for NATO to meet the practical requirements of an effective CT policy to be able to remain strategically relevant organization for its members. Accordingly, this research addresses the questions of What is the role of CB in CT? How is CT-CB related to NATO's ongoing military and strategic transformation? And why is it important to increase CT-CB activities to counter the terrorist threat?

Thus, this research is an attempt to contribute to the literature on NATO's role in CT by primarily focusing on practical implementations of CT-CB. To do so, in the first part the authors will attempt to give clear definitions of the key terms such as CB, and the relationship between CB and CT. The second part of the research will provide concrete data demonstrating NATO's practical engagement with CT-CB. By doing so, this research aims to show what has been done in CT-CB

² Nathaniel A. Bailey, "NATO and the War on Terrorism: Objectives and Obstacles" (Unpublished Master Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2004, p.9).

³ "NATO's Policy Guidelines On Counter-Terrorism - Aware, Capable and Engaged for a Safer Future" North Atlantic Treaty Organization at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/ct-policy-guidelines.pdf (accessed 15 September 2018).

since 2010. The data were retrieved from NATO's official documents such as Annual Reports of the Secretary Generals, Military Concepts, Operational Directives, and the scholarly publishing in the related field. Since the authors do not aim to draw clear-cut conclusions, the third part of the research consists of a summary of the findings and the policy implications.

The Relationship between CB and CT

To begin with, it is essential to define CB to understand its relationship with CT. However, it is difficult to define CB since it embodies a mixed bag of different concepts which reflect different meanings in different contexts. In its widest context, CB often refers to focusing on staff development within any given organizational body through formal E&T programs to meet the deficits of that organization or its personnel. Thus, to be able to give a more coherent definition of CB there is a need to define 'capacity' first.

The term 'capacity' has many different meanings in different contexts. Since NATO did not define the term, it would be adequate to use the definition provided by the United Nations (UN). The UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) defines capacity as "the combination of all the strengths, attributes and resources available within an organization, community or society to manage and reduce disaster risks and strengthen resilience."⁴ According to the UNISDR, the term, capacity, may also include "infrastructure, institutions, human knowledge and skills, and collective attributes such as social relationships, leadership, and management". It is worth noting that capacity is not a passive state but is part of a continuing process⁵.

Thus, building capacity may refer to improving the infrastructure, institution and/or sub-organs of any given organization in addition to human resources, human knowledge, and skills. Therefore, CB is an intra-organizational domain in which various activities are conducted aimed at effective performance in any given organization.

Although CB is not a new domain that NATO performs various activities within, the inclusion of CT as a mission within CB has been more recent. To be more precise, since 9/11, NATO has been performing CB activities not only aimed at countering traditional threats but also at countering the emerging threats of the new security environment, including international terrorism. Thus, the scope of CB activities has begun to extend since then. However, it is not clear how the activities that are part of CB such as education and training programs including military exercises serve NATO's role in Transatlantic CTC. None of the official documents published by NATO bodies clearly define neither the role of CB within CT nor CB itself. This kind of blurriness also arose in the overall structure of NATO regarding the responsible sub-organizational structures in CT. As the former Head of NATO-Headquarters CT Section, Juliet Bird argued;

"If a search is conducted for references to 'terrorism' in NATO's internal documents between 2001-2005, it is difficult to tell which parts of the NATO structure led on the issue; it was the hot topic and most sections/divisions wrote on it, confident they had something relevant to offer. Thus,

⁴ United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, "Report of the open-ended intergovernmental expert working group on indicators and terminology relating to disaster risk reduction", (2009), p.12

⁵ "Ibid."

it was that many of NATO's core activities were often labeled 'CT'. NATO undoubtedly contributed useful activities to the international approach over a 10-year period but, when a review of NATO's CT posture was called for in 2011, it was clear that coherent action was needed to determine where NATO could add value⁶.

Thus, CB is one of the venues where NATO can implement practical actions. However, it is worth noting that neither the literature on NATO's role in Transatlantic CTC nor NATO itself categorized CB. In other words, it is difficult to retrieve any data to analyze NATO's CT-CB activities. This situation results in a lack of systematic research on how to increase the levels of CB-CT activities.

Additionally, within the official NATO documents, CB is often used together with the term 'defense' as 'defense capacity building (DCB),' and most of the research conducted on NATO's CB activities addresses the enhancement of defense institutions of partner and other non-member states. However, NATO's CB activities are not limited to enhancing the defense institutions of partner and non-member states but also extend to building capacities of both members and non-members aimed at being able to give a coherent response to any possible terrorist attacks. As Yost argued once, CB is "an important instrument in the Alliance's toolbox with multiple examples, including NATO's training missions and activities and various efforts such as military exercises focused on improved capacity and interoperability of Allied and partner forces."⁷ Thus, CT in this context appears as an integrated component of CB. In the broader context, the Strategic Concept (2010) identifies three key responsibilities which NATO must continue to fulfill to reassure the security of its members: "Collective Defense, Crisis Management, and Cooperative Security." Within this broader context, CB activities have been performed to improve member states' and partners' defense institutions that contribute to NATO's collective defense posture. However, the changing dimension of NATO's collective defense understanding, which moves from a traditional understanding to a more proactive and anticipatory one, has blurred the frontiers of possible actions aimed at providing a collective defense⁸. This situation has been demonstrated by using the CB as a toolbox and by embedding CT into CB as a relatively new objective. In this regard, CB became a far-reaching venue, which also includes CT as a mission.⁹

The Prague Summit which was held in 2002 can be regarded as an initial indication of the inclusion of CT as a mission within CB. At the summit, the Allied nations have agreed on a "comprehensive package of measures", based on the Strategic Concept of 1999, in order to improve the Alliance's ability to confront the so-called new challenges of the post-9/11 era. Along with the comprehensive package of measures, endorsement of the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) was another important milestone in the inclusion of the CT mission into CB activities. The main aim of PCC is to enhance the operational capabilities of member state military forces both individually and

⁶ Juliette Bird, "NATO's Role in Counter-Terrorism", *Perspectives on Terrorism* 9 (2) (2015), p.

⁷ David Yost, "NATO's Evolving Purposes and the next Strategic Concept, *International Affairs*, 86 (2), (March 2010), pp. 489-522, p.490.

⁸ NATO, "BI-SC Collective Training and Exercise Directive (CT&ED) 075-003", 2 October 2013, p. 12 available at http://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/structure/jft/bi-sc-75-3_final.pdf accessed (10 September 2018).

⁹ Although a considerable amount of theoretical literature has been published on NATO's role as a collective security organization in Transatlantic, from a legal point of view NATO does not have principal responsibility for collective security in Transatlantic. The North Atlantic Treaty does not suggest such a role. Furthermore, the debates on the issue is beyond the scope of this research.

collectively to fight against terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs)¹⁰. In order to overcome deficiencies in their operational capabilities, the Allies agreed to improve their capabilities in four key areas, including ‘defense against terrorism’¹¹.

Furthermore, the Military Concept for Defense against Terrorism (MCDT), which was endorsed and agreed on by the Alliance leaders in 2002, also demonstrates the inclusion of the CT mission into CB activities, since it gives clear definitions of terrorism-related concepts. MCDT includes all possible military activities that NATO can engage in combatting terrorism, namely “anti-terrorism, consequence management, CT and military cooperation.”¹² It is important to note that in MCDT NATO made a clear distinction between ‘anti-terrorism’ and ‘counter-terrorism;¹³’ where the former specifies defensive measures such as consequence management, intelligence sharing, and disaster relief, but the latter combines offensive military actions. Although the establishment of MCDT is a significant development, it did not establish any principles or guidelines for CT. However, 2002 MCDT has been superseded by the endorsement of the new Military Committee Concept for CT (MCCT) in 2015. In this regard, MCCT “establishes a framework, principles, and guidelines to ensure that provision for CT is reflected coherently over time in the revision process of policies and plans across the spectrum of NATO’s activities, including doctrine, training, and material¹⁴”. Thus, MCCT became the doctrinal guide on how CB activities that aim to fight against terrorism will be performed. In other words, CT has been included into NATO’s individual and collective E&T, exercises, and evaluations at all levels including operational, tactical and strategic. Additionally, the establishment of new institutional mechanisms, such as the Center of Excellence-Defense Against Terrorism (CoE-DAT) and the Emerging Security Challenges Division (ESCD) also demonstrates the extension of the scope of CB. For instance, with the establishment of ESCD, NATO started to provide a coordinating role in protecting the Allied nations and managing the Alliance’s efforts in various fields, including CT. In this way NATO has aimed to add value to the transatlantic CTC, raising awareness and harmonizing individual approaches of the allied nations to critical infrastructure protection as well as providing E&T to improve preparedness for a potential terrorist threat and to build resilience¹⁵. Evidently, the establishment of these sub-organizational structures is a part of the ongoing transformation process of the Alliance to be able to remain strategically relevant. In addition, and more significantly, the establishment of these sub-structures are the keystones of NATO’s CT-CB efforts. Thus, the role of CB in Transatlantic CTC should be examined while always bearing in mind that NATO’s structural re-organization and newly created and/or evolving organs to perform CT-CB activities are embedded into the ongoing transformation process both in strategic and structural terms.

¹⁰ NATO, “Prague Summit Declaration” 2002 available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_19552.htm, (accessed 13 September 2018)

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Lord Robertson, “The Role of the Military in Combating Terrorism”, Speech by NATO Secretary General, (9 December 2002) at <https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021209b.htm> (accessed 11 September 2018).

¹⁴ NATO, “Military Concept for Counter-terrorism, MC 0472/1 Final”, 6 January 2016. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/topics_pdf/20160905_160905-mc-concept-ct.pdf (accessed 11 September 2018).

¹⁵ NATO, “NATO’s Counter-Terrorism Cooperation with Partners” (Emerging Security Challenges Division,

Although NATO does not clearly categorize its constituent parts, CB in this research refers to E&T activities (including military exercises). To be able to make a classification, the researchers benefited from NATO's official web page through searching the keywords such as CB, E&T, and CT. Simply put, in general, all the activities performed under the title of E&T can be considered the components of CB¹⁶. Besides, specifically, all the CB activities which carry out CT as a mission are components of CT-CB activities. Therefore, the following parts of the research will critically analyze the CT-CB activities through E&T and what has been done in CT through E&T activities since 2010.

