

Editor's Note

The *Defence Against Terrorism Review* (DATR), first published in the Spring of 2008, is now one year old. DATR presents with great pride its third issue Spring 2009 in which our readership will again find, we hope, a collection of very valuable articles on extremely interesting subjects by distinguished scholars, professionals and experts from around the world. It goes without saying that terrorism has many faces and DATR addresses in this issue only a few of the types of terrorism that the world community is facing.

In his article on the threat posed by the weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Guy Roberts discusses the important and dangerous challenges NATO faces and he highlights the complex nature of NATO's work in trying to create a 'holistic' deterrence posture. The author also makes some suggestions towards maintaining NATO's ability to combat WMD terrorism.

Relations between staunch allies Pakistan and the United States have since September 11 attacks been deteriorated due to the severe criticisms of the American administration about the reluctance of Pakistani authorities to give all the support they needed in their fight against Al Qaeda, which uses Afghanistan and Pakistan as a sanctuary. Moeed Yusuf argues that once Pakistan's own threat perception and self-defined regional objectives are held constant, it becomes entirely rational for it to avoid complementing the US objectives wholeheartedly. He, therefore, suggests that the United States should change Islamabad's cost-benefit equation by altering the incentive payoffs rather than hoping that the moral undertones of the discourse would somehow lead it to oblige fully.

With the advances in IT technologies, issues pertaining to terrorism and the fight against it are taken to a new and more complex level, namely the cyberspace. Gilbert Ramsay argues that strategies for offsetting the advantages that terrorists may have in the cyberspace do exist. The author suggests that by recognizing the limitations of the Internet as a tool for terrorism, governments, with their ability to shape agendas across the complete spectrum of media, stand a much better chance of countering threats which do emerge from it.

Divine religions or other types of communal spiritual beliefs and acts of terrorism can hardly have anything in common. Andreas Armbrorst provides a conceptual and descriptive clarification of the notion of killing in the name of a religion by presenting a variety of definitional features. The author argues that as part of the efforts of clerics and jurists over the centuries to adjust Islamic international law to social-political realities of their time in a sophisticated manner, today's reformists seek for a non-hostile interpretation of jihad.

Because terrorism has become truly global, the link between terrorism and how it changes the foreign policy framework of the states gains much currency. Itr Toksöz studies the concept of threat in international politics and deliberates on the types, as well as the old and new usages, of the term of instability. The author argues that without a good understanding of what is domestic and what is international concerning threat perceptions, the role of the military in foreign policy making in the post-Cold War era cannot be fully understood.

It is a well know fact that while states must be successful in their efforts to protect their citizens and their strategic assets at all times, terrorists need to be successful only once. Hence, intelligence and security services work hard to thwart any such attempts. Gordon Woo argues that terrorist targeting, attack mode and multiplicity can be analyzed, and the prioritization of

targets for attack and defense can be assessed according to criteria of societal criticality, attack vulnerability, and terrorist capability. The author suggests measures to mitigate and avoid terrorism risk by adopting a risk-informed approach to counterterrorism resource allocation.

DATR always welcomes contributions from experts, civil and military officers as well as academics who have been involved, in one way or another, in defence against terrorism, which has become not just a professional undertaking of only a number of individuals in various capacities, but rather an overarching duty of all the noble members of the world's peace loving communities. There is no other way out, but to bring together the efforts of all the concerned body of intellectuals against the terrorism predicament, hopefully, sooner rather than later.

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Hostis Humani Generis: The Threat of WMD Terrorism and How NATO is Facing the Ultimate Threat

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Abstract: *Terrorism as we have seen in the past can arise from almost any situation and in various forms. The 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington ushered in a new era of potential catastrophic terrorist acts. The first part of this paper considers the important and dangerous challenges NATO faces from the threats of Biological, Chemical, and Nuclear agents/materials by using past examples to illustrate the threat. The second, and central, part of this paper then highlights the complex nature of NATO's work in trying to create a 'holistic' deterrence posture. It focuses on NATO's work in accordance with the Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG), which was endorsed by nations, after the 2006 Riga summit. The CPG reinforced the belief that the threat emanating from WMD terrorism remains one of NATO's primary challenges for the next 10-15 years and stresses the importance of creating and maintaining International Partnerships to combat the spread and use of WMD material. Finally, the paper considers NATO's remaining challenges and makes some suggestions towards maintaining our ability to combat WMD terrorism.*

Keywords: *NATO, WMD terrorism, Biological, Chemical, Nuclear, Deterrence, Partnerships, Co-operation, CBRN, Defence*

Introduction

On September 12th 2001 many commentators and analysts argued that the terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington D.C. have made our worst fears a reality. Yet regardless of the terrifying events of that day we have fortunately not seen our worst fears become reality. Local, national and international terrorism have caused thousands of casualties each year and indeed the events on September 11th 2001 have made us aware that terrorist groups and individuals with similar ambitions are willing and capable of killing and injuring thousands of innocent civilians.

The attacks on 9/11, regardless of their enormous impact, were conventional in nature. A similar attack with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), defined as a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) device would have had much more of a devastating effect than the attacks of 9/11. So far we have been fortunate that a full blown WMD terrorist attack has not occurred and that attempts have been largely unsuccessful. This however should not imply that we are immune to such attacks in the future. Looking at the past, together with the severe implications of using CBRN materials and coupled with the motivations of certain terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda (AQ). We must acknowledge the fact that WMD terrorism is a real and even likely possibility.

Nevertheless, sceptics point to the fact that terrorists need to overcome numerous hurdles to perpetuate an act of WMD terrorism. They argue that the technical difficulties and the moral boundaries of such an attack are too high and that the motivation of terrorists groups to acquire WMD is too low for such an event to occur. Yet in looking at specific cases it becomes vividly clear that such assessments are overly optimistic, worse still, such assumptions could lull civil society into a false sense of security and result in a failure to adequately invest the necessary time and effort to prepare for the eventuality of a WMD attack.¹

NATO has over time adapted itself to the evolving international security environment and has had to ask very stern questions in order to be able to prepare for the worst. How vulnerable are we to a CBRN attack by terrorists and how are we able to respond? Hopefully, the following section can present some of the dangers and vulnerabilities we have encountered and the following section can look into NATO's responses. It now becomes useful for the purpose of this article to delve into the recent past and note the WMD threats, so as to correlate NATO's work with the existent threats.

WMD-Terrorism Threat Assessments

The Biological Threat - 'The Poor Man's Atomic Bomb'

A recent Interpol report states: "Current analysis indicates that the potential for terrorist use of biological represents a real threat. The timing of events is difficult, if not impossible, to predict, and the threat is summarized by the statement: not if, but when."² Experts see the increased proliferation of dual-use civilian biotechnology, as well as scientific know-how to recreate biological lethal pathogens and toxins as an increasingly worrisome source of bio terrorism. The biotechnology industry continues to expand throughout the world, new pathogens and pathogen making technologies are rapidly spreading, increasing the risk that terrorists will acquire these deadly tools.

There have been several cases in the past, in which Al-Qaeda or affiliates of the organization have tried to acquire the means for a biological attack. Al-Qaeda's leader in Iraq, Abu Hamza al

¹ See Osman Aytaç and Mustafa Kibaroglu (eds.), *Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism*, IOS Press, Amsterdam, 2009.

² Interpol Bio-Terrorism Incident Pre-Planning & Response Guide 206, p. 7.

Muhajir, stated in an audio statement in September 2006 that: "The field of jihad can satisfy your scientific ambitions, and the large American bases [in Iraq] are good places to test your unconventional weapons, whether biological or dirty".³ This statement provides an insight into the WMD aspirations of these terrorist groups. Al Qaeda has also hired knowledgeable scientists in order to try to acquire/ assemble crude biological weapons for their purposes, demonstrating the practical desires of the group. According to the Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, Al-Qaeda had launched, parallel with the planning for the September 11th terrorist attacks, a concerted effort to develop an anthrax weapon that could inflict further mass casualties in a separate event. To succeed in this endeavor Al-Qaeda hired a Pakistani veterinarian named Rauf Ahmad to set up a bio-weapons laboratory in Afghanistan. After differences with Ahmad concerning his pay, Al-Qaeda turned to another man to continue their work Malaysian terrorist Yazid Sufaat. Mr. Sufaat who had studied biology at California State University fled back to his home country after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, where he was later arrested.

In the mid-1990s, the Japanese doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo (AS) had plans for terrorist attacks in their home country using biological weapons, namely botulinum toxin and anthrax. Reports indicate that AS has, at least a dozen times, attempted bio attacks. The first notable incident occurred in June 1993 when they released a cloud of botulinum toxin in the vicinity of government buildings and the imperial palace. Two years later, they tried again in a subway station, this time instead opting for a suitcase loaded with aerosol emitters. The first attempt failed due to the low quality of the toxin, but disaster was averted in the second attempt as an AS member chose not to load the aerosol emitters. AS then used anthrax in attacks on Tokyo. On one occasion they simply released anthrax spores from a mid-rise office building in downtown Tokyo and let the wind disperse the pathogen. Once again luck played a big part in preventing human deaths, but animals were affected. It was later found that the toxins used were designed for vaccine purposes and were not potent enough for weaponization. However, it goes without saying that if AS had succeeded in acquiring a virulent strain and delivered it effectively, the casualties could have been in the thousands.

Finally, also considering the anthrax letter attacks in the United States that occurred shortly after the 9/11 atrocities. An American bio-defence scientist named Bruce E. Ivins, working at the U.S. Army's bio-defence research laboratory at Fort Detrick, allegedly sent out several letters containing 1-2 grams of dried anthrax to three major television broadcast networks in New York and Florida. Letters were also sent to the offices of Senators, Tom Daschle and Patrick Leahy in Washington D.C. By November 2001, 22 people in New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Florida and the District of Columbia had been infected with anthrax, half of them through the skin (causing cutaneous anthrax) and the other half through the lungs (causing inhalational anthrax). Five of the victims who had contracted inhalational anthrax later died.

Even more significant, The Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism estimated the total economic impact of the anthrax letter attacks was more than 6 billion US dollars. These attacks also led to the tragic death of 5 of the 22 people infected. Despite the

³ The Middle East Media Research Institute. www.memri.org/bin/articles. (no. 1309)

small quantity of dried spores used in the 2001 letter attacks – a total of about 15 grams- the ripple effects of the attacks extended far beyond those sickened or killed. The attack caused massive panic, shut down the U.S. government mailing system, led to an overrun of hospitals and had a significant impact on the financial markets.

According to the U.S. commission report the threat coming from biological material is greater than that of a nuclear attack. This is due to the belief that the acquisition of deadly pathogens and the weaponization and dissemination in aerosol form entail fewer technical hurdles than the theft/production of weapons-grade uranium or plutonium and the implications attached to building an Improvised Nuclear Device (IND).⁴ The cases above have hopefully displayed the elements of fortune which have played a part in keeping the casualty levels down. One thing is for certain, fortune will eventually run out consequently NATO needs to be prepared for every eventuality.

The Chemical Threat

Looking at precedent, we quickly find references to past attacks that point in the direction of chemical weapons. Iraqi insurgents have on several occasions used chlorine canisters in vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED) killing dozens and injuring an unverifiable number of others. On the 20th of February 2007 U.S. troops discovered a VBIED-making workshop near Fallujah that contained 55-gallon chlorine cylinders as well as a number of partially completed car bombs. Three years earlier U.S. troops uncovered a terrorist chemical weapons factory in the region of Fallujah. The rudimentary laboratory contained guidebooks on how to assemble crude chemical weapons as well as the precursors for the blood agent hydrogen cyanide, including potassium cyanide and hydrochloric acid.

Additionally there have been reports of various chemical terrorist plots in Jordan in 2004. According to Jane's Intelligence Digest one terrorist plot came perilously close to reality; however, the suspected terrorists were arrested and accused of plotting a massive chemical attack in the capital Amman. It was claimed that the terror-cell planned to attack a compound of government buildings using a truck bomb to disable the compound's defences, which would have been followed by a detonation of explosive devices combined with a cocktail of chemicals such as acetones, nitric acid and sulphuric acid.⁵

So far, the most devastating terrorist attack using chemical means occurred in 1995, when the already mentioned apocalyptic Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo released self-manufactured Sarin gas at five points on the Tokyo subway, killing in total 12 people and injuring more than 5,500. Even though the cult had competent chemists, AS still did not achieve mass casualties. AS, however, did succeed in creating a great deal of panic, disruption and suffering.

The Nuclear Threat

Let us start with the good news first. Contrary to the biological or the chemical threat, there are no cases that could be defined as "nuclear terrorism". Up to this day there have been no reports that

⁴ See Bob Graham, "The Report of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism," *World at Risk*, p. 11.

⁵ See "Briefings: Risks of Chemical Terrorism," *Jane's Intelligence Digest*, September 10, 2004.

indicate that terrorist groups or other individuals have been successful in assembling a fully operational nuclear weapon or even an improvised nuclear device (IND).

Graham Allison, the director of Harvard's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and the co-author of the 2008 WMD commission report, argued in 2004: "In my own considered judgement, on the current path, a nuclear terrorist attack... in the decade ahead is more likely than not."⁶ Now this might sound for many as fear-mongering, yet Allison makes a valid point. Looking at the current *availability and security of fissile materials* in certain states, the *desire and motivation of certain terrorist groups* such as Al Qaeda to acquire nuclear weapons or INDs and the *capability* of such groups to assemble such weapons, it becomes shockingly clear that we are faced with a real and growing threat. The following three areas of concern give adherence to Allison's statement.

The Availability of Fissile Materials:

Most of the global fissile material stock, which is needed for the manufacturing of nuclear weapons (Uranium-235 and Plutonium-239), is adequately and sufficiently protected. A large amount, however, predominately in Russia, is stored under highly questionable security conditions. The black market of fissile material is monitored by the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database, which records illicit trafficking cases of radioactive and nuclear materials since the beginning of the 1990s. From the over 100 recorded cases the most prominent case has been the arrest of a man in St. Petersburg who was aiming to sell 2, 9 kg of highly enriched uranium. This case was recently overcome by reports of the arrests of the individuals in the Ukraine, who were trying to sell close to 4 kg of Plutonium-239.⁷ Even though these quantities are still insufficient for a crude nuclear device they could be used in a radiation dispersal device, these examples underline the fact that there is a demand for fissile material by both rogue states and terrorists.

The Desire and Motivation of Terrorists

On an AQ associated website Osama Bin Laden's spokesman Abu Gheith asserted that AQ had "the right to kill 4 million Americans – 2 million of them children - and to exile twice as many and wound and cripple hundreds of thousands".⁸ Also, on more than one occasion, Osama Bin Laden has openly declared that acquiring nuclear weapons 'in the defence of Muslims' is a religious duty. When asked by a journalist working for TIME magazine in 1999 if he was trying to acquire chemical or nuclear weapons Bin Laden replied: "Acquiring weapons for the defence of Muslims is a religious duty. If I have indeed acquired these weapons, then I thank God for enabling me to do so. And if I seek to acquire these weapons, I am carrying out a duty. It would be a sin for Muslims not to try to possess the weapons that would prevent the infidels from inflicting harm on Muslims."⁹ Yet the motivation of AQ to acquire such weapons is not to be underestimated as and

⁶ Graham Allison, *Nuclear Terrorism. The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe*, Times Books, New York, 2004, p. 15.

⁷ New York Times, Europe, www.nytimes.com/2009/04/15/world/europe/15ukraine.htm

⁸ Allison 2004, p. 12.

⁹ See "Conversation with Terror," *Time Magazine*, January 11, 1999.

reduced to mere motivation and talk. The best documented attempt of AQ to acquire the necessary material for the construction of an IND was in 1993, when operatives of the organization reportedly tried to purchase uranium in Sudan worth 1.5 million American dollars. This effort failed since the materials were fortunately bogus. It nonetheless demonstrated that Al Qaeda does have a strong motivation and the financial means to acquire materials for the construction of an IND.

The Capability of Terrorist Groups to Assemble INDs:

Assuming that AQ or any other terrorists organization could acquire a sufficient amount of weapons grade fissile material (about 25 kg of U-235 or 8 Kg of Pu-239) for the construction of a first generation nuclear weapon, hence an IND, the question remains if the terrorists would then be capable of assembling such a device? Even though there are differences of opinion concerning this question, there is a wide consensus among numerous U.S. weapons designers that certain terrorist groups could build a crude nuclear weapon with a so-called 'gun-type' design, given adequate supply of fissile material.¹⁰ Furthermore, the U.S. National Research Council warns in its report, that "crude HEU weapons could be fabricated without state assistance."¹¹

Concerning the threat of nuclear terrorism we may conclude the following. Even though, we have not yet witnessed nuclear terrorism we need to both urgently prepare for such an eventuality and do everything we can to prevent this from occurring. Terrorists have to overcome many difficult and complicated nuclear hurdles however, nuclear terrorism, the worst form of WMD terrorism, cannot be ruled out in the future. All three WMD scenarios have highlighted two sobering facts: First we have been extremely fortunate in those few cases where society has been attacked with a WMD. Second, with the exception of the Anthrax attacks in 2001 the disruptions have been relatively minor. Given the determination of those who seek such weapons and the growing availability of CBRN materials our luck will eventually run out.

NATO's Fight Against WMD-Terrorism.

As previously discussed, one of the greatest modern challenges that NATO faces comes from the threat of (WMD) falling into the hands of those who would indiscriminately use them against a civilian population. The vulnerability of critical sites and national infrastructures are the subject of rigorous assessment, but vulnerability also includes public perceptions. Similarly, the response to a CBRN attack will largely be shaped by the quality of the public response. This means that WMD terrorism cannot be treated as a purely national security, 'top-down' issue. NATO has been looking at these broad aspects in the context of a more complex and problematic international security environment.

One of our new aims recognizes that we can only tackle the threat posed by terrorists armed with CBRN through cooperation with inter-governmental organizations and other partners.

¹⁰ See Carson Mark *et al.* "Can Terrorists Build Nuclear Weapons?" in Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander (eds.), *Preventing Nuclear Terrorism*, Nuclear Control Institute, Lexington 1987, p. 55.

¹¹ *Making the Nation Safer. The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism*, U.S. National Research Council, Washington D.C. 2002, p. 45.

NATO's approach is based upon prevention of CBRN proliferation, deterrence of an attack (should prevention fail) and assisting members to recover and respond (should deterrence fail). The role currently being undertaken is not an easy one; NATO member countries and allies remain subject to a wide variety of military and non-military risks that are both multi-directional and difficult to predict.

After briefly discussing empirical and theoretical evidence in regards to potential WMD terrorism it is now relevant to discuss NATO's efforts in combating the threats of WMD. As mentioned above it is not difficult to imagine how terrorists might eagerly use a weapon that could inflict thousands of civilian casualties or even how a terrorist cell may fund the acquisition of a WMD. These are but a few of the tasks that NATO faces on a daily basis while maintaining a conduct which is in accordance with international law and UN principles. NATO and its Allies take this threat very seriously, not only from the ones arising from fully assembled WMD weapons but also from the illicit transfer of components, technologies, industrial equipment, and dual use items including chemical, biological or radiological material. Proof we can note from the of committees that undertake work in this area: The Joint Committee on Proliferation is a senior advisory body providing coordinated reports to the North Atlantic Council on political- military and defense aspects of the proliferation of WMD. It brings together members of the Senior Political-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP) and the Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP) in joint session to coordinate the political and defense dimensions of NATO's response to the WMD threat. The SGP considers a range of factors in the political, security and economic fields that may cause or influence proliferation and considers political and economic means to prevent or respond to proliferation. DGP is the senior advisory body to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on proliferation of WMD and their associated delivery systems. It brings together experts and officials with responsibilities in this field under the joint North American and European chairmanship. The DGP considers the military capabilities needed to discourage WMD proliferation, to deter threats and the use of such weapons and makes recommendations for further enhancing our capabilities to respond to WMD threats.

After the Washington Summit in April 1999, it was believed that the threat of WMDs was extremely serious not only from sovereign states such as North Korea and Iran but also from non-state actors, such as terrorist groups. This strong belief lead to the launch of NATO's WMD centre in 2000, which deals with the threats arising from the potential use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear assets. The Centre includes a number of personnel from the International Secretariat as well as National Experts. The Centre's primary role is to improve coordination of WMD-related activities, as well as to strengthen consultations on non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament issues. The other role the centre provides is three-fold, to improve intelligence and information sharing on proliferation issues, to assist allies in enhancing the military capabilities to work in a WMD environment and third to discuss and bring the Alliance's support to non- proliferation efforts in the world.

A CBRN event would have serious consequences on the people and infrastructure involved in the attack. The recent swine flu epidemic showed us that how great an effort in international co-ordination would be needed in the event of a CBRN attack. After deterrence, NATO has been working rigorously on solidifying its ability to respond to any attack. Demonstrated by the yearly event organized by the WMD Centre, with the aim of educating and exhibiting to NATO's Allies

and Partners about the capabilities of NATO in the event of CBRN attacks/plans, most recently it was held in Jambes, Belgium, with 98 participants from 35 countries. The Centre also supports defense efforts to improve the preparedness of the Alliance to respond to the risks of WMD and their means of delivery.

Further enhancement of collaboration was achieved after the 2002 Prague Summit when NATO adopted a Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism, reinforcing cooperation with partner countries by agreeing on a partnership Action Plan against Terrorism. The military concept for Defence against Terrorism underlines the alliance's readiness to help deter, defend, disrupt and protect against Allied populations, territory, infrastructure and forces by acting against terrorist and those who harbour them; to provide assistance to national authorities in dealing with the consequences of terrorist attacks; to support operations by the European Union or other international organisations or coalitions involving Allies; and to deploy forces as and where required to carry out such missions. Regarding NATO-EU relations, undoubtedly, there is still a degree of duplication between activities carried out by each organization. But there are also examples of cooperation, for example, on bio-detection and the disposal of improved explosive devices (IEDs). Unfortunately, as there is not a proper institutional relationship between NATO and the EU, the extent of effective cooperation is limited.

Another example of teamwork in this area is evident through The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC), a '24/7' focal point for coordinating disaster relief efforts among NATO member and partner countries. In order to ensure close cooperation with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA), a permanent UN liaison officer is based in the EADRCC. During an actual disaster, the EADRCC can temporarily be augmented with additional personnel from EAPC delegations to NATO, or NATO's international civilian and military staffs. In addition, the EADRCC maintains a list of designated national experts that can be called upon to provide the Centre with particular advice in different areas in the event of a major disaster.¹² The Centre has guided consequence management efforts in more than twenty-five emergencies, including fighting floods and forest fires and dealing with the aftermath of earthquakes. Operations have included support to the US in response to Hurricane Katrina and - following a request from the Government of Pakistan - assistance to Pakistan in coping with the aftermath of the October 2005 earthquake. Since September 2001, the EADRCC has also been tasked with dealing with the consequences of terrorist attacks.

At the same summit NATO governments endorsed the implementation of five nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) defence initiatives designed to improve the Alliance's defence capabilities against WMD. The biggest challenge and something the WMD centre has been working strongly for is the need to intensify cooperation with other international organisations that can contribute to efforts in improving the defence against terrorism. In this area NATO and the EU have exchanged information on civil emergency planning and in other related fields. NATO is also contributing actively to the work of the UN counter terrorism Committee. The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery remains a matter of serious concern for the WMD centre. We recognise that proliferation can occur despite efforts to

¹² See the official NATO website <http://www.nato.int/issues/eadrcc/index.html>

prevent it and can pose a direct threat to our Allies. Our support for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has been at the heart of our work towards combating any future type of WMD attack by a terrorist group.

After the Prague summit in 2002, NATO launched three broad initiatives in an effort to modernize, and to ensure that the Alliance is able to effectively meet the new challenges of the 21st Century. The first was aimed at addressing the increasing threat of missile proliferation and the threat on Alliance territory. The second initiative is in the area of defense against CBRN weapons. Within this field states also agreed on implementing immediately five initiatives that can be categorized in the area of response in countering the threat of WMD attacks. One was to constitute an event response force to counter different types of threats.

The second was to set up deployable laboratories to assess what type of agents one could be dealing with and the third was to look at the creation of a medical surveillance system. The final two initiatives in this response category was to create a stockpile of pharmaceutical and other medical counter-measures to react to any attack and finally to improve training within this area as a whole. These were but a few of the demonstrations exhibited at the Jambes event, as mentioned above. The Prague summit also called for an implementation of the civil emergency plan of action for the threat of WMD terrorism.

In regards to terrorism arising from WMD, NATO's primary instrument is for the support and enforcement of the Non- Proliferation Treaty. We want and need it to be universal. It makes the job much more hazardous if there are states who would want to create WMDs or material to pursue this goal. Unfortunately there is a growing risk; we live in a world with many dual- use technologies. Dual- use technologies that can be used for appropriate purposes that can also be misused. The medical industry for example can draw on direct benefit from biological research.

Not only are the use of WMD by terrorists a threat to life and property but they also have the threat of mass disruption. This is something the WMD centre at NATO is trying to combat. Improving coordination with civil groups and disseminating information could be used in the event of a radiological blast for example. In the same vein we have been working closely with organisations such as Interpol and the World Health Organisation (WHO), at a minimum, to prevent any duplication in our work. NATO has to be able to work alongside numerous other specialist non-military agencies, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and World Health Organization (WHO).

As well as this we are also trying to deepen our relations and co-operation with partner group countries. Including Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean dialogue countries. We only have to look at Pakistan and the growing influence of the Taliban within the Northern region to see the possibility of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal going missing. It only takes one to disappear for there to be the potential of catastrophic human casualties. On top of the NATO-Russia Council, the NATO- Ukraine Commission and the Mediterranean Dialogue NATO also consults with countries in the broader Middle East which take part in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

Together with the theoretical and political tools of cooperation which are needed to prevent, deter and respond. NATO has also looked at the practical elements by creating the Multinational Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense Battalion on 1 December 2003 designed to provide capabilities specifically for defense against CBRN threats as well as timely

assessments and advice to commanders and forces in the field. The Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) which was endorsed at the Riga summit in 2006 also provides an analysis of the future security environment and a fundamental vision for NATO's ongoing transformation. It highlights the danger of the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery. The CPG also reiterates the importance of civilian actors in achieving NATO's goals. Although, even to this day we still encounter some suspicion from civilian organizations and humanitarian actors towards cooperating with a military alliance. The WMD centre can hopefully continue being a hub for the continued improvement in the area of co-operation. The multinational Chemical, Biological, Radiological Nuclear Defense Battalion was declared fully operational at the Istanbul summit in June 2004. Since then it has been replaced by the Combined Joint CBRN Defense task force. The Combined Joint CBRN defense Task Force is designed to respond to and manage the consequences of the release of any CBRN agent. Under normal circumstances it will operate within NATO Response Force, which is a joint, multinational force of up to 25,000 troops designed to respond to emerging crises across the full spectrum of Alliance missions.

Another area in which NATO has been working is the Joint Centre of Excellence on CBRN Defense based in Vyskov, the Czech Republic activated in July 2007. The Centre is there to offer recognized expertise and experience to the benefit of the Alliance, especially in support of the transformation process. The purpose of this Centre of Excellence is to provide education, training and exercises, assisting concept, doctrine, procedures and standards development in the CBRN area. On top of this NATO is actively cooperating with partners to improve in this area. NATO has been working at improving sea based defense in regards to the trafficking of WMD. After the attacks of Sept 11 2001, NATO initiated a maritime counter-terrorism operation- Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) aimed at deterring terrorists' threats in the eastern Mediterranean. To enhance and expand MIO expertise, in 2004 NATO established a Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre in Crete, Greece. This promotes the exchange of best practices, development of doctrine, and provision of training in the planning and conduct of MIOs among the Allies and with NATO's partners. Partner countries have also endorsed the effectiveness of Operation Active Endeavour, NATO's maritime counter-terrorism operation in the Mediterranean, which continues to make an important contribution to the fight against terrorism.

Many of NATO's science programmes focus on the civilian side of nuclear, chemical and biological technology. Scientists from NATO and Partner countries are developing areas of research that impact on these areas. These include the decommissioning and disposal of WMD, and components of WMD, the safe handling of materials, techniques for arms control implementation, and the detection of CBRN agents.

NATO also facilitates workshops and seminars on proliferation issues involving non- member countries. The largest event, which was organized by the WMD centre under the directions of the SGP took place in Vilnius, Lithuania, in April 2007, attracted more than 120 senior officials representing 43 countries from five continents, as well as a number of international organizations and academic institutions/ it covered all types of WMD threats as well as political and diplomatic responses to them.

NATO's Remaining Challenges

As the threat of a WMD terrorist attack on Alliance territory is real, complex and multifaceted so are the challenges that remain in this regard. The Alliance might face numerous challenges in the continuous fight to prevent a WMD attack by terrorists. In that regards three elements will be crucial.

NATO Must Maintain a Credible Deterrent!

It is often argued that deterrence, in particular nuclear deterrence, has no value when it comes to the threat of terrorists using WMDs. Hence the popular argument goes that terrorists have no territory to defend or loose, no population to protect or even their own life or freedom to preserve. Terrorists, in particular suicide bombers, supposedly act highly irrational and emotional and can therefore be not deterred by nuclear weapons and the prospects of "Mutual Assured Destruction". This however is not completely true. These arguments overlook fundamental qualities of a holistic and credible nuclear deterrent.

First of all, a credible nuclear deterrent is needed to effectively deter potential nuclear state sponsors to help, give or sell a fully operational nuclear weapon or even fissile material for the manufacture of an IND to motivated terrorists. Through nuclear forensics it is possible today to identify the origins of fissile materials, which then would directly lead to the state sponsors of the "stateless" perpetrators. In such a case and after a successfully committed WMD-terrorist attack, the Alliance could then consequently respond with its full range of military force, including and up to its nuclear capabilities. Thanks to the Alliance credible nuclear deterrent potential state sponsors are aware that even indirect acts of aggression against NATO make possible gains incalculable and unacceptable. The consequences for the state sponsor would be devastating and final, governments of such states are fully aware of that.

Secondly, terrorists can be deterred by the holistic deterrent approach of NATO, as the Alliance does not solely rely on its nuclear forces to deter, but also upholds deterrence through a mix of nuclear and conventional forces as well large capabilities to respond to a committed WMD-terrorist attack, through the creation i.e. of NATO's CBRN Defense Battalion. The latter is especially important in this regard. As mentioned earlier, even though a WMD attack by terrorists is possible, terrorists face numerous and difficult obstacles in their quest to WMD-terrorism. They need reliable contacts, knowledgeable and dedicated scientists and engineers, proper and affluent financing and a covert area of operation where they can prepare for such an attack. A WMD terrorist attack will cost time and money, while at the same time not necessarily guaranteeing success and glory. A successful response force, such as the CBRN Defense Battalion, can even minimize the effects of such an attack making such an attack less severe. Terrorists might then still rather prefer conventional methods, as they are cheap, quick and effective, than to "waste time" on costly and highly complicated endeavors where success is not guaranteed and its outcome can be minimized by NATO's response. In this regard, defense is the best offense and functions well in the complex and appropriate mix of NATO's deterrent.

Adopting a “Network of Networks” Approach.

As mentioned earlier the threat of WMD-terrorism is severe and complex, NATO cannot fulfill all the tasks by itself. The Alliance must continuously uphold and strengthen the partnership with other international organizations, state partners, non-governmental organizations and academics to be fully aware and capable to face this grave threat. Cooperation between NATO and the European Union, the United Nations, World Health Organization, Interpol, the IAEA and many others need strengthened and extended. NATO’s Comprehensive Approach outlines this and was endorsed by nations, after the 2006 Riga summit. We can only effectively face this multifaceted threat by a multifaceted response. We need to include experts from all different sorts of fields and backgrounds. The response must have qualities from military, political, and scientific areas of expertise and we can only sufficiently combine these, if we expand our approach of “networks of networks”. This will be a crucial area of expenditure and expansion in the coming years.

The Fight Against WMD-Terrorism Needs Full International Commitment!

As also outlined at the beginning of this article, the threat of a WMD-terrorist attack is real and challenging. In some aspects we have already witnessed the first forerunners of WMD terrorism, such as e.g. the U.S. Anthrax letters of 2001. That we have not yet witnessed a nuclear holocaust or a biological attack resulting in a global pandemic should not lead us to the conclusion that we are safe and sound and immune against all future threats of this kind. We have to stay alert and committed to the cause of preventing future WMD attacks by individuals and terrorist groups. Therefore, we need the full commitment of the international community to uphold and even further financial and human capital commitments. Promises and response paper tigers will not get the job done. We at NATO have numerous programs, initiatives, responsive units and the political structures to deter as well as respond well to the threat, but these numerous initiatives need the political support of the home governments and populations of the member states. The population of our member and partner states should be made aware, without causing unnecessary panic and hysteria, of the common threat we face and why we need full international and financial commitment to the cause. WMD-terrorism does not have to be inevitable, even though experts claim it is not a question of if, but when. In this regard the capability to effectively respond to a CBRN attack will lessen the probability of such an attack occurring. Only the international community—recognizing that no one nation can stop this scourge alone—working together effectively and efficiently building a network of networks to create a web of denial has the best chance of preventing and deterring a terrorist WMD attack. This will require the full support and strong political will to address this unparalleled threat. Sheer words and promises are not and never have been enough to stop *Hostis Humanis Generis*.