The Relationship between NATO's Transformation Process and CT through Education and Training

In the broader context, Transformation in the context of NATO is an overarching term for the numerous changes that NATO has experienced since the end of the Cold War. However, NATO officially adopted the title 'Transformation' at the Prague Summit in 2002. The establishment of ACT in 2003 was a significant development aimed at enhancing the "readiness and interoperability" of the Allies through the coordination of individual E&T activities with collective training and exercises¹⁷. The ACT is not only responsible for managing NATO schools but also responsible for developing joint and individual E&T, and related policy and doctrine between NATO and Partnership Training and Education Centers¹⁸ (PTECs). Since July 2012, ACT has also been responsible for directing collective training & exercises based on the requirements of the ACO. As it is stated in NATO's BI-SC Collective Training and Exercise Directive, the ACT "identifies and develops the most appropriate E&T solution for every single discipline."¹⁹ The ACT is specially designed to keep pace with rapid technological changes, which is critical for the Alliance to remain strategically relevant since the military forces of the Allied nations should be integrated and interoperable to be able to conduct the full range of missions, including CT in and beyond the Alliance territory²⁰.

The transformation of NATO Command Structure resulting from the Chicago Summit in 2012, gave Allied Command Operations (ACO) responsibility for the planning and execution of E&T activities, based on the actual needs of NATO forces²¹. But the individual E&T efforts, the scenario development, and the integration of future trends in the exercises program remained Allied Command Transformation's (ACT) responsibility. ACO plays a significant role in the arena of CT through E&T. The ACO establishes and manages the appropriate standards of the military forces

Counter-Terrorism Section, 2016), p. 16.

¹⁶ See Figure 1

¹⁷ "Education and Training", North Atlantic Treaty Organization, at https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics_49206.htm (accessed 07 September 2018)

¹⁸ "e-NATO - Education and Training", NATO Allied Command Transformation, at <https://www.act.nato.int/e-nato> (accessed 09 September 2018)

¹⁹ NATO, "BI-SC Collective Training and Exercise Directive (CT&ED) 075-003", 2 October 2013, p. 185.

²⁰ NATO, "Framework for Future Alliance Operations", 2018, pp. 1-69; Nathaniel A. Bailey, "NATO and the War on Terrorism: Objectives and Obstacles, p.9.

and provides guidance to the national forces of the Allies on exercise programs and the evaluation of the exercises, and identifies requirements related to training and the development of the force capabilities²². ACO and ACT manage E&T, military exercises, and evaluation process in collaboration.

NATO			
EDUCATION & TRAINING			
Facilities			
Individual		Collective and Individual	
Education	Training	Education	Exercises
NDC		NATO ACT	
NATO School of Oberammergau		NATO ACO	
Other Schools			
COE-DAT			
PTECs			

Additional Table 1: Target Groups of NATO’s education and training activities & Responsible bodies to perform

NATO has been conducting collective E&T activities since 1949; however, over time, they have “expanded both geographically and institutionally to become an integral part of NATO’s ability to protect the security of its members.”²³ NATO aims to ensure that the commands and forces “remain ready, adaptable and interoperable” to a variety of challenges including terrorism, through E&T activities, despite the “differences in tactics, doctrine, training, structures, and language among the Allied nations.”²⁴

E&T activities provide a fundamental transformation venue both for the members of the Alliance and the non-member NATO partner states. After the Chicago Summit, two central elements have shaped NATO’s approach to E&T. First, NATO has “moved from a campaign footing, such as focusing on the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), to a contingency footing, which is more balanced, prepared and ready to conduct a wide range of missions as Allies recuperate and reconstitute.”²⁵ Secondly, NATO changed its vision in terms of testing the means and capabilities “to conduct the full range of missions, from most dangerous to most likely.”²⁶ The Secretary General’s Annual Report in 2012 stated that E&T activities are the key agents of NATO’s transformation and that the E&T programs have been expanded.²⁷ Since 2010, E&T activities also provide a means for the Allied nations and NATO partners to cooperate on “how to build, develop and reform

²¹ “NATO Encyclopedia”, NATO, at http://www.coedat.nato.int/publication/datr/Writing_Principles.pdf (accessed 10 September 2018)

²² “Education and Training”, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

²³ *ibid*

²⁴ *ibid*

²⁵ NATO, Bi-Sc Directive 2 October 2013 Number 075-003 Collective Training and Exercise Directive, 2 October 2003. http://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/structure/jft/bi-sc-75-3_final.pdf

²⁶ NATO, “BI-SC Collective Training and Exercise Directive (CT&ED) 075-003”, 2 October 2013

²⁷ Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2012”, NATO, at https://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/stock_publications/20130131_Annual_Report_2012_en.pdf (accessed 17 September 2018)

educational institutions in the security, defense, and military domains.”²⁸ According to NATO BI-SC Collective Training and Exercise Directive, there are four central dimensions of NATO E&T programs: individual and collective education and training, civil and military exercises and the respective evaluation of these.²⁹ In this respect, through E&T activities, NATO aims to enhance the knowledge and skills of its military forces and to develop NATO’s capabilities to counter a variety of challenges including terrorism. Thus, the E&T activities are embedded in CT to imply stronger operational capabilities. Additionally, NATO’s E&T activities support the continuing process of transformation.³⁰

There are several bodies within NATO through which CT- E&T activities are implemented. Some of the CT- E&T activities operate under the management of the Alliance while others are external but complementary to the Alliance structures.³¹ There are seven E&T facilities where CT-E&T activities have been performed within the overarching institutional framework of NATO namely: NATO Defense College (NDC) in Rome, Italy, the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany (NSO), the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre (NMIOTC), the NATO Communications and Information Systems School (NCISS) in Latina, Italy, the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) in Stavanger, Norway, the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) in Bydgoszcz, Poland, and the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) in Lisbon, Portugal.³² Although most of these facilities were established prior to the 21st century, the emerging threats of the new security environment forced them to adapt to meet these new challenges. The NSO, for instance, is the primary operational-level training center for military personnel.³³ Due to the limitations of this research, it is not possible to present the exact numbers of the CT-related courses and/or lectures given by the above-mentioned facilities. However, NSO, for instance, has been offering hundreds of courses (resident and e-learning) since 2002 that are both directly and indirectly related to CT, such as Defense against Terrorism, NATO Operational Education, NATO Security, and ISAF COIN Intelligence, which all include terrorism within their learning objectives³⁴. NDC, which is NATO’s principal educational facility at the strategic level, “includes areas of study such as trends in the international security environment and their potential effects on NATO countries.”³⁵ NDC also offers several resident and online courses, including modular short courses such as Global Security Challenges, which primarily covers terrorism within its learning objectives.³⁶

The other E&T entities, which have a relationship with NATO but are managed by the individual member and non-member partner states and are open to participation by civilian and military personnel both from the member states and non-member partners and may also accept indi-

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ NATO, “BI-SC Collective Training and Exercise Directive (CT&ED) 075-003”, 2 October 2013.

³⁰ Ibid

³¹ Ibid.

³² “Education and Training”, North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

³³ Ibid

³⁴ “NATO School Course Catalogue”, NATO School Oberammergau at <https://www.natoschool.nato.int/Academics/Portfolio/Course-Catalogue> (accessed 18 September 2018).


³⁵ “Education and Training”, North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

³⁶ “Academic Calendars”, NATO Defense College at <http://www.ndc.nato.int/education/courses.php?icode=16> (accessed 11 September 2018).

viduals coming from other countries and organizations.³⁷ These entities are The Centers of Excellence (CoEs), the Partnership Training and Education Centers (PTECs) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institute. All these entities have numerous E&T programs and a wide range of courses related to CT. However, beyond the numbers of the activities and courses conducted by them, the establishment of these entities itself demonstrates that NATO is able to implement the practical requirements of an adequate CT policy and that CT has become an integral component of CB.

Establishment of CoE-DAT in this regard represents the most relevant example of the role of CB in transatlantic CTC. Although there are 25 CoEs that offer specialized courses both to the military and civilian personnel of the Alliance members and non-member partner states, CoE-DAT is the venue where NATO performs E&T activities especially aimed to contribute to NATO’s CT efforts. Thus, CoE-DAT, with 8 sponsoring nations, is an important mechanism that serves one of NATO’s objectives, to be able to meet the challenges of CT. While CoEs are the entities which offer expertise and experience to support NATO based the requirements of its transformation, CoE-DAT provides “support to NATO decision makers to find realistic solutions to the challenges of terrorism and CT.”³⁸ CoE-DAT offers conferences, courses, research and studies, workshops, and workshop reports that cover terrorism-related issues (including cyberterrorism).³⁹

From its establishment in 2005 to 2016, CoE-DAT offered 151 courses, including Defense Against Terrorism, Defense Against Suicide Attack, Terrorist Use of Cyberspace, Terrorism and the Media, Critical Infrastructure Protection from Terrorist Attacks, Terrorist Use of Weapons Mass Destruction and Border Security, Refugees and Counter-Terrorism⁴⁰.



Additional Graph 1: CoE-DAT Courses Between 2005-2016⁴¹

³⁷ “Education and Training”, North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

³⁸ “About Coe-Dat”, Centre of Excellence Defense Against Terrorism at <http://www.coedat.nato.int/functions.html> (accessed 14 September 2018).

³⁹ Ibid

⁴⁰ See additional graph #3

⁴¹ “Conducted Activities”, Center of Excellence Defense Against Terrorism, at http://www.coedat.nato.int/conducted_activity.html (accessed 14 September 2018).

CoE-DAT not only runs residential training courses in Ankara but also runs mobile E&T courses in the form of advanced training courses⁴². These courses are oriented specifically towards the needs of NATO members, partners, ACO and ACT and other NATO Force structures.⁴³ Since 2007, CoE-DAT conducted 20 Mobile Education Training (MET) and ATC events in several members and partner countries⁴⁴. Furthermore, between 2013-2017, CoE-DAT conducted seven workshops. Additionally, in 2016 the center also started to organize the Terrorism Experts Conference annually. As Corbe argues, the broad variety of subjects covered by CoEs can effectively counter the destabilization caused by hybrid threats⁴⁵. Thus, CoE-DAT, while offering countermeasures against possible terrorist attacks, has been contributing to NATO's CT-CB efforts at the same time.

Furthermore, NATO has been providing E&T aimed at countering terrorism through NATO-led operations such as the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in Afghanistan. The "RSM is a NATO-led mission to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces and institutions, launched on 1 January 2015 immediately following the stand-down of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)"⁴⁶. The establishment of RSM was part of the broader engagement of the international community in Afghanistan to counter international terrorism⁴⁷. As the increase in numbers⁴⁸ of contributing nations' troops to ISAF – especially between 2010-2012 – demonstrates, the necessary steps for an effective CT policy have been taken, at least to some extent. In accordance with the principles that the Allies set at the Chicago Summit on enhancing CTC through CB activities, practical implementations were reflected in the decision to extend the ISAF mission and continue contributions of the Allies to RSM. It is also worth noting that some Allies, such as Canada and France, have withdrawn their forces from RSM. However, both Allies are still financing the mission. Besides, the withdrawal of forces alone would not be sufficient to demonstrate a lack of support to NATO's CT-CB activities. Canada, for instance, is now contributing 110 million (USD) a year to support the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. Additionally, Canada's Defense Minister, Harjit Sajjan, has stated that Canada's priority remains to defeat ISIS, or Daesh, in Iraq and Syria⁴⁹.

⁴² "About Coe-Dat", Centre of Excellence Defense Against Terrorism, at <http://www.coedat.nato.int/functions.html> (accessed 14 September 2018).

⁴³ Ibid

⁴⁴ "Mobile Education and Training Activities", Centre of Excellence Defense Against Terrorism, at <http://www.coedat.nato.int/atc.html> (accessed 13 September 2018).

⁴⁵ Marian Corbe, *A Collective Response to Destabilization: The NATO Centers of Excellence*, in *A Civil Military Response to Hybrid Threats*, E. Cusumano, M. Corbe (eds) 2018

⁴⁶ Resolute Support Mission (RSM): Key Facts and Figures at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_09/20180903_2018-09-RSM-Placemat.pdf

⁴⁷ Ibid

⁴⁸ ISAF Facts Sheets", NATO, at <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/107995.htm> (accessed 19 September 2018).

Note on numbers: Totals are approximations and actual numbers change daily. Number of troops will never be exact and should be taken as indicatives.

⁴⁹ Chris Hall, "Afghanistan looks to Canada for more training support", CBS News (19 November 2017), at <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/afghanistan-training-support-1.4409506> (accessed 18 September 2018)

ISAF Number of Contributing Troops ⁵⁰					
	Feb 2010 ⁵¹	Jan 2011	Jan 2012	Feb 2013	Jan 2014
Belgium	575	530	520	253	140
Canada	2830	2903	556	950	265
Denmark	750	750	750	568	263
France	3750	4000	3916	550	205
Germany	4415	4922	4818	4400	3,077
Greece	15	136	154	10	7
Turkey	1755	1823	1845	1093	458
United Kingdom	9500	9500	9500	9000	5200
U.S. A	47,085	90,000	90,000	68,000	38,000

Additional Table 2: ISAF Number of Contributing Troops

RSM Number of Contributing Troops ⁵²			
	May 2015	Dec 2016	Jan 2017
Belgium	43	62	62
Denmark	160	97	97
Germany	850	980	980
Greece	4	4	4
Turkey	503	532	532
United Kingdom	470	450	450
U.S. A	6827	6941	6941

Additional Table 3: RSM Number of Contributing Troops

Additionally, NATO established a partnership with Iraq in 2012, which includes cooperation in the areas of political dialogue, E&T, response to terrorism, defense institution building, and border security, among others. The activities conducted under this partnership were held in Jordan until 2017. In January 2017, the NATO Training and Capacity Building program in Iraq began to train the Iraqi military officers within the territories of Iraq⁵³.

To put in a nutshell, while introducing adequate CT policies, NATO has also been implementing a wide range of practical actions through E&T activities. Thus, this implies that NATO can add

⁵⁰ The Chart does not involve all contributing nations. The contributing nations selected randomly to demonstrate the change in the levels of contribution.

⁵¹ "ISAF Facts Sheets", NATO, at <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/107995.htm> (accessed 19 September 2018).

⁵² The Chart does not involve all contributing nations. The contributing nations selected randomly to demonstrate the change in the levels of contribution.

⁵³ "Countering Terrorism", NATO, at https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_77646.htm (accessed 20 September 2018).

value to Transatlantic CTC through E&T activities. However, enhancing Transatlantic CTC through E&T activities comes with its own constraints, since they require substantial financial and human resources. For instance, the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I), which was established in 2004, trained over 15,000 military and police personnel and required “over 115 million (€) worth of military equipment and a total of over 17.5 million (€) in trust fund donations from members for training and education at NATO” facilities⁵⁴. The need for additional financial and human resources has been increasing due to the growing demand for NATO’s E&T activities, especially for CT and military exercises. The lack of resources is a constant challenge, which in turn raises the most controversial and current issue, the fair share of burdens. In order to overcome this obstacle, at the Wales Summit (2014), members agreed to increase their defense budgets and work towards the NATO guideline of spending two percent of their GDPs on defense expenditures by 2020⁵⁵. The decision was important not only because it gave an impetus to the fair share of the burden, but also because it demonstrated that the Allies have the ability to compromise on vital policy issues.

CT through Military Exercises:

As mentioned before, military exercises are the foremost activity “for maintaining, testing and evaluating the readiness and interoperability of the Allies, partners, and other non-NATO entities.”⁵⁶ Military exercises are designed to test the knowledge that is acquired by the E&T activities and thus, “take E&T a step further through scenario-based live or computer-assisted simulations.”⁵⁷ NATO uses military exercises as a mechanism to ensure that the Alliance is able to respond to the emerging security challenges of the 21st century including terrorism, “through the constant adaptation of its courses, training events, and the introduction of new concepts and capabilities.”⁵⁸ Military exercises generally involve many participants and may involve both members and non-member partner countries. As they are the principal means of maintaining, testing and evaluating the readiness and interoperability of the Allies, and partner countries, military exercises represent the highest and most complex form of E&T activities.⁵⁹ Regarding CT, through military exercises, a wide range of countries are developing the capacity to work closely together to respond to a hypothetical terrorist attack.⁶⁰

The very first exercise of the Alliance was held in 1951, and in 1953 there were approximately 100 exercises conducted by NATO commanders.⁶¹ Until the 1990s, NATO maintained a dynamic exercise program to train forces in as many demanding scenarios as possible.⁶² During the Cold War, military exercises were the most vital parts of the Alliance’s deterrence and defense posture

⁵⁴ NATO, “NATO’s assistance to Iraq”, last updated September 2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_51978.htm (accessed August 18, 2017).

⁵⁵ NATO “NATO Wales Summit Declaration”, last updated 26 September 2016, https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm (accessed August 18, 2017).

⁵⁶ NATO, “BI-SC Collective Training and Exercise Directive (CT&ED) 075-003”, 2 October 2013.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ “Education and Training”, North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

⁵⁹ NATO, “BI-SC Collective Training and Exercise Directive (CT&ED) 075-003”, 2 October 2013.

⁶⁰ Claudia Bernasconi, “NATO’s Fight Against Terrorism – Where Do We Stand?”, NATO Defense College Research Division, 66 (2011), p. 4.

⁶¹ “Exercises”, NATO, at https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/topics_49285.htm (accessed 17 September 2018).

⁶² NATO, “BI-SC Collective Training and Exercise Directive (CT&ED) 075-003”, 2 October 2013.

to assure that NATO forces were ready for any potential aggression from the Soviet Union. Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the Allies have given impetus to the transformation process to deal with international terrorism. To this end, the NATO Response Force (NRF), established in 2002 as an “advanced multinational force” which can be deployed wherever and whenever needed. The NRF was revised in 2009.”⁶³ Since then NATO has been placed the emphasis on the exercises conducted in support of the NRF.⁶⁴

This revision was intended to re-assure the ability of NRF to deploy as soon as possible whenever needed and its ability to operate effectively in a variety of situations, including possible terrorist attacks.⁶⁵ Thus, performing CT activities is an additional function besides all the other operations within NRF. The NRF made up of land, air, maritime, and special forces components, became more important after the NATO-led ISAF mission ended in Afghanistan. On 21 February 2013, defense ministers agreed that the NRF will be at the core of the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI), which aims to maintain NATO’s readiness and combat-effectiveness through expanded education and training, increased frequency of exercises and better use of technology.⁶⁶ As part of the initiative, ministers agreed that the Alliance should hold a major live exercise in 2015 in which actual military forces participate and includes the NRF and draw up a comprehensive program of training and exercises for the period between 2015-2020.⁶⁷

At the 2004 Istanbul Summit, the heads of NATO states and governments have introduced the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), to pave the way for cooperation between NATO and partner nation-states from the Middle East in E&T, and provided the partners to engage in joint training and exercises against terrorism.⁶⁸ Since the endorsement of the new Strategic Concept in 2010 and the new partnerships policy, NATO exercises have been open to all non-member NATO partners. At the Chicago Summit in 2012, the Allied leaders discussed to expand education, training, and exercises and introduced the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) aimed to ensure that the Allied forces maintain their interoperability gained during their operational experience in Afghanistan, Libya, the Horn of Africa and the Balkans.⁶⁹ In February 2013, NATO defense ministers introduced revitalization plans for NATO’s exercise programs including a more precise “multi-year training schedule” to ensure that NATO forces maintain the ability to work effectively together.⁷⁰ Furthermore, to allow the member states to continue to develop their operational compatibility and to test the systems, tactics, and concepts, NATO defense ministers also agreed to broaden the range of exercise scenarios and increase both the frequency and the level of ambition⁷¹.

⁶³ “Exercises”, NATO, at https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/topics_49285.htm (accessed 17 September 2018)

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ “Exercises”, NATO, at https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/topics_49285.htm (accessed 17 September 2018).

⁶⁶ Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2013”, NATO, at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/stock_publications/20140123_SG_AnnualReport_2013_en.pdf (accessed 07 September 2018).


⁶⁷ Ibid

⁶⁸ “Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI)”, NATO, at https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics_58787.htm (accessed 20 September 2018).

⁶⁹ Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2013”, NATO

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2013”, NATO



Additional Graphic 2: Trend of CT and Key Military Exercises by Years⁷²

In March 2014, after Russia's invasion of Crimea, the number of military exercises undertaken was increased. However, due to the perception of an increasing threat posed by Russia; the number of military exercises that includes CT missions has decreased.⁷³ Additionally, in 2013, NATO conducted its largest live exercise, Steadfast Jazz, since 2006, in a collective defense scenario which includes CT as a mission. This exercise was conducted at sea, in the air, and in the territories of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland⁷⁴. After the conclusion of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan in 2015, the Allied forces conducted a major exercise hosted jointly by Spain, Portugal, and Italy.⁷⁵ According to the Secretary General's Annual Report in 2014, the number of military exercises undertaken in 2014 significantly increased as a part of NATO's efforts to reassure the members located in NATO's eastern flank and to adapt to the changing security environment. According to the report, "with 162 events under the Military Training and Exercise Program – double the initially planned number – and 40 national exercises in the context of assurance measures, one exercise started every two days within the area of responsibility of NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)."⁷⁶ These exercises took place on land, at sea, and in the air over the territories of the Alliance.⁷⁷

⁷² Data is collected through official NATO web page archive by searching the keywords "exercises" and "counter-terrorism military exercises" between 2001-2016 in addition to the press-released military exercises fact-sheets. The numbers only include "key NATO and Allied military exercises" defined by NATO.