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Rational Institutional Design, Perverse Incentives, and the US-Pakistan Partnership in post-9/11

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Abstract: *Since 9/11, Pakistan has faced intense criticism from the international community at large for 'not doing enough' to assist the US counter-terrorism mission in Afghanistan. Much of the present debate looks at Pakistan from an outsider's perspective and finds Islamabad's reluctance to support the US wholeheartedly as irrational. Using the rational institutional design framework, this paper presents a strategic perspective arguing that once Pakistan's own threat perception and self-defined regional objectives are held constant, it becomes entirely rational for it to avoid complementing the US objectives wholeheartedly. The US policy towards Pakistan since 9/11 has employed a five pronged approach: (i) coerce Pakistan; (ii) buy-out Pakistan; (iii) do it ourselves; (iv) emphasize the seriousness of the threat faced by Pakistan itself; and (v) ensure that Pakistan's tensions with India remain in check. The cumulative effect of this policy has been to create perverse incentives which rationally nudge Pakistan to avoid aligning its objectives and strategies with the US. To extract better performance from Pakistan, the US needs to change Islamabad's cost-benefit equation by altering the incentive payoffs rather than hoping that the moral undertones of the discourse would somehow lead it to oblige fully. This requires a regional approach on US' part whereby Pakistan's insecurities vis-à-vis India and Afghanistan are addressed.*

Keywords: US, Pakistan, Afghanistan, War on Terror, terrorism, Taliban, rational institutional design, incentive structure..

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Introduction

Pakistan is widely believed to be the hub of Islamist terrorism today. Western capitals are convinced that global security in the near-to-medium term will hinge on Pakistan's ability to tackle militant extremists within its borders. Apart from the global dimension, Pakistan's own survival is at stake. Just this year, militants began to establish control over areas within 100 kilometers of the capital city of Islamabad and have openly expressed their desire to capture Pakistan's seat of power.

Since 9/11, Pakistan has faced intense criticism from the international community at large for 'not doing enough' to assist US efforts in Afghanistan. The substantial increase in local and foreign militant presence in Pakistan and the use of Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) as a launching pad for operations against US-led forces in Afghanistan is increasingly being seen as the biggest stumbling block in the success of the anti-terror campaign. The nature of this discourse is highly normative. Much of the present debate looks at Pakistan from an outsider's perspective and finds Islamabad's reluctance to support the US wholeheartedly as irrational and proof of its insincerity towards bringing peace to the South Asian region.

This paper takes a counterintuitive approach. While it concurs with the view that Pakistan may not be going all out in supporting the US agenda, it moves away from the normative calculus so often employed to analyze this case. Instead, we utilize the rational institutional design framework to explain why, taking Pakistan's own threat perception and self-defined regional objectives as a given, it is entirely rational for Pakistan to avoid complementing the US objectives completely. The paper makes no value judgments about the moral tenacity of either the US or Pakistani stance. Nor does it argue that Pakistan's threat perception is well-founded. Instead, it simply suggests that once Islamabad's perception of the situation and the objectives it derives from it are held constant, the incentive structure set up by the policy-setter, the US in this case, turns out to be perverse and ends up nudging Pakistan to oblige the US sub-optimally. Therefore, to extract better performance from Pakistan, the US needs to change Pakistan's cost-benefit equation by altering the incentive payoffs rather than hoping that the moral undertones of its discourse would somehow lead it to oblige wholeheartedly. This requires a regional approach on US' part whereby Pakistan's insecurities vis-à-vis India and Afghanistan are addressed.

The next section lays out the rational institutional design framework and establishes US and Pakistani objectives in the War on Terror. Section III evaluates US policies and highlights the kind of incentives these create for Pakistan. Pakistan's reaction is rationalized in light of the cost-benefit analysis as seen by Islamabad itself. Finally, the anomalies in US' current approach to Pakistan are discussed to point to avenues for reversing the perverse incentives in place.

Laying the Context: Rational Institutional Design and the US and Pakistani Objectives

Our argument is theoretically grounded in the rational institutional design framework which we use to underscore the importance of proper incentives in a strategic interaction similar to the one US and Pakistan are involved in.¹ At its core, the rational institutional design argument is highly

¹ For an excellent overview of rational institutional design, see Phillip Pettit, "Institutional Design and

intuitive. The party establishing the incentives (the policy-setter) is to create a payoff structure such that it incentivizes the other side (policy-taker) to adopt policies the policy-setter wishes to see it pursue. In essence, the task entails devising incentives that alter the cost-benefit equation for the policy-taker in a manner that automatically results in the desired change in its behavior. For this to happen, the benefits from the transformed behavior have to be both higher than the costs and more attractive than the alternative options available.

Where the two sides involved in the strategic interaction see themselves as partners rather than competitors, the ideal scenario entails alignment of their strategies in pursuit of common goals. The cumulative effect of their actions then becomes mutually reinforcing. That said however, the policy-setter's strategies do not exist in a vacuum. Rather, they are intrinsically tied to the reaction from the policy-taker and thus are affected by it; in essence, both actors have a modifying effect on each other's moves.² Therefore, realistically the policy-setter should structure the incentives keeping in mind the self-defined outlook and objectives of the policy-taker given that the latter's reactions will emanate from this understanding of the context.

For the case at hand, the US has been trying to convince Pakistan to side with it in the quest to rout out anti-American terrorists from Afghanistan. In order to understand the incentive structure the US has attempted to create and the challenges it has faced in this regard, one needs to lay out the objectives with which both sides entered the fray post-9/11.

The US Objectives

For the Bush administration, the objectives of the intervention in Afghanistan were extremely broad. However, in terms of Pakistan's involvement, the US wanted Islamabad's full cooperation in routing out hardcore Al Qaeda and Taliban presence that could threaten a repeat of the 9/11 attacks. Pakistan's concurrence was critical since it was the most obvious supply route for Coalition forces in Afghanistan. Moreover, Pakistan's traditional links with the Taliban and Pakistani intelligence agency's – the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) – deep penetration of the Taliban's Afghanistan made it an asset in terms of intelligence and information about the makeup of the enemy. Later on, Pakistan's importance was taken to a new level as FATA became the principal sanctuary for Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters who fled the US attack in Afghanistan.³ Even more compelling, FATA is now believed to have become the new global hub for the Al Qaeda leadership.⁴ Notwithstanding the fact that the Obama administration seems inclined to tone down its objectives and may be drifting towards negotiations with the 'moderate' Taliban as the end-game, this can only take place once the US is in a position of strength, a scenario which is

Rational Choice" in Robert Goodin, *Theory of Institutional Design*, Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 54-89.

² In this sense, the interaction can be envisioned as a strategic 'game'. For the basics of the types of games and interactions in game theory, see Edwin Mansfield, *Microeconomics: Theory and Applications*, W. W. Norton, 1997, pp. 410-441.

³ Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia*, Allen Lane, 2008, p. 268.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 268-269.

unlikely to materialize until both US and Pakistan coordinate their activities in Afghanistan and FATA respectively. Finally, as Pakistan itself has come under attack, the US mandate has added a fresh dimension. Washington realizes that state collapse in this nuclear-armed country could have a catastrophic impact on global security. It thus sees an interest in ensuring that militants targeting the heartland of Pakistan are eliminated as well; it finds utility in propping Pakistan up through extensive monetary assistance lest the anti-Pakistan Taliban take advantage of the state's weakening writ and ability to satisfy its citizenry.

The Pakistani Objectives

Pakistan was a reluctant entrant into the US War on Terror. Having supported the Taliban throughout their rule in Afghanistan and having used militant factions as a foreign policy tool initially against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan – incidentally this was pursued with active US involvement – and subsequently in support of the insurgency in Indian Kashmir, Pakistan found itself in a catch-22. In light of the fact that the UN Security Council had unequivocally condemned terrorism and passed Taliban-specific resolutions, continuing overt support of the Taliban would have brought Pakistan to the verge of international isolation. It therefore had little choice but to formally join hands with the US.⁵ However, Pakistan also realized that the transformation in its traditionally pro-Islamist outlook would have a serious backlash and therefore it had an interest in minimizing the threats to the state from its clients-turned-enemies.

More importantly however, Pakistan was adamant on maintaining the regional balance of power in South Asia. Pakistan's number one concern has always been the threat from India and its military establishment, having dictated the country's national security vision sees, the ability to stand up to India as its *raison d'être*.⁶ At no cost was the military willing to let the US intervention change regional dynamics in a way that left Pakistan vulnerable to its eastern neighbor. At the tactical level, this translated into an interest to ensure that the military's eastern formations remained intact lest it be caught unprepared in the event of an unexpected Indo-Pak crisis. Further, the Pakistani military establishment considered a friendly, client-based relationship with Afghanistan vital in order to retain its 'strategic depth' vision which it had employed throughout the 1990s to offset its lack of geographical depth vis-à-vis India.⁷

Pakistan wished to support the US only within this self-defined framework. However, once the decision to reverse the pro-Taliban policy was taken, the Pakistani government under Parvez Musharraf sought additional benefits in terms of political support for his rule and economic aid, both military and non-military, for the country. In fact, Islamabad even hoped to use the US to force India to be forthcoming in resolving all contentious issues, including Kashmir, with Pakistan.

The divergent outlooks of the two partners in this so-called 'alliance' should be obvious. The US was much more focused on eliminating the Taliban and Al Qaeda threat and wished for total

⁵ Ahmer Bilal Soofi, "The Reality of Pakistan's Turnarounds," *The Friday Times*, Vol. XVII, No. 8, April 15-21, 2005.

⁶ Ayesha Siddiq Agha, "Pakistan's Security Perceptions" in Imtiaz Alam, ed., *Security and Nuclear Stabilization in South Asia*, Free Media Foundation, 2006, pp. 201-216.

⁷ Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*, p. 25.

Pakistani commitment in this regard. Pakistan, on the other hand, was understandably more concerned about its own well-being and saw the ideal within the regional objectives it had defined for itself. The divergence implied that the US had its work cut out in terms of instituting an incentive structure that would prompt Pakistan to align its goals and enter into a strategic alliance with Washington.

Substantively, Washington's task translated into increasing the payoffs for Pakistan to rid itself of the India-centric outlook, instead focusing its energies on routing out the anti-US militant elements. Moreover, it had to incentivize Pakistan's move away from the strategic depth doctrine that necessitated Afghanistan's existence as a client state for Islamabad. These together amounted to less than a complete transformation in the threat perception of the Pakistani military, the beholder of Pakistan's national security vision. The 'carrots' that could theoretically assist the US in incentivizing Pakistan included the promise of extensive state-building support, adoption of a policy that would prod India to resolve outstanding Indo-Pak issues, and a guarantee of assuaging Pakistan's concerns in terms of a hostile post-Taliban Afghanistan.

Mismatch Between Policies and Objectives: Incentives Gone Wrong

Having outlined the objectives of both sides and the incentive structure the US sought to put in place to achieve its aims, this section discusses the actual US policies towards Pakistan since 9/11. Next, it analyzes the Pakistani response in light of the incentives these policies had created in the hope of transforming Islamabad's behavior.

The US Policy towards Pakistan

The post-9/11 U.S. policy towards Pakistan has entailed a six-pronged approach: (i) coerce Pakistan; (ii) buy-out Pakistan; (iii) do it ourselves; (iv) emphasize the seriousness of the threat faced by Pakistan itself; and (v) ensure that Pakistan's tensions with India remain in check.

Coercion was the very first tool the US applied to goad Pakistan into a partnership to target Al Qaeda and Taliban presence in Afghanistan. The then Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage's infamous threat (which is continuously denied) of bombing Pakistan 'back to the stone age' immediately after the 9/11 attacks was the first overt use of the coercive element of the strategy.⁸ However, over time, coercion became less and less tenable since it was clear that the political and strategic costs of putting US boots on the ground in Pakistan were prohibitive. Not only was this impractical given that US forces were already stretched thin in Iraq and Afghanistan but such a move would also have galvanized the already-strong anti-US sentiment in Pakistan and further radicalized the citizenry. Moreover, tactically, US commanders and officials were clear early on that the nature of the terrain and lack of support from the local population would leave their gains extremely limited. Indeed, Washington's official enclave has persistently reiterated that a full blown US operation in Pakistan was never on the cards.

The buy-out option was arguably the leading factor in US' policy towards Pakistan under President Bush. America's approach vis-à-vis Pakistan remained highly client-based throughout

⁸ Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir*, Free Press, 2006, p. 201.

this period. Washington sought to ‘buy-out’ the Pakistani authorities, offering handsome monetary transfers in return for fighting what was essentially understood by both sides to be America’s war. Much of the US assistance, substantial in absolute terms, was narrowly focused on reimbursing and rewarding Pakistan for the fight against terrorism.⁹ In the initial days, the understanding between the two partners was confined to apprehending Al Qaeda and Taliban miscreants who had crossed over into Pakistan’s tribal areas to flee the US attack.¹⁰ While the arrangement expanded in scope as the true extent of the threat was comprehended, the mindset in the Bush White House essentially remained one of a patron who had to pay off a mercenary for a specific task.

The buy-out approach had two negative spin-offs. First, the Bush administration used the Pakistani ruler cum Army Chief, Parvez Musharraf as their point man, in the process undermining the mainstream democratic forces in the country.¹¹ In the final outcome, the US lost goodwill with the Pakistani masses as it was largely seen as having contributed to the sustainability of a dictatorship. Second, the overwhelming focus on ‘coalition support funds’ as reimbursement for Pakistani efforts in the War on Terror meant that US aid was doing little to alleviate the economic plight of the Pakistani masses.

To its credit, the Obama administration has singled out the buy-out approach as a major shortcoming in their predecessor’s policy towards Pakistan. The incoming team realizes that in the face of an emboldened anti-Pakistan campaign by the Taliban, a broad-based socio-economic aid package has become necessary to prevent Pakistan’s state collapse. The Obama White House has already taken tangible steps to alter the aid composition. The non-military aid is to be tripled to \$1.5 billion a year under the PEACE act of 2009.¹²

The rather shortsighted buy-out approach is not the only aspect of the US policy which reflected the absence of a holistic outlook. Equally disturbing was the US inclination to believe that it could combine the buy-out with a do it ourselves mentality to eliminate militant presence. In the early days of the campaign, the US was reluctant to trust Pakistan’s partnership. This was flowing, understandably, from its concerns about lingering Pakistani military and ISI involvement with the Taliban and the persistent failure of efforts by the international community to convince Pakistan to sever ties with the Taliban pre-9/11. The lack of trust in the Pakistani establishment was manifested at the very outset when the US chose not to consult Islamabad on its specific plans to launch an attack on the Taliban’s Afghanistan.¹³ Similarly, the US refused to allow the Pakistani

⁹ Craig Cohen, “A Perilous Course U.S. Strategy and Assistance to Pakistan: A Report of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project Center for Strategic and International Studies,” *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, August 2007.

¹⁰ Interview with Dr. Maleeha Lodhi, former Pakistani Ambassador to the US, May 25, 2009.

¹¹ Jane Parlez, “After Years on a Tightrope, Musharraf Disappoints the U.S. and His Own Nation,” *New York Times*, August 18, 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/19/world/asia/19legacy.html?fta=y>.

¹² Elise Labott, “Legislation Would Triple US Non-military Aid to Pakistan,” *CNN Online*, May 5, 2009, <http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/05/04/pakistan.aid/>.

¹³ While reports indicate that Pakistan was informed of the timing of the attack and received safe passage to pull its personnel out of Afghanistan. However, Pakistani sources contend that the US did not consult Pakistan on the plans and even the specific timing. Interview with Maleeha Lodhi, former Pakistani Ambassador to the US, May 25, 2009.

authorities to provide security for supply trucks destined for coalition troops through Pakistan, instead preferring to use private security presence and striking deals with local tribes for safe passages.¹⁴

Over time however the US-Pak differences have become much more fundamental. This has resulted in further emphasis on the do it ourselves option. Perhaps the most obvious examples in the recent past are the virtual breakdown of the US-Pakistan intelligence sharing mechanism and the use of drones to strike targets within Pakistani territory. The intelligence sharing protocol collapsed amidst US suspicions of a continuing Pakistani ‘double game’ whereby the ISI while collaborating with the US was also believed to be tipping off the potential targets.¹⁵ As for the drone strikes, while the author’s discussions with members of Pakistan’s strategic enclave confirm that there was a tacit understanding between the US and Pakistani governments – under Musharraf the Pakistani intelligence is believed to have collaborated actively on the strikes –, post-2007, the US has increasingly sought to avoid full disclosure to the ISI, instead stepping up the drone strikes as a counter to what it sees as Pakistan’s lack of interest in taking out anti-US elements.¹⁶ Despite being the subject of immense controversy and forcing militants to disperse into Pakistan’s main cities, the US continues to argue that the Predator missions are productive and that they shall remain in place.¹⁷

There is one other dimension of the do it ourselves approach that has a tangible negative fallout on Pakistan. This relates to the reluctance on the part of the US to formulate its Afghan counter-terrorism strategy in consultation with Pakistan. The most obvious case of a fundamental divergence in interest is President Obama’s troop surge which seeks to increase the strength of the American forces in Afghanistan. As publicly acknowledged by US officials, the move is certain to push Afghan Taliban into Pakistan, creating more challenges and external pressure on Islamabad.¹⁸ Yet, Washington argues that it has no option but to trade-off Pakistani stability for success in Afghanistan at this point. On balance then, the two sides continue to show propensity to fight their own distinct wars in a common theater.

¹⁴ The author has spoken to a number of military sources in private discussions where this fact has been confirmed. It was also substantiated in an interview with Ejaz Hadier, Op-ed editor of the Daily Times and one of Pakistan’s senior most defense journalists, May 3, 2009.

¹⁵ Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “Afghan Strikes by Taliban Get Pakistan Help, U.S. Aides Say” *The New York Times*, March 25, 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/26/world/asia/26tribal.html?hp>.

¹⁶ Julian E. Barnes and Greg Miller, “Pakistan Gets a Say in Drone Attacks on Militants,” *LA Times*, May 13, 2009, <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-predator13-2009may13,0,1748949.story>.

¹⁷ Karen DeYoung and Joby Warrick, “Drone Attacks Inside Pakistan Will Continue, CIA Chief Says,” *Washington Post*, February 26, 2009, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/25/AR2009022503584.html>

¹⁸ Matthew Weaver, “US troop surge in Afghanistan 'could push Taliban into Pakistan,” *Guardian*, May 22, 2009, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/may/22/us-troop-afghanistan-taliban-pakistan>; Iftikhar A Khan, “Gilani Expresses Concern Over Increase of US Forces,” *Dawn*, May 30, 2009, <http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/06-gilani-expresses-concern-over-increase-of-us-forces-rs-03>.

The US disappointment with Pakistan's performance and its propensity to treat Pakistan as a client state notwithstanding, it also adopted the paradoxical position of prodding Pakistan to get serious and fight the common enemy alongside the US. Repeated US assertions have been aimed at convincing Islamabad to comprehend the gravity of the threat the militant enclave poses to Pakistan itself. This view has become much more credible since the anti-Pakistan elements have coalesced under the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) umbrella and have specifically targeted state interests within Pakistan.

Notwithstanding the above, much to the bewilderment of the international community, till the TTP had threatened to take over Islamabad, the Pakistani government and population at large remained in a state of denial about the gravity of the situation. Not only did Pakistan's military establishment show reluctance to undertake a concerted effort against the Taliban, but even the Pakistani masses exhibited extreme ambivalence about the militant threat to their country.¹⁹ The majority sentiment dismissed the threat as exaggerated, pointing instead to US presence in Afghanistan as the underlying problem; the antipathy towards the US amounted to a sympathetic view of virtually anyone who opposed its presence in the region. This sentiment understandably frustrated the US policy makers further and prompted them to seek unilateral measures, in effect reinforcing their inclination to employ the 'do it ourselves' approach.

Finally, the US was mindful of the need to keep Pakistan military's other potential distractions in check so that it could focus on the War on Terror. The US remained diplomatically involved in Indo-Pak relations. However, the policy had a one-point agenda: nudging the two sides to keep their border calm. In line with this goal, the US played an extremely constructive role in pulling the South Asian rivals back from the brink in the 2001-02 nuclear crisis. It also supported the continuation of the Indo-Pak peace process which has been ongoing since 2004. Beyond this however, Washington refrained from proactively pushing the two sides to settle contentious issues permanently, this being a long standing Pakistani demand. The Obama administration which came in pledging support for a 'regional' solution to South Asia has back tracked, and much to Pakistan's dismay, has left India completely out of its 'Af-Pak' formulation.²⁰ The US has also remained indifferent to India's involvement in Afghanistan's reconstruction efforts, a fact that has raised eyebrows in Islamabad. Furthermore, on the Afghanistan front, the US instituted a government, which despite having Pushtun representation has left the key power wielding positions in the hands of the Panjshiri Tajiks belonging to the Northern Alliance.²¹

Pakistan's Reaction on the US Policy

From the US perspective, its policy should have ideally prompted Pakistan to behave as a true ally, thereby complementing US efforts to defeat the adversary in Afghanistan and FATA. It should

¹⁹ Moeed Yusuf, "And We Hit a New Low," *The Friday Times*, Vol.XXI, No.8, April 10-16, 2009.

²⁰ Asif Ezdi, "It is Af-Pak-Ind, Mr Obama," *The News*, February 26, 2009, http://www.thenews.com.pk/editorial_detail.asp?id=164576.

²¹ Thomas H. Johnson, "The Loya Jirga, Ethnic Rivalries and Future Afghan Stability," *Strategic Insight, Center for Contemporary Conflict, Naval Post Graduate School*, August 6, 2002, <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/rsepResources/si/aug02/southAsia.asp>.

also have led Pakistan to tame the largely Pakistan-focused TTP. Much to the contrary, the Pak-US relationship has been increasingly strained and their interests have continued to diverge substantially.

US coercion bore dividends to begin with as it forced Musharraf to transform Pakistan's pro-Taliban policy and agree – at least on paper – to virtually all US demands in terms of supporting its Afghan operation. However, in no time, the Pakistani military establishment became as confident as their US counterparts that a large-scale, direct US intervention was implausible. Notwithstanding the trust deficit and the progressive deterioration in the military-to-military collaboration over the years, the Pakistani military was convinced that the US could not afford to lose the tactical and intelligence support, however limited, that Pakistan was providing. Moreover, it must have seen its tacit understanding to allow intermittent US predator strikes and access to a number of apprehended suspects as an additional buffer against any serious consideration of direct US intervention in Pakistan. Not to mention, Islamabad remained fully cognizant that the extreme anti-Americanism among the Pakistani masses was a strong deterrent for the US to intervene militarily.

Pakistan's position on being bought out was interesting. On the one hand, Gen. Musharraf saw President Bush's propensity to use him as the point man as politically expedient. The narrowly focused aid for the terrorism effort allowed him both to present to the military, the transfers as benefits of being involved in the otherwise unpopular war as well as to avoid having to take ownership of the effort as 'Pakistan's war' in front of the Pakistani population. However, in terms of US' overall objectives, this formulation was highly counterproductive. For one, it meant that the Pakistani military never considered itself to be part of an overarching alliance with the US; the outlook remained strictly tactical. In addition, the Pakistani masses saw the War as being trust upon them by the US and thus blamed the entire backlash within Pakistan on Washington.²²

More worrisome from the US perspective, the Pakistani government never saw the US monetary support as being a quid pro quo for the Pakistani forces to fight on US terms. There was no consideration among the khakis that Pakistan could oblige Washington beyond a point where its own national interests – as defined by the military – would be undermined. In fact, the Pakistani establishment was equally adept at realizing the client-based nature of the relationship and internalized the aid as little more than direct reimbursement for the costs of fighting the War. In a text book example of perverse incentives, the transactional nature of the arrangement had in fact created an incentive for Pakistan to prolong the effort as much as possible; the longer Pakistan remained involved in tactical operations, the higher the reimbursements would be.

As for the lack of economic aid, Musharraf shifted the entire blame on the US, continuously arguing that Washington was not paying enough attention to the plight of the average Pakistani. Notwithstanding the fact that his own political interests had much to do with Pakistan's acceptance

²² The perceived US injustices to Pakistan in the War on Terror have spiked the anti-US sentiment among the Pakistani people. Recent polls put Pakistan's as the third most anti-American nation behind Turkey and Palestine. Umit Enginsoy, "Turkey 'Most Anti-U.S. Country' in World, Poll Syas," *Turkish Daily News*, June 29, 2007, <http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=76984>. Also see, "'Anti-U.S. feeling high in Pakistan'," *Daily Times*, February 20, 2005, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_20-2-2005_pg7_7.

of this narrowly defined aid relationship, the implication was that the Pakistani masses again found reason to point fingers at the US.²³ Interestingly, while the present government in Islamabad has cashed in on this rhetoric to convince President Obama of the need for a holistic aid package, there is no fundamental change in the mindset in terms of the use of reimbursements as part of military aid.

As already mentioned, the Musharraf administration seems to have been on board with much of the do it ourselves approach of the US. After all, it agreed to allow the US to manage the security of its supply convoys destined for Afghanistan and to collaborate on the drone attacks. Pakistan's approach on this issue reveals something very fundamental about the mindset in Islamabad. It reinforces the fact that Pakistan never saw the anti-militant effort as one where it needed to take the front seat. Instead, it was much more comfortable allowing the US to take charge of the more controversial aspects of the campaign even at the expense of a breach of its territorial sovereignty. At best then, Islamabad's outlook reflects a propensity to play second fiddle to the US in the hope that this would reduce the blame and the direct losses to it.

Contrary to the above, Pakistan's stance on US' Afghan policy is the polar opposite; there, Islamabad would prefer a consultative role for itself, especially on plans that have a direct bearing on Pakistan's security situation. Again, the troop surge is the most obvious example where the Pakistani authorities have raised concerns. Rather interestingly, the surge is also the clearest manifestation of the divergence in goals of the two sides; what America sees as essential to tackle the Taliban in Afghanistan, it itself acknowledges will be counterproductive for Pakistan. Here, for Pakistan, the US is clearly part of the problem rather than the solution.

The politicking that went on in Islamabad around the issue of US' do it ourselves approach was entirely counterproductive for American interests. The Pakistani masses grew increasingly resentful of what they saw as US heavy handedness and disrespect for their country's sovereignty. The ongoing controversies about the drone strikes are a continuation of this thread.

Next, in terms of the seriousness of the threat, Pakistan's position has moved from ambivalence to taking a nuanced view of the adversary. The US' aim has been to convince Pakistan that the Taliban-Al Qaeda combine operating in Afghanistan is organically linked to militant factions within Pakistan, therefore making it imperative upon Pakistan to target them for its own sake. Pakistan on the other hand has sought to disaggregate the threat and treat it with different policy options. There has been complete agreement that Al Qaeda's elimination is in the interest of both sides. Indeed, it is no coincidence that most of the high profile operatives that were arrested by Pakistani authorities and handed over to the US belonged to Al Qaeda. By the same token, bulk of the drone targets were reportedly Al Qaeda elements.

On the Taliban, the two sides diverge. The US has always seen the 'Afghan Taliban' and groups directly linked to their activities against Coalition forces in Afghanistan as the principal threat. While the US now includes the Pakistani Taliban in its list of targets, this is a recent development that has been spurred by tangible evidence of their involvement across the border.²⁴

²³ Mark Magnier, "Pakistanis Doubt the Effectiveness of More U.S. Aid," *LA Times*, March 29, 2009, <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-pakistan-economy29-2009mar29,0,174875.story>.

²⁴ Joshua Rhett Miller, "Taliban Leader's Washington Threat Is Credible, Analysts Say," *Fox News*, March

Pakistan, on the other hand, sees the anti-Pakistan TTP and its affiliates as the main adversary. The incentive to target the Afghan Taliban and associated militant factions pledging not to target Pakistani security forces is much less. Despite the ideological links these outfits share with the TTP, the Pakistani military establishment seems confident that it can continue negotiating with this cohort to keep its anti-Pakistan activities in check.²⁵ At the same time, it seems to be able to hold out a credible enough threat of retribution should the Afghan Taliban openly utilize Pakistani territory to run their entire anti-US operations. The incentive is to turn a blind eye to a certain residual level of activity while simultaneously cooperating with the US on intelligence and allowing the US a relatively free hand to target these elements aurally.²⁶

The extent to which the US incentive structure has become lopsided however cannot be comprehended fully without introducing the India factor into the equation. From Pakistan's perspective, the US role in stabilizing the Indo-Pak relationship has been largely counterproductive. Exaggerated as it may be, in the Pakistan military's view, the US involvement in Afghanistan and its reluctance to push India to address Pakistani insecurities has further aggravated the regional imbalance. It is now considered common wisdom in Pakistan that the US, deeply committed as it is to a long-term strategic partnership with India, will remain averse to pulling back from massive defense and nuclear energy cooperation with it but will at the same time avoid according identical treatment to Pakistan. The military also remains resentful of the US' refusal to fulfill what it believes are genuine defense needs – F-16s being the most prominent sticking point – and of Washington's constant concerns about its military aid being diverted to build Pakistani capacity vis-à-vis India.²⁷

In terms of policy, the divergence in opinion is just as strong. Pakistan saw Washington's unwillingness to prod India to agree on a solution to Kashmir after the Pakistani President Musharraf had shown significant flexibility as another sign of US bias. Much the same is the sentiment in India's alleged involvement in supporting separatist elements in Pakistan's Balochistan province, a long-standing Pakistani claim that has been acknowledged by the Baloch separatists and recently reinforced by independent experts.²⁸

Furthermore, Pakistan sees a direct connection between the US intervention in Afghanistan and the increase in Indian leverage with the Afghan government. The US indifference on this count

31, 2009, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,511873,00.html>.

²⁵ Carlotta Gall, "Pakistan and Afghan Taliban Close Ranks," *New York Times*, March 26, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/27/world/asia/27taliban.html>.

²⁶ David Ignatius, "A Quiet Deal With Pakistan" *The Washington Post*, November 4, 2008, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/03/AR2008110302638.html>.

²⁷ David Rohe, Carlotta Gall, Eric Schmitt, and David E. Sanger, "U.S. Officials See Waste in Billions Sent to Pakistan," *New York Times*, December 24, 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/24/world/asia/24military.html>.

²⁸ Most recently, Brahmdagh Bugti, a key separatist tribal figure has acknowledged Indian support on Pakistani television. US policy analyst Christine Fair has also recently pointed to Indian involvement in Balochistan based on her private conversations with Indian officials. Christine Fair, "What's the Problem with Pakistan?," *Foreign Affairs*, March 31, 2009, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/roundtables/whats-the-problem-with-pakistan>.

challenges the very premise of Pakistan military's obsession with a placid Kabul; even before strategic depth was experimented with in the 1990s, a friendly Afghanistan was considered essential for the military to be able to focus on the eastern border. Finally, although US leverage with Iran is minimal, the alleged Indian use of Iranian territory to funnel support to the Baloch insurgency is also an issue Islamabad would have ideally liked Washington to take up with New Delhi. What Pakistan perceives instead is an increasingly pro-India tilt in US' South Asia policy.

Reversing the Perverse Incentives

It is safe to say that the US has failed to alter the Pakistani policy payoffs such that Islamabad would begin to see all out support for the US as beneficial to its cause. Much to the contrary, the Pakistani establishment's threat perception and its long term regional objectives remain entrenched. Worse yet, it associates a deteriorating regional balance vis-à-vis India, a less amenable Afghanistan, and increased backlash due to counter-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan as a direct outcome of US' South Asia policy. To add, the US has been unable to use its state-building support to gain the requisite concessions from Pakistan or to alter its negative perception in the eyes of the Pakistani citizens.

The incentive structure laid out by the US to goad Pakistan into aligning its strategies with American goals needs an urgent overhaul. Indeed, such is the level of perverseness of the framework that a rational actor model would predict maximum Pakistani gains if it were to choose a policy option somewhere between impressing upon the Afghan Taliban to negotiate with the Obama administration while the US is still in a position of relative weakness to actively supporting the Taliban in increasing the misery of Coalition troops in Afghanistan in the hope that it would lead to their forced withdrawal.

In terms of correction, our analysis leaves only one avenue open for US policy intervention: assuaging Pakistan's regional concerns. Other than that, the value of coercion has decreased significantly, the do it ourselves outlook reflects the wrong mindset and is at best a tactical concern in the grand scheme, convincing Pakistan of the gravity of the threat from the Afghan front is intrinsically linked with its regional threat perception, and while the Obama administration has made a positive turn on the buy-out aspect by prioritizing Pakistan's socio-economic needs, by itself this element of policy cannot transform Pakistani incentives such that it would contemplate shifting its focus and troops from the eastern border to tackle the Afghan Taliban and their associates wholeheartedly.

In essence then, the US is left with the extremely challenging task of maneuvering South Asian regional politics in order to alleviate Pakistan's security concerns. Here, the Pakistani demand for the US to prod India to agree on a final settlement for Kashmir is unrealistic. The US simply does not have the leverage to extract such a concession from India when the latter sees any mutually acceptable solution as less preferable to the status quo. However, there are a number of other measures the US could convince India on, ones that may not normalize relations but would be substantial enough to force a serious rethink on Pakistan's part. To begin with, symbolically the US needs to defer to Pakistan's demand of applying a 'regional' lens to South Asia. The Obama Administration's backtracking on including India in Special Envoy Holbrooke's portfolio was unfortunate in this regard. Similarly, the US should persistently and publicly support an

uninterrupted continuation of the dialogue and an early resolution to the Kashmir dispute, making it clear to New Delhi that it would not support the status quo indefinitely. Next, militarily, there is substantial room for India to scale down its formations on its western border. Indeed, a reduction in Indian troop presence is a prerequisite for the US to impress upon Pakistan to do the same.²⁹ By the same token, the deployment of short range Indian Prithvi missiles add little to India's tactical advantage and could be removed to send a strong conciliatory signal to Pakistan. Even going further, the US could spark a debate on a 'no war pact' which, if reached, would be immensely beneficial in terms of shifting Pakistan's focus westward.³⁰ Finally, while these measures may reduce the need for military upgradation in the medium term, for the immediate future, the US should fulfill its long-standing promises of supplying military hardware requested by Pakistan. This would convince Islamabad that the US tilt towards India does not imply a total neglect of Pakistan's needs.