⁷³ It is worth to note that, due to the confidentiality of the official documents it is not possible to list all the scenarios of the military exercises conducted by NATO. Thus, the exact numbers of the military exercises aimed only at countering hypothetical terrorist attacks would not be possible. However, some military exercises cover a wide range of missions including CT. The key military exercises between 2000 and 2016 demonstrate that the numbers of CT related exercises have increased after the terrorist attacks of 9/11.

⁷⁴ Anders Fogh Rasmussen, "The Secretary General's Annual Report 2013", NATO

⁷⁵ Jens Stoltenberg, "The Secretary General's Annual Report 2016", NATO

⁷⁶ Jens Stoltenberg, "The Secretary General's Annual Report 2014", NATO, at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2015_01/20150130_SG_AnnualReport_2014_en.pdf (accessed 20 September 2018)

⁷⁷ Ibid.

In 2014, at the Summit in Wales, NATO leaders agreed to enhance their efforts on collective defense scenarios with an emphasis on the importance of military exercises. Additionally, at the Warsaw Summit in 2016, NATO leaders agreed on a strengthened deterrence and defense posture that draws upon all the tools at NATO's disposal, including military exercises.⁷⁸ However, this shared vision among the Allies on how to strengthen NATO's role in CT has not been reflected in terms of practice. As it can be demonstrated in the percentages of the military exercises which include CT as a mission in 2015⁷⁹ and 2016 as 25 % and 15 % respectively, were the lowest levels of CT military exercises after the Chicago Summit in 2012. To be more precise, the number of CT military exercises in 2015 was 3 out of the total number of key military exercises which was 12 whereas, the number of CT military exercises was 3 out of the total number of key military exercises which was 19. Hence, despite the agreed vision on the importance of military exercises in countering the threat posed by terrorism, NATO could not be able to fully meet the practical needs of CT in terms of military exercises.

To sum up, although the shared sense of terrorist threat – as a dimension of Transatlantic CTC – contributes to the greater willingness of NATO member states to include the military exercises and deployments as a mechanism for CT, in terms of the policy, the Allies could not be able to reflect this policy in terms of practice.

CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

In sum, since the Chicago Summit in 2012, the Alliance has implemented numerous practical CT activities in the domain of CB, including civil and military E&T activities and, military exercises. However, the challenge that remains is the lack of a systematic organization of CT-CB activities. Although NATO has an official directive to manage the E&T activities the place of CT within E&T is not clearly defined. Furthermore, the Alliance should be more transparent regarding the numbers of CT-CB activities. In other words, analyzing the practical implementation of CT-CB activities comes with its own constraints since the numbers of CT-related activities have not been clarified within the official NATO documents (i.e.: within the factsheets, among others). In terms of its policy implications, this situation may endanger the Allied cohesion on CT-related issues, in a sense, by the fact that the lesser transparency would be resulted by lesser accountability of the Alliance to its members.

In addition, external factors such as the Russian annexation of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine had negative impacts on the practical implementation of CT-CB activities, mostly in terms of CT-related military exercises, as it was demonstrated in the decreasing levels of CT military exercises after 2014, since, the focus of the Allies has shifted from the threat posed by terrorism to the threat posed by Russia. Thus, NATO should be able to find a proper balance between the practical needs of its member states in the Eastern and Southern flanks.

⁷⁸ Jens Stoltenberg, "The Secretary General's Annual Report 2017", NATO, at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_03/20180315_SG_AnnualReport_en.pdf (accessed 201 September 2018)

⁷⁹ Total number of exercises is around 280 in 2015. Ratios only cover key military exercises

To put in a nutshell, the adoption of an adequate CT-CB policy framework may be the first step taken towards achieving an effective intra-alliance CTC. It can be argued that even if the key focus is on E&T to meet short and medium-term needs, CB measures should be assessed in the wider context of implementing CT policies in a sustainable way. Thus, CB and the role of CB in CT should be clearly defined as priorities to provide a shared understanding among the Allies. Lack of coherent and agreed definitions of the terms such as CB and/or lack of a clear identification of the role of CB within CT-related issues would hinder the cooperative actions among the Allies. Besides, the Alliance should not only clarify the role of CB within CT but also should increase the levels of practical implementation of CT-CB policies. As this article suggests, CB is one of the most suitable domains where NATO can add its value to the practical implementation of CT policies. Hence, it would be wise of Allies both to expand the use of CB activities in CT-related issues and to increase the practical implementations of the CT-CB policies. It is much more important for NATO to meet the practical requirements of an effective CT policy to be able to remain strategically relevant organization for its members.

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The enemy of my enemy: Strategies aimed at co-opting irregular forces.

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***Abstract:** Conflicts change rapidly and present challenges to long-term strategies aimed at confronting them. Despite their fluid nature, addressing conflicts requires nuanced understanding and a long-term in-depth approach. Demands for rapid action and rapid results hold tremendous implications for the formulation and execution of strategies. These demands create a focus on short-term strategies that are inherently reactionary and can, in fact, be counter to long-term interests. Political forces are motivated to seek low-impact solutions, such as co-opting local rebels as proxies to address immensely complex international issues such as civil wars, terrorism, resource competition, and the power vacuum of failed states. These local proxies are poorly understood and the result is often underdeveloped, short-term strategies. These strategies lack the required knowledge base to adequately appreciate the situation and develop sound long-term policies necessary to obtain goals and insure they remain sustainable. The crux of the problem is that when these local proxies are sought out, they are assessed primarily on short-term military effectiveness and immediate needs with long-term consequences often overlooked. Successful engagement with local partners and long-term stability requires a nuanced understanding of local culture, politics, language, and history. All of this must be supported by a deep knowledge base. Currently NATO countries are engaged in a cycle of engagement and disengagement on this front. There is a need to develop a larger emphasis on the social knowledge required for both immediate military and long-term political success. With this emphasis in place there is a need to establish a permanent physical commitment to the development of and preservation of this social knowledge in the context of conflict.*

***Key Words:** Regional partners, long-term strategies, temporary alliances, cultural knowledge, local proxies.*

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Introduction

Conflicts change rapidly and present challenges to the long-term strategies aimed at confronting them. Despite their fluid nature and the challenges this presents to planning, addressing conflicts requires nuanced understanding and a long-term in-depth approach. Democracies confront particular risks in this regard. Demands for rapid action and rapid results have tremendous implications for the formulation and execution of strategies. This demand creates a focus on short-term strategies that are inherently reactionary and can, in fact, be counter to long-term interests. The political forces at play, focused as they are on navigating domestic opinion, are motivated to seek low-impact solutions, such as co-opting local irregulars and rebel groups as proxies to address immensely complex international issues. What is meant by irregulars and rebel groups in this regard are local armed militia and political groups opposed to the same forces we ourselves are attempting to confront. The result is often underdeveloped short-term strategies that lack the required knowledge base to adequately appreciate the situation and develop sound long-term policies necessary to obtain goals and insure they remain sustainable.

In the following pages, this **quandary** will be described and examined. Through historical examples basic principles concerning this recurring pattern will be highlighted. An argument will be made as to how these policies can work and where their pitfalls lie. Past failures from these historical examples will be pointed to as part of a larger argument concerning how to modify these policies and so they can be incorporated into a successful strategy moving forward. At the core of this argument is the belief that successful engagement with local partners and long-term stability requires a nuanced understanding of local culture, politics, language, and history. All of this must be supported by a deep knowledge base. Currently we engage in a cycle of engagement and disengagement on this front. There is a need to develop a larger emphasis on the social knowledge required for both immediate military and long-term political success. With this emphasis in place there is a need to establish a permanent physical commitment to the development of and preservation of this social knowledge in the context of conflict.

The Battlefield

Compounding problems of short-term vs. long-term strategies is our general conception of conflict and resulting discourse. This dialogue is consumed with ideas and approaches based in 'conventional' conceptions of warfare, that is to say, state-on-state conflict. Generally it is imagined as something like the popular conception of the Second World War with a unified enemy, in uniform, and answerable to a clearly recognised and defined leadership.

This is not what the battlefields of today look like, if they ever really looked that way. The reality is that throughout our history we have been most often confronted with chaotic conflicts that contain cellular and disjointed enemies with only a loose ideological leadership: and with an enemy that is unidentifiable until holding a weapon and who transitions in and out of the battle space easily, the guerrilla.² Even when major powers are at war, the chaos of conflict breeds these loose

² Robert Schaefer. *The Insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus: From Gazavat to Jihad*. (Praeger, 2011), 12

irregular units. Often serving as proxies, they can come to take a prominent position as a vanguard and buffer between opposing powers seeking to either avoid major conventional conflicts or undermine their conventional opponents. We tend to try and view things as black and white when grey is the more common colour.

When we look at the major conflicts confronting us around the world today it is difficult to find one that does not fit into the 'grey zone.' Ukraine, ISIS, Boko Haram, Yemen all fall into this framework. The reality is that what we often label conventional operations of the military is in fact an anomaly of war. More often the norm is the 'irregular' war.³ That is, the 'asymmetrical' fights where a military faces something else; an irregular force, or terrorist organisation (with the line blurring between the two) be it ISIS, the Taliban, or Al-Qaeda.

Most often we are unprepared to face irregular forces and usually approach these situations in a slapdash manner, politically and strategically underprepared. We confront these issues without concrete long-term planning or strategies. We are reactionary instead of proactive in the face of these conflicts. The 'irregular' war is what we usually face and we need to do a better job of planning for. It is a more complex, murky, perhaps ugly, and nuanced subject and, equally, requires a strategy of the same level of complexity with long-term focus.

A common coping mechanism that has served to further distort these conflicts is the tendency to label these conflicts and discuss them in a way that forces them into conventional terms or presents them as something other than what they are. We call them 'terror-related operations' or we twist it in our imagination into a regular war between two opposing armies, and we adopt absurd nomenclature such as the 'War on Terror.' We force it to conform to our thinking instead of challenging our own views, anything to avoid the ugly truth of conflict, a chaos we have little power to control.

Even wars like the Second World War were multifaceted; they were mosaics, with layers upon layers of overlapping conflicts. Yugoslavia, for example, witnessed civil war, ethnic and religious wars, genocides, a war of resistance (or insurgency, if you prefer), a revolution, and even inter-allied conflicts all within the larger Axis-Allied conflict.⁴ Even within conventional state-to-state conflict we witness these elements but our understanding tends to be limited and simplistic. Not only are there uniformed militaries, but non-uniformed resistance fighters, local militias, allied proxies, bandits and warlords. The fluid nature of events on the ground cause governments, once invested in a conflict, to take on a reactionary stance. The idea of controlling the course of the conflict is something of an illusion. Ultimately, it is chaos itself that has the final say, producing variables that we are compelled to respond to. It becomes about trying to chart your course down the river as opposed to controlling the course of the river itself.