As for Pakistan's fear of encirclement by growing Indian presence in Afghanistan, the US, without challenging India's right to be involved in reconstruction efforts, could push it to utilize Pakistani facilities through Karachi as the principal access route to Afghanistan. Even better would be a simultaneous effort to get Pakistan to accelerate the implementation of the recent Pak-Afghan Memorandum of Understanding on allowing India over-land transit to Afghanistan. One operational, India ought to utilize this route to its maximum potential. Currently, India's investment in a much more convoluted and costly route through Iran into Afghanistan makes little sense beyond seeking means to reduce Pakistan's influence in the region.³¹ Even more critical, the Pakistani concern about Indian meddling in Balochistan must be addressed. Public rhetoric aside, the US intelligence would be in complete know-how of the extent of Indian involvement; based on this information, it should reach out to New Delhi on the subject. The US must grasp any opportunities it finds to use its leverage and convince India to rethink its strategy. The US may have missed a perfect moment to do so in the aftermath of the Mumbai terrorist attacks; it could have brought the Balochistan issue up with India just as it was pressuring Pakistan to come clean on its involvement in the attacks.

The above said, just as Pakistan is unlikely to budge on its threat perception till the India question is addressed, it is equally unrealistic to expect India to commit to any concessions unless Pakistan is bound by stringent commitments. In return for heeding to Pakistani demands, the US should hold out serious ramifications for Pakistan should its involvement in supporting terrorist attacks on Indian interests in the future be proven. The proposed 'no war pact' should consider tangible support to terrorism as a violation liable to be sanctioned through a pre-defined, mutually agreed mechanism. Moreover, Pakistan should also be forced to ensure complete transparency in terrorist probes that involve non-state actions against Indian interests from its soil.

²⁹ Ejaz Haider, "Debunking Arguments Against Eastern Deployment," *Daily Times*, May 27, 2009, http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\05\27\story_27-5-2009_pg3_2.

³⁰ Pakistan has in the past indicated its willingness to sign a 'no war pact' with India. "India Rejects 'No-war' Pact Plea," *The Hindu*, January 25, 2002, <http://www.hindu.com/2002/01/25/stories/2002012503140100.htm>.

³¹ India is partnering with Iran to upgrade its Chahbahar port and has recently completed a strategic 135-mile long road connecting Afghanistan's Nimroz province with Chahbahar.

Another element of the US effort to assuage Pakistan's regional concerns should focus on creating buffers against a hostile Afghanistan once the US withdraws its presence. The US needs to play a delicate balancing act whereby it guarantees that enough non-Northern Alliance Pushtun elements would be included in any political formulation for Pakistan to be convinced that Indian encirclement with Kabul's blessings is implausible. Yet, the US should make clear that a return to the pre-9/11 Taliban's Afghanistan is out of the question. A strong enough Pushtun representation in a government which nonetheless has a broad representation across ethnicities seems to be the most realistic middle ground, one that Pakistan will likely be willing to accept.

The suggested transformation in America's South Asia policy provides the best hope for reversing the perverse incentive structure that currently makes it irrational for Pakistan to fall in line with the US objectives. With India having made visible concessions and Afghanistan's outright animosity towards its eastern neighbor ruled out, Pakistan's cost-benefit equation would have been overhauled. The utility of ties with hardcore militants would decrease at the same time that the potential gains from helping the US negotiate with 'moderate' non-Northern Alliance Pushtun elements from a position of strength increases. The rational actor model would then point to a high probability of Pakistan supporting the anti-terror campaign wholeheartedly.

A Final Word

The fundamental premise of the argument forwarded in this paper is not attractive to the mainstream discourse on the subject. Instead of applying the normative weight of the US position, we have presented a strategic perspective – this is missing for the most part in existing literature – arguing that a state's threat perception is in the eye of the beholder. Therefore, where outright coercion is not an option, attractive incentives have to be created for the party in question to mould its behavior as desired. In terms of the US-Pakistan partnership on the War on Terror this implies a need for the US to assuage Pakistan's regional insecurities before it can expect Islamabad to support its objectives. This is not to make any claim that Pakistan's threat perception or its present response to US policies is rational or commensurate with its long term objectives as a country. That is meaningless as long as Pakistan believes it is. Taking this into account, the prescribed policy course is the only realistic way to bring Pakistani behavior in line with US goals.

The policy implications of the foregoing analysis are not likely to be welcomed by all quarters. Foremost, an Indian perspective may not see such concessions from New Delhi as warranted simply to benefit a third party. By the same token, a US strategist may find any move by Washington to pressure India simply to extract concessions from Pakistan as absurd given the much higher stakes associated with a cordial Indo-US relationship over the long run. Moreover, much of Washington's policy enclave would detest a strategy that they may consider to be too soft on a Pakistan playing a 'double game'. Each of these contentions is justified. However, these point more to the severity of the challenge the US faces in bringing about a positive transformation in its relationship with Pakistan rather than a weakness of the arguments made here. Make no mistake, while the US is right in believing that 'victory' in Afghanistan is not possible without Pakistan's support, achieving that will require challenging the conventional wisdom at home and making a key ally – India – uncomfortable abroad.

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Relocating the Virtual War

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Abstract: *Countering Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups' use of the Internet for both organizational purposes and the dissemination of radical propaganda has frequently been conceptualized in terms of a war in a virtual space. This assumption has led to a distorted understanding of how the Internet is relevant to terrorism, and what methods are appropriate for addressing this. In particular, it has led to an overemphasis on action by governments 'on' the Internet. This entails moving the 'fight' into a terrain in which it cannot easily be won. Better strategies for countering the benefits terrorists draw from the Internet might proceed from instead drawing on governments' overwhelmingly greater power over matter and physical space, and their ability to shape agendas across the complete spectrum of media.*

Keywords: *Terrorism, Al-Qaeda, internet, media, virtual war, counter-terrorism.*

Introduction

The issue of countering the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes has become an increasing policy concern in recent years. While the 'Electronic Pearl Harbour' foretold by writer and consultant Winn Schwartau¹ has not yet materialized (if 'materialized' is quite the right word for such a phenomenon), there is now a significant literature devoted to the various ways in which the Internet can be used to further the purposes of terrorist groups. Terrorists, it has been proposed, use the Internet for a wide variety of purposes, such as fundraising, training, recruitment, networking, secret communication, propaganda, intelligence gathering, psychological warfare and so on – depending on which particular list of such uses is consulted.

Given the exploitation of the 'new arena' of the Internet by terrorists, who are supposed to find therein a 'safe haven' for organizational activities which are no longer so easy to conduct in more traditional ways, the argument has tended to run that ways must be found of bringing the Internet

¹ Winn Schwartau, *Terminal Compromise*, Interpact Press, New York, 1991.

more thoroughly under control. As one scholar puts it, 'the war against Al Qaida has been fought on a virtual as well as a physical battlefield'.² The Internet, a British cabinet minister has said, is not a 'no-go area' for government.³ Indeed, more apocalyptically, a US senator has pronounced that 'we cannot afford to cede cyberspace to the Islamist extremists, for if we do they will attack us in our normal environment'.⁴

Given the apparently unquestioning reliance on the spatial metaphor of cyberspace as a way of conceptualizing the relationship between terrorism and the Internet, it is perhaps not surprising that proposals to counter this threat have also tended to emphasize activity by governments and others 'on' the Internet. In this vein, Davis (2006) has emphasized a dramatic strengthening of the Internet 'governance' exercised by ICANN (the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers – a non-profit corporation responsible for administering the Internet's underlying address system) and the United Nations. Weimann and Von Knop,⁵ by contrast, have called for a more unilateral approach in which individual actors would use the principle of 'noise' in order to disrupt terrorist dissemination of content on the Internet. This could vary from counter-narratives, aimed at challenging terrorist discourses, through to more unconventional (some might say underhanded) tactics such as the use of cyberattacks or malware to disrupt terrorist communications. The principle of 'counter-narrative' on the Internet has also been endorsed by recent think tank reports, including the Institute for European and International Affairs' Countering Militant Islamist Radicalisation on the Internet and the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence's Countering Online Radicalisation: A Strategy for Action. The latter advocates the use of small start up seed funds for community based initiatives aiming to use, in particular 'web 2.0' as a means for promoting alternatives to radical (Islamic) agendas.

The purpose of this paper will be threefold: to challenge (or at least query) some of the assumptions that are generally made about the relationship between terrorism and the Internet; to point out some of the flaws in approaches which depend on addressing the notion of 'terror on the Internet' and, finally, to suggest how many of the actual terrorist threats arising from use of the Internet may be better addressed by focusing not on the 'virtual' arena, but rather on the very substantial powers which governments retain over the physical world in which, thus far, terrorism has continued to actually take place. Many of these proposals are, as we shall see, normal actions which governments are already taking. Recognizing their significance, however, against terrorist use of the Internet offers a potentially useful way to reframe action against this particular issue.

² Akil Awan, "Al Qa'ida's Virtual Crisis," *The RUSI Journal*, Vol 154, 1, 2009, p. 1.

³ Jacqui Smith, reported in Tim Stevens and Peter Neumann, *Countering Online Radicalisation, A Strategy for Action* International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, London, 2009, p. 7.

⁴ Senator Joseph Lieberman, quoted in Anne Broach, 'Terrorists voice alarm over terrorist Net presence' CNET News May, 3, 2007 available at http://news.cnet.com/Senators-voice-alarm-over-terrorist-Net-presence/2100-1028_3-6181269.html.

⁵ Gabriel Weimann and Katherina Von Knop 'Applying the Notion of Noise to Countering Online Terrorism', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* Vol 31, No 10, pp. 883-902.

Terrorism and the Internet

What's in a name? A remarkable feature of discussion on terrorism and the Internet has been the number of different formulations used to describe the phenomenon (if, indeed, it is a single phenomenon that is being described). Cyberterrorism is still, particularly in policy circles, used in a broad sense to refer to the full gamut of uses to which terrorists might put the Internet, from cyberattacks through to social networking. Generally speaking, academics have tended to favor somewhat more precise language: cyberterrorism, it is insisted by, eg Denning,⁶ is to be understood strictly as the serious disruption of computer systems resulting in real, frightening damage for ideological purposes. It is not equivalent to just any use of the Internet by terrorists – for example, for purposes of fundraising, recruitment, internal communication, dissemination of training and so on.

Uses of the Internet which are in some way 'terrorist', but which are not 'cyberterrorism' are, in turn, described by a number of different formulations. Lt Col Timothy Thomas⁷ proposed the term 'cyberplanning' to describe this set of situations. Others have preferred less snappy, but arguably more descriptive phrases. Conway⁸ favors 'terrorist "use" of the Internet' – the quote marks perhaps implying the term 'misuse' or even 'abuse' often favored by governments, rather as if sending someone a letter calling for bloodthirsty revolution were an illegitimate abuse of the good will of the postal service. Weimann has used formulas such as 'how ...terrorism uses the Internet',⁹ 'terror on the Internet'¹⁰ and simply 'online terrorism'.¹¹ A more cautious phrase adopted by the Council of Europe¹² and the United Nations¹³ has been 'use of the Internet for terrorist purposes'. Hovering around the edges of the subject area have been related concerns such as 'radicalisation on the Internet',¹⁴ 'cyberwar'¹⁵ and 'information war'.

⁶ Dorothy Denning, 'Is Cyber Terror Next?' SSRC essays, 2001 <http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/denning.htm>, also Dorothy Denning 'Activism, Hacktivism and Cyberterrorism: The Internet as a Tool for Influencing Foreign Policy' in Arquilla and Ronfeldt (eds) *Networks and Netwars: The Future of War, Crime and Militancy* RAND, Santa Monica, 2001 pp. 239-288.

⁷ Lt Col. Timothy Thomas, 'Al Qaeda and the Internet: The Danger of "Cyberplanning"', *Parameters*, Spring 2003, pp. 112-123.

⁸ Maura Conway 'Terrorist "Use of the Internet, and Fighting Back' International Relations and Security Network, 2006 <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0C54E3B3-1E9C-BE1E-2C24-A6A8C7060233&lng=en&id=20642>.

⁹ Gabriel Weimann, 'www.terror.net: how modern terrorism uses the Internet' Special Report, United States Institute of Peace, 2006 <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr116.html>.

¹⁰ Gabriel Weimann *Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, The New Challenges*.

¹¹ Op cit. p. 2.

¹² Ulrich Sieber, *Cyberterrorism: The Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes*, Council of Europe Report, 2007.

¹³ See 'Report of the Working Group on Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes' <http://un.org/terrorism/workgroup6.shtml>.

¹⁴ Akil Awan, 'Radicalization on the Internet?' *The RUSI Journal* Vol 152, No 3, 2007 pp. 76-81.

This lack of a precise terminology matters. It indicates a continued uncertainty as to what we are actually talking about. Is the problem with ‘terrorists’ on the Internet, for example, or is it with ‘radicals’? If the former, then are we talking about actual ‘terrorists’, or about some sort of new category of ‘terrorists on the Internet’. If the latter, then what assurance is there that radicalism is, in itself, something to worry about? Is it cause for concern simply that terrorists use the Internet (of course they do!), or is the point that the unique capabilities of the Internet give rise to a new and unique type of terrorist phenomenon requiring special remedies?

To make the point concrete, there is the issue of ‘terrorist websites’. Various estimates of the number of these exist: a lower estimate being around 5,300¹⁶, an upper estimate being as many as 50,000.¹⁷ None of these estimates, however, provide an accurate definition of what a ‘terrorist website’ actually is. If it is the site of a ‘supporter’ of terrorism, then that is categorically different (though not necessarily recognizably different) from a website actually maintained by a terrorist organization. Are individuals behind ‘terrorist’ websites (of whatever definition) contributing to ‘terrorism’ on that account? Are ideological supporters of terrorism guilty of a terrorist offense on that account? The problem is that, uncomfortable as it may sound, support for terrorist groups is often more widespread than the small number of actual participants in the violence. As Gupta points out, ‘while an entire community may be sympathetic to the cause, a miniscule minority carries out the acts of violence.’¹⁸ Acting, therefore, on the assumption that sympathy for terrorism is a kind of terrorist offense may be a classic example of the counterproductive counterterrorist excess criticized by Silke.¹⁹

At the same time, there are certainly ways in which the Internet’s unique convergence of capabilities does appear to present some genuine conundrums in this regard. The Internet, as has often been observed, helps to collapse the distinction between consumer and producer. As Conway points out, an implication of this is that it also collapses the distinction between the terrorist propagandist and the consumer of this propaganda.²⁰ This in turn invites, so it seems, ideas of ‘networked’, ‘leaderless’, ‘home grown’ types of terrorism, in which individual consumers-producers-interacters of terrorist propaganda go on to think of themselves as participants in a wider militant movement and, from there, move on either to more concrete forms of support activity (e.g. fundraising and recruitment) or actually progress to violence themselves.

¹⁵ John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, ‘Cyberwar is coming!’ in John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (eds) *In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age* RAND, Santa Monica, p. 23.

¹⁶ Gabriel Weimann ‘The Psychology of Mass-Mediated Terrorism’ *American Behavioural Scientist* Vol 52, No 1, 2008 pp. 69-86.

¹⁷ Eric Swedlund, ‘UA effort sifting web for terror threat data’ *Arizona Daily Star* 24/09/2007.

¹⁸ Dipak K. Gupta ‘Towards an Integrated Behavioural Framework for Analysing Terrorism: Individual Motivations to Group Dynamics’ Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, California 22/03/06.

¹⁹ Andrew Silke ‘The Fire of Iolous: The Role of State Counter-Measures in Causing Terrorism, and What Needs to be Done’ in Tore Bjorgo (ed) *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward* Routledge, London, 2005, pp. 524-621.

²⁰ Maura Conway, ‘Mass Communication - from Nitro to the Net’ *The World Today* Vol 60 No 8/9 pp. 19-22.

Even taken at fact value, there is the paradox that the most obviously objectionable materials on the Internet in terms of flagrant attempts at incitement to violence are often not the 'official' websites of terrorist organizations, but rather the sites of their supporters.²¹

But it is worth stressing that this narrative of the role of the Internet in terrorism is only one possible interpretation of the story. Indeed, there are some (Kimmage: 2008 for example) who contend that the anarchic nature of the net is a thorn in the flesh to terrorist groups as much as it is to governments. Al Qaeda, embarrassed by the postings of enthusiastic but ignorant fans was forced to make moves to rein in what it called 'media exuberance'. Indeed, the posting guidelines for Al-Faloja²² – currently one of the primary outlets on the Internet of Al Qaeda affiliate propaganda – primly exhort posters to avoid material likely to give offense or create *fitna* (division) in the community, as well as, interestingly, information on subjects such as how to make bombs. According to the author's discussion with a member of the Belgian special police unit dealing with terrorism and the Internet, observers here have concluded that forums are rigidly controlled, and that posting even of official videos in advance of their specified issue date is cause for a serious reprimand.

Indeed, one fundamental problem of looking for 'terrorism' on the Internet is that it is so easy to find. With radical forums boasting memberships in the tens of thousands and a proliferation of radical materials of one sort or another, looking for actually dangerous individuals is, arguably, like looking for a needle in a stack of needles. Denning (and others) has rightly poured cold water on the idea of a threat posed by 'virtual terrorism' as practiced by groups such as the 'Second Life Liberation Army'.²³ However, statistical odds alone speak for the fact that hordes of avid 'jihobbyists' (to use the term proposed by Brachman)²⁴ are living out a not dissimilar fantasy – reveling in the sense of agency given them by practicing 'jihad of the tongue', but still a very long way from crossing over to the more demanding path of 'jihad of the sword'. Presumably, no one would be obtuse enough to mistake the irony intended in Syrian poet Ahmed Matar's popular poem 'Yes, I am a terrorist'; but, a not dissimilar discourse appears to stand behind the declarations of the popular jihadi nasheed 'Irhabyun Ana' (I am a terrorist), the handle of the 'cyberjihadi' irhabi007, and even the declaration made in the Al Qaeda document dating from 2007 entitled 'the dictionary' in which it is baldly declared that the word 'terrorism' is to be translated simply as 'jihad'. Where then, does this leave a case such as that of Muhammad Atef Siddique, who reportedly declared 'Osama bin Laden is my God' – a statement hardly likely to flatter the strictly literalist Wahhabi sentiments of the 'sheikh', - and was alleged to have 'caused a breach of the peace by claiming to be a member of the terror network, Al Qaeda'.²⁵ Reportedly, there were better reasons (inadmissible in court, because they derived from surveillance by intelligence) for why this individual, was prosecuted under the UK 2006 Terrorism Act, essentially

²¹ Gabriel Weimann and Yariv Tsfati 'www.terrorism.com: terror on the Internet' *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* Vol 25, 317-332, 2002, 317-332.

²² <http://www.al-faloja.info/vb/announcement.php?f=10>

²³ Dorothy Denning 'The Jihadi Cyberterror Threat', powerpoint presentation from SUMIT 07, 2007.

²⁴ Jarret M. Brachman *Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice* Routledge, Abingdon (Oxon) 2009 p. 19.

²⁵ Aberdeen Press and Journal, 17/09/07.

for the possession of documents on explosive materials and the establishment of pro-Al Qaeda websites. As well, it has been alleged, Atef Siddique's online social network included individuals who were more deeply involved in activities preparatory to actual violence than he (apparently) was.²⁶ Nonetheless, the controversies surrounding this case provide an elegant illustration of the difficulties and ambiguities inherent in distinguishing between real terrorists and self-styled terrorists.

Another difficulty in approaching the issue of terrorism on the Internet is distinguishing between causation and mere co-occurrence. This is not just an issue in questions of Internet radicalization (does a large collection of terrorist propaganda material turn one into a terrorist, or is it simply a side-effect of another process which turns one into a terrorist?). It is also an issue of much more concrete uses of the Internet by terrorists. So, for example, Weimann (2006) asserts that the 9/11 hijackers 'used the Internet, and used it well'. According to Weimann's account, the 9/11 hijackers were heavy users of email, which they accessed through Internet cafés, even receiving orders in this way, by means of a very primitive word substitution cipher. They may indeed have 'used the Internet well' – but did they, in most respects a normal group of Western educated middle class Arabs, use the Internet any better, or any differently than their peers? If not, then the implication is that terrorist use of the Internet is, to this extent, an unremarkable correlate of the age, education and socioeconomic status of the individuals concerned. Of course, this may be the point. Indeed, it is perhaps ironic (given the frequent suspicion in which terrorism researchers are held, of being, as Wilkinson puts it, 'more right wing than Genghis Khan'), that much of the background to the assertion that the Internet is a powerful new medium for terrorism rests on a wide-eyed techno-optimism more characteristic of the new-age tinged liberalism of the likes of Howard Rheingold.²⁷

In fact, determining whether or not the Internet has really given terrorists a new edge is immensely difficult to prove either way – particularly where the issue is not with terrorists benefiting from 'abnormal' uses of the Internet (such as hacking or identity theft) but with 'normal' uses of the Internet. Globally speaking, there is no good evidence that terrorism, as a whole, has become more common or more lethal since the beginning of the 1990. Indeed, the period of the exponential rise of the Internet between the mid 1990s and the mid 2000s has seen an overall decline in the incidence and (9/11 excepted) a generally stable lethality of terrorist violence.²⁸

Reflecting on this fact does not negate the idea that the Internet is valuable to terrorists, but it does force us to reflect on what the usefulness of the Internet to terrorists actually means. Does the Internet give terrorists a special edge over counterterrorists (counterterrorists being understood in the broadest possible sense – not just as military and law enforcement personnel, but as anyone whose actions, intentional or otherwise, might ultimately result in terrorism not occurring)? Does

²⁶ Network diagram in Steve Swann, 'Aabid Khan and his Global Jihad' 18th August 2008 available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7549447.stm>.

²⁷ Howard Rheingold *The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier*, Addison Wesley Publishing, Reading (Massachusetts), 1993.

²⁸ See Rik Coolsaet and Teun Ven De Voorde 'The Evolution of Terrorism in 2005: A Statistical Assessment' Special Report, University of Ghent, 2006.

the Internet merely provide a different way for things to happen that would happen anyway, or does the Internet create new terrorist phenomena which are not so much better or worse, but simply different?

For example, just as it has been argued that many types of terrorist incidents in the past (for example barricade and hostage situations) have been deliberately orchestrated for maximum televisual impact²⁹, so too it might be argued that certain types of recent terrorist activity have been carefully scripted for the different properties of the Internet. Hence, it could be argued that hostage beheadings are ideally suited to the Internet's lack of censorship, super-abundance of choice (meaning that material needs to have a certain shock value to compete for attention) constraints on bandwidth (which rewards conciseness), temporal ambiguity (meaning that an image must contain its own narrative within itself), celebration of montage³⁰ and craving for physical authenticity³¹ (Gies 2008). This would relate to another well-known Internet video series: the 'Baghdad Sniper' of the Islamic Army of Iraq. Here, a particular series of violent acts have been elaborately assembled into a sophisticated new-media narrative. The Baghdad sniper videos are essentially compilations of sniper attacks on US personnel in Iraq. However, they have been stitched together around the (probably fictional) character 'Juba,' the sniper of Baghdad, who is portrayed as a paragon of Islamic and chivalric virtue – scrupulously discriminate in his use of violence, patriotic and pious. This character has been surrounded by a carefully constructed online personality cult. Anasheed (Islamic hymns) have been composed in his honor, and his website offers a variety of resources for fans – including posters. Paradoxically, however, despite the apparent artifice of the character of Juba, in the introduction to 'Juba, the Baghdad Sniper 2' a blurred out figure claimed to be the 'commander of the sniper brigade in Baghdad' explains the popularity of the videos in terms of bodily authenticity: 'filming the operations is very important, because the scene that shows the falling soldier when hit has more impact on the enemy than any other weapon'. This is in contrast to other types of attack commonly filmed by the IAI such as roadside IEDs or rocket attacks, where casualties are not normally visually apparent.

This illustrates elegantly the difficulty of distinguishing issues of terrorism 'on the Internet' from the Internet actually leading to terrorism on the ground. Creating a montage of sniper assassinations makes for compelling propaganda, but did the 'Juba' project actually inspire the Islamic Army in Iraq to carry out assassinations purely for the sake of the video? If it did, did this displace other kinds of more lethal or more reprehensible attacks? Are hostage beheadings worrying because of their inherently repulsive qualities (like a sort of violent equivalent to obscene pornography); are they worrying because they may encourage others to go and do likewise? Are they worrying (to make a subtle, but important distinction) because their success as propaganda may lead terrorist groups to carry out more of them? Certainly, hostage beheadings are upsetting and effective at achieving 'terror', but they are no more lethal than any other situation in which terrorists kill a hostage.

²⁹ For examples of this see, eg Alex Schmid and Janny de Graaf *Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media*, London, Sage 1982.

³⁰ See Lev Manovich, *The Language of New Media* MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2002.

³¹ Lieve Gies, 'How Material are Cyberbodies? Broadband Internet and Embodied Subjectivity' *Crime, Media, Culture* Vol 4, No 3, 2008 pp. 311-330.

Terrorism is not just about lethality. By this metric, it is well known that terrorism has always been insignificant by comparison with other types of cause of death. The impact of terrorism has always been psychological as well as physical. Its sensationalism is an inseparable part of its reality. Nonetheless, the idea that terrorism 'on' the Internet must be countered 'in' cyberspace implies a worrying shift away from the centrality of concern over the actual damage that terrorism does to human lives and towards a much more nebulous concern over the presumed danger presented by certain combinations of words and ideas. But the objection to attempting to fight terrorism 'on' the Internet is not just an objection to a project which could risk becoming a creeping de-legitimization of the right to dissent. It is also an objection to engaging in a misconceived and potentially expensive attempt to shift the 'battle' against terrorism to a place where it cannot be won.

Combating Terrorism on the 'Virtual Battlefield'

While determining what 'terrorism on the Internet' could actually mean is difficult, determining, in the abstract, what sort of online actions might be taken against it is relatively straightforward. This is because, ultimately, the Internet is not a parallel dimension, but rather a means for the transmission of electronic data between computers. This means that, in any activity taking place by means of the Internet, there are two basic issues at stake: the fact of communication taking place, and the dissemination, in the course of this communication, of an item of digitally expressed information. It is a central peculiarity of the Internet and other forms of digital communication that the properties of digital content (as discussed by Negroponte: 1993), that digital information of any kind, once created, can be copied infinitely at virtually zero cost, and this fact creates an important duality between person to person communication and the mass dissemination of content. Nonetheless, it is possible for the sake of simplicity to distinguish between two basic issues: *interpersonal communication* by electronic means, and social activities occurring in an online public space through the medium of *digital content*.

Interpersonal communication, as a counterterrorist issue, is in essence the same problem regardless of medium (though concern, specifically, over electronic communication by terrorists has played its part in justifying laws such as the USA PATRIOT act, and in the UK the Regulation of Investigative Powers Act). In principle, the question 'should we monitor communications on the Internet?' is identical to the question 'should we tap phone lines?' or 'should we steam open envelopes?' This is not to say that there are not Internet specific concerns. Far from it; the basic architecture of the Internet as a packet switched 'best effort' system means that any attempt to intercept communications, in contrast to a directly routed telephone conversation, is liable both to unwarranted intrusion into the private communications of non-suspects and to being thwarted by evasive means. Moreover, the economic organization of Internet Service Provision provides a further policy dilemma regarding what level of customer data governments can legitimately require.

However, such concerns have not tended to lend themselves well to discussions on the issue of 'countering' terrorism on the Internet (though they take a prominent place in Weimann's: 2006 chapter on the subject). They are at once too generalized (they impinge on all sorts of illegal activity that may be conducted by means of the Internet, not only terrorism); and too specific (they

tend to relate to concretely criminal actions, such as conspiracies to commit actual crimes). Finally, they give rise to no obviously new terrorist phenomenon. A technology which enables X and Y (who must already have successfully established each other's bona fides – perhaps through face to face contact) to communicate with each other secretly implies no dramatic change in the underlying way in which terrorism happens – just a new evolution of ancient practice to keep up with new technology.

In so far as it has produced genuinely new social phenomena, the Internet has not done so simply by being a text and graphic based version of the phone system. Rather, the revolutionary potential of the Internet has derived from the potential of multi-way exchanges of digital data to create the possibility of 'public space'. This is no less true for assertions about terrorism on the Internet as it is for anything else. Claims about terrorists providing 'training' on the Internet, 'recruiting' on the Internet, 'networking' on the Internet and even, in some instances, raising funds on the Internet are founded on the notion of there being online public spaces of multi-way communication in which such things can occur. While the World Wide Web is by no means the only Internet application which creates this possibility, any multi-way communication by any means (for example, instant messenger) ultimately entails the existence of a quasi-physical 'space' created by the existence of digital items viewable by several people at once. In other words, online community relies on the notion of several people looking at the same thing at once. This means that, ultimately, it boils down to a question of what to do about digital content.

What to do About Digital Content?

Given the notion that digital content of a given type is pernicious in its effects, there are two obvious courses of action that might be taken. Either attempt to eliminate the content in question (or at least make it more difficult to get hold of), or, somehow, attempt to eliminate the pernicious effects of the content. Mark Potok, senior intelligence agent at the Southern Poverty Law Centre, a civil rights practice specializing in countering hate groups (especially of the extreme right) in the USA puts this choice in a elegant public health based metaphor: either quarantine, or inoculate.

Quarantining

The idea that material judged to be terrorism related or radical can be effectively removed from the Internet is not dead. In the European Union, a new proposal is calling for further examination of the extent to which the hotline model, currently used for reporting child pornographic and sometimes extreme right material to ISPs for removal, can be usefully extended to this area. In Australia, a national filtering system is being tested that lists, among other things, terrorism related material.³² In the US, Senator Joseph Lieberman was responsible for successfully lobbying for an alteration of the acceptable use terms of the video sharing site YouTube.³³ Others have called for more radical solutions still, involving an international level treaty that would regulate content on the Internet, or for action at the level of the global domain name system to similar effect. Yet

³² Joshua Keating, 'The List: Look Who's Censoring the Internet Now.' *Foreign Policy* March, 2009.

³³ 'Lieberman to YouTube: 'Remove Al Qaeda Videos' CNN, 20/05/08.

others have suggested a more devious approach, involving, amongst other things, the use of ‘cyberwar’ techniques against terrorist material such as denial of service attacks or the disruptive use of malware.³⁴

In spite of this, there is a growing expert consensus that censorship of whichever variety is unlikely to be effective against terrorism related content. In particular, Ryan (2007) has pointed out that even the best filtering systems are both inaccurate and vulnerable to malicious subversion, while a recent United Nations report has cast doubt on the viability of a new instrument for the regulation of terrorist or radical content on the Internet. However, existing critiques of the viability of combating radical content through a strategy based on limiting access to it have tended to focus on the technical limitations to such a strategy, failing to emphasize that there are also reasons inherent to the way that terrorist propaganda content is actually disseminated which argue against the likely success of repressive tactics – at least within the limitations imposed by liberal-democratic frameworks.

Indeed, the discussion on the problems of countering radical/terrorist content on the Internet has tended to focus on what might be called the *international* problem of Internet governance. That is to say, the difficulty created by the fact that content which is illegal within a particular locality may well be perfectly legal elsewhere. This has stimulated a focus either on solutions based on local filtering systems, or on international agreements.

The tacit assumption behind such an approach is that terrorist propaganda content survives because it is hosted in places where it cannot be taken down; but this is, in fact, substantially not the case. It is true that much radical and terrorist content is hosted in the US (as is the majority of all material on the Internet). However, unlike extreme right wing content, which is now increasingly hosted on private servers where it shelters at the furthest extremity of the cover offered by the First Amendment to the US Constitution, this content is generally to be found on mainstream, commercial hosting companies. Such companies have a history of voluntarily removing such content when they are informed about it, as demonstrated by the work of Aaron Weisburd, a private researcher into Islamic radicalism on the Internet, who for a time specialized in doing just this, removing over a thousand sites in the process.³⁵ Indeed, radical material is frequently encountered in locations such as blog hosting, file hosting or video hosting sites where it is explicitly in contravention of publicly available acceptable use agreements. Getting such material removed is simply a matter of clicking on the appropriate button and informing the host. Indeed the proliferation of defunct sites and materials encountered by any researcher of radical and terrorist propaganda materials is eloquent testimony to the fact that such facilities are actually used.

The continued survival and proliferation of radical material on the World Wide Web is, then, not the result of an absence of will or ability to remove such content. Rather, it is due to the singularly robust qualities of digital material disseminated through the Internet. A useful example of this is presented by the radical Islamist forum ‘Medad al-Suyuf’. According to ‘Al Mihdar’ a senior member, the ‘companions’ of the forum back the entire site up every day in anticipation of

³⁴ Weimann and Von Knop, op cit. p. 2.

³⁵ Correspondence with the author.

its being attacked or removed. Moreover, they maintain an email list of every member, which serves a dual purpose: on the one hand, it is used on a day to day basis as a means of sending fresh releases direct to interested parties. On the other, it serves as a means for keeping the community alive and informing it of any future change of venue for the main site. Indeed, this appears to reflect a strategy discussed during the last days of another radical forum, Al Hisbah, where, faced with attacks which had taken down the other major Al Qaeda forums, it was proposed that members network by email list, with a view to taking over any useful-looking Islamist forums they might encounter, without being entirely reliant for the survival of the community on any one forum's permanent existence.

A further interesting point raised by 'Al Mihdar' in response to ongoing concerns about intelligence infiltration of radical Islamist forums is his eminently realistic and sensible assessment that it happens, but it doesn't matter. Al Mihdar argues that creating closed forums as an attempt to prevent intelligence infiltration is ineffective and a recipe for petty factionalism. Rather, he advocates an open policy in which the community will focus on disseminating information freely regardless of whether some of those reading it are doing so for ulterior motives.

The evolution of this robust system (which in fact parallels still more sophisticated measures taken by still more heavily persecuted communities devoted to child pornography and Neo-Nazism) is a useful demonstration of why measures aimed at restricting the dissemination of content is probably a non-starter. The material survives not because it is not adequately policed, but simply because the demands, of the Internet, both technical and commercial make for a system in which gatekeeping always takes place after the event: in other words, after the horse has bolted.

Inoculating

Given widespread acceptance that restriction of radical material is not likely to be an effective strategy (at least on its own), another strategy that has been much promoted recently is that of 'counter-narrative': that is to say, using the Internet as a means of promoting alternative, positive messages. In contrast to censorship of the Internet, which is inevitably distasteful to analysts coming from a liberal perspective, the idea of 'harnessing the power of the Internet' to provide 'positive messages' has been trumpeted with almost uniform enthusiasm from policy-makers and experts alike. In this vein, Ryan³⁶ talks of the importance of empowering end users to engage extremists in dialogue; Stevens and Neumann (2009) advocate 'promoting positive messages' through 'an independent start up fund to provide seed money for online initiatives'; and Weimann and Knop discuss the usefulness of counter-narrative as a means of creating cultural and psychological 'noise'.

Unfortunately, such an approach is more attractive as a principle than as a practice. 'If you build it they will come' type approaches, in which governments help to finance websites devoted to views they would like to see put forward are likely to be costly failures – as is demonstrated by the failure of the UK Home Office backed 'Radical Middle Way' site to generate more than a few thousand hits a week. Worse, as the scholar of modern Islamic politics Olivier Roy points out,

³⁶ Johnny Ryan, *Countering Militant Islamist Radicalisation on the Internet: A User Driven Strategy to Recover the Web* Institute of European and International Affairs, Dublin, 2007.

government backing for such views can be a kiss of death for any credibility that their proponents might have with the disaffected individuals at whom such campaigns are (rightly or wrongly) targeted.³⁷ Direct engagement in conversations on radical sites is most likely to result simply in ejection from these sites, as is elegantly illustrated by a conversation on the forum 'Islamic Awakening' in which a member laments having been promptly ejected from the Al Qaeda affiliate forum 'Al Ikhlas' after questioning Al Qaeda in Iraq's tendency to kill Muslim civilians. Another member informs him that it serves him right, and that the mujahidin must be sick of such questions.

Moreover, attempting to engage in Islamic dialogue may be a red herring in any case if, as scholars such as Roy suggest, Al Qaeda is actually better understood as a youth movement than as a religious grouping. As Roy points out:

To my knowledge, none of the arrested [al Qaeda] terrorists or suspects had Zawahiri or other books in their house, while they often have handbooks on how to make bombs or videos about 'atrocities' perpetrated against Muslims. Contrary for instance to the Hizb ut-Tahrir members, who always formulate their positions in elaborate ideological terms, Al Qaeda's members do not articulate before or after having been caught a political or an ideological stand (most of AQ suspects keep silent or deny any involvement during their trial, a very unusual attitude for political militants, who traditionally transform their trial into a political tribunal). We should certainly not discard entirely the fact that some quarters in Al Qaeda are writing or thinking in terms of ideology, but this does not seem to be the main motivation for joining Al Qaeda.³⁸

Indeed, many of the most militant of 'jihadi' cultural items available from the Internet are highly ideologically promiscuous, referencing in turns a heady mix of half understood Islamism, Arab nationalism, Salafism, the Nation of Islam, conspiracy theories of the left and the right and so on. The logic expressed is not that of a well-worked out theological justification for jihad as a *fardh 'ayn*, but rather a loose, but emotive sense that Muslims (as an imagined community more than as adherents to a highly specific creed) are under attack and must be defended. While there may be a narrative behind such beliefs, it is emotive rather than intellectual and therefore not necessarily accessible to argumentation.

An Offline Strategy Against Online 'Terrorist' Activity

The failure to build a coherent policy on terrorism on the Internet is based, arguably, on the fact that it has been built on two important fallacies. The first is the assumption that terrorism on the Internet is a problem in and of itself. The second is that because it is 'on' the Internet, the response to it must be as well. In fact, terrorist use of the Internet (however, defined) is a *terrorist* problem only when it leads to terrorism in real life. And in so far as material on the Internet might be a problem in its own right, it could be that there are other *offline* actions which would do more to counter it than anything governments could do online. Indeed, offline actions to counter online

³⁷ Olivier Roy, *Al Qaeda in the West as a Youth Movement: The Power of a Narrative*, Microcon Policy Working Paper, November 2008.

³⁸ Op cit. previous page.

problems may often hold more promise for the simple reason that they enable government to act where its power is strongest – namely, over matter and physical space rather than where it is most open to being contested, that is to say, in the domain of ideas.

To begin with one very specific example of what this might mean, consider the alleged role of Google Earth in the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai. Whether Google Earth was in fact used is not known – the dossier of evidence produced by the Indian government³⁹ concerning the attacks confirms the use of GPS devices (which might be seen as related, in a wider sense to ‘cyberspace’). For the sake of argument, however, let us assume that Google Earth was used.

This example is a useful test case, since the Internet material in question, though beneficial to terrorists, is clearly innocent. Admittedly, according to an article in the (London) *Times*⁴⁰ an Indian court did actually consider outlawing the service in India (another story from around the same time claimed that an Indian company was planning a more detailed and up to date version of the same service specifically for India). However, how such a measure would have prevented terrorists, who started their journey in *Pakistan*, from using it in their planning is difficult to understand. Nor would a more limited service be possible. Google Earth has, at request, removed sensitive military locations from the images it provides. Although, the terrorists in this instance did not (as terrorists customarily do not) attack such a location. Terrorist targets are precisely the same type of civilian locations which a service such as Google Earth can hardly avoid covering.

Therefore, in this instance, removing material from the Internet is clearly not a solution. Nor, indeed, is any type of activity that might realistically be carried out on the Internet. What, then, is? According to Google’s geo-location services manager, Rob Painter, the satellite images used by Google are a year old (which incidentally makes them, as he points out, 364 times more compliant with US law than they need to be, since government mandates exclusive access to the data only for its first 24 hours after capture). Consequently, one obvious counterstrategy is simply to move potential targets often enough to ensure that the information is out of date. While this advice is clearly more applicable to, for example, military formations than it is to city centers, it is not necessarily completely irrelevant to the case at issue. Newman and Clark,⁴¹ for example, advocate regular changes to physical space, such as changing the names and signs of popular cafés, as one way of rendering them less vulnerable to suicide bombers who may be unfamiliar with the terrain and dependent on a set route.

A related approach might be to plan counter-terrorist responses around the assumption of an opponent well supplied with certain types of general geographical data, but without other types of more specific topographical information. Targets could be hardened, for example, or traps sprung in places identified as likely to look tempting to an attacker with a bird’s eye view.

These are not comprehensive suggestions. The idea is, rather, to suggest an alternative state of mind that might be brought to thinking about threats emanating from the Internet. The key point

³⁹ Dossier available from <http://www.nefafoundation.org/documents>.

⁴⁰ Rhys Blakely ‘Indian court asked to ban Google Earth’ *The Times* (London) 10/12/08 http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech_and_web/the_web/article5314085.ece.

⁴¹ Ronald V. Clarke and Graeme R. Newman, *Outsmarting the Terrorists* Praeger Security International, Westport, Connecticut, p. 93.

being made in the example above is this: while a government may be almost powerless to affect a certain activity happening online, it may well retain an overwhelming advantage in another area which, if denied to terrorists, would render their online advantage irrelevant. By choosing to have the confrontation on the Internet, governments are denying themselves the right to take the initiative and confront the enemy on territory where they enjoy an advantage.

This approach is not new. In fact, it corresponds closely with historical experiences of confrontations between heavy, hierarchical, industrialized forces and lighter, more maneuverable opponents. To take one example, in *Making Sense of War: Strategy for 21st Century* Alan Stephens and Nicola Baker⁴² point to the example of how General Ulysses S. Grant was able to win the American Civil War for the Union, following a series of disastrous defeats at the hands of a Confederacy inferior in men and material, but superior in the tactical abilities of its leadership. Grant's strategy was to 'never maneuver'. Rather than try to defeat the enemy at their own game, he simply concentrated on grinding them down. This is not, of course, to suggest that a brutal emphasis on physical force is in any way appropriate for a 'virtual' or 'information' war on a sometimes almost metaphysical adversary. Rather, the point is that, like the Northern Union in the civil war, governments' greatest comparative advantage *viz à viz* amorphous ideational networks lies precisely in their superior *weight*.

From the point of view of Western democracies, the most important issue in terms of terrorism and the Internet appears to be its role in supporting the type of leaderless political violence which Raffaello Pantucci identifies as that advocated by the jihadi strategic thinker Abu Mus'ab al-Suri.⁴³ This suggests a model of terrorist activity in which individually inspired groups of activists, unknown to each other but sharing a common agenda spontaneously engage in acts of violence against a commonly agreed on enemy.

One obvious weakness of this model is that, while it may create plenty of enthusiastic volunteers, it is less good at providing people with the necessary tradecraft and military skills necessary to translate this fervor into effective terrorist action. This is amply evidenced by the number of botched operations carried out by 'leaderless jihadis' and their equivalents from different ideological spectra.⁴⁴ These could include the failed bombing attempts in London on 21 July (which Kohlmann observes differed to the 7/7 bombings, which benefited from some formal training camp experience) 'only in the quality of their explosives'; the equally unsuccessful attempts by Bilal Abdullah and Kafeel Ahmed on Glasgow Airport, and the failed nail bombing on 'The Giraffe' restaurant in Exeter.

⁴² Alan Stephens and Nicola Baker, *Making Sense of War: Strategy for the 21st Century* Cambridge University Press: Cambridge; New York, 2006, pp. 71-72.

⁴³ Raffaello Pantucci, 'Operation Praline: The Realisation of Al-Suri's Nizam, la Tanzim?' *Perspectives on Terrorism* Vol 2, No 12.

⁴⁴ Marc Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the 21st Century* Pennsylvania State University Press, Philadelphia, 2008.

In explanation of this, Sageman observes, following the work of Michael Kenney⁴⁵ on organizational learning by criminal and terrorist networks, that there are certain skills (such as bomb making) which cannot be learned simply through acquiring theoretical technical knowledge (which Kenney calls *techne*). There must also be a more abstract type of know-how gained by practical experience (*metis* in Kenney's terminology).

While governments may, then, have limited powers to prevent individuals from acquiring the necessary *techne* for bomb making (and indeed other types of operation), there may be a great deal that can be done to prevent the acquisition of *metis*. Indeed, at least in a UK context, it is fair to say that significant measures in this regard have already been taken. For example, the 2006 Terrorism Act contains explicit provisions against training for terrorism and attendance at a place used for terrorist training. At the same time, the establishment of a hotline to report terrorist activity has led, at times, to useful information on the construction of explosives.

It is also possible, however, that other, relatively subtle measures might be useful in denying would-be-terrorists the opportunity to hone their skills. For example, in the UK context, it is interesting that the one relatively successful example of 'leaderless' terrorism based on information downloaded from the Internet was carried out not by a 'jihadi', but rather by David Copeland, an individual with neo-Nazi sympathies. Copeland reportedly practiced his bomb making skills late at night on his local Hampshire common. Hence, his success in contrast to jihadi terrorists is conceivably related to the generally urban background of proponents of this ideological tendency, which may limit the opportunities of the latter to hone their skills. It would follow that measures which would deny empty rural spaces to would-be terrorists – even through means as innocuous as promoting greater recreational use of such areas could, potentially, have knock-on effects in terms of preventing terrorism. At the same time, this observation emphasizes the relevance of attempts, whether political or military, to reduce the physical availability of training facilities in other parts of the world.

The 'War of Ideas'

Measures to reduce access of would-be terrorists to physical opportunities for developing necessary skills are sensible enough, but may be seen as a complacent retreat from the wider issue of countering the (in a broad sense) ideological narratives that are seen as sustaining continued involvement in terrorist violence. In fact, conspicuous and humiliating failures (and, in the case of Kafeel Ahmed, agonizing and protracted death) may well be more effective in discouraging involvement than any amount of government counterpropaganda. However, there may also be ways in which a de-emphasising of the importance of Internet 'space' may provide potentially interesting avenues for countering the rise of radical ideas as well.

Firstly, a concept of there being an Internet space dominated by terrorists invites a distorted perspective on the actual state of play in what is sometimes termed the 'war of ideas'. Comparing Al Qaeda with, say, NATO on the Internet and then asking who is winning is simply a meaningless comparison if we accept that by 'Al Qaeda' we mean something like 'any sort of

⁴⁵ Michael Kenney *From Pablo to Osama Trafficking and Terrorist Networks, Government Bureaucracies and Competitive Adaptation*, Pennsylvania State University Press, Philadelphia, 2007.

concept relating to jihad as a violent activity and the applicability of this interpretation to contemporary contexts and the lives of individuals'. Even if we take a narrower understanding of 'Al Qaeda' – say, only the official 'Islamic Media Foundations' charged with dissemination the productions of the organization and its affiliates, then the best comparison, given its all-embracing anti-Western, anti-secular state agenda would not be with any given military or political entity, but with media giants such as Al-Jazeera or even Reuters.

Moreover, despite the growing difficulties of monetizing traditional news sources, the Internet is ironically making such traditional, corporate sources of news more important than ever. This is because, while the Internet does much to transmit news, it does not generally supplant its original sources. So, paradoxically, while fewer people than ever may buy newspapers or watch television news, they remain at least as dependent as ever on conventional sources at second or third remove. In fact, as Paterson has demonstrated, far from providing a cornucopia of media diversity, the overwhelming majority of Internet use actually derives from either the Associated Press, or Reuters. The Internet offers almost unlimited possibilities for collation, discussion and analysis of news material, but physical limits on the actual creation of news still remain, providing an effective potential lever for governments seeking to influence agendas.

All of this suggests that the traditional agenda-setting power of governments has not been removed by the Internet. Indeed, if anything, discussion of government actions on the Internet, as reported by traditional news sources, has the potential to greatly amplify their apparent import. In media terms, government, as Nacos⁴⁶ has demonstrated, *is* the story. Government achieves this informational superiority, like terrorists, through propaganda of the deed. But as theorists such as Chomsky⁴⁷ have wryly observed, this state power over media agenda is, paradoxically, reliant on the perception of media independence. By trying to write the story as well it undermines its credibility. This, in fact, is a principle which appears to have been tacitly accepted by RICU – a trilateral UK initiative which aims to counter Al Qaeda and global jihadism by means of press releases submitted to independent media. The premise is, so it seems, that by means of this sort of filter, a measure of credibility can be retained: the stories must in the first place be good enough to report. Ultimately, mass media management may be as effective a tool for governments on the Internet as anywhere else.

Indeed, jihadist media is frequently reactive in tone. This is particularly true in relation to English language content, where sites such as jihadunspun are premised on the familiarity of their audience with an 'official' account produced by mainstream media.⁴⁸ On English language forums with a militant bent, such as the politics, jihad and current affairs section of 'Islamic Awakening', official productions of Al Qaeda are much less common than conspiracy theories cobbled together from English language books and media sources. By directly intervening in these discussions, the

⁴⁶ Brigitte Nacos, *Terrorism and the Media: From the Iran Hostage Crisis to the World Trade Center Bombing* Columbia University Press, New York, 1994.

⁴⁷ Noam Chomsky, *Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies* South End Press, Boston MA, 1989.

⁴⁸ See Akil Awan 'Virtual Jihadist Media: Function, Legitimacy and Radicalizing Effectiveness' *European Journal of Cultural Studies* Vol 10, No 3 pp. 389-408, 2007, also Akil Awan 'Radicalisation on the Internet?' in the RUSI Journal Vol 152 No 3, pp. 76-81, 2007.

risk is that government, far from taking the initiative, actually hands it to the very extremists it hopes to counter. Moreover, it is worth remembering that a core fact underlying the compelling nature of jihadist media is the very physical limit on the production of digital content just observed. Terrorists and militants have, over their counterparts, the crucial edge that they are actually doing, and through their documentation of this fact have, ipso facto mastery at source of compelling new material. Rather than seeking to counter this through rational or ideological argumentation further down the line, one approach might be for governments to provide the local victims of groups such as the Taliban with the physical means to document their own suffering.

The Physicality of ‘Cyberterrorists’

A final point to bear in mind may be that people do not leave their bodies behind when they go online. This simple observation is emphasized by Stevens and Neumann⁴⁹ in their recommendation that physical arrests are probably a more powerful tool in countering online incitement to violence than are attempts to remove content from the Internet. However, there may be subtler ramifications to the point as well. According to Keith Verrells, an investigator in the case of the ‘cyberjihadi’ and propagandist Younis Tsouli, this individual demonstrated behavior which, while not clinically diagnosed, appears to be a plausible case of Internet addiction. On his arrest, Tsouli’s parents expressed incredulity at their son’s activities, not believing that it was possible to commit the crimes he was accused of while sitting at a computer. Regardless of any political views concerning the appropriateness or otherwise of certain types of Internet activity, it might be suggested that a more proactive approach to the physical problem of computer dependence may be relevant to disrupting this sort of activity in the early stages of its development. In an opposite case, Tsouli’s co-conspirator Tariq al-Daour was, apparently, responsible for a number of physical assaults on Orthodox Jews. Again, a focus on physical activity in this instance might have served to disrupt the development of an individual who was later convicted for what was considered to be a significant role in terrorist activity.

Conclusion

Misunderstandings and misconceptualizations of the relationship between terrorism and the Internet, and of the way the Internet works, have the potential to draw governments into a ‘conflict’ which they cannot possibly win, and in which they have a significant amount of credibility to lose. By recognizing the limitations of the Internet as a tool for terrorism, and by a nuanced appreciation of what it does offer, governments stand a much better chance of countering threats which do emerge from it. In practice, much that is relevant to countering the worst implications of the Internet for terrorism is already being done. However, it is not being recognized and appreciated as such. Better appreciation of how offline measures may impact on a threat considered ‘online’ may lead to the evolution of further measures that may be effectively applied by governments.

⁴⁹ Op cit. p.1

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A Profile of Religious Fundamentalism and Terrorist Activism

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Abstract: *Religious fundamentalism and Islamic activism in general aren't necessarily related to violent or even terrorist activism. This article provides a conceptual and descriptive clarification of the notion of jihadism by presenting 13 definitional features. These features help to identify the subtle varieties between different forms of Islamic activism. The article provides no new empirical findings but rather compiles crucial contributions from the vast literature on the topic.*

Keywords: *Religious fundamentalism, Jihadism, Islamic activism, terrorism.*

Introduction

Contemporary terrorism is often equated with religious terrorism, and more so with Islam. The image of an "Islamic danger" emerged, because jihadi violence is no longer confined to countries in the Middle East but, also, poses a threat to the domestic security of Western states. Like all stereotypes, the image of so-called "Islamic terrorism" helps to heuristically cope with a complex subject. Such mental shortcuts are at the expense of details, subtle relations and broader background, and refer to two complexities that are sometimes poorly understood: terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism. While religious fundamentalism in general isn't necessarily related to violent or even terrorist activism this is the case with jihadism.¹ This article seeks to provide a solid description of jihadi fundamentalism by thoroughly defining the term jihadism.

Jihadism refers to a certain form of Islamic social movement – deterritorialized and loosely connected through an ideology – that employs a heterodox form of jihad as a mean to fight

¹ Jihadism could likewise be termed jihadi fundamentalism. Both terms are used throughout this text interchangeably. The term jihadism is used within the academic and intelligence community as well as by the press.

secular-democratic influences and to assert fundamentalists beliefs. While the movement's fundamentalist outlook largely derives from Salafism – a pious and purist Islamic denomination – its militant activism roots in the intellectual legacy of certain influential political activists, ideologists and religious scholars such as Sayyid Qutb, Mohammed Faraj, Abdallah Azzam, and more recently Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Yusuf al-Uyayri and many others.²

It would be too simplistic to equate jihadism with terrorism but jihadi violence partly is terrorist violence. That makes it descriptive and therefore conceptual understanding even more difficult. Our academic (western-secular) concepts and analytical frameworks such as crime, deviant behavior, terrorism and war do not adequately capture the contemporary social phenomenon of jihadism. Terrorism is said to be the “blurring of the war/crime dichotomy” (Waddington, 2007:4) that exhibits *three anomalies*: it is a) altruistic violence that b) responds to perceived injustice by applying collective liability (Black 2004:10), and it is c) countered through a mix of criminal justice and war like measures (Pedahzur/Ranstorp, 2001) although it is neither genuine crime nor genuine military aggression.

In this article jihadism is characterized and defined in regard to three constitutive dimensions: It is “Islamic activism” (*activist dimension*) but it is different from other forms of Islamic activism (namely political Islam, Islamic nationalism and mainstream fundamentalism) in that jihadism has developed a doctrine that is different from orthodox judicial interpretations of jihad (*discursive dimension*), and it continues the long history of jihad-warfare, however in an unprecedented manner that takes the form of a new type of conflict that is neither genuine crime nor genuine nor war (*military dimension*).

According to these three dimensions, part 1 describes and compares jihadism with other forms of Islamic activism to highlight their differences and similarities. Part 2 singles out jihadists' unique and novel interpretation of the religious concept of jihad and compares it to the dogmatic conception of jihad as it is stipulated in Islamic international law [siyar]. Beyond the comparison of these competing jihad-dogmata (in part 2.3), part 3 shows how contemporary global jihad is different from historical occurrences of jihad as a state-doctrine in foreign policy. Thereby thirteen definitional features of jihadism are compiled into a profile of jihadism (see figure 2 at the end of the article).

The compilation of these definitional features is the result of a meta-review of appropriate literature from various disciplines (Islamic and oriental studies, sociology, terrorist studies). This article shall condense and systemize some of the contributions of knowledgeable authors in the field, to propose a conceptual rather than an anecdotal and narrative definition of jihadism.

² For a comprehensive overview of influential jihadi ideologues see the militant ideology atlas (McCants 2006).

	Islamism	Islamic Nationalism	Salafi Fundamentalism		
			apolitical	dissident	jihadi
Roy (1994, 2004)	political Islam	Islamic Nationalism	Neofundamentalism/Salafism		
			mainstream	- ³	jihadi
ICG (2005)	internal jihadi	-political Islamism/political Islamic activism - irredentist jihad	missionary Islamic activism	-	global jihadi
Wiktorowicz (2005)	-	-	Salafism		
			purists	Politicos, dissident ulamas	jihadi
Gerges (2005)	religious nationalism	statist nationalism	-	-	transnational jihadism
Hegghammer /Lacroix (2007)	-	-	rejectionists, Neo-Salafists	reformists Islamism	jihadism
Keppel (2004)	-	-	Salafi pietists	-	Salafi jihadists
Criteria	- capture the nation-state - doctrinaire jihad - takfir-jihad - the near enemy - revolutionary - political - sovereignty of god - "the Quran is our constitution"	- laical, secular - religion follows state - political - sovereignty of the people - non-revolutionary - desacralization of politics	- apolitical - rejection of the nation state - reform of the soul - political - sovereignty of god	- politicized - oppositional - reform of the state and the religious establishment - influenced by Islamism - political - sovereignty of god	- abolition of the nation-state - doctrinaire jihad - the near & far enemy - influenced by Islamism/Quibism - political - sovereignty of god
Examples	- Muslim Brotherhood (Quitbist branch)	- PLO (Palestine) - Muslim Brotherhood (al-Hudaybi branch) - Pan-Arabism (Nasserism)	- al-Jama'a al-Salafiyya al-Muchtasiba (JSM)	- Al-sahwa al-Islamiyya (Saudi Arabia)	- Al-Qaida and associates

Figure 1: Five forms of Sunni Islamic activism⁴ in the terminology used by 6 different authors

³ The authors do not explicitly speak about this form of Islamic activism.

⁴ Islamic activism is defined as "the active assertion and promotion of beliefs, prescriptions, laws, or policies that are held to be Islamic in character." (ICG 2005:1)

Jihadism in the Universe of Islamic Activism

The International Crisis Group (ICG) reasonably defines Islamic activism as: “the active assertion and promotion of beliefs, prescriptions, laws, or policies that are held to be Islamic in character.” (2005:1). Literature distinguishes three kinds of Islamic activism (Islamism⁵, Islamic nationalism, and Islamic fundamentalism) whereby fundamentalism is subdivided into apolitical, dissident, and jihadi. Mapping the different manifestations of Islamic activism and highlighting jihadi fundamentalism (jihadism) as one of its manifestations, is the concern of this section. Figure 1 illustrates this division and shall help to navigate through part 1.

Jihadism has to be carefully distinguished from other forms of Islamic activism. It has its own set of doctrines and concepts of how to react to the perceived malaise of the Muslim world. Different authors use different expressions when they refer to the same kinds of Islamic activism: In his two famous books “Globalised Islam” and “The failure of political Islam” Oliver Roy distinguishes three kinds of Islamic activism: Islamism (also called political Islam), Islamic nationalism, and neofundamentalism (subdivided into mainstream and jihadi).⁶ Roy’s categorization encompasses the whole spectrum of Islamic activism⁷, while other authors focus on specific manifestations. Accordingly, the top line of Figure 1 is based on Roy’s typology. It is the encompassing framework under which the terminology of six authors is subsumed. A clarification and explanation of these terms highlights jihadism (right column) as a distinct entity in the universe of Islamic activism.

The International Crisis Group (ICG 2005) distinguishes five types of Sunni Islamic activism: Political Islamism, missionary Islamic activism and jihadi activism, the latter can be internal, global or irredentist. In the context of Salafism (which Roy labels ‘neofundamentalism’) social scientist Quintan Wiktorowicz has identified purists, politicos and jihadis (rejectionists, reformists and jihadi according to Hegghammer/Lacroix in the context of Saudi Arabia). The Middle East expert Fawaz Gerges uses the terms religious nationalists and transnational jihadis when talking about Islamism and jihadi Salafism. Gilles Kepel, focusing on the Wahabi context in Saudi Arabia, speaks about Salafi pietists and jihadists.

Despite considerable confusion in the usage of the words Islamism and Islamic fundamentalism⁸ concerning the question as to whether these words connote the same or different

⁵ Apparently, there is some confusion about the term Islamism. Many authors use “Islamism” synonymously with “Islamic activism”.⁵ Throughout this paper the term ‘Islamism’ is used synonymously with ‘political Islam’ which is a subset of the broader, capacious term of ‘Islamic activism’.

⁶ Such categorizations are more heuristically than are empirically validated, e.g. concerning internal homogeneity and external heterogeneity (Roy 2004:21). It should be noted that these are diachronic categories which represent different stages of the transformation-process from *Islamism* (political Islam) to *post-Islamism* (Islamic nationalism and Neofundamentalism/Salafism). Despite the importance of Roy’s thesis the transformation-process is not the subject of this paper.

⁷ Roy elaborates these categories in his books “Globalised Islam” (2004) and “The failure of political Islam” (1994). The terms are dealt with on the following pages in the original text sources: *Islamism*, (2004) pages 1-4, 21, 40, 58-92, 99, 245-254; (1994) pages 35-60, 75; *Nationalism*: (2004) pages 62-67, 315; *Neofundamentalism (mainstream)*: (2004): 232-257, (1994) pages 60-75; *Neofundamentalism (jihadi)*: (2004) pages 41f, 234, 244, 250, 254-257.

⁸ See e.g. Kramer 2003.

social phenomena, this article make an analytical distinction between the two: Islamism utilizes political mechanisms that allow for the exercise of power such as political dialogue, lobbying, or the foundations of parties. Political participation is considered legitimate as long as it is beneficial for the Islamist's agenda (that can indeed contain fundamentalist issues). Fundamentalists, in contrast, might follow a very similar agenda but abstain from and condemn political participation. They indeed offer an alternative societal concept concerning goals and means.

Islamism/Political Islam

When comparing Islamism (Figure 1, 1st column) and jihadism (5th column) several similarities appear, such as their disappointment about 'apostate' Muslim regimes, resentment towards Western influences and their doctrinaire-revolutionary conception of jihad. Despite their affinity it is justified to draw a distinction between both forms of activism because jihadi fundamentalists reject the idea of utilizing state institutions and politics as a tool to Islamize society (unlike political Islamists) and they have expanded their domestic struggle (internal jihad against the near enemy) to a transnational level (jihad against the far enemy) as a result of strategic considerations.

Many of the Muslim countries in the Middle East fit the description of authoritarian or single party systems. However, it is not the lack of democratic principles that Islamists criticize. Rather, their movements criticize these regimes to be un-Islamic since they fail to comprehensively implement Sharia law in the domestic legislation. Islamists witness the growth of cultural and social pluralism and consequently consider the Muslim society to be going astray. They use the word *jahiliyya*⁹ to describe the societal status quo, a truly negatively connoted term that refers to the pre-Islamic era in which war, hatred and chaos ruled. The corrupt and dependent state power is considered to be the cause for this profane and secular situation. Consequently Islamists oppose and try to overthrow most regimes in the Middle East through oppositional activities (e.g. education, propagation, political mobilization, and sometimes through political violence).

Capture the State vs. Abolish the State

This is what distinguishes political Islam from the global Salafi jihadism: Islamists try to capture the nation-state alongside with all its institutions through which political power can be exercised, police, military, schools and universities, legislative and judiciary bodies and so on. In this way Islam shall be promoted and asserted top down via the nation state. The Muslim Brotherhood's¹⁰ slogan "The Quran is our constitution" is illustrative for the *symbiosis of religion, politics and state*.¹¹ Contrarily, Salafists try to abandon all man-made political institutions, the nation state and

⁹ The Muslim Brother ideologue Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) re-used the term jahiliyya [ignorance] to describe of the societal situation of Egypt in the 1950s.

¹⁰ The Muslim Brotherhood – founded 1928 in Egypt by Hassan al-Banna – is the prototype of Islamist movements. Note that today the MB is not considered a revolutionary movement anymore since it has subscribed to democratic principles and abstains from the use of violence. However, there might be a fine line between political activism and subversion.

¹¹ Therefore, Juergensmeyer (1994, 1996) as well as Gerges (2005:43ff) appropriately call Islamism *religious nationalism*. Religious nationalism is not to be confused with secular Islamic nationalism in which politics and religion are separated (compare second and third column in table 1).

“the Western Westphalian order in world politics” (Tibi 2008:112) altogether. A leading Salafi hadith scholar – Shaykh Nasir al-Din al-Albani – repeatedly stated: “the good policy is to abandon politics” (Lacroix 2008:6). For the Salafi movement the administrative entity is not the state (especially contemporary nation states with their foreign made borders) but, more vaguely, the Muslim collective (the ummah).

Jihad Against the Near Enemy vs. Jihad Against the Far Enemy

The second point of distinction between global jihadists and Islamists is in their scope of jihad. It is quite natural that the revolutionary aspirations of the Islamists have often resulted in violent conflicts with the state power. Activists design this conflict as a jihad. In this regard Sayyid Qutb (in the 1950's) introduced very appealing thoughts to the Egyptian context by arguing that Muslim rulers can be the legitimate target of jihad if it is proven that these rulers are in fact apostates and renegades who have betrayed Islam.¹² Various Islamist movements have utilized Qutb's doctrine to legitimize their *jihad against the near enemy* (internal jihad against the state power). One arena of such conflict is Egypt (Sadat's assassination 1981 and a jihadi terrorist campaign of Jama'a al-Islamiyya in the 1990's).

In contrast global jihadists have made a strategic shift. Many members of the global jihadi movement are former domestic Islamists who experienced merciless repression during their revolution at home. Their experience and their strategic reasoning holds that the jihad against the near enemy cannot be won as long as the Arab regimes are supported by the US. Consequently they target the far enemy (the US and its allies) to address the alleged root causes for the Muslim malaise and jahiliyya. In the groundbreaking manifest “Knight's under the prophet's banner” published in 2001, Ayman al-Zawahiri details the strategic shift from the near to the far enemy.

In his analysis “The failure of political Islam”, Roy (1994) argues that the era of Islamism has ended after its revolutions were unsuccessful (except for the Shiite context in Iran). Today's situation (post-Islamism) shows that the former activists either started to be secular nationalists or took a fundamentalist outlook refraining from any political participation. “The Islamist myth was that of the unification of the religious and the political; post-Islamism means that both spheres are autonomous.” (Roy 2004:3).

Islamic Nationalism

Another type of Islamic activism is Islamic nationalism¹³ (Figure 1, 2nd column). Unlike political Islamism, Islamic nationalism shows little or no revolutionary momentum. Their movements and

¹² Qutb uses to the takfir doctrine, which is the Islamic practice of denouncing people as infidels and which includes the excommunication of Muslims. Since this practice is about the question ‘who is a Muslim, and who is not’ it is very contentious in Islam. In Islamic history takfir has been applied in several contexts not only to stigmatize rulers who are too profane but also to “denounce entire populations as apostates” (Phares 2007). Qutb borrowed main ideas from the prominent scholar Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), who first codified takfir in order denounce unpopular Muslim rulers of his time (namely the Mongolians who converted to Islam after their intrusion into Muslim territory).

¹³ What the ICG describes as *political Islamic activism* and *political Islamism* is what Roy names

parties are acting entirely secularly but with an Islamic agenda. Nationalist activists try to “assert Islamic beliefs, prescriptions and laws” through political participation. Their primate is their state not the religion.

Political Sovereignty of People vs. Political Sovereignty of God

The differences between jihadi movements are apparent. *Salafi Jihadists reject the nation state while Islamic nationalists embody the nation state*. Nationalists believe in the political sovereignty of people (not necessarily through democracy); Islamists, and especially Salafists, believe in the sovereignty of God.

Tellingly, when Hamas (the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood), participated and succeeded in the 2006 election, the al-Qaeda official Ayman al-Zawahiri condemned their participation in the election exactly because the Salafiyya jihadiyya feared Hamas’ transformation from a religious-revolutionary to a nationalist movement:

How come they did not demand an Islamic constitution for Palestine before entering any elections? Are they not an Islamic movement? [. . .] Accepting the legitimacy of Mahmoud Abbas [. . .] is an abyss that will ultimately lead to eliminating the jihad and recognizing Israel.¹⁴

At a later point Abu Yahya al-Libi joined the dispute:

Those listening to your statements can no longer differentiate between you and secular groups. . . . They [Hamas] betrayed the dreams of their young fighters.¹⁵

Surprisingly, despite the fundamental differences between nationalists and jihadi Salafists both movements sometimes engage side-by-side in the same conflict namely in irredentist jihads.