Preparing for this reality requires a robust and multi-faceted strategy that holds multiple contingency plans, all of which must be supported by a deep and nuanced knowledge base. Building

³ Kathy Gilsinan, "How Mercenaries Are Changing Warfare." *Defense One* (25 March 2015) at <http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2015/03/how-mercenaries-are-changing-warfare/108436/> (Accessed 23 June 2017)

⁴ "Q&A with Antony Beevor – 21 June 2012," *CSPAN Video Library*, at <http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/Beev> (Accessed 23 November 2017)

these plans depends upon dedicated, in-depth regional and cultural knowledge, a sound reading of history, a heavy emphasis on long-term goals, and benchmarks on how these goals are to be achieved. All of this demands serious long-term commitment both before, during and after to see it through.

Planning (Or the Lack Thereof)

One of the more controversial and compelling elements in confronting the irregular reality is a strategy that has come to underpin state, particularly NATO efforts to fight irregular forces, the use of one's own irregular force. This is the old 'enemy of my enemy is my friend' approach. What this refers to is engagement with 'local partners', essentially rebel groups or non-state actors, with the to co-opt these local forces to achieved a desired end. Those who utilize it as a foundation for their policies would do well to recall that many of those invoking such a policy in the past have had their lives cut short at the hands of such friends.

What we are really doing, in essence, is finding an enemy of our enemy and calling them friend...for the moment. These proxies are usually not friends at all but temporary allies at best, and at worst, future enemies. With this in mind, we then find ourselves forming temporary alliances that often challenge our principles and pit our short-term 'needs' against our long-term 'aims'. We do so in the vague, and often misguided, hope that the enemy of our enemy can achieve our aims... if only we supply them with enough guns and ammunition.⁵

There is a failure to fully appreciate that these irregular forces are third party actors who are acting in their interests, not ours. They have their own agendas and, like us, will align themselves with whatever force provides for their immediate needs. We have to ask: what are their long-term goals? Do they conform with our own?, And are they reliable? After all, the reality is that once armed we will have very little control over what they do next. In order to properly understand these potential partners, we need to know about the nature of things on the ground beforehand instead of after the fact. We cannot afford to be learning about things the hard way as we go along.

Arming proxies is problematic because, in part, it rests on questionable assumptions. This includes the belief that the flow of weapons to a rebel group will allow them to fight and win a war against the opponents in a way that we find acceptable. Even with sophisticated weapons, the ability to wage a war and protect the civilian population is a monumental challenge even for great powers, never mind loosely aligned rebels. Furthermore, the idea that because we have armed these rebels they will remain our friends once in power is far from a certainty - that is if these groups do not turn on each other first and use these newfound weapons to slide into sectarian violence or perhaps even ignite a regional conflict.⁶

⁵ Max Fisher, "In Arming Libyan Rebels, the U.S. Would Follow an Old, Dark Path." *The Atlantic* (25 March 2011) at <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/03/in-arming-libyan-rebels-the-us-would-follow-an-old-dark-path/73019/> (Accessed 23 November 2017)

⁶ Rachel Stohl and Alison Giffen, "Arming Syrian rebels is a bad idea." *Politico* (26 October 2012) at <http://www.politico.com/story/2012/10/arming-syrian-rebels-is-a-bad-idea-082887> (Accessed 23 November 2017)

No matter the justification used there is an element of short-sightedness in these approaches that can potentially serve to undermine our overall goals in the long-term. There is a need to understand that these groups often lack a cohesive political and military leadership making their behaviour difficult to predict or control. All the arms in the world does not change this reality or make these groups any better at achieving our long-term goals of peace and the protection of humanitarian values.⁷

The Trap

The cycle is not unfamiliar to us, even if we are reluctant to acknowledge it. In an effort to avoid a ‘boots on the ground’ commitment, or to maintain a limited commitment, local proxies are turned to and cultivated as allies. The crux of the problem is that when these local proxies are sought out, they are assessed primarily on short-term military effectiveness. Political or ethical concerns are often stressed as paramount but when actually considered they are frequently forced into a secondary position by immediate military needs. In selecting militarily effective proxies to reach short-term goals, often we find ourselves in league with forces that are largely uncontrollable once let loose. To be effective they often utilise unsophisticated tactics and extreme brutality. Often these forces are totally unsuited to long-term aims of peace and stability. Good fighters in war often make poor politicians in peace.

Letting loose these forces is not, of course, a spontaneous event. It is critical to recognise that this is an evolution. This engagement with local proxies we have chosen to partner with is not a one-off event. Rather, it is an ongoing relationship. Often a feedback loop is created as then we pour arms and munitions into these groups that is then, in turn, utilized to pursue objectives with coarse measure. These measures create fallout which in turn demands greater investment and the further commitment of even more arms, munitions and increasing support drawing us further down the rabbit hole.

These forces are a dangerous temptation for our political leaders. They create the falsehood that there are easy options and short cuts. Perceived as an option where there is less risk involved, governments are more likely to resort to the use of these kinds of force.⁸ The potential brutality and unpredictability of proxies, however, can not only make them largely unsuitable for long-term goals. If left unchecked they can in fact serve to create and perpetuate further violence and instability. This is of course, counter to both short-term as well as long-term aims. Instead it draws further resources into an area awash with weapons and battle-hardened fighters familiar with our tactics since they were often trained by us. Often, in trying to defeat an enemy, a greater enemy is created.

Knowing this, these consequences are of paramount importance when confronted by an opposing nation state engaged in supplying irregulars. If the ultimate aim is sowing chaos and destruction in another state or region, with the goal of harming an opponent this method can provide high reward

⁷ Stohl and Giffen, “Arming Syrian rebels is a bad idea.”

⁸ Gilsinan, “How Mercenaries Are Changing Warfare.”; Lawrence Korb, “Why the U.S. military can’t succeed in training foreign armies.” *Reuters* (Blog) (5 October 2015) at <http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/10/05/why-the-u-s-military-cant-succeed-in-training-foreign-armies/> (Accessed 23 November 2017)

at low cost. In the long term, however, the immediate result of sowing chaos is likely to be negated by the long-term fallout. In both cases these forces are just as likely turn on their former masters.

In a region awash with easily available weapons along with a hardened and desperate population not only is conflict more likely to continue, it makes other conflicts more probable. In a region where conflict prevails, borders become porous and security more difficult. A now radicalized or just desperate population is left behind and the area becomes fertile ground for warlords, organized crime, and the like. The reality is that these weapons do not stay contained in the areas intended. This endangers the lives of our military if and when they eventually end up there (as they often do) and also fuels violent instability that affects regional foreign policy objectives in the long-term for years to come.⁹

The history of these types of strategies demonstrates with startling clarity that once these weapons are provided it is incredibly difficult to guarantee where they end up or how they are used. It also shows that they do not stay idle long and will move around the globe from conflict to conflict. We often see our enemies holding weapons we gave our friends a short time before. However good the intentions might be the security consequences should be enough for us to seriously reconsider how we approach these questions.¹⁰

Forgetting to Remember

From mission creep, to radicalized populations, to the long-term fallout, none of these consequences are unknown to us.

During the Second World War, the British were keenly aware that Axis occupation of Yugoslavia had ignited a civil war. The British were deeply concerned that their program of supplying rebels with arms to fight the Axis would fan these flames. The chaos within Yugoslavia made separating friendly groups from non-friendly groups an impossibly murky task. The aims of these groups also highlighted the difficulty of divorcing political and military considerations. Churchill himself dedicated a great deal of time trying to prevent these rebel groups from turning Allied weapons upon one another as well as attempting to steer the course in Yugoslavia to desired post-war aims.¹¹ Ultimately British efforts on the political front amounted to little and post-war Yugoslavia saw the creation of a Communist state that was arguably the inevitable result of the civil war and revolution that had occurred under Axis occupation. The level of influence the British had over these events and what difference their supply of arms actually had seems debatable. It does not, however, lessen the value of the lesson nor detract from the keen awareness and considerable debate witnessed within the British government over the immediate suitability or long-term political implications of these temporary rebel allies.

⁹ Stohl and Giffen, "Arming Syrian rebels is a bad idea."

¹⁰ Stohl and Giffen, "Arming Syrian rebels is a bad idea."

¹¹ David Dilks. "British Political Aims in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe, 1944" in *British Political and Military Strategy in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe in 1944*. Edited by William Deakin, Elisabeth Barker, and Jonathan Chadwick. (New York: St Martin's Press, 1988), 35

The British experience in the Second World War provided mixed results. In the case of Tito in Yugoslavia the British handed over support with a naïve belief they could control the Communists and ended up going from the senior to junior partner in the relationship and having to face a Communist Yugoslavia that was somewhat hostile to the west. The British lucked out in that Tito was his own man with an independent streak that saw him also shrug off Soviet domination, but this was less than the desired result of a Royalist Yugoslavia firmly in the British camp¹²

Indeed, one can trace these issues much further back through history if they chose. Another example from Britain's history would be the use of paramilitary privateers, what would today perhaps be called private military contractors, during the War of the Spanish Succession. The use of privateers had been not only effective but profitable and provided a low-impact / low cost way of attacking the enemy's lines of supply. With the end of the war thousands of well-trained sailors / fighters were left unemployed. This resulted in producing the last of the three periods of the Golden Age of Piracy wherein these privateers turned to the Caribbean to ply their trade. Attacking the booming cross-Atlantic colonial shipping trade these privateers, rebranded as pirates turned on their former sponsors.¹³

In the 21st century this phenomenon might be argued to now extend to the cyber domain. Nation states increasingly enlist contractors and even 'hacking groups' (a cyber version of a non-state actor) as part of a larger proxy strategy. The consequence of this temporary expedient is to strengthen a group or individual that the nation state is likely to become an eventual target of in the future. It is critical to remember these are independent third party actors with their own ideals, aims, and agendas.

Returning to our recent past, the US in particular is keenly aware of the problems associated with this kind of strategy. The US experience with arming rebel groups is in fact long and complicated. The 20th century alone and has produced a long list of mixed results for the US.