Irredentist Jihad vs. “Nomadic Jihad”

Irredentist jihad is a means to defend the national sovereignty of Muslim nations in case of foreign occupation (e.g. Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine, Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army (Shiite) in Iraq). Irredentist jihadists have national interests – often not even considering themselves as jihadists – and have to be distinguished from global Salafi jihadists, who are often involved in the same armed conflicts but with entirely different motivations.¹⁶ Global jihadists see irredentist conflicts as a chance to widen their sway among other non-Salafi Muslims and to engage in jihad against infidels. In the literature the Salafi involvement in irredentist conflicts is called “nomadic jihad” (Roy 1999:7, Wiktorowicz 2001) because some mujahedeen travel from conflict to conflict far away from their homes to engage in jihad.

nationalism (Roy 2005:62). Confusingly, Roy uses the term Islamism/political Islam when referring to what the ICG labels *internal jihadi activism*.

¹⁴ Statement of Ayman al-Zawahiri published December 20th 2006. For the entire dispute, see the online article “The war of words between Hamas and al-Qaeda” (Lipton 2007).

¹⁵ Statement of Abu Yahya al-Libi published April 29th 2007.

¹⁶ For an insightful article about the Bosnian context see Mitchell 2008, also Cetin 2008.

Quite often, however, they alienate the domestic Muslim population with their austere and anti-nationalist ideas. An example of the strange alliance between nationalists and transnational fundamentalists is the War in Bosnia in which a contingent of foreign Salafī mujahedeen supported the regular Bosnian army. A Bosnian soldier said about his foreign Salafī brothers-in-arms: “They are superb fighters, but you can’t argue with them” (cited in Mitchell 2008:813).

In the Chechen context, the nomadic mujahedeen were even able to change the nature of the conflict. What has started as a secular-irredentist conflict, driven by the demand of a Muslim province for political autonomy from Russia, became a religiously inspired conflict after Salafī jihadists under the leadership of Shamil Basayev and Ibn al-Khattab entered the scene and provoked the second Chechen war by declaring a caliphate in Dagestan.

Fundamentalism/Salafism

Salafism is a very austere and strict Islamic denomination. Their model of society comes from the early Islamic period and the rule of Mohammad and the two following generations of caliphs also called the Rashidun Caliphs or rightly guided caliphs. This kind of Islamic activism can be considered fundamentalist. Like all kinds of religious fundamentalism it is characterized by three features: it strictly opposes the concessions to modernism and secularism made by their moderate brothers-in-faith; it perceives societal pluralism as an existential threat to their religion; it follows a scriptural interpretation of the holy texts to counterweight profane influences. Jihadism clearly has a Salafī dimension. However, the opposite is not true. Salafism cannot be reduced to global jihad and terrorism. Only a small minority within the Salafī community has a jihadi outlook, while the majority abstains from political activism.

Contemporary Salafism (almost indistinguishable from the Saudi Wahabism¹⁷) are not to be mistaken for the classical Salafīyya (embodied by Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad ‘Abduh at the end of the 19th century) which was an Islamic reform movement.¹⁸ The term neo-Salafism (Figure 1, 3rd column) is used by Hegghammer/Lacroix (2007) to name the apolitical and rejectionists branch of Saudi fundamentalists (to be distinguished from the establishment Wahabis on the one hand and the political Salafists, namely the ‘sahwa islamiyya’ on the other hand). Wiktorowicz (2006) distinguishes three major factions within Salafism: purists, politicians and jihadis.

The Salafī movement does not think and act in terms of state-power, nationality or democracy. Adherers perceive such concepts as heretic innovations [bid’ah] and vehemently polemicize against them. A detained member of the Saudi jihadi movement puts it this way:

I read history and did not find something called jinsiyya [nationality]. Each Muslim must operate in Dar al-Islam [Islamic territory] wherever he wants and without borders restraining him or passports confining him and without a taghut watan [despot nation] to worship. [...] I

¹⁷ The term Wahabism has a pejorative connotation and is used by Muslims that are critical towards Salafism rather than by the Salafī movement itself.

¹⁸ For this reason Roy chooses to name contemporary Salafism “neofundamentalism” to avoid confusion with the classical Salafīyya.

do not belong to Al-Saud who have no right to make people belong to them. (al-Shuwayl quoted in al-Rasheed 2008:8)

Mainstream Salafism: Rejectionist and Da'wa

The activism of (non-jihadi) Islamic fundamentalists (Figure 1, 3rd column) is consequently apolitical and is focused on the adherence to licit individual conduct: "Reform of the soul should precede reform of the state. [...] For neofundamentalists the aim of action is salvation, not revolution" (Roy 2004:248). Any political activism is proscribed. Societal change can only permissibly be achieved through propagation [da'wa], purification [tazkiyya], and religious education or cultivation [tarbiya] (Wiktorowicz 2006:217).

In the view of the mainstream Salafis, internal jihad against an unjust Muslim ruler is an illegitimate innovation adopted from the Western model of political participation and political revolution. Those who engage in such activism are driven by political utility and human desire, two bogeys to Salafists. Because purists refuse both, a (corrupt) Muslim government as well as political opposition against it, Hegghammer calls this Salafi current (for the Saudi Arabian context) *rejectionist Islamism* that is "intellectually and organizationally separate from the other and more visible forms of Saudi Islamist opposition such as the so-called "the Awakening" [al-Sahwa] movement or the Bin Laden-style jihadists" (Hegghammer/Lacroix 2007:104).¹⁹ For the rejectionists/purists contemporary engagement in jihad is only permissible for defensive purposes (e.g. irredentist jihad in Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia) while an offensive jihad against non-Muslim countries requires the purification of the ummah as well as its reorganization to a caliphate (both criteria are not met nowadays).

In the specific case of Saudi Arabia, the clergy is largely comprised of highly educated establishment (mainstream) Salafis. Most of them hold views that are similar to those of the rejectionists (purists). However, due to their symbiotic relation to the monarchy they do not openly question its legitimacy. The ulamas are a very influential force in the Saudi kingdom, but when it comes to the religious approval of political decisions they often go along with the earthly will of the rulers in order not to jeopardize their own power and influence. Because of these strategic concessions other Salafis pejoratively call them "palace-ulamas" [ulama al Balat], "the scholars of power" [al-ulama al-sulta] or "palace lackeys" (Kepel 204:310; Wiktorowicz 2006:227).

Political and Jihadi Salafism

Besides the purist or mainstream faction there is a political as well as a jihadi faction of Salafi fundamentalism.²⁰ (4th and 5th column) The political and jihadi Salafis agree with the knowledgeable purist scholars in many religious regards. However, they do not rely exclusively

¹⁹ Likewise Wiktorowicz (2006:219): "Purists ardently reject the oppositional (and often violent) method of the politicians and jihadis as religious innovations without precedent in the prophetic model and consensus of the companions."

²⁰ (Roy 2004: 41f 234, 244, 250; ICC 2005:11, 16; Wiktorowicz 2006:225ff). Another term for the same distinction is given by Kepel who speaks of Salafi pietists compared to Salafi jihadis (2004:308ff).

on non-violent da'wa [propagation] as the only option to defend Islam against profane influences. Politicos and jihadis mainly differ in their readiness to express their opposition by violent means. The politicians, also called "dissident ulamas" (ICG 2005:12), are to a certain degree politicized, mainly through the intellectual and personal influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, who entered the Saudi stage in the 1960's.²¹ They criticize the political blindness of the purists, and especially of the Saudi ulamas and claim to have a better understanding of current affairs, notably, that the Muslim regimes appear to be too dependent on the West.

The jihadis exhibit the political disobedience of the politicians in combination with the radical takfir-thinking of the Qutbists. They have adopted the idea that – under contemporary political conditions – jihad has to be an individual obligation [fard 'ayn] because the ruler who solely can declare jihad traditionally (offensive jihad as a collective obligation [fard kifaya]) conspires with the actual enemy of Islam and therefore will not declare jihad against his ally and himself. "This is probably the best criterion with which to draw a line between conservative neofundamentalists and radical ones: the latter are rightly called 'jihadists' by the Pakistani press" (Roy 2004:42).

In this respect, the Qutbist Islamists (1st column) and the jihadi Salafis (5th column) seem to be one and the same: They share the idea that the corrupt Muslim regimes are the main obstacle on the path to the ideal Islamic society, and they hold the same conception of doctrinal takfir-jihad as a mean of opposition. Nonetheless, two distinctive features separate them. The first is in their conception of the post-conflict society. Islamists would use the captured political institutions and the existing social infrastructure to introduce the Sharia and Islamize the nation that allegedly has been misguided under the despotic regime. Jihadi fundamentalists do not hold such conceptions of societal administration. They would rule the community through propagation (da'wa), purification (tazkiyya), religious education or cultivation (tarbiya) and the direct application of the Sharia, without any concessions to national law, thereby building a full-fledged theocracy (abolish the state). The second difference is in the scope of their militant struggle. Islamists are almost solely concerned with the inner-political situation in their respective countries (the near enemy). Before the political power is not in their hands, other urgent problems of the ummah (e.g. the Palestinian question), they think, cannot be dealt with effectively. Quite contrary, Salafi jihadis have a global outlook beyond the context of certain nation-states.

The universe of Islamic activism is made up of different movements with their corresponding ideologies and worldviews. One of which is jihadism. The above described categorizations are

²¹ Political awareness was introduced to the inherently religious outlook of Saudi clerics in the 1960's when numerous followers of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood fled oppression in their country. Subsequently "they even managed to do the near-impossible – to radicalize the already radical Wahabism" (Fradkin 2008:10f). Sahwa followers, during the 1980's were critical, yet not rebellious towards the Saudi monarchy. Saudi rulers accepted the movement with the ulterior motive to form a counterweight for the oppositional religious propaganda of the rejectionists which were popular among the masses. However, this precarious alliance only lasted until 1990 when establishment ulamas sanctioned the decision to host American forces on Saudi soil. This event was, and still is, a sacrilege for many Salafists. Two prominent leaders of the sahwa, Safar al-Hawali and Salman al-Awdah, were imprisoned between 1994 and 1999 because they exhausted their credit of criticism. At this time many sahwa followers joint Bin Laden's and Zawahiri's call for global jihad in the "Declaration of war against the Americans occupying the land of the two holy places" (Bin Laden 1996).

constructed by experts with a profound knowledge about Islamic societies and their social movements, but who have not always validated their thoughts empirically.²² Although systematic differences in discourse and social behavior between the specific types of Islamic activism obviously exist these types partly overlap. Roy describes this lack of mutual exclusiveness as “[t]he blurring of the divide between Muslim Brothers, neofundamentalists and conservatives“ (Roy 2004:253). The right segment of figure 1 shows six (of thirteen) criteria of jihadism.

Jihad in the Book: The Dogmatic Conception of Jihad

The previous part of this article described different types of Islamic activism to give an impression of its complexity and heterogeneity concerning actors, doctrines, strategies and worldviews. Another criterion of jihadism, which distinguishes it from nonviolent forms of fundamentalism, is its doctrinaire and heterodox conception of jihad. It is central in the ideology of Jihadism and constitutes the primary mean for the activists.²³ This form of jihad, as it was recently invented by Salafi intellectuals and ideologues, is religiously heterodox and has no precedence in the military history of jihad. This section shall give a short overview of jihad “in the book” and its historical manifestations “in action” (part 3) in order to show further distinctive features of contemporary global jihad.

Substantially jihad is a judicial concept that concerns ‘jus in bello’ (conduct within war) and ‘jus ad bellum’ (provisions for the use of armed force). Its textual sources can be found in the Medinan suras of the Quran and in different hadith collections (written tradition of the words and the deeds of the prophet).²⁴ Through exegesis from these textual sources are derived the legislation of lesser jihad as the Islamic instrument “of governance for war and peace” (Phares 2005:22). A distinction is made by some Muslims between the greater jihad (as practiced by the Sufis) – a spiritual struggle to overcome wrongful human drives and earthly temptations – and the lesser jihad, which is the only legitimate form of warfare in Islamic law. However, the hadith, which favors the greater jihad over the lesser jihad, is considered apocryphical and weak by some

²² Christina Hellmich expressed a harsh critique in this regard: “[P]articularly those explanations that seem to have become the official wisdom regarding the fundamental logic of Al Qaeda, Wahabism and the Salafi-Jihadist discourse, are concepts that are poorly understood and subject to much controversy. In the anxious quest to explain Al Qaeda, the terrorism studies community seems to have deviated from the guidelines of academic conduct” (2008:111). Hellmich recommends the analysis of primary data from the Al Qaeda’s inner tiers to reach conceptual clarification of notions of global salafi jihad. Some authors have done so: Brachmann (2009) has extensively reviewed ideological and strategic writings of the global salafi movement. Likewise the 360-page “Militant Ideology Atlas” (McCants 2006) provides a systematic insight into the writings of the jihadi movement. Gerges (2005; 2006) based his contributions on empirical field work and finally the studies of Thomas Hegghammer (for instance 2005) show his detailed knowledge of primary data from al-Qaida.

²³ The Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD 2004) describes four different modus operandi of Islamic activism: overt- and covert dawa; overt- and covert jihad. The authors assess the impact of these strategies on the vertical democratic order (between government and citizens) and the horizontal democratic order (between citizens).

²⁴ In the Arabic language use, ‘jihad’ also connotes ‘effort’ or ‘struggle’ in general without implying a specific religious concept.

Sunni scholars and of course by the jihadi movement. This section exclusively deals with the bellicose conception of jihad.

Jihad is an integral part of Islamic international law [al-siyar], which is a branch of general Islamic jurisprudence and “a fully functional body of the sharia” (Ali/Rehman 2005:323). Siyar regulates the conduct of the Islamic state (the caliphate) when interacting with other “de facto or de jure states” (Hamidullah 1961:3), or with the collective of infidels (kafir) in general. Islamic international law, together with its concept of jihad, has been subject to constant judicial development and adjustment to the socio-political context. “There is very little that is rigid and immutable in Islamic law” (Badr 1982:56, cited in Ali/Rehman 2005:327).

Still, there is no univocal Muslim position on central questions concerning jihad.²⁵ Different scholars and exegetes treat different aspects they may regard as opportune or believe to be prudent. In particular, the intellectual elite of the jihadi movement have made painstaking efforts to construct jihad-related fatwas that serve their cause. This has challenged more peace loving Muslims to make relative the practice of militant jihad in modernity. As we will see next, the un-contextualized and literal understanding of jihad indeed can lead to a confrontational and militant position towards non-Muslims.

Origins of the Jjihad-Dogma

The militant accentuation of jihad in the Medinan suras of the Quran is due to the historical circumstances from which these passages originate.²⁶ After Mohammed’s emigration from Mecca to Medina in 622 (the hijra), he established the first Islamic nation-like community [al dawla al Islamiyya], which was surrounded and threatened by hostile Bedouin tribes and pagan Mecca. The process of da’wa [propagation, proselytization] was opposed by the non-Muslim environment which demanded the temporary use of force in order to eventually pacify and Islamize the conflict-torn region. “It was at this time that the doctrine of jihad, in the sense of armed conflict, gained currency” (Ali/Rehman 2005:332).²⁷ Even more detailed is the bellicose description of jihad in numerous hadiths. There is general agreement among scholars that these hadiths are authentic

²⁵ This juridical pluralism is not restricted to the legal concept of jihad but is omnipresent in Islamic jurisprudence. It is due to what Jackson (2002:34) calls “the problem of free speech”. By this he means that every jurist can have his own position on any legal topic, and as long as he uses the recognized sources and abides by recognized methods of interpretation (as stipulated by *usul-al fiqh* - the sources of knowledge and understanding of the law), his position is equally valid to any other’s. Accordingly, Jackson distinguishes between “an Islamic position” and “the Islamic position” (ibid. p. 34). Only the latter is considered infallible. This infallibility (otherwise only granted to the prophet Muhammad) can be reached when the “interpretive community as a whole” has reached a “unanimous consensus” (ibid). Remarkably some jihadi ideologues claim infallibility of their views. This infallibility allegedly is given through transcendent experience during the practice of jihad. See Alshech (2008).

²⁶ Muslim reformers and of course historians make the argument to historicize the Quarnic text: “It matters little whether we accept the Quran as divine revelation or not. For whether it came from God or Muhammad or anywhere else, it certainly reflected the social, historical and political realities of seventh century Arabia” (Jackson 2003:37). See also: Donner (1991).

²⁷ Likewise Tibi (1999:84): “The call for the use of force occurs in the Quran step by step in Medina and thickens to a jihad-doctrine.”

(unlike the hadith promoting greater jihad). However, the synonym of armed struggle in the Quran is not jihad but qital: “According to the Quran the military part of jihad is called qital/combat” (Tibi 1999:74).²⁸ Qital is to be distinguished from the term harb (war) which denotes illegitimate aggression. Thus, it can be maintained that jihad cannot be reduced to qital, but qital is an integral part of jihad as it is described in the Medinan suras and some hadith collections. As noted before it is difficult to relativize its martial character, because the writings about the lesser jihad in Quran and Sunna are coined by the military-expansional situation of the ummah at the time of its origin. Modernists do this by historic-contextualized reading while conservatives rarely try to relativize the doctrine at all.

What is the characteristic legal discourse of the jihadi movement that delimitates it from the interpretations of the Islamic mainstream?

Contentious Aspects of Jihad

Inherent in Islam (as in other religions) is a necessity for proselytization. This necessity is due to the universal claim of Islam: “Muslims are obligated to spread the Islamic revelation worldwide” (Tibi 1999:80) and jihad is the mean. “Islam calls his project of Islamization of the world jihad” (ibid. p. 51).²⁹ When this religious universalism is combined with governance (especially foreign policy), as a consequence the Muslim ummah has to subdue the whole mankind under Islamic rule. As long as a worldwide Islamic administration is not established, this obligation does not cease. This universal claim is so categorical and non-disputable because Islam explains, that only its holistic rule can allow for a peaceful human society. Non-Islamic territory is named dar al’harb (house of war) or possibly dar al-sulh (house of treaty) if there is a peace agreement,³⁰ while territory under Muslim rule is called dar al-Islam (house of peace).

Offensive Jihad: Use of Armed Force [Qital] and Perpetual Warfare?

The dispute between reformers and conservatives is not about the concept of jihad per se, but about the legitimacy and even the obligation to use force for Islamic expansion [futuhat] in the contemporary political context. Reformists admit that jihad for the purpose of Islamic expansion into dar al’harb *can*³¹ include the use of force [qital] as *ultima ratio*, when peaceful attempts of proselytization and subjugation are forcefully prevented by the unbelievers. However, they argue, that contemporary political realities do not meet the prerequisites under which qital as jihad is to

²⁸ All quotations of Tibi (1999) are translated from German by the author.

²⁹ Rahman gives a similar explanation: “There is no doubt that the Quran wanted Muslims to establish a political order on earth for the sake of creating an egalitarian and just moral-social order. Jihad is the instrument for doing so” (1980:63f, cited in Streusand 1997:6), and by Khadduri (1966:xi): “Islam was neither the first nor the last of the nations that sought to establish a world public order based on divine legislation and to enforce it by the ‘jihad’”.

³⁰ The distinction into dar al-harb and dar al-Islam is not genuine to the Quran but was introduced at a later point through the practice of ijtihad (independent interpretation of the textual sources).

³¹ But is not necessarily limited to the smaller jihad: “Although the instrument by which the Islamic state was meant to sustain itself and expand territorially was through waging jihad, this did not always mean going to war” (Ali/Rehman 2005:333). See also Bar (2006:28ff).

be applied.³² Contrary, more textual interpretations of the sources in Quran and hadith make it difficult to detach qital from jihad no matter what current affairs look like. Other reformists, rather than separating qital from jihad, make the point that jihad does not necessarily mean a perpetual warfare against all non Muslims.³³

Although clerics from the jihadi movement may support the exegetical thesis of jihad as perpetual warfare, offensive jihad is not of immediate concern to the jihadi movement. This is because offensive jihad is an instrument of foreign policy and military expansion. The movement lacks the geopolitical capacity for concerted military campaigns. Therefore, contemporary jihad is fought as defensive jihad with certain doctrinal innovations. Nevertheless the global jihadi movement seeks to establish a geopolitical basis for offensive jihad like it did in Afghanistan under the Taliban, in the Republic of Dagestan and currently in the Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan.

Defensive Jihad: An Individual Obligation [Fard Ayn]

For the jihadi movement the classical distinction into dar al-Islam and dar al-harb does not meet contemporary geopolitical realities anymore. A country, in which people live under the nomocracy of the Sharia, does not exist. The entire world seems to be dar al'harb and the movement perceives itself as the vanguard of Islam just as the Prophet Muhammad and his companions were the Muslim vanguard in Medina. Possibly, the federally administered tribal areas in Pakistan (FATA) best compare to the situation of this time.

Territories that used to fulfill the Sharia-criteria for dar al'-Islam are either occupied by the "enemies of Islam" (it matters little whether the invaders are people of the book, polytheists or atheists), or they are governed by corrupt Muslim leaders. In the case of foreign occupation or military deployment jihad is fought as defensive jihad (Cashmere, Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, Palestine, Saudi Arabia Andalusia) and therefore is an individual obligation (fard ayn) that does not necessitate the command of a Caliph. Every territory that has ever been under Islamic rule is suitable for launching defensive jihad. Local Muslims have to fulfill this obligation and if they are not able or powerful enough to do so, the obligation passes to Muslims elsewhere.³⁴

³² The eminent Azhar University in Cairo takes the following position: "Is it necessary to carry out da'wa/the call to Islam with the weapon? [...] The sword used to be a mean for the spread of Islam, today, however, this is only important when it is to avert evil from Muslims. [...] Today there are newspapers and other communication media, with whose one can intrude in the houses of the others in order to spread Islam. However, there is a small group of Muslims who want spread Islam via weapons without realizing that the foes of Islam are fighting us with much more dangerous means today." (al-Azhar 1984, Bayan li al-nas min al-Azhar al-sharif (Declaration to mankind from the grand al-Azhar), cited in Tibi 1999:72).

³³ For instance see Shakir (2003). In an article on the website Islamic-answers.com the position of the conservatives is described as follows: "In the past some classical Muslim Jurists held the opinion that Islam enjoins Muslims to maintain a state of permanent belligerence with all non-believers. According to this opinion Muslims are under a legal obligation to reduce all non-Muslim communities to Islamic rule. Proponents of this view did not make any distinction between neutral or peaceful non-Muslim states and those who are violent and aggressive towards the Islamic State." (Kareem 2008:1).

³⁴ The provisions for jus ad bellum have been provided by Abdullah Azzam. See Wiktorowicz (2001:23f).

Both, reformists and conservatives, agree that jihad for the defense of dar al-Islam sanctions the use of armed force. Thus, the omnipresent theories about the global conspiracy against Islam in jihadist circles are ideologically important.³⁵ Additionally, the classification of contemporary global jihad as defensive jihad also provides the possibility for jihadi agitators to bypass the Islamic prohibition of the indiscriminate killings of civilians (women and children) since such regulations only exist for offensive jihad.

Takfir vs. Fitna

The defensive paradigm is also present in the *takfir-jihad* against allegedly apostate Muslim governments. War among Muslims [fitna] cannot be justified theologically. Accordingly, the internal jihadists excommunicate their Muslim adversaries to make them a legitimate target. “Arab regimes are thus considered the functional equivalent of foreign occupation” (Wiktorowicz 2001:26). The controversial debate about the practice of takfir within the Salafi community cannot avoid that jihadi groups use takfir in a utilitarian manner without considering its dogmatic restrictions.

This is not the place to review the far reaching theological discussion of jihad in detail. It surely would be worthwhile to describe the dogmatic position of the four schools of Sunni jurisprudence (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’I and Hanbali) on different aspects of jihad and Siyar, but for the understanding of jihadism it is not important to grasp this discourse comprehensively.

Jihad in Action: the Military History of Jihad

Contemporary jihadism has no prior correlates, neither in the dogmatic design of jihad, nor in its historic occurrence. The application of jihad to social realities, as performed by past Muslim rulers, has always somewhat deviated from its theological conception. Therefore, it is worth comparing the “religious-doctrinaire meaning” with the actual “historical meaning” (Tibi 1999:57).³⁶ Historically, jihad means warfare, theologically jihad *can* mean warfare. “[T]he history of Islam is characterized by recurring violence claimed to be justified by jihad, even when it was not.” (Bassiouni 2008:79).³⁷ Therefore, the historical novelty of jihadism is not constituted in the discrepancy between jihad in the book and jihad in action but rather in the combination of three characteristics (left segment in figure 1: Non-state actors waging jihad against Muslim and non-Muslim rulers alike, directing their violent campaign partially against civilians as part of their strategy.

³⁵ That is one reason why Wiktorowicz in 2001 cautions to consider the wider impact the war on terror could have on the non-jihadi Salafi movement. The invasion in Afghanistan and Iraq certainly undermines the moderate’s argument that Islam is not under attack and defensive jihad thus is not appropriate.

³⁶ Jackson (2003:41) makes a similar distinction by speaking of the “Quranic and the classical articulation of jihad”. Likewise Bassiouni (2008:80): “Jihad, like many other aspects of Islam, has its theoretical and practical aspects – both being frequently quite distinct from each other”.

³⁷ Similarly Roy (2004:56) states: “Notwithstanding the debate on what the word really means, it is clear that jihad, as an armed struggle, has always been instrumentalized for political and strategic purposes, by state actors or would-be state actors”.

As described above, the origins of the codification of the lesser jihad fall in the period of its first application, when the prophet Mohammad expanded the Islamic ummah into the Arabian Peninsula.³⁸ After the prophet's death in 632 in Medina, his institutional succession was established in the caliphate, which was the political embodiment of Islam. Only the official caliph could declare jihad for territorial expansion of the ummah. In fact, he was under the religious-legal obligation to do so whenever conditions were favorable.

Consequently, the early caliphs, the so-called Rashidun caliphs (632-661), translated these religious requirements into military conquest. The first dynasty after the Rashidun era – the Umayyads (661-750) – further developed jihad into a “doctrine of conquest” (Phares 2005:26) and made it an essential pillar of their governance. Through the rigorous usage of jihad as a state tool, objectives other than religious (proselytization) could be achieved: the region became politically more stable because rivaling Bedouin clans were subdued and united; growing socioeconomic needs could be satisfied by opening up new resources and trade relations; and the spiritual dimension of the military campaigns facilitated recruiting. The geopolitical expansion of Islam through the caliphate-jihad is also called *fatah* or *futuh* [opening]. The Umayyads (and later the Ottomans) are described as “jihad-states” (Blankenship 1994) because these states were structurally based on *fatah*. The Umayyad's *fatah* let them conquer territories in North Africa, Andalusia, and Asia.

Beside *fatah* there were two other modes of military conflict in the course of Islam: *fitna* and *ridda*. *Fitna* is the term for war and unrest among Muslims while *ridda* means “a revolt against Islam, a retreat from the religion back to apostasy” (Bukay 2008:142), that is, a war between Muslims and Muslim apostates. Both types of conflict are not fought as a jihad, which poses a judicial problem since jihad is the only legitimate form of warfare in Islam. Therefore, *ridda* is considered as a war “of reinstating Islam among tribes that decided to quit it” (*hurub al ridda*) (Phares 2005:28) based on the sharia provision that conversion from Islam is punishable by death. In the case of *fitna*, the use of force against other Muslims was legally sanctioned by the application of the *takfir* doctrine (the excommunication of Muslims). So, the difference between *fitna* and *ridda* is that in first case the enemy is excommunicated *in order* to fight him, while in the latter case the enemy actively converses from Islam and *therefore* is fought.

During periods of *fitna* the questions about the right faith and therefore the question about the legitimate rule of the ummah were central. “*Fitna* became a permanent condition after 750, when the political unity of the Muslim community (ummah) came to an end” (Streusand 1997:3). The fragmentation of the ummah undermined the dichotomy of *dar al'harb* and *dar al'islam*. So for the most time in Islamic history the premise, under which jihad was waged in order to establish worldwide peace has not been met. Because the first (influential) codification of Islamic international law (*Siyar*) is attributed to the work of Muhammad Ibn al-Hassan al-Shybbani (8th century) (see: Khadduri 1966), Streusand (1997) concludes: “In effect, the law of jihad was formulated after the condition it fit had passed.” However, despite intellectual controversy, the Umayyad Caliphate was militarily successful and judicial considerations could not stop their campaigns.

³⁸ The occurrence of the actual written version of the Qur'an, like it is known today, dates to 644 when the third caliph Uthman Ibn Affan compiled and homogenized the existing written sources.

The importance of jihad as military invasion diminished during the Abbasid dynasty (750-1258). Although not used as a tool for large scale military conquest, jihad remained in the course of Islamic conflicts, such as in anti-colonial jihads (Sedgwick 2007). The last official jihad was declared in 1914 by Caliph Mehmed V. At the same time it was the first jihad that was fought with an “infidel” ally, the Germans, who trained, counseled and equipped the Ottoman military in the preceding years (Schwanitz 2007, 2008). This last Caliphate-jihad in history did not have much in common with its early conception. The subsequent end of the Caliphate in 1924 is perceived by today’s jihadists as a bitter setback in the conflict between Islam and the often mentioned “crusader-conspiracy”. Although the Caliphate as an entity in international relations disappeared, it is exactly this geopolitical situation that contemporary global jihadis seek to re-establish. “In the years after the collapse of the Caliphate, three currents emerged from the ashes of the world official body of jihad: one that rejected it and adhered to international law; another one that ignored the debate while adhering practically to the new international community; and third, the jihadists, which resuscitated it, reshaped its doctrines, and wages wars and conflicts in its name” (Phares 2005:45). Contemporary jihadism is one manifestation of the ever-changing nature of jihad conflicts. Hassan al-Banna “was one of the first Muslims since the abolition of the caliphate, who again used the term jihad and called for its resumption.” (Tibi 1999:243)

What makes contemporary jihad exceptional is the combination of three characteristics. First, territorial annexation is not the primary objective of jihadi violence (in some cases it still is, Dagestan, Cashmere, Iraq) but rather subversion and nihilism. Second, it is not anymore orchestrated by a central command but is practiced by everyone who claims so. Third, it makes strategic use of terrorism.

The point could be made that the Ismaili-Hashshashin, or Assassins, in the twelfth century were the first sub-state actors engaging in jihad against other Muslims (while rarely against non-Muslims). Roy describes their action as “an exception in Muslim history, an isolated and weird episode born out of a marginal heresy” (Roy 2004:42). What is uncertain, however, is whether today’s Jihadism will become anything else but a “marginal heresy” in Islamic history.

Conclusion

This article discusses 13 opposing pairs (dissident vs. rejectionist; nomadic jihad vs. irredentist jihad...) that characterize jihadism and help to distinguish it from related phenomena. Figure 1 depicts these 13 definitional characteristics of jihadism. They have been divided into three sets: Jihadism as one form of Islamic activism (right segment) with a distinct dogma of jihad (middle segment) that employs a historically novel modus operandi of militant action (left segment). This enumeration is not exhaustive but it provides an overview of crucial features of jihadism. It can be summarized as follows:

Although deeply committed to the Salafi creed Salafi jihadists gave up the rejectionist stance of their spiritual leaders and consider jihad, rather than da’wa [propagation] purification [tazkiyya], and religious education or cultivation [tarbiya], as a legitimate means of protest against profane tendencies. Unlike Islamic nationalists, who follow a secular/laical pro-nationalist agenda (which of course can contain Islamic issues), Salafi jihadists condemn all manmade laws and believe in the political sovereignty of god. Nevertheless they migrate to conflicts in which Islamic

nation-states are involved in order to wage jihad (e.g. Bosnia, Chechnya, or Cashmere). Islamism seeks to assert religious goals through capturing and utilizing the existing political infrastructure of a nation. It is quite natural that such aspirations often result in violent conflicts with the state power (jihad against the near enemy). In contrast, Salafi jihadists fight the near enemy with the intention of abandoning the existing political infrastructure. In addition they reason that apostate Muslim regimes are difficult to defeat as long as they are supported by Western nations (the far enemy), which therefore have to be attacked, too.

The Islamic international law (Siyar), of which the religious concept of jihad is a subset, has been developed and modified by clerics and jurists in a sophisticated manner over the centuries to adjust it to social-political realities of their time. It is part of this adjustment that today's reformists seek for a non-hostile interpretation of jihad, such as the separation of jihad and qital or the relativization of jihad as perpetual warfare. Jihadists, too, have adapted the jihad-doctrine to current affairs from their point of view. In their perception, Islam is under attack which makes jihad through the force of arms [qital] an individual obligation [fard ayn], even against 'apostate' Muslims [takfir].

The inventive discourse of the jihadi intellectuals has been translated into action. Jihadi warfare traditionally has been a doctrine for foreign policy that was employed by Muslims rulers for military conquest [fatah]. In contrast, contemporary jihad is an asymmetrical conflict in which terrorist and guerilla tactics are employed.




Figure 2: Thirteen definitional features of Jihadism. *The inner segment shows the configuration of ten criteria that are characteristic for jihadism.*

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A Profile of Religious Fundamentalism and Terrorist Activism

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Abstract: *Religious fundamentalism and Islamic activism in general aren't necessarily related to violent or even terrorist activism. This article provides a conceptual and descriptive clarification of the notion of jihadism by presenting 13 definitional features. These features help to identify the subtle varieties between different forms of Islamic activism. The article provides no new empirical findings but rather compiles crucial contributions from the vast literature on the topic.*

Keywords: *Religious fundamentalism, Jihadism, Islamic activism, terrorism.*

Introduction

Contemporary terrorism is often equated with religious terrorism, and more so with Islam. The image of an “Islamic danger” emerged, because jihadi violence is no longer confined to countries in the Middle East but, also, poses a threat to the domestic security of Western states. Like all stereotypes, the image of so-called “Islamic terrorism” helps to heuristically cope with a complex subject. Such mental shortcuts are at the expense of details, subtle relations and broader background, and refer to two complexities that are sometimes poorly understood: terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism. While religious fundamentalism in general isn't necessarily related to violent or even terrorist activism this is the case with jihadism.¹ This article seeks to provide a solid description of jihadi fundamentalism by thoroughly defining the term jihadism.

Jihadism refers to a certain form of Islamic social movement – deterritorialized and loosely connected through an ideology – that employs a heterodox form of jihad as a mean to fight

¹ Jihadism could likewise be termed jihadi fundamentalism. Both terms are used throughout this text interchangeably. The term jihadism is used within the academic and intelligence community as well as by the press.

secular-democratic influences and to assert fundamentalists beliefs. While the movement's fundamentalist outlook largely derives from Salafism – a pious and purist Islamic denomination – its militant activism roots in the intellectual legacy of certain influential political activists, ideologists and religious scholars such as Sayyid Qutb, Mohammed Faraj, Abdallah Azzam, and more recently Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Yusuf al-Uyayri and many others.²

It would be too simplistic to equate jihadism with terrorism but jihadi violence partly is terrorist violence. That makes it descriptive and therefore conceptual understanding even more difficult. Our academic (western-secular) concepts and analytical frameworks such as crime, deviant behavior, terrorism and war do not adequately capture the contemporary social phenomenon of jihadism. Terrorism is said to be the “blurring of the war/crime dichotomy” (Waddington, 2007:4) that exhibits *three anomalies*: it is a) altruistic violence that b) responds to perceived injustice by applying collective liability (Black 2004:10), and it is c) countered through a mix of criminal justice and war like measures (Pedahzur/Ranstorp, 2001) although it is neither genuine crime nor genuine military aggression.

In this article jihadism is characterized and defined in regard to three constitutive dimensions: It is “Islamic activism” (*activist dimension*) but it is different from other forms of Islamic activism (namely political Islam, Islamic nationalism and mainstream fundamentalism) in that jihadism has developed a doctrine that is different from orthodox judicial interpretations of jihad (*discursive dimension*), and it continues the long history of jihad-warfare, however in an unprecedented manner that takes the form of a new type of conflict that is neither genuine crime nor genuine nor war (*military dimension*).

According to these three dimensions, part 1 describes and compares jihadism with other forms of Islamic activism to highlight their differences and similarities. Part 2 singles out jihadists' unique and novel interpretation of the religious concept of jihad and compares it to the dogmatic conception of jihad as it is stipulated in Islamic international law [siyar]. Beyond the comparison of these competing jihad-dogmata (in part 2.3), part 3 shows how contemporary global jihad is different from historical occurrences of jihad as a state-doctrine in foreign policy. Thereby thirteen definitional features of jihadism are compiled into a profile of jihadism (see figure 2 at the end of the article).

The compilation of these definitional features is the result of a meta-review of appropriate literature from various disciplines (Islamic and oriental studies, sociology, terrorist studies). This article shall condense and systemize some of the contributions of knowledgeable authors in the field, to propose a conceptual rather than an anecdotal and narrative definition of jihadism.

² For a comprehensive overview of influential jihadi ideologues see the militant ideology atlas (McCants 2006).

	Islamism	Islamic Nationalism	Salafi Fundamentalism		
			apolitical	dissident	jihadi
Roy (1994, 2004)	political Islam	Islamic Nationalism	Neofundamentalism/Salafism		
			mainstream	- ³	jihadi
ICG (2005)	internal jihadi	-political Islamism/political Islamic activism - irredentist jihad	missionary Islamic activism	-	global jihadi
Wiktorowicz (2005)	-	-	Salafism		
			purists	Politicos, dissident ulamas	jihadi
Gerges (2005)	religious nationalism	statist nationalism	-	-	transnational jihadism
Hegghammer /Lacroix (2007)	-	-	rejectionists, Neo-Salafists	reformists Islamism	jihadism
Keppel (2004)	-	-	Salafi pietists	-	Salafi jihadists
Criteria	- capture the nation-state - doctrinaire jihad - takfir-jihad - the near enemy - revolutionary - political - sovereignty of god - “the Quran is our constitution”	- laical, secular - religion follows state - political - sovereignty of the people - non-revolutionary - desacralization of politics	- apolitical - rejection of the nation state - reform of the soul - political - sovereignty of god	- politicized - oppositional - reform of the state and the religious establishment - influenced by Islamism - political - sovereignty of god	- abolition of the nation-state - doctrinaire jihad - the near & far enemy - influenced by Islamism/Quibism - political - sovereignty of god
Examples	- Muslim Brotherhood (Quitbist branch)	- PLO (Palestine) - Muslim Brotherhood (al-Hudaybi branch) - Pan-Arabism (Nasserism)	- al-Jama’a al-Salafiyya al-Muchtasiba (JSM)	- Al-sahwa al-Islamiyya (Saudi Arabia)	- Al-Qaida and associates

Figure 1: Five forms of Sunni Islamic activism⁴ in the terminology used by 6 different authors

³ The authors do not explicitly speak about this form of Islamic activism.

⁴ Islamic activism is defined as “the active assertion and promotion of beliefs, prescriptions, laws, or policies that are held to be Islamic in character.” (ICG 2005:1)

Jihadism in the Universe of Islamic Activism

The International Crisis Group (ICG) reasonably defines Islamic activism as: “the active assertion and promotion of beliefs, prescriptions, laws, or policies that are held to be Islamic in character.” (2005:1). Literature distinguishes three kinds of Islamic activism (Islamism⁵, Islamic nationalism, and Islamic fundamentalism) whereby fundamentalism is subdivided into apolitical, dissident, and jihadi. Mapping the different manifestations of Islamic activism and highlighting jihadi fundamentalism (jihadism) as one of its manifestations, is the concern of this section. Figure 1 illustrates this division and shall help to navigate through part 1.

Jihadism has to be carefully distinguished from other forms of Islamic activism. It has its own set of doctrines and concepts of how to react to the perceived malaise of the Muslim world. Different authors use different expressions when they refer to the same kinds of Islamic activism: In his two famous books “Globalised Islam” and “The failure of political Islam” Oliver Roy distinguishes three kinds of Islamic activism: Islamism (also called political Islam), Islamic nationalism, and neofundamentalism (subdivided into mainstream and jihadi).⁶ Roy’s categorization encompasses the whole spectrum of Islamic activism⁷, while other authors focus on specific manifestations. Accordingly, the top line of Figure 1 is based on Roy’s typology. It is the encompassing framework under which the terminology of six authors is subsumed. A clarification and explanation of these terms highlights jihadism (right column) as a distinct entity in the universe of Islamic activism.

The International Crisis Group (ICG 2005) distinguishes five types of Sunni Islamic activism: Political Islamism, missionary Islamic activism and jihadi activism, the latter can be internal, global or irredentist. In the context of Salafism (which Roy labels ‘neofundamentalism’) social scientist Quintan Wiktorowicz has identified purists, politicos and jihadis (rejectionists, reformists and jihadi according to Hegghammer/Lacroix in the context of Saudi Arabia). The Middle East expert Fawaz Gerges uses the terms religious nationalists and transnational jihadis when talking about Islamism and jihadi Salafism. Gilles Kepel, focusing on the Wahabi context in Saudi Arabia, speaks about Salafi pietists and jihadists.

Despite considerable confusion in the usage of the words Islamism and Islamic fundamentalism⁸ concerning the question as to whether these words connote the same or different

⁵ Apparently, there is some confusion about the term Islamism. Many authors use “Islamism” synonymously with “Islamic activism”.⁵ Throughout this paper the term ‘Islamism’ is used synonymously with ‘political Islam’ which is a subset of the broader, capacious term of ‘Islamic activism’.

⁶ Such categorizations are more heuristically than are empirically validated, e.g. concerning internal homogeneity and external heterogeneity (Roy 2004:21). It should be noted that these are diachronic categories which represent different stages of the transformation-process from *Islamism* (political Islam) to *post-Islamism* (Islamic nationalism and Neofundamentalism/Salafism). Despite the importance of Roy’s thesis the transformation-process is not the subject of this paper.

⁷ Roy elaborates these categories in his books “Globalised Islam” (2004) and “The failure of political Islam” (1994). The terms are dealt with on the following pages in the original text sources: *Islamism*, (2004) pages 1-4, 21, 40, 58-92, 99, 245-254; (1994) pages 35-60, 75; *Nationalism*: (2004) pages 62-67, 315; *Neofundamentalism (mainstream)*: (2004): 232-257, (1994) pages 60-75; *Neofundamentalism (jihadi)*: (2004) pages 41f, 234, 244, 250, 254-257.

⁸ See e.g. Kramer 2003.

social phenomena, this article make an analytical distinction between the two: Islamism utilizes political mechanisms that allow for the exercise of power such as political dialogue, lobbying, or the foundations of parties. Political participation is considered legitimate as long as it is beneficial for the Islamist's agenda (that can indeed contain fundamentalist issues). Fundamentalists, in contrast, might follow a very similar agenda but abstain from and condemn political participation. They indeed offer an alternative societal concept concerning goals and means.

Islamism/Political Islam

When comparing Islamism (Figure 1, 1st column) and jihadism (5th column) several similarities appear, such as their disappointment about 'apostate' Muslim regimes, resentment towards Western influences and their doctrinaire-revolutionary conception of jihad. Despite their affinity it is justified to draw a distinction between both forms of activism because jihadi fundamentalists reject the idea of utilizing state institutions and politics as a tool to Islamize society (unlike political Islamists) and they have expanded their domestic struggle (internal jihad against the near enemy) to a transnational level (jihad against the far enemy) as a result of strategic considerations.

Many of the Muslim countries in the Middle East fit the description of authoritarian or single party systems. However, it is not the lack of democratic principles that Islamists criticize. Rather, their movements criticize these regimes to be un-Islamic since they fail to comprehensively implement Sharia law in the domestic legislation. Islamists witness the growth of cultural and social pluralism and consequently consider the Muslim society to be going astray. They use the word *jahiliyya*⁹ to describe the societal status quo, a truly negatively connoted term that refers to the pre-Islamic era in which war, hatred and chaos ruled. The corrupt and dependent state power is considered to be the cause for this profane and secular situation. Consequently Islamists oppose and try to overthrow most regimes in the Middle East through oppositional activities (e.g. education, propagation, political mobilization, and sometimes through political violence).

Capture the State vs. Abolish the State

This is what distinguishes political Islam from the global Salafi jihadism: Islamists try to capture the nation-state alongside with all its institutions through which political power can be exercised, police, military, schools and universities, legislative and judiciary bodies and so on. In this way Islam shall be promoted and asserted top down via the nation state. The Muslim Brotherhood's¹⁰ slogan "The Quran is our constitution" is illustrative for the *symbiosis of religion, politics and state*.¹¹ Contrarily, Salafists try to abandon all man-made political institutions, the nation state and

⁹ The Muslim Brother ideologue Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) re-used the term jahiliyya [ignorance] to describe of the societal situation of Egypt in the 1950s.

¹⁰ The Muslim Brotherhood – founded 1928 in Egypt by Hassan al-Banna – is the prototype of Islamist movements. Note that today the MB is not considered a revolutionary movement anymore since it has subscribed to democratic principles and abstains from the use of violence. However, there might be a fine line between political activism and subversion.

¹¹ Therefore, Juergensmeyer (1994, 1996) as well as Gerges (2005:43ff) appropriately call Islamism *religious nationalism*. Religious nationalism is not to be confused with secular Islamic nationalism in which politics and religion are separated (compare second and third column in table 1).

“the Western Westphalian order in world politics” (Tibi 2008:112) altogether. A leading Salafi hadith scholar – Shaykh Nasir al-Din al-Albani – repeatedly stated: “the good policy is to abandon politics” (Lacroix 2008:6). For the Salafi movement the administrative entity is not the state (especially contemporary nation states with their foreign made borders) but, more vaguely, the Muslim collective (the ummah).

Jihad Against the Near Enemy vs. Jihad Against the Far Enemy

The second point of distinction between global jihadists and Islamists is in their scope of jihad. It is quite natural that the revolutionary aspirations of the Islamists have often resulted in violent conflicts with the state power. Activists design this conflict as a jihad. In this regard Sayyid Qutb (in the 1950's) introduced very appealing thoughts to the Egyptian context by arguing that Muslim rulers can be the legitimate target of jihad if it is proven that these rulers are in fact apostates and renegades who have betrayed Islam.¹² Various Islamist movements have utilized Qutb's doctrine to legitimize their *jihad against the near enemy* (internal jihad against the state power). One arena of such conflict is Egypt (Sadat's assassination 1981 and a jihadi terrorist campaign of Jama'a al-Islamiyya in the 1990's).

In contrast global jihadists have made a strategic shift. Many members of the global jihadi movement are former domestic Islamists who experienced merciless repression during their revolution at home. Their experience and their strategic reasoning holds that the jihad against the near enemy cannot be won as long as the Arab regimes are supported by the US. Consequently they target the far enemy (the US and its allies) to address the alleged root causes for the Muslim malaise and jahiliyya. In the groundbreaking manifest “Knight's under the prophet's banner” published in 2001, Ayman al-Zawahiri details the strategic shift from the near to the far enemy.

In his analysis “The failure of political Islam”, Roy (1994) argues that the era of Islamism has ended after its revolutions were unsuccessful (except for the Shiite context in Iran). Today's situation (post-Islamism) shows that the former activists either started to be secular nationalists or took a fundamentalist outlook refraining from any political participation. “The Islamist myth was that of the unification of the religious and the political; post-Islamism means that both spheres are autonomous.” (Roy 2004:3).

Islamic Nationalism

Another type of Islamic activism is Islamic nationalism¹³ (Figure 1, 2nd column). Unlike political Islamism, Islamic nationalism shows little or no revolutionary momentum. Their movements and

¹² Qutb uses to the takfir doctrine, which is the Islamic practice of denouncing people as infidels and which includes the excommunication of Muslims. Since this practice is about the question ‘who is a Muslim, and who is not’ it is very contentious in Islam. In Islamic history takfir has been applied in several contexts not only to stigmatize rulers who are too profane but also to “denounce entire populations as apostates” (Phares 2007). Qutb borrowed main ideas from the prominent scholar Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), who first codified takfir in order denounce unpopular Muslim rulers of his time (namely the Mongolians who converted to Islam after their intrusion into Muslim territory).

¹³ What the ICG describes as *political Islamic activism* and *political Islamism* is what Roy names

parties are acting entirely secularly but with an Islamic agenda. Nationalist activists try to “assert Islamic beliefs, prescriptions and laws” through political participation. Their primate is their state not the religion.

Political Sovereignty of People vs. Political Sovereignty of God

The differences between jihadi movements are apparent. *Salafi Jihadists reject the nation state while Islamic nationalists embody the nation state*. Nationalists believe in the political sovereignty of people (not necessarily through democracy); Islamists, and especially Salafists, believe in the sovereignty of God.

Tellingly, when Hamas (the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood), participated and succeeded in the 2006 election, the al-Qaeda official Ayman al-Zawahiri condemned their participation in the election exactly because the Salafiyya jihadiyya feared Hamas’ transformation from a religious-revolutionary to a nationalist movement:

How come they did not demand an Islamic constitution for Palestine before entering any elections? Are they not an Islamic movement? [. . .] Accepting the legitimacy of Mahmoud Abbas [. . .] is an abyss that will ultimately lead to eliminating the jihad and recognizing Israel.¹⁴

At a later point Abu Yahya al-Libi joined the dispute:

Those listening to your statements can no longer differentiate between you and secular groups. . . . They [Hamas] betrayed the dreams of their young fighters.¹⁵

Surprisingly, despite the fundamental differences between nationalists and jihadi Salafists both movements sometimes engage side-by-side in the same conflict namely in irredentist jihads.

Irredentist Jihad vs. “Nomadic Jihad”

Irredentist jihad is a means to defend the national sovereignty of Muslim nations in case of foreign occupation (e.g. Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine, Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army (Shiite) in Iraq). Irredentist jihadists have national interests – often not even considering themselves as jihadists – and have to be distinguished from global Salafi jihadists, who are often involved in the same armed conflicts but with entirely different motivations.¹⁶ Global jihadists see irredentist conflicts as a chance to widen their sway among other non-Salafi Muslims and to engage in jihad against infidels. In the literature the Salafi involvement in irredentist conflicts is called “nomadic jihad” (Roy 1999:7, Wiktorowicz 2001) because some mujahedeen travel from conflict to conflict far away from their homes to engage in jihad.

nationalism (Roy 2005:62). Confusingly, Roy uses the term Islamism/political Islam when referring to what the ICG labels *internal jihadi activism*.

¹⁴ Statement of Ayman al-Zawahiri published December 20th 2006. For the entire dispute, see the online article “The war of words between Hamas and al-Qaeda” (Lipton 2007).

¹⁵ Statement of Abu Yahya al-Libi published April 29th 2007.

¹⁶ For an insightful article about the Bosnian context see Mitchell 2008, also Cetin 2008.

Quite often, however, they alienate the domestic Muslim population with their austere and anti-nationalist ideas. An example of the strange alliance between nationalists and transnational fundamentalists is the War in Bosnia in which a contingent of foreign Salafī mujahedeen supported the regular Bosnian army. A Bosnian soldier said about his foreign Salafī brothers-in-arms: “They are superb fighters, but you can’t argue with them” (cited in Mitchell 2008:813).

In the Chechen context, the nomadic mujahedeen were even able to change the nature of the conflict. What has started as a secular-irredentist conflict, driven by the demand of a Muslim province for political autonomy from Russia, became a religiously inspired conflict after Salafī jihadists under the leadership of Shamil Basayev and Ibn al-Khattab entered the scene and provoked the second Chechen war by declaring a caliphate in Dagestan.

Fundamentalism/Salafism

Salafism is a very austere and strict Islamic denomination. Their model of society comes from the early Islamic period and the rule of Mohammad and the two following generations of caliphs also called the Rashidun Caliphs or rightly guided caliphs. This kind of Islamic activism can be considered fundamentalist. Like all kinds of religious fundamentalism it is characterized by three features: it strictly opposes the concessions to modernism and secularism made by their moderate brothers-in-faith; it perceives societal pluralism as an existential threat to their religion; it follows a scriptural interpretation of the holy texts to counterweight profane influences. Jihadism clearly has a Salafī dimension. However, the opposite is not true. Salafism cannot be reduced to global jihad and terrorism. Only a small minority within the Salafī community has a jihadi outlook, while the majority abstains from political activism.

Contemporary Salafism (almost indistinguishable from the Saudi Wahabism¹⁷) are not to be mistaken for the classical Salafīyya (embodied by Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad ‘Abduh at the end of the 19th century) which was an Islamic reform movement.¹⁸ The term neo-Salafism (Figure 1, 3rd column) is used by Hegghammer/Lacroix (2007) to name the apolitical and rejectionists branch of Saudi fundamentalists (to be distinguished from the establishment Wahabis on the one hand and the political Salafists, namely the ‘sahwa islamiyya’ on the other hand). Wiktorowicz (2006) distinguishes three major factions within Salafism: purists, politicians and jihadis.

The Salafī movement does not think and act in terms of state-power, nationality or democracy. Adherers perceive such concepts as heretic innovations [bid’ah] and vehemently polemicize against them. A detained member of the Saudi jihadi movement puts it this way:

I read history and did not find something called jinsiyya [nationality]. Each Muslim must operate in Dar al-Islam [Islamic territory] wherever he wants and without borders restraining him or passports confining him and without a taghut watan [despot nation] to worship. [...] I

¹⁷ The term Wahabism has a pejorative connotation and is used by Muslims that are critical towards Salafism rather than by the Salafī movement itself.

¹⁸ For this reason Roy chooses to name contemporary Salafism “neofundamentalism” to avoid confusion with the classical Salafīyya.

do not belong to Al-Saud who have no right to make people belong to them. (al-Shuwayl quoted in al-Rasheed 2008:8)

Mainstream Salafism: Rejectionist and Da'wa

The activism of (non-jihadi) Islamic fundamentalists (Figure 1, 3rd column) is consequently apolitical and is focused on the adherence to licit individual conduct: "Reform of the soul should precede reform of the state. [...] For neofundamentalists the aim of action is salvation, not revolution" (Roy 2004:248). Any political activism is proscribed. Societal change can only permissibly be achieved through propagation [da'wa], purification [tazkiyya], and religious education or cultivation [tarbiya] (Wiktorowicz 2006:217).

In the view of the mainstream Salafis, internal jihad against an unjust Muslim ruler is an illegitimate innovation adopted from the Western model of political participation and political revolution. Those who engage in such activism are driven by political utility and human desire, two bogeys to Salafists. Because purists refuse both, a (corrupt) Muslim government as well as political opposition against it, Hegghammer calls this Salafi current (for the Saudi Arabian context) *rejectionist Islamism* that is "intellectually and organizationally separate from the other and more visible forms of Saudi Islamist opposition such as the so-called "the Awakening" [al-Sahwa] movement or the Bin Laden-style jihadists" (Hegghammer/Lacroix 2007:104).¹⁹ For the rejectionists/purists contemporary engagement in jihad is only permissible for defensive purposes (e.g. irredentist jihad in Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia) while an offensive jihad against non-Muslim countries requires the purification of the ummah as well as its reorganization to a caliphate (both criteria are not met nowadays).

In the specific case of Saudi Arabia, the clergy is largely comprised of highly educated establishment (mainstream) Salafis. Most of them hold views that are similar to those of the rejectionists (purists). However, due to their symbiotic relation to the monarchy they do not openly question its legitimacy. The ulamas are a very influential force in the Saudi kingdom, but when it comes to the religious approval of political decisions they often go along with the earthly will of the rulers in order not to jeopardize their own power and influence. Because of these strategic concessions other Salafis pejoratively call them "palace-ulamas" [ulama al Balat], "the scholars of power" [al-ulama al-sulta] or "palace lackeys" (Kepel 204:310; Wiktorowicz 2006:227).

Political and Jihadi Salafism

Besides the purist or mainstream faction there is a political as well as a jihadi faction of Salafi fundamentalism.²⁰ (4th and 5th column) The political and jihadi Salafis agree with the knowledgeable purist scholars in many religious regards. However, they do not rely exclusively

¹⁹ Likewise Wiktorowicz (2006:219): "Purists ardently reject the oppositional (and often violent) method of the politicians and jihadis as religious innovations without precedent in the prophetic model and consensus of the companions."

²⁰ (Roy 2004: 41f 234, 244, 250; ICC 2005:11, 16; Wiktorowicz 2006:225ff). Another term for the same distinction is given by Kepel who speaks of Salafi pietists compared to Salafi jihadis (2004:308ff).

on non-violent da'wa [propagation] as the only option to defend Islam against profane influences. Politicos and jihadis mainly differ in their readiness to express their opposition by violent means. The politicians, also called "dissident ulamas" (ICG 2005:12), are to a certain degree politicized, mainly through the intellectual and personal influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, who entered the Saudi stage in the 1960's.²¹ They criticize the political blindness of the purists, and especially of the Saudi ulamas and claim to have a better understanding of current affairs, notably, that the Muslim regimes appear to be too dependent on the West.

The jihadis exhibit the political disobedience of the politicians in combination with the radical takfir-thinking of the Qutbists. They have adopted the idea that – under contemporary political conditions – jihad has to be an individual obligation [fard 'ayn] because the ruler who solely can declare jihad traditionally (offensive jihad as a collective obligation [fard kifaya]) conspires with the actual enemy of Islam and therefore will not declare jihad against his ally and himself. "This is probably the best criterion with which to draw a line between conservative neofundamentalists and radical ones: the latter are rightly called 'jihadists' by the Pakistani press" (Roy 2004:42).

In this respect, the Qutbist Islamists (1st column) and the jihadi Salafis (5th column) seem to be one and the same: They share the idea that the corrupt Muslim regimes are the main obstacle on the path to the ideal Islamic society, and they hold the same conception of doctrinal takfir-jihad as a mean of opposition. Nonetheless, two distinctive features separate them. The first is in their conception of the post-conflict society. Islamists would use the captured political institutions and the existing social infrastructure to introduce the Sharia and Islamize the nation that allegedly has been misguided under the despotic regime. Jihadi fundamentalists do not hold such conceptions of societal administration. They would rule the community through propagation (da'wa), purification (tazkiyya), religious education or cultivation (tarbiya) and the direct application of the Sharia, without any concessions to national law, thereby building a full-fledged theocracy (abolish the state). The second difference is in the scope of their militant struggle. Islamists are almost solely concerned with the inner-political situation in their respective countries (the near enemy). Before the political power is not in their hands, other urgent problems of the ummah (e.g. the Palestinian question), they think, cannot be dealt with effectively. Quite contrary, Salafi jihadis have a global outlook beyond the context of certain nation-states.

The universe of Islamic activism is made up of different movements with their corresponding ideologies and worldviews. One of which is jihadism. The above described categorizations are

²¹ Political awareness was introduced to the inherently religious outlook of Saudi clerics in the 1960's when numerous followers of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood fled oppression in their country. Subsequently "they even managed to do the near-impossible – to radicalize the already radical Wahabism" (Fradkin 2008:10f). Sahwa followers, during the 1980's were critical, yet not rebellious towards the Saudi monarchy. Saudi rulers accepted the movement with the ulterior motive to form a counterweight for the oppositional religious propaganda of the rejectionists which were popular among the masses. However, this precarious alliance only lasted until 1990 when establishment ulamas sanctioned the decision to host American forces on Saudi soil. This event was, and still is, a sacrilege for many Salafists. Two prominent leaders of the sahwa, Safar al-Hawali and Salman al-Awdah, were imprisoned between 1994 and 1999 because they exhausted their credit of criticism. At this time many sahwa followers joint Bin Laden's and Zawahiri's call for global jihad in the "Declaration of war against the Americans occupying the land of the two holy places" (Bin Laden 1996).

constructed by experts with a profound knowledge about Islamic societies and their social movements, but who have not always validated their thoughts empirically.²² Although systematic differences in discourse and social behavior between the specific types of Islamic activism obviously exist these types partly overlap. Roy describes this lack of mutual exclusiveness as “[t]he blurring of the divide between Muslim Brothers, neofundamentalists and conservatives” (Roy 2004:253). The right segment of figure 1 shows six (of thirteen) criteria of jihadism.

Jihad in the Book: The Dogmatic Conception of Jihad

The previous part of this article described different types of Islamic activism to give an impression of its complexity and heterogeneity concerning actors, doctrines, strategies and worldviews. Another criterion of jihadism, which distinguishes it from nonviolent forms of fundamentalism, is its doctrinaire and heterodox conception of jihad. It is central in the ideology of Jihadism and constitutes the primary mean for the activists.²³ This form of jihad, as it was recently invented by Salafi intellectuals and ideologues, is religiously heterodox and has no precedence in the military history of jihad. This section shall give a short overview of jihad “in the book” and its historical manifestations “in action” (part 3) in order to show further distinctive features of contemporary global jihad.

Substantially jihad is a judicial concept that concerns ‘jus in bello’ (conduct within war) and ‘jus ad bellum’ (provisions for the use of armed force). Its textual sources can be found in the Medinan suras of the Quran and in different hadith collections (written tradition of the words and the deeds of the prophet).²⁴ Through exegesis from these textual sources are derived the legislation of lesser jihad as the Islamic instrument “of governance for war and peace” (Phares 2005:22). A distinction is made by some Muslims between the greater jihad (as practiced by the Sufis) – a spiritual struggle to overcome wrongful human drives and earthly temptations – and the lesser jihad, which is the only legitimate form of warfare in Islamic law. However, the hadith, which favors the greater jihad over the lesser jihad, is considered apocryphical and weak by some

²² Christina Hellmich expressed a harsh critique in this regard: “[P]articularly those explanations that seem to have become the official wisdom regarding the fundamental logic of Al Qaeda, Wahabism and the Salafi-Jihadist discourse, are concepts that are poorly understood and subject to much controversy. In the anxious quest to explain Al Qaeda, the terrorism studies community seems to have deviated from the guidelines of academic conduct” (2008:111). Hellmich recommends the analysis of primary data from the Al Qaeda’s inner tiers to reach conceptual clarification of notions of global salafi jihad. Some authors have done so: Brachmann (2009) has extensively reviewed ideological and strategic writings of the global salafi movement. Likewise the 360-page “Militant Ideology Atlas” (McCants 2006) provides a systematic insight into the writings of the jihadi movement. Gerges (2005; 2006) based his contributions on empirical field work and finally the studies of Thomas Hegghammer (for instance 2005) show his detailed knowledge of primary data from al-Qaida.

²³ The Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD 2004) describes four different modus operandi of Islamic activism: overt- and covert dawa; overt- and covert jihad. The authors assess the impact of these strategies on the vertical democratic order (between government and citizens) and the horizontal democratic order (between citizens).

²⁴ In the Arabic language use, ‘jihad’ also connotes ‘effort’ or ‘struggle’ in general without implying a specific religious concept.

Sunni scholars and of course by the jihadi movement. This section exclusively deals with the bellicose conception of jihad.

Jihad is an integral part of Islamic international law [al-siyar], which is a branch of general Islamic jurisprudence and “a fully functional body of the sharia” (Ali/Rehman 2005:323). Siyar regulates the conduct of the Islamic state (the caliphate) when interacting with other “de facto or de jure states” (Hamidullah 1961:3), or with the collective of infidels (kafir) in general. Islamic international law, together with its concept of jihad, has been subject to constant judicial development and adjustment to the socio-political context. “There is very little that is rigid and immutable in Islamic law” (Badr 1982:56, cited in Ali/Rehman 2005:327).

Still, there is no univocal Muslim position on central questions concerning jihad.²⁵ Different scholars and exegetes treat different aspects they may regard as opportune or believe to be prudent. In particular, the intellectual elite of the jihadi movement have made painstaking efforts to construct jihad-related fatwas that serve their cause. This has challenged more peace loving Muslims to make relative the practice of militant jihad in modernity. As we will see next, the un-contextualized and literal understanding of jihad indeed can lead to a confrontational and militant position towards non-Muslims.

Origins of the Jjihad-Dogma

The militant accentuation of jihad in the Medinan suras of the Quran is due to the historical circumstances from which these passages originate.²⁶ After Mohammed’s emigration from Mecca to Medina in 622 (the hijra), he established the first Islamic nation-like community [al dawla al Islamiyya], which was surrounded and threatened by hostile Bedouin tribes and pagan Mecca. The process of da’wa [propagation, proselytization] was opposed by the non-Muslim environment which demanded the temporary use of force in order to eventually pacify and Islamize the conflict-torn region. “It was at this time that the doctrine of jihad, in the sense of armed conflict, gained currency” (Ali/Rehman 2005:332).²⁷ Even more detailed is the bellicose description of jihad in numerous hadiths. There is general agreement among scholars that these hadiths are authentic

²⁵ This juridical pluralism is not restricted to the legal concept of jihad but is omnipresent in Islamic jurisprudence. It is due to what Jackson (2002:34) calls “the problem of free speech”. By this he means that every jurist can have his own position on any legal topic, and as long as he uses the recognized sources and abides by recognized methods of interpretation (as stipulated by *usul-al fiqh* - the sources of knowledge and understanding of the law), his position is equally valid to any other’s. Accordingly, Jackson distinguishes between “an Islamic position” and “the Islamic position” (ibid. p. 34). Only the latter is considered infallible. This infallibility (otherwise only granted to the prophet Muhammad) can be reached when the “interpretive community as a whole” has reached a “unanimous consensus” (ibid). Remarkably some jihadi ideologues claim infallibility of their views. This infallibility allegedly is given through transcendent experience during the practice of jihad. See Alshech (2008).

²⁶ Muslim reformers and of course historians make the argument to historicize the Quarnic text: “It matters little whether we accept the Quran as divine revelation or not. For whether it came from God or Muhammad or anywhere else, it certainly reflected the social, historical and political realities of seventh century Arabia” (Jackson 2003:37). See also: Donner (1991).

²⁷ Likewise Tibi (1999:84): “The call for the use of force occurs in the Quran step by step in Medina and thickens to a jihad-doctrine.”

(unlike the hadith promoting greater jihad). However, the synonym of armed struggle in the Quran is not jihad but qital: “According to the Quran the military part of jihad is called qital/combat” (Tibi 1999:74).²⁸ Qital is to be distinguished from the term harb (war) which denotes illegitimate aggression. Thus, it can be maintained that jihad cannot be reduced to qital, but qital is an integral part of jihad as it is described in the Medinan suras and some hadith collections. As noted before it is difficult to relativize its martial character, because the writings about the lesser jihad in Quran and Sunna are coined by the military-expansional situation of the ummah at the time of its origin. Modernists do this by historic-contextualized reading while conservatives rarely try to relativize the doctrine at all.

What is the characteristic legal discourse of the jihadi movement that delimitates it from the interpretations of the Islamic mainstream?

Contentious Aspects of Jihad

Inherent in Islam (as in other religions) is a necessity for proselytization. This necessity is due to the universal claim of Islam: “Muslims are obligated to spread the Islamic revelation worldwide” (Tibi 1999:80) and jihad is the mean. “Islam calls his project of Islamization of the world jihad” (ibid. p. 51).²⁹ When this religious universalism is combined with governance (especially foreign policy), as a consequence the Muslim ummah has to subdue the whole mankind under Islamic rule. As long as a worldwide Islamic administration is not established, this obligation does not cease. This universal claim is so categorical and non-disputable because Islam explains, that only its holistic rule can allow for a peaceful human society. Non-Islamic territory is named dar al’harb (house of war) or possibly dar al-sulh (house of treaty) if there is a peace agreement,³⁰ while territory under Muslim rule is called dar al-Islam (house of peace).

Offensive Jihad: Use of Armed Force [Qital] and Perpetual Warfare?

The dispute between reformers and conservatives is not about the concept of jihad per se, but about the legitimacy and even the obligation to use force for Islamic expansion [futuhat] in the contemporary political context. Reformists admit that jihad for the purpose of Islamic expansion into dar al’harb *can*³¹ include the use of force [qital] as *ultima ratio*, when peaceful attempts of proselytization and subjugation are forcefully prevented by the unbelievers. However, they argue, that contemporary political realities do not meet the prerequisites under which qital as jihad is to

²⁸ All quotations of Tibi (1999) are translated from German by the author.