This includes American support for all things anti-communist in Latin America during the Cold War, which resulted in a series of poorly thought out policies such as anti-communist militias in Honduras. In Argentina this policy saw the US support a military *junta* that showed itself to be unequivocally fascist and openly anti-semitic. The same *junta* would be involved in 'disappearing' thousands of its own citizens with not only the awareness but approval of certain elements of the US government.¹⁴ In essence, support of this kind led the US to train some elements of the security forces that later evolved into death squads.¹⁵

¹² Phyllis Auty and Richard Clogg, eds. *British Policy Towards Wartime Resistance in Yugoslavia and Greece* (London, UK: The Macmillan Press Ltd. 1975) 251; Fitzroy Maclean. *The Heretic: The Life and Times of Josip Broz-Tito* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957) 243

¹³ Rediker, Marcus. "Pirates and the Imperial State." *Reviews in American History* 16(3) (1988), 351-357

¹⁴ Press Release: Argentine Military Believed U.S. Gave Go-Ahead for Dirty War (1976), National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 73 - Part II, Edited by Carlos Osorio, *US National Security Archive* (2002) at <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB73/index3.htm> (Accessed 23 November 2017); Kissinger to the Argentine Generals in 1976 (1976), National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 133, Edited by Carlos Osorio and Kathleen Costar *US National Security Archive* (2004) at <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB133/index.htm> (Accessed 23 November 2017); Christopher Hitchens, "Kissinger Declassified." *Vanity Fair* (December 2004) at <https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2004/12/hitchens200412> (Accessed 23 November 2017)

¹⁵ Fisher, "In Arming Libyan Rebels, the U.S. Would Follow an Old, Dark Path."

Let us not forget the lessons to be taught by CIA operations in Chile aimed at not only supporting Pinochet's military coup against socialist President Allende but creating the conditions to facilitate it.¹⁶ Widely seen as a watershed moment in the history of the Cold War it led to the establishment of a *junta* in Chile and the subsequent suppression of leftist political forces. It also represents the end of what had been beacon of democracy and stability in South America. Pinochet, (America's man) would later be arrested as a war criminal for mass murder and torture. That is to say nothing of the fact that General Pinochet was responsible for the assassination of former Chilean Foreign Minister, Orlando Letelier, on US soil by way of a car bomb detonated on a busy Washington D.C. street.¹⁷

In Latin America, US anti-communist policies were an extension of the Cold War. The US long-term aim was to maintain American supremacy in the region. However, to achieve these aims a short-term policy of co-opting whatever local anti-communist forces could be found prevailed. More often than not these 'partners' engaged in activities so horrifying they challenged the premise of American moral supremacy. Usually when they came to light they crushed administrations. In the long-term these 'partners' only served to destabilize the entire region and foster anti-American sentiment that persists to this day, directly contrary to long-term US aims. Furthermore, US activities in Latin and South America during the Cold War have left an indelible stain upon the US government that continues to taint its foreign relations on the continent.

US fears of a Communist victory in the El Salvadoran civil war led to a massive financial and military intervention in the conflict, this time with congressional support. It saw the US prop up a regime that although anti-Communist, massacred its own people (see the El Mozote massacre) events the White House refused to acknowledge at the time. The US legacy in El Salvador is distasteful, at best. The intervention led to terror and humanitarian suffering, and support for a regime that lacked regard for fundamental human rights and was the antithesis of everything America stands for. The short-term success is clear, but it came at a moral cost, and with it a long-term legacy that still plagues US relations with the entire region.¹⁸

U.S. involvement with Nicaraguan Contras is another well-known example. The Contras, like many other US-backed groups, spent more time torturing and killing their perceived enemies amongst the civilian population than the Communist enemies the US had intended their support be directed towards. This included not only numerous human rights violations but several terrorist attacks and even led to allegations of US involvement in cocaine smuggling. Much to the horror of the American people this support continued covertly after Congress had prohibited it, undermining

¹⁶ Scott Shane. "Robert Dallek on Nixon and Kissinger", *New York Times* (18 April 2007) at https://web.archive.org/web/20140114215904/http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/17/arts/17iht-dallek.1.5318101.html?_r=0&pagewanted=all (Accessed 23 November 2017); Christopher Hitchens, *The Trial of Henry Kissinger*, (Verso, 2001), 55-71

¹⁷ Hitchens, "Kissinger Declassified."

¹⁸ Benjamin Schwarz, Dirty Hands: The success of U.S. policy in El Salvador — preventing a guerrilla victory — was based on 40,000 political murders. *The Atlantic* (December 1998) at <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1998/12/dirty-hands/377364/> (Accessed 23 November 2017); Cara E. McKinney "Twelve Years a Terror: U.S. Impact in the 12-Year Civil War in El Salvador". *International ResearchScape Journal: An Undergraduate Student Journal*, 2(1) (2014); Peter S. Michaels "Lawless Intervention: United States Foreign Policy in El Salvador and Nicaragua". *Boston College Third World Law Journal*. 7(2) (1 May 1987)

Americans' trust in their own government, all to stop what was termed by world relief organization, Oxfam, "the threat of a good example."¹⁹ This event highlights the incoherence in government policy that often sees not only long-term interests pitted against short-term needs but various pragmatic interests placed above higher moral principles.

Discussing Contras inevitably leads to a discussion of Iran. One can point to the joint British-US support (creation) of the Iranian coup to overthrow Mossadegh (the closest thing Iran has ever had to a democratic leader). Known by the British as Operation Boot and by the Americans as Operation Ajax, its goal was to install the *Shah* as the unquestioned leader of Iran. This was all in the name of oil rights and as a result the US would come to train the notorious SAVAK (*azeman-e Ettela'at va Amniyat-e Keshvar*, Organization of National Intelligence and Security), the official secret police and intelligence service of Imperial Iran with a reputation for extreme brutality, in order to help maintain the Shah's position. The results would be to foster growing anti-Western sentiment eventually leading to the 1979 revolution and the hardline theocracy, once considered an anathema to Iranian culture, which now rules Iran. This was contrary to everything the US had hoped to gain in supporting the Shah. Short-term successes resulted in long-term failures rooted in a lack of understanding and appreciation for realities in Iran. There has thus been persistent difficulties in relations between Iran and the West ever since.²⁰ US subversion of Iranian politics have a long and sordid history and have tainted US relations with not only Iran but the Muslim world for half a century, obviously quite contrary to the goals of Operation Ajax.

American tacit acceptance of the *Khmer Rouge* while they fought Communist Vietnam is far more complicated and uncertain but still stands as another point worth mentioning. At the very least one could argue that the US turned a blind eye to the Khmer Rouge behaviour until public opinion compelled them to walk away. There is no doubt it did nothing to help American prestige in the region.

Alternatively, the use of the *Hmong* Lao resistance during the Vietnam conflict was relatively successful for the US. As a result, however, there remains a longstanding refugee crisis as the *Hmong* face continued persecution in Communist Laos and the Thai government seeks to rid themselves of the longstanding refugee problem. One could argue that the US use of these fighters without an appreciation of long-term implications has therefore created a longstanding source of, if not instability, certainly humanitarian crisis.

US experiences also include support to Angolan rebel groups fighting against a pro-Soviet government that, with the support of Cuba was engaged in atrocities against the civilian population. Similar to other examples, in this case a covert aid program, an effort of the US Department of State and CIA, was eventually made public. And like other examples, US Congress responded by banning the support, this time through the Clark Amendment, but the CIA continued in its support.

¹⁹ Nicaragua: The threat of a good example?, Oxfam, (1 Jan 1989) at <https://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/nicaragua-the-threat-of-a-good-example-121188> (Accessed 23 November 2017)

²⁰ Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, "64 Years Later, CIA Finally Releases Details of Iranian Coup." *Foreign Policy* (20 June 2017) at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/20/64-years-later-cia-finally-releases-details-of-iranian-coup-iran-tehran-oi/> (Accessed 23 November 2017)

US involvement in Angola arguably served only to increase Soviet and Cuban involvement in the conflict. There is no denying, however, that the Soviet-oriented Angolan government engaged in cruel repression of Western-oriented rebels, who were themselves engaged in similar attacks. US efforts in Angola were part of a larger Cold War effort to oppose Soviet-backed, undemocratic governments and the US was both effective in its provision of support which gave victims of communist atrocities a means of protection and served to further America's larger Cold War agenda of fighting undemocratic Soviet proxies. Equally, however, it served to quickly escalate the intensity of the conflict as well as draw it out. Angola was a horrendous conflict in terms of human suffering and loss of life, one which saw the US supporting the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), a rebel group that made wide use of child soldiers, as documented by Human Rights Watch.²¹

Other, perhaps, more 'positive' examples of efforts to support or co-opt rebel groups could include the example that is at the heart of American history, French support of American colonialists during the American Revolution. The French supply of weapons to the colonists during the American Revolution was decisive in contributing to American victory. French involvement served to achieve French aims concerning Britain and led to the reclamation of lost territories. It further served the moral goal of assisting in a peoples' democratic quest for self determination and the establishment of a free and democratic state. It should be pointed out that the Americans were a people the French were very familiar with and unlike many of our other examples, the French went in knowing who they were supporting, the result was a success for both partners.

Likewise, British efforts to co-opt Arab nationalism and arm Arab fighters against the Ottoman Empire during the First World War led to considerable success during the Arab Revolt. The revolt created an entire front where none would have otherwise existed and helped to dismantle the Ottoman Empire from within. It also gave rise to the almost mythical T.E. Lawrence. This figure and these events have had a tremendous impact on Western military and political thinking ever since.

The 'Arab Revolt' against the Ottoman Empire not only brought the British considerable success: it also laid the foundations for the modern conception (or dream) of co-opted rebel movements. It would serve to create an almost obsessive belief among the British in the indirect approach, and a romantic fascination with great guerrillas that would lead them during the Second World War to try to recreate the Arab Revolt numerous times over. It is this ideal that we continually imitate and attempt to recreate even today.

The British support for Arab nationalists during the First World War galvanized Arab nationalism and unleashed a force Britain was not prepared to contend with, one that would not dissipate willingly. Britain's abandonment of these ideals at the end of the war and its return to imperial ways lacked the long-term commitment (which Lawrence had been advocating) and had intense long-term implications. Today, the Sykes-Picot agreement is still spoken of in the Middle East as if it

²¹ Angola, *Forgotten Fighters: Child Soldiers in Angola, Use of Children in the War Since 1998* Human Rights Watch at <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/angola0403/Angola0403-03.htm> (Accessed 23 November 2017)

were signed only yesterday.²² If the vision advocated by Lawrence had won out, the Middle East would no doubt be quite different today. Arguably it would be more stable and even secular, the West having avoided many of the horrifying events of the 20th century in that region.

Returning to the Second World War, the Soviet use of partisan units behind Axis lines is another example of a positive success, at least from the Soviet perspective. These efforts were successful on two fronts. In the immediate short term they helped to secure the defeat of the Nazis and liberation of the Soviet Union. Of equal importance, in the long-term it served the Soviet goal of positioning communist movements, ready to take power in neighboring countries at the end of the war. By supporting communist partisans the Soviets were able to ensure a great many of their neighbors established Soviet-oriented communist governments at war's end, much to the chagrin of the Western Allies.

Likewise, the British had considerable successes in supporting rebel groups in occupied Europe during the Second World War. The arming of the French Resistance, *Maquee*, and De Gaulle's Free French Forces, likewise provided both immediate and long-term rewards. In the case of France it served to assist Allied landings and operations in France. Furthermore, it acted as a bulwark against the emerging struggle against communism as inter-allied tensions began to emerge and the Cold War loomed on the horizon. Where Britain succeeded with France and failed in Yugoslavia is knowledge and control. In Yugoslavia, the British lacked a clear understanding of who they were dealing with and had little control over the realities on the ground. Conversely, in the case of France the British were very clear on who they were dealing with, the political forces they were confronting in the long-term, and, most importantly, held the necessary control and influence in the case of De Gaulle to largely steer events.

Returning to the present, Afghanistan might be perhaps the most significant example of these irregular forces. In December of 1984 and 1985 the US massively increased support to anti-Soviet rebels in Afghanistan. In looking to how to best use this funding, a CIA classified memo argued, "analytically, the best fighters — the best organized fighters — were the fundamentalists."²³ This inevitably led to the US arming *Mujahideen* leaders who would later become the Taliban that the US themselves would face in Afghanistan.²⁴

For the US, arming rebel groups has brought about many long-term strategic blunders. In Afghanistan, the U.S. achieved mixed results with the largely successful (in the short-term) aiding of the *Mujahideen* opposition to Soviet occupation. This is, of course, with the benefit of hindsight. At the time, the policy was arguably sound. It was without question successful in the short-term objective of damaging the Soviets. In the long-term some might point to it as a contributory factor in ending the Cold War (a debate beyond the scope of this article). The end result, however, was to create a massive problem for the US as these weapons and training have since been turned against their own forces.

²² Larry Hannant, "100 years on: Why the Sykes-Picot pact is still hated in the Mideast" *The Globe and Mail* (9 May 2016) at <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/100-years-on-why-the-sykes-picot-pact-is-still-hated-in-the-mideast/article29929515/> (Accessed 23 November 2017); Umut Özsü "Why Sykes-Picot is (still) important" *Oxford University Press* (Blog) (6 June 2016) at <https://blog.oup.com/2016/06/why-sykes-picot-is-still-important/> (Accessed 23 November 2017)

²³ Fisher, "In Arming Libyan Rebels, the U.S. Would Follow an Old, Dark Path."

²⁴ Fisher, "In Arming Libyan Rebels, the U.S. Would Follow an Old, Dark Path."

This was because after the short-term aim of ousting the Soviets was complete the US thought the job was done and walked away. It had actually only just begun and the hard work had just started. An argument could be made that had the US had the foresight to commit to a long-term nation building project in Afghanistan at that moment, the long-term results might have been more rewarding and less difficult to achieve. This is, of course, a subjective claim, and one that is difficult not to paint as rather optimistic. The ability to pursue nation building activities in a country with fiercely divided loyalties based on tribe or clan is often overstated, and indeed part of the trap we often fall into.

Despite this experience we seem committed to forgetting the lessons of our past. The same holds true for US involvement in Iraq. A little more than four years after the US had begun pulling out of Iraq, they were moving back in to fight ISIS. In Iraq, it should be pointed out, the open sale of American M4 rifles had become commonplace. Originally intended by the US to prop up a new liberated Iraq, these weapons, intended for military use, are now available on the streets to potential enemies and outside the control of the US. This is representative of an extraordinary failure of long-term follow through on the part of the US.²⁵

The US handed out an unbelievable amount of firepower to its local battlefield partners in Afghanistan and Iraq. To this day, the US has only a partial idea of how many weapons it even issued, never mind where they ultimately ended up. In Afghanistan the US replaced the Afghan Army's Kalashnikovs with NATO weapons leaving, what NATO estimates to be 83,000 Kalashnikovs in surplus that the US never attempted to recover.²⁶ NATO's Inspector General expressed the concern that, "they could be obtained by insurgents and pose additional risks to civilians."²⁷ This should never have occurred given the fact that the CIA was already in the process of attempting to buy back the Stinger missiles it had handed out during the Soviet occupation so that they would not be used against ISAF and US forces. These short-term policies without follow through are deeply problematic. Buy back programs have been attempted with mixed results, the problem being that arms are not *removed* but *replaced* with money that in the long run might prove simply as a vehicle to upgrading these group's armaments.

It is understandable and even forgivable that in a time of war, governments will make rapid decisions based on immediate need, and sometimes without all the facts. The lack of follow through is not so easily excused, especially when the limitless supply of unchecked weapons is part of why Iraq has been unable to recover as the US hoped it would.²⁸

We should always remember the role the US played in creating Al-Qaeda by supporting the extremists claiming affiliation with Islam (ECAI) in Afghanistan in the 1980s. By supporting anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan and then leaving after immediate aims were met, Afghanistan was led into a brutal civil war that raged on long after the Soviets abandoned the country. The result has

²⁵ C.J. Chiversaug, "How Many Guns Did the U.S. Lose Track of in Iraq and Afghanistan? Hundreds of Thousands." *The New York Times Magazine* (24 August 2016) at <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/23/magazine/how-many-guns-did-the-us-lose-track-of-in-iraq-and-afghanistan-hundreds-of-thousands.html?smid=fb-share&r=0> (Accessed 24 June 2017)

²⁶ Chiversaug, "How Many Guns Did the U.S. Lose Track of in Iraq and Afghanistan? Hundreds of Thousands."

²⁷ Chiversaug, "How Many Guns Did the U.S. Lose Track of in Iraq and Afghanistan? Hundreds of Thousands."

²⁸ Chiversaug, "How Many Guns Did the U.S. Lose Track of in Iraq and Afghanistan? Hundreds of Thousands."

been the Taliban and everything else that has happened since. A clear line can be drawn from the decision to support Afghan rebels we did not fully understand, to the rise of radical ECAI, to 9/11, and America's own road into the graveyard of empires.²⁹

Afghanistan serves as a particularly poignant example of what happens when short-term necessity dictates strategy and where a lack of long-term follow through returns to haunt us. We have to better understand the landscape of where we are involving ourselves and the dynamics of the forces we are unleashing and supporting. Once this chaos has been let out of its cage it will be a devil of a time to harness it again. Ultimately taking a 'hands-off' approach is a much bigger risk than it would tempt us into believing.³⁰ We have to be cautious in building these groups up to be strong enough to stand-alone; it is at this point we begin to lose influence. It might be better to leave them dependent upon us and relegated to a supporting role while we take the lead if we wish to steer the course of events in the long-term.

The unfortunate truth is when looking to arm rebels you are peering into a vast abyss of uncertainty. It is incredibly difficult to predict what the region will look like even a few months into the future. Beyond this it is very difficult, even in the present, to get a clear view of the realities on the ground. The fallout of arming a particular group can be immensely difficult to predict. These rebel groups we turn to can be fluid and volatile. It can be very difficult to know who they are or what their aims are without a solid well-developed knowledge base supporting the formulation of these policies. Without having the ability to determine which actors will be legitimate partners in a future peace, sending in weapons without a solid knowledge base and concrete long-term planning based upon strong intelligence, and regional understanding is a failure of strategy.³¹

Despite associated risks, not engaging with local actors on the ground is simply not a realistic option either. In attempting to stabilize a conflict zone, local actors who desire long-term stability and peace must be supported and engaged with in order to be successful in our long-term aims. For these reasons a greater effort must be placed on developing a strong standing knowledge base that can support strategies aimed at co-opting local forces. This requires that the long-term follow through be supported by a standing system of engaged research aimed at developing and preserving a nuanced understanding of potential conflict zone's culture, history, actors, trends and the like, so that effective vetting of potential allies can be conducted. The core concept is to already know what is going on, who the (potential) actors are, and what the various agendas before something happens, so we do not have to go in blind and learn the hard way as we go along.

What We Know

When we examine historical examples of efforts to co-opt local proxies the results have been mixed. There have been many short-term successes but just as many long-term failures. Policies aimed at co-opting irregular movements and arming rebels in the hopes that we can successfully

²⁹ "What Does History Say About U.S. Success in Arming Rebel Movements?" *PBS News Hour* (4 July 2013) at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world-july-dec13-syria2_07-04/ (Accessed 24 June 2017)

³⁰ "What Does History Say About U.S. Success in Arming Rebel Movements?" *PBS News Hour*

³¹ Stohl and Giffen, "Arming Syrian rebels is a bad idea."

utilise them for their own ends have often failed. The question is why? In the end, almost without fail, these programs falter in the long-run because of two key issues: a lack of solid understanding of whom we are arming, along with a failure in long-term follow-through. Essentially, short-term success has been traded on long-term failure. The most common result then, in general terms, has been to create and perpetuate instability, which usually lasts longer than the political imperative that had motivated initial involvement.

This comes down to a failure in long-term planning. If we wish to defeat an immediate threat and create long-term stability we need to look further out. Creating stable governments, political leadership, train and equip a security force, and provide infrastructure development where almost none existed requires good regional knowledge going in and a far longer timeline than we often commit to. Trying to do all these things requires more than handing out copious amounts of guns and money to those you hardly know or understand. The corruption of these massive, ill-defined, and poorly planned efforts is almost assured; even without the assistance lent to it by those who seek through violence to ensure its demise.³²

Does this mean that arming rebels just doesn't work? At first glance some might think so but that is a superficial understanding of events. No, these programs instead fail because they have been poorly executed. With better support, implementation, and long-term thinking they can, and have worked.

When one begins to assess the possibilities of arming and coopting irregular forces, there are questions that first need to be asked: who are these people, really, what is their long-term agenda, what will become of these weapons, and who will they be turned on once the immediate enemy is defeated? Failure comes from not addressing these questions. This is rooted in unpreparedness. We lack proper understanding of countries and proxies going in, and a lack of follow through on the way out. To invoke a strategy of co-opting irregular forces requires just as much long-term commitment and planning, perhaps more, than to go it alone.

US experience in Afghanistan can be summed up like this: the US had been choosing which Afghan leaders to support, who to reward with what contracts, who could be trusted, and who was the enemy. They did this without really knowing, with any depth, who anyone really was. These choices were the key to why so much went wrong; all the people the US had chosen were considered through the immediate American lens to be correct but by that of the local Afghans, who also carried a longer view, they were all wrong. This was directly rooted in a lack of any real nuanced understanding of Afghanistan.³³ We knew very little, and the reason why is the never-ending cycle of short-term thinking and complete lack of long-term knowledge based strategies aimed at local proxies. In short we have failed to invest in maintaining knowledge based long-term planning in this regard.