²⁹ Rahman gives a similar explanation: “There is no doubt that the Quran wanted Muslims to establish a political order on earth for the sake of creating an egalitarian and just moral-social order. Jihad is the instrument for doing so” (1980:63f, cited in Streusand 1997:6), and by Khadduri (1966:xi): “Islam was neither the first nor the last of the nations that sought to establish a world public order based on divine legislation and to enforce it by the ‘jihad’”.

³⁰ The distinction into dar al-harb and dar al-Islam is not genuine to the Quran but was introduced at a later point through the practice of ijtihad (independent interpretation of the textual sources).

³¹ But is not necessarily limited to the smaller jihad: “Although the instrument by which the Islamic state was meant to sustain itself and expand territorially was through waging jihad, this did not always mean going to war” (Ali/Rehman 2005:333). See also Bar (2006:28ff).

be applied.³² Contrary, more textual interpretations of the sources in Quran and hadith make it difficult to detach qital from jihad no matter what current affairs look like. Other reformists, rather than separating qital from jihad, make the point that jihad does not necessarily mean a perpetual warfare against all non Muslims.³³

Although clerics from the jihadi movement may support the exegetical thesis of jihad as perpetual warfare, offensive jihad is not of immediate concern to the jihadi movement. This is because offensive jihad is an instrument of foreign policy and military expansion. The movement lacks the geopolitical capacity for concerted military campaigns. Therefore, contemporary jihad is fought as defensive jihad with certain doctrinal innovations. Nevertheless the global jihadi movement seeks to establish a geopolitical basis for offensive jihad like it did in Afghanistan under the Taliban, in the Republic of Dagestan and currently in the Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan.

Defensive Jihad: An Individual Obligation [Fard Ayn]

For the jihadi movement the classical distinction into dar al-Islam and dar al-harb does not meet contemporary geopolitical realities anymore. A country, in which people live under the nomocracy of the Sharia, does not exist. The entire world seems to be dar al'harb and the movement perceives itself as the vanguard of Islam just as the Prophet Muhammad and his companions were the Muslim vanguard in Medina. Possibly, the federally administered tribal areas in Pakistan (FATA) best compare to the situation of this time.

Territories that used to fulfill the Sharia-criteria for dar al'-Islam are either occupied by the "enemies of Islam" (it matters little whether the invaders are people of the book, polytheists or atheists), or they are governed by corrupt Muslim leaders. In the case of foreign occupation or military deployment jihad is fought as defensive jihad (Cashmere, Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, Palestine, Saudi Arabia Andalusia) and therefore is an individual obligation (fard ayn) that does not necessitate the command of a Caliph. Every territory that has ever been under Islamic rule is suitable for launching defensive jihad. Local Muslims have to fulfill this obligation and if they are not able or powerful enough to do so, the obligation passes to Muslims elsewhere.³⁴

³² The eminent Azhar University in Cairo takes the following position: "Is it necessary to carry out da'wa/the call to Islam with the weapon? [...] The sword used to be a mean for the spread of Islam, today, however, this is only important when it is to avert evil from Muslims. [...] Today there are newspapers and other communication media, with whose one can intrude in the houses of the others in order to spread Islam. However, there is a small group of Muslims who want spread Islam via weapons without realizing that the foes of Islam are fighting us with much more dangerous means today." (al-Azhar 1984, Bayan li al-nas min al-Azhar al-sharif (Declaration to mankind from the grand al-Azhar), cited in Tibi 1999:72).

³³ For instance see Shakir (2003). In an article on the website Islamic-answers.com the position of the conservatives is described as follows: "In the past some classical Muslim Jurists held the opinion that Islam enjoins Muslims to maintain a state of permanent belligerence with all non-believers. According to this opinion Muslims are under a legal obligation to reduce all non-Muslim communities to Islamic rule. Proponents of this view did not make any distinction between neutral or peaceful non-Muslim states and those who are violent and aggressive towards the Islamic State." (Kareem 2008:1).

³⁴ The provisions for jus ad bellum have been provided by Abdullah Azzam. See Wiktorowicz (2001:23f).

Both, reformists and conservatives, agree that jihad for the defense of dar al-Islam sanctions the use of armed force. Thus, the omnipresent theories about the global conspiracy against Islam in jihadist circles are ideologically important.³⁵ Additionally, the classification of contemporary global jihad as defensive jihad also provides the possibility for jihadi agitators to bypass the Islamic prohibition of the indiscriminate killings of civilians (women and children) since such regulations only exist for offensive jihad.

Takfir vs. Fitna

The defensive paradigm is also present in the *takfir-jihad* against allegedly apostate Muslim governments. War among Muslims [fitna] cannot be justified theologically. Accordingly, the internal jihadists excommunicate their Muslim adversaries to make them a legitimate target. “Arab regimes are thus considered the functional equivalent of foreign occupation” (Wiktorowicz 2001:26). The controversial debate about the practice of takfir within the Salafi community cannot avoid that jihadi groups use takfir in a utilitarian manner without considering its dogmatic restrictions.

This is not the place to review the far reaching theological discussion of jihad in detail. It surely would be worthwhile to describe the dogmatic position of the four schools of Sunni jurisprudence (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’I and Hanbali) on different aspects of jihad and Siyar, but for the understanding of jihadism it is not important to grasp this discourse comprehensively.

Jihad in Action: the Military History of Jihad

Contemporary jihadism has no prior correlates, neither in the dogmatic design of jihad, nor in its historic occurrence. The application of jihad to social realities, as performed by past Muslim rulers, has always somewhat deviated from its theological conception. Therefore, it is worth comparing the “religious-doctrinaire meaning” with the actual “historical meaning” (Tibi 1999:57).³⁶ Historically, jihad means warfare, theologically jihad *can* mean warfare. “[T]he history of Islam is characterized by recurring violence claimed to be justified by jihad, even when it was not.” (Bassiouni 2008:79).³⁷ Therefore, the historical novelty of jihadism is not constituted in the discrepancy between jihad in the book and jihad in action but rather in the combination of three characteristics (left segment in figure 1: Non-state actors waging jihad against Muslim and non-Muslim rulers alike, directing their violent campaign partially against civilians as part of their strategy.

³⁵ That is one reason why Wiktorowicz in 2001 cautions to consider the wider impact the war on terror could have on the non-jihadi Salafi movement. The invasion in Afghanistan and Iraq certainly undermines the moderate’s argument that Islam is not under attack and defensive jihad thus is not appropriate.

³⁶ Jackson (2003:41) makes a similar distinction by speaking of the “Quranic and the classical articulation of jihad”. Likewise Bassiouni (2008:80): “Jihad, like many other aspects of Islam, has its theoretical and practical aspects – both being frequently quite distinct from each other”.

³⁷ Similarly Roy (2004:56) states: “Notwithstanding the debate on what the word really means, it is clear that jihad, as an armed struggle, has always been instrumentalized for political and strategic purposes, by state actors or would-be state actors”.

As described above, the origins of the codification of the lesser jihad fall in the period of its first application, when the prophet Mohammad expanded the Islamic ummah into the Arabian Peninsula.³⁸ After the prophet's death in 632 in Medina, his institutional succession was established in the caliphate, which was the political embodiment of Islam. Only the official caliph could declare jihad for territorial expansion of the ummah. In fact, he was under the religious-legal obligation to do so whenever conditions were favorable.

Consequently, the early caliphs, the so-called Rashidun caliphs (632-661), translated these religious requirements into military conquest. The first dynasty after the Rashidun era – the Umayyads (661-750) – further developed jihad into a “doctrine of conquest” (Phares 2005:26) and made it an essential pillar of their governance. Through the rigorous usage of jihad as a state tool, objectives other than religious (proselytization) could be achieved: the region became politically more stable because rivaling Bedouin clans were subdued and united; growing socioeconomic needs could be satisfied by opening up new resources and trade relations; and the spiritual dimension of the military campaigns facilitated recruiting. The geopolitical expansion of Islam through the caliphate-jihad is also called *fatah* or *futuh* [opening]. The Umayyads (and later the Ottomans) are described as “jihad-states” (Blankenship 1994) because these states were structurally based on *fatah*. The Umayyad's *fatah* let them conquer territories in North Africa, Andalusia, and Asia.

Beside *fatah* there were two other modes of military conflict in the course of Islam: *fitna* and *ridda*. *Fitna* is the term for war and unrest among Muslims while *ridda* means “a revolt against Islam, a retreat from the religion back to apostasy” (Bukay 2008:142), that is, a war between Muslims and Muslim apostates. Both types of conflict are not fought as a jihad, which poses a judicial problem since jihad is the only legitimate form of warfare in Islam. Therefore, *ridda* is considered as a war “of reinstating Islam among tribes that decided to quit it” (*hurub al ridda*) (Phares 2005:28) based on the sharia provision that conversion from Islam is punishable by death. In the case of *fitna*, the use of force against other Muslims was legally sanctioned by the application of the *takfir* doctrine (the excommunication of Muslims). So, the difference between *fitna* and *ridda* is that in first case the enemy is excommunicated *in order* to fight him, while in the latter case the enemy actively converses from Islam and *therefore* is fought.

During periods of *fitna* the questions about the right faith and therefore the question about the legitimate rule of the ummah were central. “*Fitna* became a permanent condition after 750, when the political unity of the Muslim community (ummah) came to an end” (Streusand 1997:3). The fragmentation of the ummah undermined the dichotomy of *dar al'harb* and *dar al'islam*. So for the most time in Islamic history the premise, under which jihad was waged in order to establish worldwide peace has not been met. Because the first (influential) codification of Islamic international law (*Siyar*) is attributed to the work of Muhammad Ibn al-Hassan al-Shybbani (8th century) (see: Khadduri 1966), Streusand (1997) concludes: “In effect, the law of jihad was formulated after the condition it fit had passed.” However, despite intellectual controversy, the Umayyad Caliphate was militarily successful and judicial considerations could not stop their campaigns.

³⁸ The occurrence of the actual written version of the Qur'an, like it is known today, dates to 644 when the third caliph Uthman Ibn Affan compiled and homogenized the existing written sources.

The importance of jihad as military invasion diminished during the Abbasid dynasty (750-1258). Although not used as a tool for large scale military conquest, jihad remained in the course of Islamic conflicts, such as in anti-colonial jihads (Sedgwick 2007). The last official jihad was declared in 1914 by Caliph Mehmed V. At the same time it was the first jihad that was fought with an “infidel” ally, the Germans, who trained, counseled and equipped the Ottoman military in the preceding years (Schwanitz 2007, 2008). This last Caliphate-jihad in history did not have much in common with its early conception. The subsequent end of the Caliphate in 1924 is perceived by today’s jihadists as a bitter setback in the conflict between Islam and the often mentioned “crusader-conspiracy”. Although the Caliphate as an entity in international relations disappeared, it is exactly this geopolitical situation that contemporary global jihadis seek to re-establish. “In the years after the collapse of the Caliphate, three currents emerged from the ashes of the world official body of jihad: one that rejected it and adhered to international law; another one that ignored the debate while adhering practically to the new international community; and third, the jihadists, which resuscitated it, reshaped its doctrines, and wages wars and conflicts in its name” (Phares 2005:45). Contemporary jihadism is one manifestation of the ever-changing nature of jihad conflicts. Hassan al-Banna “was one of the first Muslims since the abolition of the caliphate, who again used the term jihad and called for its resumption.” (Tibi 1999:243)

What makes contemporary jihad exceptional is the combination of three characteristics. First, territorial annexation is not the primary objective of jihadi violence (in some cases it still is, Dagestan, Cashmere, Iraq) but rather subversion and nihilism. Second, it is not anymore orchestrated by a central command but is practiced by everyone who claims so. Third, it makes strategic use of terrorism.

The point could be made that the Ismaili-Hashshashin, or Assassins, in the twelfth century were the first sub-state actors engaging in jihad against other Muslims (while rarely against non-Muslims). Roy describes their action as “an exception in Muslim history, an isolated and weird episode born out of a marginal heresy” (Roy 2004:42). What is uncertain, however, is whether today’s Jihadism will become anything else but a “marginal heresy” in Islamic history.

Conclusion

This article discusses 13 opposing pairs (dissident vs. rejectionist; nomadic jihad vs. irredentist jihad...) that characterize jihadism and help to distinguish it from related phenomena. Figure 1 depicts these 13 definitional characteristics of jihadism. They have been divided into three sets: Jihadism as one form of Islamic activism (right segment) with a distinct dogma of jihad (middle segment) that employs a historically novel modus operandi of militant action (left segment). This enumeration is not exhaustive but it provides an overview of crucial features of jihadism. It can be summarized as follows:

Although deeply committed to the Salafi creed Salafi jihadists gave up the rejectionist stance of their spiritual leaders and consider jihad, rather than da’wa [propagation] purification [tazkiyya], and religious education or cultivation [tarbiya], as a legitimate means of protest against profane tendencies. Unlike Islamic nationalists, who follow a secular/laical pro-nationalist agenda (which of course can contain Islamic issues), Salafi jihadists condemn all manmade laws and believe in the political sovereignty of god. Nevertheless they migrate to conflicts in which Islamic

nation-states are involved in order to wage jihad (e.g. Bosnia, Chechnya, or Cashmere). Islamism seeks to assert religious goals through capturing and utilizing the existing political infrastructure of a nation. It is quite natural that such aspirations often result in violent conflicts with the state power (jihad against the near enemy). In contrast, Salafi jihadists fight the near enemy with the intention of abandoning the existing political infrastructure. In addition they reason that apostate Muslim regimes are difficult to defeat as long as they are supported by Western nations (the far enemy), which therefore have to be attacked, too.

The Islamic international law (Siyar), of which the religious concept of jihad is a subset, has been developed and modified by clerics and jurists in a sophisticated manner over the centuries to adjust it to social-political realities of their time. It is part of this adjustment that today's reformists seek for a non-hostile interpretation of jihad, such as the separation of jihad and qital or the relativization of jihad as perpetual warfare. Jihadists, too, have adapted the jihad-doctrine to current affairs from their point of view. In their perception, Islam is under attack which makes jihad through the force of arms [qital] an individual obligation [fard ayn], even against 'apostate' Muslims [takfir].

The inventive discourse of the jihadi intellectuals has been translated into action. Jihadi warfare traditionally has been a doctrine for foreign policy that was employed by Muslims rulers for military conquest [fatah]. In contrast, contemporary jihad is an asymmetrical conflict in which terrorist and guerilla tactics are employed.




Figure 2: Thirteen definitional features of Jihadism. The inner segment shows the configuration of ten criteria that are characteristic for jihadism.

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The Turkish Military's Perception of Instability as an External Threat and Terrorism

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Abstract: *This paper tries to understand the increasingly employed concept of instability in its post Cold War sense and argues that regional instabilities are perceived as a threat by the military. The goal here is to put the concept of "instability" under the scholarly microscope to understand why and how it is viewed as a threat, especially as an external threat. To this end, the paper studies the concept of threats in international politics and brainstorms on the types, old and new usages of the term of instability, arguing that instability is indeed a threat as it is the suitable ground on which other threats, especially terrorism, emerge. By examining the texts written by Turkish military sources over the last 20 years, the paper aims to highlight how the Turkish military focuses and reacts to instabilities around the country, how it sees the links between instability and terrorism and how this focus changes the foreign policy framework of the Turkish military.*

Keywords: *Turkish Military, Instability, Terrorism, Threat Perception.*

Introduction

After a Cold War marked by bipolar stability, instability has probably been one of the terms most frequently used to describe the state of international affairs in the world. The post-Cold War world is characterized by instability encompassing all sorts of ethnic conflicts, failed states, newly emerging states, separatist movements, regional tensions, economic rivalries, regionalism vs. globalization, emerging powers and above all terrorism. The repositioning of the former communist countries in the international system in the transition from the bipolar structure to a unipolar one has created most of the turmoil in the 1990s. However, this is not to say that the disorder created is only due to the changes in the former communist world. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the strengthening of the USA ever since, gave rise to new opportunities and also

new challenges for many of the existing actors in the international stage. Moreover, new actors appeared on the stage of world politics. All these novelties contributed to a more unstable world.

The study of world politics became more of an interdisciplinary area given the complexities and overlapping influences of globalization. This being the case, new types of threats replaced the old. Terrorism, drug trafficking, human trafficking, migration, environmental problems, structural violence, questions of identity, separatism, religious fundamentalism, energy security, water security, economic recession, even globalization became the names of the new threats. Now that the structure of the Cold War is history, actors' behaviors have become less predictable due to the uncertainties and instabilities which accompany the new times.

Turkey has had its share of changes and challenges brought by the new era. In this new era, thanks to the newly emerging security atmosphere in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the new types of threats were increasingly scrutinized in Turkey. For the Turkish security elite, there has often been a spill-over effect between internal and external threats; the internal front has often been regarded as an extension of the external front. During the Cold War, domestic communist groups were regarded as instruments of the USSR; in the post Cold War world, ethnic separatists and religious fundamentalists were not only evaluated as internal threats but also as extensions of external threats and as reflections of global trends of rising ethnic and religious identities.¹

The perception of this spill-over effect became all the more visible in the post Cold War era. In this sense, ever since the end of the Cold War, Turkish civilian and military authorities have emphasized the existence of the crises and instabilities within the troubled neighborhood of Turkey and have seen these crises and instabilities as a threat to the security of the country. The common rhetoric goes that Turkey finds itself in the very center of the hottest spots of the new world: the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East. This situation is worrisome for the Turkish statesmen, as the global world is known for having problems that transcend borders where security problems in one country are especially likely to spill-over to nearby countries. Containment was once a term used to define encirclement and a strategy to stop the progress of the communist waves, but today containment can be applied as a strategy against all kinds of instabilities emanating from failed or rogue states, civil or interstate wars, political and economic crises in the world.

Instability in its post-Cold War sense will be the focus of this paper. The goal here is to put the concept of "instability" under the scholarly microscope and try to understand why and how it is viewed as a threat, especially as an external threat by the Turkish military. To this end, we will first take a look at the concept of threats in international politics and reflect on the concept of instability. Then we will argue that instability is indeed a threat as it is the suitable ground on which many other threats emerge. In this context, we will take a look at how terrorism and instability are related. We will elaborate the Turkish military's perspectives on instability in the last two decades, see how this concept is related to terrorism in the military mind through some cases and finally conclude with an analysis of the impact of the perception of instabilities as a threat on the foreign policy approaches of the military.

¹ Itr Toksöz, "Security Dilemmas and Threat Perceptions: Turkey at the Crossroads, unpublished Ph. D dissertation", 2007, Northeastern University, Boston, Massachusetts, Chapter 5 & 6.

Threats and Instability in International Relations

In international relations, threats are often addressed within the context of security studies — especially those focusing on nuclear deterrence, alliance formation and interstate conflict. In general, a threat perception is “understood as anticipation on the part of an observer (the decision maker) of impending harm — usually of a military, strategic or economic kind — to the state”.² Thus, in international relations we talk about threats aimed at the territorial integrity, political sovereignty, major national interests and core ideology of the state and its regime. As the study of International Relations evolved from classical realist and idealist paradigms towards contemporary ones such as theories of decision making, International Relations scholars started to employ this concept more and more in their analysis.

Threats may be understood in an active or passive sense: in the active sense, threat is the undertaking of one actor to impose a sanction on another; in the passive sense, it is an anticipation of impending danger.³ A threat may also be announced or latent. When it is announced, the picture is often quite clear, as one actor openly challenges the other. In the case where the threat is latent, it is harder to define the nature of the threat and its credibility as the perception of the observer has more of a subjective nature based on interpretation of certain signals from or assumptions about the threatening party.

In international relations, threat perception is seen as “the decisive intervening variable between action and reaction;” unless the threat is perceived, despite information to confirm that the threat actually exists, there is no action taken; defense is not activated.⁴ When threatened, a state’s response behavior depends on its perception and interpretation of the signals coming from the external environment.⁵ The threat and the perception of a threat are inseparable in a way, because even if A threatens B, as long as B does not perceive the threat coming from A, B does not act.⁶

There is a relationship between capability and intent in the formulation of threat perceptions: as either capability or intent appears to approach the zero level, threat perception tends to diminish.⁷ However this formulation of threat perceptions is criticized for lack of a psychological dimension as threat perception also includes an inference where the perceiver subjectively, not objectively, pieces together the intent with capability in his mind upon which the threat is based.⁸ Thus, one is

² Raymond Cohen, *Threat Perception in International Crisis*, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1979, p.4.

³ Raymond Cohen, “Threat Perception in International Crisis”, *Political Science Quarterly*, 91 (3), 1978, p. 95. also see David A. Baldwin, “Thinking About Threats”, *Conflict Resolution*, (XV)1, 1971, p. 71-78

⁴ Raymond Cohen, “Threat Perception...” 1978. p. 93.

⁵ Warren Philips and Richard Rimkunas, “The Concept of Crisis in International Politics”, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 15, No.3, 1978, p. 270.

⁶ see also David A. Baldwin, “Thinking About Threats”, *Conflict Resolution*, (XV)1, 1971, p. 71-78 on the dynamics between a country A and a country B in threat perception.

⁷ See in detail in David J. Singer, “Threat-Perception and the Armament-Tension Dilemma”, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1958, p. 93-94.

⁸ See Raymond Cohen, *Threat Perception...*, 1979, p. 7 where Cohen supports D.G. Pruitt’s argument. See D.G. Pruitt, “Definition of the Situation as a Determinant of International Action”, in Herbert C. Kelman,

to distinguish between external and internal sources of behavior.⁹ Some of the perception is based on the perceiver's characteristics and some are relative to the environment. While we may distinguish between the two for better understanding, we must consider them jointly for their predictive potential.¹⁰

When dealing with the definition of a situation, most decision making theorists regard the world as viewed by decision makers to be at least as important as objective reality.¹¹ "Threat is not perceived in a vacuum"; it is very much related to the surrounding circumstances as well as being a psychological process and in that sense is not just an "objective appraisal of some unambiguous state of the environment."¹² This argument goes hand in hand with the concepts of "operational milieu" which sees the world as it actually exists and "psychomilieu" which sees the world through the eyes of the political leaders.¹³ Taken together, these milieus comprise not only the realities as they are but also the realities as perceived by the actor where the decision maker cognitively constructs the image or a representation of a reality.

Generally threats are of two kinds: external and internal. The majority of the scholarly literature employs the word threat in its external sense—the threat originates outside the country's borders. This focus on external threat only is to be expected given that most of the literature on threats and threat perceptions was written right after WWII and during the Cold War. For a great majority of the Western world—where the literature on threat perceptions was born—most of the time threats actually originated outside the borders of a country. Therefore, when we refer to the generalization of an "actor" in the scholarly literature, the authors and the readers mostly think of another state. Still, we have seen in the post Cold war period more states dealing with intrastate conflicts rather than interstate ones. Only after the end of the Cold War, and especially with the post 9/11 era of War on Terrorism, the domestic and/or transnational characters of threats were additionally discussed platforms. Actors are now more varied and the new types of threats are different than old types of threats. These new actors are fed by instabilities and the new types of threats surface more easily within instabilities. In this new world, instability is thus also a threatening condition and it needs to be studied as such.

In political science-international relations, instability can be employed within three different contexts: 1- instability of the international system at large, a type of instability which occurs during power transitions on the global scale; 2- instability within a region where the relations between or among countries are sour; 3- instability within a specific country which suffers from fluctuations in its economy, social unrest, illegitimate or poor governance etc. These three contexts of instability are often interdependent: instability of the system may cause increased

(ed.), *International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis*, New York: Holt, Reinhart & Winston, 1965, p. 399-407.

⁹ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 35.

¹⁰ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception...*, p. 48.

¹¹ James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., *Contending Theories* p. 554-555

¹² Raymond Cohen, *Threat Perception*, 1979, p. 87.

¹³ Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, *An Ecological Paradigm for the Study of International Politics*, Monograph No.30, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Center for International Studies, 1968, p. 11.

turbulence especially in regions of strategic importance; instability within a specific country may generate instability in one region; instability in a region may spill over to the neighboring countries.

Originally, instability or stability of the international system was mostly a topic of the Cold War. In the Cold War sense, Gaddis asserts that systems theory provides criteria in order to distinguish between stable and unstable political configurations and draws his arguments on stability from David Singer and Karl Deutsch where they define stability as “the probability that the system retains all of its essential characteristics; that no single nation becomes dominant; that most of its members continue to survive and that large-scale war does not occur.”¹⁴ In that sense, stability is the balance of power and is a feature of the systemic level. Gaddis explains the stability of the Cold War through the structural elements of stability such as bipolarity and independence of the superpowers from each other and through the behavioral elements of stability such as the nuclear weapons, reconnaissance revolution and ideological moderation. According to him, in a system which functions without a superior authority, order is dependent upon certain rules of the game such as respecting spheres of influence, avoiding direct military confrontation, using nuclear weapons only as an ultimate resort, preferring predictable anomaly over unpredictable rationality, refraining from undermining the other side’s leadership.¹⁵ He cites this last one as a dilemma and asks: “If what one wanted was stability at the international level, did it make sense to try to destabilize the other side’s leadership at the national level?”¹⁶ Even this remark shows how instabilities at different levels of analysis could affect one another.

This systemic notion of (in)stability is no longer the exact sense in which we use instability in international politics today. In the post Cold War world, the immediate problems of security seem to have relocated from the systems level to regional and local levels. The term of instability is more and more frequently used, yet in a sense completely different than in that of the Cold War. Today, instability of the international system seems to be of a lesser concern to states than instabilities within regions and within countries.

If instability on the systemic level is generated by absence of balance of power, then what is instability at regional or national levels? In a study conducted by Blanco & Grier, where the determinants of political instability in 18 Latin American countries between 1971-2000 are investigated, the authors study regime type and regime durability, factionalism, income equality, ethnic diversity, ethnic discrimination, regional spillover effects, urban growth and macroeconomic variables. They find that democracy and openness to trade has a negative impact on instability, that factionalized political systems experience higher instability and that instability is affected by income inequality, ethnic fractionalization and urban growth.¹⁷

Another such study was conducted by the Political Instability Task Force, which studied internal wars and failures of governance that occurred between 1955 and 2006 in all countries with

¹⁴ John Lewis Gaddis, “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System”, Karen Mingst and Jack Snyder, *Essential Readings in World Politics*, New York, W.W.Norton & Company, 2001, p. 12.

¹⁵ John Lewis Gaddis, “The Long Peace: ...”, p. 13-19.

¹⁶ John Lewis Gaddis, “The Long Peace: ...”, p. 19.

¹⁷ Louisa Blanco and Robert Grier, “Long Live Democracy: The Determinants of Political Instability in Latin America”, *Journal of Development Studies*, 45:1, 2009, p. 76-95

populations of over 500,000. A part of the study was designed to identify factors associated with state failure. For the four different types of state failure or serious political crisis examined for this project such as revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, mass killings and adverse or disruptive regime changes, four broad areas of variables correlating with state failure were identified. These areas were: demographic and societal measures (infant mortality, school enrollment, population change), economic measures (GDP per capita, change in inflation, trade openness), environmental measures (access to safe water, drought, intensity of use of cropland) and political and leadership measures (democracy level, traits of ruling elites, presence of ethnic discrimination and separatist activity).¹⁸

As seen, these studies scrutinize political instability in states. Yet there are also those which refer to instabilities in regions. Actually political instability in states and regional instability are linked closely. Ades and Chua define regional instability as political instability in neighboring countries and find that regional instabilities have a negative effect on a country's economic performance, by disrupting trade flows and by increasing military expenditures, which result in "negative spillovers among politically unstable neighboring countries."¹⁹ Goldstone et al. suggest that if a country has four or more bordering states in armed conflict, this state is more likely to suffer a crisis onset.²⁰ Gurr et. al found that countries with neighbors in civil or ethnic conflicts show more vulnerability to an outbreak of ethnic war.²¹ They also found that Muslim countries are more vulnerable to instability when more bordering states are engaged in any type of armed conflict, internal or international. This result confirms their models on global and ethnic-wars, yet it is only for the Muslim countries that they find the involvement of neighboring states in international conflict contributing to the risk of instability.²² Blanco & Grier suggest that countries in 'bad neighborhoods' which receive a flood of refugees into the country or which the guerilla armies use as a base from which to attack their home country are more prone to instability.²³

Thus, regional instabilities can be a result of the existence of unstable states in a region or due to existence of troubled relations between neighboring states in this region. Often times, it is both: unstable countries provoke unstable regional relations and unstable regions result in more unstable states. It is a chicken and egg problem. As such, instability has a snowballing effect both inside and outside the borders of the polity which it strikes, and as such, instability needs to be first contained in order to be eradicated. Marshall sees instability as a series of events in sequence and suggests that for any given country, a period of instability is the period between the onset of the

¹⁸ Daniel C. Esty et al., "State Failure Task Force Report", 30 November 1995, p. 7, available at <http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/SFTF%20Phase%20I%20Report.pdf>.

¹⁹ Alberto Ades & Hak B. Chua, "Thy Neighbor's Curse: Regional Instability and Economic Growth", *Journal of Economic Growth*, Vol. 2, No: 3, September 1997, p. 279.

²⁰ Jack A. Goldstone et al. "A Global Forecasting Model for Political Instability", paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, September 1-4, 2005, p. 22, available at <http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/PITFglobal.pdf>.

²¹ Ted Robert Gurr, Mark Woodward and Monty G. Marshall, "Forecasting Instability: Are Ethnic Wars and Muslim Countries Different?", Prepared for delivery at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1-4, 2005. p. 3. <http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/PITFethnicmuslim.pdf>.

²² Ted Robert Gurr, Mark Woodward and Monty G. Marshall, "Forecasting Instability...", p. 9.

²³ Louisa Blanco and Robert Grier, "Long Live Democracy..." p. 84.

first instability event and the conclusion of the last instability event.²⁴ He draws attention to the fact that periods of instability are characterized “by unique combinations of instability events” and that “the onset of one event coincides with or is followed by the onset of overlapping or sequential instability events.”²⁵ Being in an unstable neighborhood is a condition which can facilitate the emergence of the first instability event. This potential is the key to understanding why instability can be qualified as a threat.

Instability as an External Threat and Terrorism

Given this two-way spill-over effect between instability in a region and instability in a country, it is meaningful to see regional instability as a threat for a stable country in an unstable region. Instability in a neighbor or between two or more neighbors can be regarded as a threat because it provides suitable ground for emergence of all kinds of new generation threats such as terrorism, migration, poverty and drug trafficking among many other ills. Perceived threats can be either actual (inferred from more or less definite signals of intent) or “potential” (inferred from some state of environment or the mere capability of the opponent).²⁶ When we talk about instability as an external threat we actually talk about threat in the potential rather than the actual sense.

Threats are, in a way, also symptoms of a crisis. Brecher who distinguishes between precrisis, crisis and postcrisis periods suggest that “the pre-crisis period is marked off from a preceding period by an increase in perceived threat on the part of the decision makers of the state under inquiry”.²⁷ In international politics, crises are common, but it is often times hard to tell when and how a situation becomes a crisis.²⁸ Yet, it is evident that crises occur more easily in regions of instability.

The intentions and capabilities of states to harm others changes quickly, a scenario referred to as a “systemic threat.”²⁹ There is always the possibility of interstate changes in intentions and capabilities to “unpredictably lead to dangerous threats following from the very structure of the international system”.³⁰ Instability also aggravates this situation as it often creates unpredictability in actors’ behaviors.

Instability comes hand in hand with uncertainty. Although one would be able to easily define the enemies, think of scenarios, develop strategies to deter or counter the enemy in a world where

²⁴ Monty G. Marshall, *Conflict Trends in Africa, 1946-2004: A Macro Comparative Perspective*, Center for Systemic Peace, report prepared for the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool, Government of the United Kingdom, October, 14 2005, p. 6.

²⁵ Monty G. Marshall, *Conflict Trends in Africa...*, p. 6.

²⁶ Klaus Knorr, “Threat Perception” Klaus Knorr (ed.), *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems*, Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 1976, p. 78. Robert Cohen, *Threat Perceptions*, p. 4 also accepts this view.

²⁷ Michael Brecher, “State Behaviour in International Crisis”, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 23, No. 3, 1979, p. 457.

²⁸ Robert S. Brillings, Thomas W. Milburn and Mary Lou Schollman, “A Model of Crisis Perception...”, p. 300.

²⁹ Klaus Knorr, “Threat...”, p. 79.

³⁰ Klaus Knorr, “Threat...”, p. 79.

the tense state of international politics is more stable, vision is blurred in the uncertain environment of instability. When there is turmoil in a neighboring country, it may be harder to determine who its real decision-makers are and foresee how they might act. In a crisis situation, even if the decision-makers of today are the same as yesterday, they may act unexpectedly. It may also be that due to instability in a region, it becomes harder to tell who the enemy is, predict when or how he may strike and what measures need to be taken against him. Uncertainty brings unpredictability, which diminishes the ability to reflect on probabilities. In this situation, insecurity, anxiety and vulnerability accompany the condition of instability. Upon reconsideration of some of the concepts related with instability (i.e. uncertainty, insecurity, vulnerability, unpredictability, anxiety), it becomes easier to understand how unstable neighbors take away the peace of mind of the decision-makers in a country.³¹

Terrorism and instability are somehow linked to each other, yet it is not clear exactly how. A comprehensive study of terrorism by Martha Crenshaw refers to several possible causes of terrorism. Among the causes / motivations of terrorism she places under the scholarly microscope are socialization of individuals who become terrorists, terrorism's characteristic as both responsive and sustained behavior, representativeness of terrorism, its aim of creating social change, disappointments and frustrations with nonviolent action, the impact of historical bitter experiences and ideologies which justify violence.³² Yet like in many other sources that tackle with the causes of terrorism, none of the points refer to unstable domestic, regional or systemic environments as a reason for the emergence of terrorism.

The reasons for not considering instability a causal variable for terrorism may be many. First of all, not all countries that are domestically unstable or that are in regions of instability experience terrorism. Moreover, some countries (especially the Western countries such as UK, Spain, USA) which have been experiencing terrorism do not experience any domestic political or economic turmoil and are in perfectly safe neighborhoods. Instability is also a rather new concept which has recently entered into the study of violence. Finally, instability is hard to define and the criteria by which one can judge instability is too vague and therefore does not allow for a classification of stable and unstable environments easily.