³² Chiversaug, "How Many Guns Did the U.S. Lose Track of in Iraq and Afghanistan? Hundreds of Thousands."

³³ Vanessa M. Gezariaug, "The Quiet Demise of the Army's Plan to Understand Afghanistan and Iraq." *The New York Times Magazine*. 18 August 2015. Accessed 24 June 2017. <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/magazine/the-quiet-demise-of-the-armys-plan-to-understand-afghanistan-and-iraq.html?ref=world>

The Path Forward

These strategies can work if your knowledge of the situation and actors is strong and you have the wherewithal for the follow through. Most important is the need to realize there is still a commitment to be made on your end in support of the irregulars. What needs to be stressed to contemporary leaders is that this is not about one method above another – it is about an ‘in combination with’ strategy. Arming rebels can work but it requires knowledge, planning and long-term commitment.

We have seen, taking the US as an example, attempts made by the military to better understand the human landscape in which they operate. The US military is now well aware that the culture of these regions is a critical component in developing effective policy and achieving goals. We saw this in Vietnam where the US was acutely aware that their lack of cultural understanding was impeding their efforts to win over the locals.³⁴

We know that this is a problem. Even without historical examples, every time we set foot in a place we rediscover this. This concept then, of developing nuanced cultural understanding, is already familiar to us in this regard. In response we quickly develop cultural programs aimed at engaging with the local population and tailoring strategies to meet the regional cultural requirements. What is needed is extend this out to developing a permanent knowledge base to support effective strategies to deal with rebel groups and achieve goals when conflicts arise.

There have been numerous US military efforts to learn about the human landscape before and since Vietnam. On more than one occasion this has led to (very poorly executed) efforts to embed social scientists in conflict zones with military backing. This was repeated by the US a number of times in Vietnam, and later in Latin America, with Project Camelot being a prominent example.

A more recent incarnation of these social-science programs would be the US Army’s Human Terrain System, which was developed as an experiment in 2006. With the situation the US was facing in Iraq and Afghanistan, the program expanded rapidly and again, haphazardly, after-the-fact as an *ad hoc* solution to a hole in planning that should not have existed. The idea was the same, send in social scientists, historians anthropologists, ethnographers, and the like to get a handle on local cultural and political currents then advise front-line officers. Sadly this represents the right idea implemented in the wrong way: on the front end, but not the back end; and afterwards instead of beforehand. The Human Terrain System was one of the positive failures (if we can call it that) that have emerged from the long overdue realignment towards a focus on irregular war – what has been popularized as counter-insurgency.

It rapidly become apparent that cultural training and a nuanced understanding of local culture, politics, language and history were desperately lacking in approaching Afghanistan. Without this base, sound intelligence and policy development, especially with regards to alliances with local proxies, were not possible. The problem was the creation of the Human Terrain System was reactionary, after the fact, a result of poor (or complete lack of) focus on long-term strategies.

³⁴ Gezariaug, “The Quiet Demise of the Army’s Plan to Understand Afghanistan and Iraq.”

The Human Terrain System's rapid creation caused it to suffer serious problems in regards to recruitment, staffing, and even a clearly defined purpose. Its muddled mix of intelligence gathering and advisory roles, an attempted catchall for all that was falling through the cracks, turned it into a poorly organized jack of all trades and master of none that was staffed in part by under qualified last minute recruits. This unfortunate turn of events only served to further widen a gap that already existed between the military and anthropologists as well as alienated many other academics, a group the military so desperately needs to do a better job of engaging with. Again, a good idea went sideways and was killed in 2014. Thankfully a small nucleus remains at Fort Leavenworth under the guise of the Global Cultural Knowledge Network.³⁵ Sadly it is an acknowledged placeholder as opposed to an all-out effort to realign how the military approaches this knowledge, its preservation and its incorporation into strategy.³⁶ There is a need to maintain a rigorous commitment, including budget, to maintain this knowledge base so it is ready when we need it, not developed after it is already too late. NATO should also be taking a stronger lead on this front.

It is also absolutely critical moving forward with these programs that their nature be properly articulated to the powers they serve. These systems, it must be understood, however robust their preparation, require considerable time to be implemented. Likewise the process by which they achieve their goals is lengthy and requires both understanding and the political will to support the patience required to harvest the rewards offered. There is also the need to understand that these approaches are not without risk and cannot function without a well-trained military force to provide security. The issue is with determining when to bow to the guidance of each part of this equation.

This is about becoming smarter about our world and the enemies in it. Most of these efforts have failed but this is not because it is a bad idea, just a badly executed one. Again, not to belabor the point but, these efforts have been slapdash, *ad hoc*, and near-sighted. We have a blind spot in long-term planning. This comes down to not just the relationship between the military and academia but between governments and their militaries. Budget concerns and peacetime focus on maintaining 'essential core elements' means these programs are often not preserved and only built up when the money starts flowing during time of crisis. This is a poor way of doing things and produces poor results. With a government looking around desperately for regional experts and throwing huge sums of money in an accelerated timeline at the first 'experts', there are as many bad hires made, as there are good.

This is only compounded by the fact that civilian governments lack an appreciation for the importance of this knowledge. As Graham Allison has recently said, "most people in Washington have almost no historical memory or grounding".³⁷ Military leadership is failing in their responsibility to emphasise to their political masters the importance of the development and maintenance of this knowledge is not only military strategy but readiness.

³⁵ Global Cultural & Knowledge Network, at <https://community.apan.org/wg/oekn/w/wiki/17790/global-cultural-knowledge-network/> (Accessed 23 November 2017)

³⁶ Controversial Army Social-Science Program Morphs Into 'Reach-Back' Office, *Inside Defence* (10 July 2015) at <https://insidedefense.com/share/170736> (Accessed 23 November 2017 ; Gezariaug, "The Quiet Demise of the Army's Plan to Understand Afghanistan and Iraq."

³⁷ Michael Crowley, "Why the White House Is Reading Greek History: The Trump team is obsessing over Thucydides, the ancient historian who wrote a seminal tract on war." *Politico Magazine* (21 June 2017) at <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/06/21/why-the-white-house-is-reading-greek-history-215287> (Accessed 24 June 2017)

The US ‘cultural soldier’ idea is a necessity as we move forward. As we face an era of increased insurgency and conflicts with non-state actors become the norm the problem becomes ever more acute. Our enemies hide in this human landscape and, to quote Lawrence, “rebellions can be made by 2 percent active in striking force and 98 percent passively sympathetic.”³⁸

We need to know everything we can about the human geography of the battle space that our enemies operate in. Like any other element of military planning you have to know what you are doing and where you are doing it. Knowledge is power, and in this case it can help avoid pitfalls that have very real and significant long-term regional implications. This knowledge is essential to tailoring successful strategies, even if there have been more failures than successes in our history, we have to continue our efforts.³⁹

We cannot afford to allow the military to skip out on the cultural knowledge part of the equation, especially if we want to develop effective strategies to deal with rebel groups. To revisit Afghanistan, the time and blood lost in relearning past lessons, such as the need for cultural intelligence, was inexcusable precisely because it was unnecessary. We need to work towards realigning our military and developing capabilities that are very different from the popular conception of militaries and conventional wars.⁴⁰

Moving forward there is a need to reach back and establish institutions that have long since been forgotten. U.S. Navy Adm. Eric Olson (ret.), former commander of U.S. Special Operations Command and adjunct professor at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs argues that “It is worth reviving the approach of the World War II-era Office of Strategic Services, or OSS. We need experts not just in warfare, but also in languages, foreign cultures, religions, global micro-regions and more.”⁴¹

Again, to quote Adm. Olson our militaries need to accept,

the value of non-traditional career paths in which coveted command positions may not be the best use of individual talent. We need to renew or reinvent our forces for the new normal. Our initiatives should include temporary appointments of civilians to officer and non-commissioned officer ranks in order to answer unique and precise needs, focused recruiting of foreign-born personnel, sabbaticals for travel and research, and repetitive assignments of individuals to specific countries and localities around the world. We need to reject old doctrine in favor of relevant knowledge, reject quantity in favor of quality, and reject our traditional notion of military victory in favor of local acceptance of enduring success. The budget, not just the conversation, must also reflect this.⁴²

³⁸ Lawrence T.E. 1920. Evolution of a Revolt. *Army Quarterly* 1: 1-22. P.22 <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/lawrence.pdf> (accessed 23 November 2017).

³⁹ Gezariaug, “The Quiet Demise of the Army’s Plan to Understand Afghanistan and Iraq.”

⁴⁰ Eric Olson, “America’s Not Ready for Today’s Gray Wars.” *Defense One*. 10 December 2015. Accessed 24 June 2017. <http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2015/12/americas-not-ready-todays-gray-wars/124381/?oref=DefenseOneFB>

⁴¹ Olson, “America’s Not Ready for Today’s Gray Wars.”

⁴² Olson, “America’s Not Ready for Today’s Gray Wars.”

There is a need to place a heavy emphasis on examining what happens directly after our immediate aims are reached in employing strategies of this kind. We need to better understand the regional dynamics of where we operate and where weapons are likely to end up when we engage proxies. We can only do this with committed long-term study, maintained in peacetime and ready beforehand. We need to be better placed to understand regional dynamics and the long-term aims and motivations of these proxies. There is only one way to achieve this – long-term institutional commitment to knowledge.⁴³

There is a great deal that can be learnt from previous historical examples if we are willing to seriously engage with academia and involve them in our planning. There is a desperate need for more social scientists, historians, among others, working with the military and government in this regard working on things like ‘applied history.’ We must reach back to these examples to find what can help us better manage the possible repercussions of implementing a strategy or arming rebels and ensuring it succeeds not only in the short-term but the long-term as well.

⁴³ Stewart Webb, “Investments Required for Operational and Tactical Intelligence Sharing in NATO.” *Defence Against Terrorism Review*, Vol. 6 No. 1 (2014): 50-2.

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Barry Buzan, “New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century,” *International Affairs* 67(3) (1991), pp. 431-451, p. 442.

b. Articles in Compilation Books:

Barry Buzan, “Is International Security Possible?,” in *New Thinking About Strategy and International Security* (Ken Both and Don Kaufman, eds, Harper Collins, 1991), pp. 31-55, p. 42.

c. Articles from Daily Newspapers:

Yossi Melman, “Computer Virus in Iran Actually Targeted Larger Nuclear Facility,” *Haaretz* (22 September 2011), p. 7.

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“Russia’s National Security Strategy to 2020” (12 May 2009), *Rustrans*, available at <http://rustrans.wikidot.com/russia-s-national-security-strategy-to-2020> (accessed 02 May 2011).

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
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