Still, there are some recent studies that include instability and terrorism together in their focus. Most of these studies are around the issue of weak and failing states as the breeding ground for terrorism. As a matter of fact, this has been the most widely adhered to view of the official American policy during the George W. Bush administration. The War on Terrorism was basically geared towards the elimination of states that were seen as weak or failing, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, because of their status as "harbors" of terrorism thereby linking the concepts of terrorism and domestic instability. The same view is also often elaborated in a regional sense as in the bad neighborhoods hypothesis. Where one weak country that harbors terrorism exists, the other

³¹ A quick look at any thesaurus for the word "instability" will give at least some of the adjectives here, if not more.

³² Martha Crenshaw "Thoughts on Relating Terrorism to Historical Contexts", in Martha Crenshaw(ed.) *Terrorism in Context*, Penn State Press, University Park, PA, 1995, p. 12-19

countries of the region are seen as more prone to being affected by the spillover effects of terrorism in their neighbor.³³

However, here we must note that not all scholars agree on the link between state weakness and terrorism. Partially countering the view that weak and failing states are the major reason for terrorism, proliferation, organized crime, bad neighborhoods, pandemics, energy insecurity, Steward argues weak and failing states may facilitate these vices but not in all cases. He contends that terrorists find “weak but functioning states” more suitable for their operations, as the weak but functioning character of these states makes it easier for terrorists to have access to the global world, which then facilitates the carrying out of their operations.³⁴ He distinguishes between weak state capacity and lack of will for good governance and argues that the most serious threats will emanate from a weak state with no will for good governance.³⁵

Another view suggests that the main cause of international terrorism today is what is called “the escalation effect”. In a study covering more than 130 countries yearly since 1968 wherein this escalation effect is scrutinized, the authors Campos & Gassebner claim that most of the empirical literature about the causes of international terrorism seems to be based only on low levels of political and economic development and ignore the study of the escalation effect and “the role of domestic political instability for the propagation of international terrorism”.³⁶ Their study places emphasis on the accumulation of terrorist human capital through schooling and training of the terrorists and reveals that domestic instability and terrorism are related. Terrorists profit from domestic instabilities which provide them the “military, strategic and organizational skills” essential to carry out acts of international terrorism.³⁷ This view completes the above mentioned view which suggests that terrorists prefer weak but functioning states. This is enough reason for a country with domestically unstable neighbors to perceive their existence as a threat to its security.

From a systems level, another view suggests that terrorism is a result of systemic conflict and crisis, in other words, systemic instabilities: the argument goes that it is the frustration resulting from internal contradictions of the global capitalist system which is built for the profit of the few and not the need of the people.³⁸ From a sociological angle, terrorism is related to the rise of global capitalism and the frustrations of desire and interest global capitalism brings to certain actors. In this sense, the social and economic conditions in which the Third World, especially the Middle East, find themselves are seen as a major breeding ground for terrorism and a fight against poverty, inequality and economic oppression is seen as the sine qua non of a winnable war of terror.³⁹

³³ The best example to this spill-over could be Pakistan and Afghanistan.

³⁴ Patrick Stewart, “Weak States and Global Threats: Assessing Evidence of ‘Spillovers’”, Center for Global Development, *Working Paper Number 73*, January 2006, p. 16-17.

³⁵ Patrick Stewart, “Weak States and Global Threats...”, p. 28.

³⁶ Nauro F. Campos & Martin Gassebner, “International Terrorism, Political Instability and the Escalation Effect”, IZA Discussion Paper No. 4061, Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn, March 2009, p. 8

³⁷ Nauro F. Campos & Martin Gassebner, “International Terrorism...” p. 25.

³⁸ Ogunrofito Ayodeji Bayo, “Systemic Frustration Paradigm: A New Approach to Explaining Terrorism”, *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 7, Number 1, Spring 2008, p. 1.

³⁹ Ogunrofito Ayodeji Bayo, “Systemic Frustration Paradigm. ... p. 32-33.

While it is important to figure out how instability causes terrorism, it is also important to see how various decision makers perceive instability as causing terrorism. Here we will take a look at the Turkish military's views on instability and terrorism.

Regional Instabilities in the Post Cold War World as a Source of Threat

In the post Cold War world, Turkish authorities of both civilian and military spheres have frequently emphasized regional instabilities as part of the new security problems of Turkey. How especially the military views regional instability is key in better understanding both the military's position on terrorism and foreign policy.

In general, the military, either as advisors to the civilian authorities or as more vocal participants to the process of national security policy formulation, is one of these decision-making bodies within the state that helps determine what constitutes a threat. The military and the civilian leadership, and even the society at large, may be in a position to perceive these threats, based on the nature of the threat. However, military men seem quicker to detect threats than civilian leaders.⁴⁰ Also, among these actors the military sees the world in a worst case scenario mindset⁴¹ for it is in the nature of the military profession to plan by assessing threats⁴² and then prepare for the worst.

A thorough study of articles and texts written and speeches given by military authorities reveal how the Turkish military perceived instabilities as a threat in the adjacent regions of Turkey in the aftermath of the Cold War.⁴³ The following paragraphs explain the frames and details of the military's threat perceptions in relation with the regional instabilities. As explained in the previous pages, instability in a country and a region are often interdependent. Therefore the military's views on domestic instabilities within neighboring countries are just as important as their views on instabilities within the regions and both views are thus taken into account for this paper. Writings about globalization and terrorism are also especially studied, for the military sees connections between instabilities and globalization and instabilities and terrorism.

One must note that the military stresses over Turkey's geography and geopolitical position and constantly sees spill-over effects between neighboring states and Turkey. This is not brand new.⁴⁴ According to the current Chief of General Staff, General Başbuğ, all throughout history Turkey

⁴⁰ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception...*, p. 8.

⁴¹ Bengt Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization and Political Power*, Beverly Hills, California, Sage Publications, 1972, p. 87).

⁴² Paul W. Zagorski, *Democracy vs. National Security, Civil Military Relations in Latin America*, Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner, 1992, p. 124.

⁴³ All the sources in this section are either articles or books written by the military authorities or speeches given by them. Among the sources are books published by the Office of the Chief of General Staff and War Academies Command Post, articles from the Armed Forces Magazine and speeches, press statements and press conference excerpts that are available on the website of the Office of the Chief of General Staff, www.tsk.mil.tr.

⁴⁴ On geopolitical situation see Lütfü Onganer, "Genel Olarak Geopolitik ve Geopolitik Durumun Milli Güvenlik Politikasına Etkileri", *Silahlı Kuvvetler Dergisi*, No. 216, 1965, p. 41. On spill-over effect see Toksöz Itr, "Security Dilemmas...", Ch. 5 and 6.

has been situated in the midst of crisis regions on which the world focuses and this situation will not change.⁴⁵ During the Cold War years, the Turkish military thought that Turkey was surrounded by many neighbors who, in the eyes of the military establishment, represented security vulnerabilities.⁴⁶ In a 1984 speech, Tümer stressed the fact that Turkey was the only NATO country which had ongoing wars around its borders.⁴⁷

From the military's perspective, instead of changing for the better, the security atmosphere has deteriorated in the post Cold War era and there has been an increase in the number of parameters that the Armed Forces had to control and manage in the security realm.⁴⁸ This worsening of the security atmosphere is clearly reflected in the words of General Büyükanıt, when he took over the office as the Chief of General Staff in 2006, who stated that Turkey has never been under so many simultaneous threats in its entire history.⁴⁹

In the post Cold War period, the military sees the international security arena as highly volatile and unpredictable.⁵⁰ The comfort of the tense but stable structure of a bipolar world is no longer available for Turkey.⁵¹ In this picture, Turkey is seen as being situated among the most important hot spots of the world. When the military talks about these hot spots and the disorder of the post Cold War world, it often employs such terms as "instability", "uncertainty", "risks" or "threats" around Turkey.⁵² The presence of potential crisis regions and of risks emanating from these

⁴⁵ İlker Başbuğ "Orgeneral İlker Başbuğ'un Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Devir Teslim Töreni Konuşması", http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konusmalar/2008/org_ilkerbasbug_dvrtslkonusmasi_28082008.html, 28 August 2008.

⁴⁶ Harp Akademisi Komutanlığı, "Türkiye'nin Jeopolitik Durumu Üzerine Bir İnceleme", *Silahlı Kuvvetler Dergisi*, No.210, 1964, p. 13.

⁴⁷ Nejat Tümer, "Oramiral Nejat Tümer'in Konuşmaları", *Silahlı Kuvvetler Dergisi*, No. 290, 1984, p. 24

⁴⁸ Hilmi Özkök, "Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Hilmi Özkök'ün Harp Akademileri Komutanlığında yaptıkları Konuşma", http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konusmalar/2006/harpakegiti_mogretimyiliaciliskonusmasi_160306.html 16 March 2006.

⁴⁹ Yaşar Büyükanıt, "Orgeneral Yaşar Büyükanıt'ın Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Devir Teslim Töreni Konuşması", http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konusmalar/2006/orgyasarbuyukanitdvrtslkonusmasi_28082006.html, 28 August 2006, he later reiterated this opinion, see Yaşar Büyükanıt, "Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Yaşar Büyükanıt'ın Washington'da Yaptığı Konuşma", 14 Şubat 2007.

http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konusmalar/2007/gnkurbkskwa_shingtonkonusmasi_14022007.html.

⁵⁰ Yaşar Büyükanıt, "Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Yaşar Büyükanıt'ın 'Güvenliğin Yeni Boyutları ve Uluslar arası Örgütler' Konulu Sempozyum Açış Konuşması", 31 May 2007, http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konusmalar/2007/konusma_sempozyum31052007.htm.

⁵¹ *Bugünün ve Geleceğin Dünya Güç Merkezleri ve Türkiye'ye Etkileri*, Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı, Harp Akademileri Basımevi, İstanbul, May 1994, p. 53.

⁵² For example, see how Büyükanıt stresses the uncertainties in the context of the Middle East, the Balkans, the caucasus and Iran. , Yaşar Büyükanıt "Orgeneral Yaşar Büyükanıt'ın Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Devir Teslim..." 28 August 2006.

regions is a serious source of worry.⁵³ It is argued that there is a need to constantly evaluate what might happen in this geography in the future, as this is the very same geography where “history is filled with unpredictable events that make the nations suffer and from which one must learn.”⁵⁴

In the mid-1990s, one source asserts that when problem regions are the topic, what comes to mind are the Balkans, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Middle East, Eastern Mediterranean and the CIS. These regions are seen as having been problematic for a long time however, the problems of present day are seen as different from problems of the past. Firstly these regions have intra-regional problems. Second, these regions have problems with the rest of the world. In other words, the intra-regional problems of the countries in these regions somehow reflect on the world and have a significant impact on world politics; Turkey is at the crossroads of all these regions.⁵⁵

A more recent source states that Turkey is located in a vitally important and challenging region with varying political regimes, religions, economic systems and military powers and that it rests at the intersection of the Black, Aegean and Mediterranean Seas as well as the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East. These are regions known for political uncertainty, economic and social instabilities and terrorism.⁵⁶ The same regions are referred to in several texts with the emphasis being Turkey’s “difficult geography”. According to the military this geography demands that Turkey has complementary strong political, economic, technological, psychosocial and military elements of power.⁵⁷ The presence of a strong military is thus strongly advocated as a result of the instabilities and crisis of these regions. One source basically stated that if the neighborhood consists of undemocratic and unstable countries, or if the strategic position of the country is important, possession of strong armed forces is seen as a state necessity.⁵⁸

As these regions are also of high importance to world powers, Turkey’s geography and its neighbors have a considerable impact on her policies and Turkey has to interact with global

⁵³ Hilmi Özkök, “Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Hilmi Özkök’ün Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Şeref Madalyası ve Üstün Hizmet Madalyası Tevcih Töreni’nde Yaptıkları Konuşma”, 24 August 2005, http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konusmalar/2005/madal_yatevcihtoreni_240805.html.

⁵⁴ Yaşar Büyükanıt, “Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Yaşar Büyükanıt’ın Harp Akademileri 2006-2007 Eğitim ve Öğretim Yılı Açılış Konuşması”, 2 October 2006, http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konusmalar/2006/harpakademilerikonusmasi_02102006.html.

⁵⁵ *Bugünün ve Geleceğin...*, p. 53.

⁵⁶ *Turkish Armed Forces and the Defense Concept*, Mönch Türkiye Yayıncılık, Ankara, 1999, p. 2

⁵⁷ Hilmi Özkök, “Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Hilmi Özkök’ün Konuşması”, 13 April 2004, http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_6_Toplantilar/nisan2004/ana.htm

⁵⁸ *Dünya Jeopolitiği ve Türkiye*, Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı Yayınları, İstanbul, 2005, p. 100. Also see İlker Başbuğ, “Genelkurmay II nci Başkanı Orgeneral İlker BAŞBUĞ’un Açış Konuşması”, Türkiye, Nato ve AB Perspektifinden Kriz Bölgelerinin İncelenmesi ve Türkiye’nin Güvenliğine Etkileri Sempozyumu, 27 May 2004, http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konusmalar/2004/sempozyum_acis_konusmasi_240504.html, Hilmi Özkök, “Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Hilmi Özkök’ün...”, 13 April 2004,

powers as well as regional powers.⁵⁹ It is interesting to see that one source approaches the issue of instabilities around Turkey skeptically and questions the destabilizing effects of the policies of the world powers on the countries situated in the “arch of crisis” as defined by Graham and Fuller.⁶⁰ Qualifying the global actors who are active in the global decision making mechanisms as the leading actors of security and stability of the world, big events that shake stability and balances in the world are seen as being caused by the clashing of these actors in several fields.⁶¹ Turkey is seen in a geography of a constantly changing, complex security atmosphere, covering a fragile fault line between the East and the West. In this context the military also finds it challenging to maintain the positive image the Armed Forces have.⁶²

Turkish military specifies two important events which deeply changed international relations, alliances, strategic thinking, the concept of “threat” and related to this, the concept of “security”, at the end of the last two decades: the fall of the Berlin Wall and September 11th. The military questions whether these events resulted in the decreasing likelihood of an all out war between superpowers, in the ongoing significance of regional and ethnic-based wars and in the possibility that terrorist events, even through the use of WMDs, can take place anytime anywhere in the world.⁶³

The military sees that “given the volatile and hard to predict state of the international security environment, in a most sensitive region of the world, in a geography of instabilities, Turkey has experienced expansion of its perceptions of threat. Regional and ethnic conflicts, political and economic instabilities, imbalance between the levels of welfare, WMDs, proliferation of long-range weapons, fundamentalism, illegal migration, drug and all sorts of arms trafficking have also fed terrorism, resulting in the expansion of the concept of threat.”⁶⁴ One of the reasons why there has been a change in the perceptions of security is that the threat is no longer one-dimensional but is asymmetrical and multi-dimensional.⁶⁵ The new risks and threats have always appeared unpredictably and have no geographical or ethnic borders. Moreover, they have dynamic and flexible structures.⁶⁶ The concept of security shifted from the state security to regional and global

⁵⁹ Hilmi Özkök, “Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Hilmi Özkök’ün Harp Akademileri Komutanlığındaki Yıllık Değerlendirme Konuşması”, 20 April 2005
http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konusmalar/2005/yillikdegerlendirme_200405.html

⁶⁰ Ergüder Toptaş, “Küresel Jeopolitik Yaklaşımlar, Avrasya ve Türkiye”, *Silahlı Kuvvetler Dergisi*, No. 389. 2006, p. 7

⁶¹ Hilmi Özkök, “Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Hilmi Özkök’ün Harp Akademileri...”, 20 April 2005

⁶² Hilmi Özkök, “Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Hilmi Özkök’ün Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri...” 24 August 2005

⁶³ İlker Başbuğ, “Genelkurmay II nci Başkanı Orgeneral İlker BAŞBUĞ’un...”, 27 May 2004

⁶⁴ Yaşar Büyükanıt, “Orgeneral Yaşar Büyükanıt’ın Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Devir Teslim Töreni Konuşması”, 28 August 2008,
http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konusmalar/2008/orgyasarbuyukanitdvrtslkonusmasi_28082008.html

⁶⁵ “Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı’nda Güvenliğin Yeni Boyutları ve Uluslararası Örgütler Konulu Sempozyum Düzenlendi”, *Silahlı Kuvvetler Dergisi*, No: 393, 2007, p. 11

⁶⁶ Hilmi Özkök, “Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Hilmi Özkök’ün Terörizmle Mücadele Mükemmeliyet Merkezi Açış Konuşması”28 June 2005,

security defined as international security.⁶⁷ Even in the case of NATO, paralleling the end of the Cold War, there have been changes in the security and threat conceptions: in the new NATO strategy, instead of the old unilateral massive threat, risks with political, economic, social and environmental dimensions and measures take precedence.⁶⁸

In a speech in 2005, General Özkök stated that the Cold War paradigms were far from rendering solutions to risks and threats that negatively affect the internal stability and security of states. In his formulation, these threats and risks cover a wide range in both characteristics and variety. For Turkey in a difficult geography, these risks and threats were seen as ranging from asymmetrical to symmetrical, covering asymmetrical risks and threats such as separatist and fundamentalist movements, international terrorism, drug trafficking and illegal migration as well as symmetrical ones such as instabilities in neighboring countries, undesired entities in Northern Iraq, instabilities in the Caucasus, big blows aimed at Turkey's interests, the water issue and WMDs.⁶⁹ In a speech in 2006 General Büyükanıt stated that "those wonderful Cold War days when one could know, guess and manage everything are in the past. Nightmares of unpredictability, frozen conflicts, break down of the world power balances have taken over our horizon."⁷⁰

The military sources often talk about the global character of the new threats and problems. The new world order is sometimes called a "disorder" or a "global chaos".⁷¹ For the military today, in the global sense, peace and security are seen either everywhere or nowhere⁷². Even though the military categorizes threats as either internal threats, regional threats or global threats, it finds it necessary to assess them together.⁷³ What is important about the new problems faced is that they are global: wealth and poverty, migration and development, drugs, disarmament and environmental problems are all intertwined.⁷⁴ It is not rare to see the military authorities describe how poverty feeds separatist and radical religious movements, how rapid population growth causes unhealthy urbanization and internal migration, which brings several economic, social and

http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konusmalar/2005/tmmmacilis_280605.html

⁶⁷ Hilmi Özkök, "Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Hilmi Özkök'ün Harp Akademileri..." 20 April 2005

⁶⁸ "Yeni Dünya Düzeni, NATO'nun Stratejisinin Lojistiği Etkileyen Yönü", [WWW.TSK.MIL.TR/4_ULUSLARARASI_ILISKILER/4_13_NATO_LOJISTIGI_KAPSAMINDA_DEGISEN_STRATEJI_VE_KONSEPTLER/KONULAR/YENI_DUNYA_DUZENI_NATONUN_YENI_STRATEJISININ_LOJISTIGI_ETKILEYEN_YONU.HTM](http://www.tsk.mil.tr/4_ULUSLARARASI_ILISKILER/4_13_NATO_LOJISTIGI_KAPSAMINDA_DEGISEN_STRATEJI_VE_KONSEPTLER/KONULAR/YENI_DUNYA_DUZENI_NATONUN_YENI_STRATEJISININ_LOJISTIGI_ETKILEYEN_YONU.HTM)

⁶⁹ Hilmi Özkök, "Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Hilmi Özkök'ün Harp Akademileri...", 20 April 2005

⁷⁰ Yaşar Büyükanıt, "Orgeneral Yaşar Büyükanıt'ın Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Devir...", 28 August 2006.

⁷¹ Ergüder Toptaş, "Dördüncü Nesil Savaş ve Etki Odaklı Harekât", *Silahlı Kuvvetler Dergisi*, No. 392, 2007, p. 59

⁷² İlker Başbuğ, "Genelkurmay II nci Başkanı Orgeneral Başbuğ'un Amerikan Türk Konseyinin 24 ncü Yıllık Toplantısı Konuşması", 6 June 2005, http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konusmalar/2005/gnkurIIncibsk_atckonusmasi_060605.html

⁷³ Yaşar Büyükanıt, "Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Yaşar Büyükanıt'ın 'Güvenliğin Yeni Boyutları...' 31 May 2007

⁷⁴ *Bugünün ve Geleceğin*..., p. 30

cultural problems.⁷⁵ Globalization is often blamed for the emergence or worsening of some of these problems. For example, one source adheres to the argument that it is due to the effects of globalization that the nation-state has suffered loss of power and has been threatened by ethnic nationalism. Globalization is also said to have adverse effects on the economies of developing countries, making them more prone to macroeconomic instabilities as a result of foreign capital movements.⁷⁶

The military sees the uncertainty that is inherent in instability as very problematic. Büyükanıt states that the degree to which we can be sure of the behaviors of our counterparts determines our trust or distrust of them.⁷⁷ When there is instability in a country and / or uncertainty about the future of a country, it is hard to build trust. The lack of certainty is always qualified as a risk, especially when coupled with capability.⁷⁸ Uncertainty is actually regarded as more dangerous than known threats. There are ways of countering known threats. However, the sources of uncertainty and instability are varied and may quickly turn into a crisis.⁷⁹ Two examples can account for the military's views on the uncertain character of a region suffering from instabilities: the case of the former Soviet Union territories in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War and the Middle East today.

Cases for the Turkish Military's Perception of Instability as an External Threat and Its Links to Terrorism

In the post-Cold War world, the Russian Federation was still accepted as a threat. Even though the Warsaw Pact dissolved, little had changed for Turkey. One source states that in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union's dissolution the Red Army and its Black Sea Navy survived with strong conventional and nuclear capabilities. The lack of clarity on who controlled this armed force was a risk in itself for Turkey.⁸⁰ Russia's economic instabilities which led former Soviet nuclear scientists to seek jobs elsewhere - possibly in the rogue states- was also perceived as a threat.⁸¹

Moreover, the instability arising from former Eastern bloc and the non-Russian successor states of the USSR became part of the larger picture of instability. One source stated that the Caucasus turned into a region where geopolitical and economic elements were used in a multilateral and multidimensional struggle: for example, the Russian Federation pressured Georgia into the Commonwealth of Independent States by exploiting ethnic issues.⁸² When Georgia joined the CIS

⁷⁵ Hilmi Özkök, "Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Hilmi Özkök'ün Harp Akademileri...", 20 April 2005

⁷⁶ For an elaborate evaluation of how globalization is viewed see Hüsamettin Sarı, "Küreselleşme", *Stratejik Araştırmalar Dergisi*, No. 11., 2008, p. 74-75

⁷⁷ Yaşar Büyükanıt, "Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Sayın Yaşar Büyükanıt'ın Açış...", p. 10

⁷⁸ Erdoğan Öznal, *Değişen Dünya Dengeleri...*, p.40

⁷⁹ Erdoğan Öznal, *Değişen Dünya Dengeleri...*, p. 101

⁸⁰ Erdoğan Öznal, *Değişen Dünya Dengeleri ve Türkiye'nin Geo-Stratejik Önemi*, Ankara, T. C Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, 1992, p. 24-32

⁸¹ Hakan Arısüt, "Kitle İmha Silahları", *Silahlı Kuvvetler Dergisi*, No: 380, 2004, p. 53

⁸² *21inci Yüzyıla Girerken Dünya Düzeni*, İstanbul, T.C. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı, 2000, p. 48

it concluded a military cooperation agreement with the Russian Federation resurrecting a Russian military presence along Turkey's border. Russia's pressures on Azerbaijan to become a CIS member and the Chechnya conflict were also seen as worrisome areas for Turkey.⁸³

The Middle East, on the other hand, is seen as the address that has something to do with separatist and fundamentalist threats. The separatist and the fundamentalist threats are also seen as connected to instabilities in the region. Three of Turkey's eight land neighbors namely Iran, Iraq and Syria are in the region and all three of them have been subject to domestic and /or regional instabilities, revolutions, civil wars or intra-state wars for the past few decades at least. Syria used to have claims on the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers originating from Turkey, provided support to terrorism, and never recognized that Hatay belongs to Turkey since 1939. Iraq also had claims on the waters of the Euphrates River as well as the Tigris River. Moreover, the power vacuum in northern Iraq where separatist terrorist organization PKK found refuge, thereby intensifying its attacks on Turkish security forces and the civilians by crossing the border, thus poisoned the bilateral relations. Iran's attempts to export its Islamic fundamentalist regime, its support to terrorist organizations, and regional competition soured the relations as well. The threats to the domestic stability and external security of Turkey are seen as coming directly and indirectly from this region.⁸⁴ Moreover, among the regions which are sources of worry, the Middle East is the one with the densest presence of weapons of mass destruction, a region that the military especially keeps an eye on with worry.⁸⁵ It is no wonder that with all these three countries in the region, given their history of instabilities, international terrorism is the key point of worry. Moreover, the conflicts between Israel and Palestine and the stances taken by third parties vis-à-vis these conflicts are seen as factors in the emergence and development of international terrorism.⁸⁶

Terrorism, among the new problems of the world which are highly affected by the global character of the new security environment, thus receives special attention by the Turkish military. "Today the concept of security has grown out of its contours of impact and interest based on time and distance. The areas of impact and interest related to terrorism have covered the entire world. Nowadays, no country has the luxury to remain indifferent to events that take place in distant corners of the world."⁸⁷ In the eyes of the military, globalization has brought terrorism into the international arena, as well as the goods, labor and capital.⁸⁸ As terrorism globalizes, so does the security of any country.⁸⁹ Within the framework of opportunities offered by globalization, terrorist

⁸³ *21nci Yüzyıla Girerken...*, p. 48-49

⁸⁴ *21nci Yüzyıla Girerken...*, p. 44

⁸⁵ "Kitle İmha Silahları", http://www.tsk.mil.tr/4_ULUSLARARASI_ILISKILER/4_20_Kitle_Imha_Silahlari/Kitle_Imha_Silahlari.htm

⁸⁶ İlker Başbuğ, "Genelkurmay II nci Başkanı Orgeneral İlker BAŞBUĞ'un Açış..." 27 May 2004

⁸⁷ Yaşar Büyükanıt, "Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Sayın Yaşar Büyükanıt'ın Açış Konuşması", 10 March 2008, *II. Uluslararası Sempozyum Bildirileri*, Terörle Mücadele Mükemmeliyet Merkezi, T. C Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, Ankara, 2008, p. 9, <http://www.tmm.mil.tr/anasayfa.htm>

⁸⁸ Hilmi Özkök, "Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Hilmi Özkök'ün Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri..." 24 August 2005

⁸⁹ İlker Başbuğ, "Genelkurmay II nci Başkanı Orgeneral Başbuğ'un Amerikan..." 6 June 2005

organizations are seen as developing mafia style cooperation with transnational criminal organizations and thereby profit from their activities.⁹⁰

In the context of terrorism, Iraq is often singled out in the most recent declarations as a country harboring great risks for Turkey. It is not only the current picture of an Iraq in instability, but also the bleak picture of the future of Iraq that worries Turkish military decision-makers.⁹¹ There are several major issues for the Turkish army in terms of the instability in Iraq: the national unity of Iraq, the territorial integrity of Iraq, the secular nature of the regime in Iraq, the federal structure of the Iraqi state, the Turkmen populations in Iraq and the status of the city of Kirkuk. The territorial integrity of Iraq is seen as not only vital for the future of Iraq but also for the institution of stability in the entire region.⁹² The military sees the issues of Northern Iraq and terrorism as inseparable from the issue of the unity of Iraq.⁹³ The instability in Iraq is such an important issue that the military sees the whole of Iraq as a problem and Northern Iraq as a problem.

History shows that instabilities in this country have results at the expense of Turkey's well-being: one source states that despite the existence of a legal agreement between Turkey and Iraq on Mosul oil, signed between the two countries after Iraq's independence in 1932, Turkey was not able to receive all of the 10% of the oil revenues it was entitled to because of the instabilities in Iraq between 1937-1941.⁹⁴

For a long time now, the instabilities of the Middle East have been the focus of military thinking, especially the instabilities in Iraq, their aggravation of the PKK problem and the dire consequences for Turkey. For example a considerable number of weapons ended up in the hands of the PKK in 1988 when Barzani's forces — which were collaborating with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war — were attacked by Iraq.⁹⁵ The arrival of Iraqi Kurdish refugees in Turkey also destabilized the area in 1989.⁹⁶ The establishment of the no-fly zone along the 36th parallel in

⁹⁰ Ergin Saygun, "Genelkurmay II nci Başkanı Orgeneral Ergin Saygun'un Sempozyum Kapanış Konuşması", 11 March 2008, *II. Uluslararası Sempozyum Bildirileri*, Terörle Mücadele Mükemmeliyet Merkezi, T. C. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, Ankara, 2008, p. 212, <http://www.tmmm.tsk.mil.tr/anasayfa.htm>

⁹¹ See İlker Başbuğ, "Genelkurmay II nci Başkanı Orgeneral İlker BAŞBUĞ tarafından..." 2 November 2004, İlker Başbuğ, "Genelkurmay II nci Başkanı Orgeneral Başbuğ'un Konuşması", 8 July 2004, http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_6_Toplantilar/temmuz2004/ana.html, İlker Başbuğ, "Genelkurmay II nci Başkanı Orgeneral İlker BAŞBUĞ tarafından, 26 Ocak 2005 tarihinde Genelkurmay Karargâhında icra edilen basın toplantısı", 26 January 2005, http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_6_Toplantilar/ocak2005/ana.html

⁹² İlker Başbuğ, "Türkiye, NATO ve AB Perspektifinden Kriz Bölgelerinin İncelenmesi ve Türkiye'nin Güvenliğine Etkileri Sempozyumu, Genelkurmay II. Başkanı Orgeneral İlker Başbuğ'un Açış Konuşması", 27 May 2004, http://www.tsk.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konusmalar/2004/sempozyum_aci_s_konusmasi_240504.html

⁹³ Yaşar Büyükanıt, "Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Yaşar Büyükanıt'ın Washington'da...", 14 February 2007

⁹⁴ Fatma İlhan, "Musul Meselesine Kısa bir Bakış ve Günümüze Yansımaları", *Silahlı Kuvvetler Dergisi*, No: 383, 2005, p. 105.

⁹⁵ *Şeyh Said İsyanı ve PKK*. İstanbul: T. C. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı. 2000, p. 166

⁹⁶ *Şeyh Said İsyanı...*, p. 169

Northern Iraq is seen as the first major attempt towards establishing an autonomous Kurdish region reminiscent of the Treaty of Sevres.⁹⁷

According to the military, in the fight against PKK terrorism, there have been some important thresholds: the first one was the first Gulf War, comprising the period between 1991 and 2003, the second one was the Second Gulf War, comprising the period between 2003 and 2007. The PKK, which was in decline before the first Gulf War, gained a wide safe haven in Northern Iraq at the end of the war. At the end of the second Gulf War, the PKK again profited from the atmosphere of chaos in the region, acquired high numbers of weapons and explosives and got extensive support from the region. As a result, there has been an increase in terrorism incidents in Turkey, especially in incidents that included the usage of explosives. The 3rd threshold is determined to be the current period elapsing on November 28th 2007 when the military was authorized to carry out trans-border operations.⁹⁸ These trans-border operations are a direct result of the instabilities and the lack of authority in this region.

For the near future, a possible civil war in Iraq resulting from oil issues in Kirkuk, it is thought will also have a seriously adverse impact on Turkey.⁹⁹ Both the breaking up of Iraq into ethnic based regions and the ongoing chaos in Iraq are seen as lose-lose scenarios for all parties involved. Territorial integrity of Iraq is seen as a matter for regional stability.¹⁰⁰ A change in the demographics of the city of Kirkuk is seen as a serious security problem for Turkey and it is stated that for the stability of the region it is best that this is well understood by the parties involved. The military believes the solution is in granting Kirkuk a special status.¹⁰¹ The military sees that taking any wrong steps in the case of Kirkuk risks dragging Iraq into a civil war which will eventually have consequences for the internal security of Turkey. Given the fact that most conflicts in today's world are based on material benefits, the existence of rich oil reserves in Kirkuk, especially with the demographic changes in the structure of Kirkuk, are seen as worrisome. Kirkuk resources make up 12% of all oil resources of Iraq. The military thinks that if the income from these resources is not used on the basis of equity for all the Iraqi population, and rather for the benefit of a single ethnic group, this will create serious conflicts of interest at the least for Iraq and for its surrounding region.¹⁰²

There is yet another area of concern emerging from the Middle East: the concept of the "moderate Islam model" within the frames of the Greater Middle East and North Africa Project. In the early 1980s, the instability created by the Iranian Revolution and the activities of Iran to

⁹⁷ Sami Uzun, "Körfez Krizi, Orta Doğu ve Türkiye", *Silahlı Kuvvetler Dergisi*, No. 330, 1991, p. 23

⁹⁸ Yaşar Büyükanıt, "Orgeneral Yaşar Büyükanıt'ın Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Devir-Teslim Töreni konuşması", 28 August, 2008, http://www.tsk.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konusmalar/2008/orgyasarbuyukanitdvrtslkonusmasi_28082008.html, accessed May 26th, 2009

⁹⁹ İlker Başbuğ, "Genelkurmay II nci Başkanı Orgeneral İlker BAŞBUĞ tarafından..." 2 November 2004

¹⁰⁰ İlker Başbuğ, "Genelkurmay II nci Başkanı Orgeneral Başbuğ'un..." 8 July, 2004

¹⁰¹ İlker Başbuğ, "Genelkurmay II. Başkanı Orgeneral İlker Başbuğ'un..." 8 July 2004

¹⁰² İlker Başbuğ, "Genelkurmay II. Başkanı Orgeneral İlker Başbuğ tarafından 08 Temmuz 2004 tarihinde Genelkurmay Karargahında icra edilen basın toplantısı Soru-Cevap Bölümü", http://www.tsk.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_6_Toplantilar/temmuz2004/2004_temmuz_soru_cevap.htm

export Islam to Turkey were seen as threats for Turkey. Today, since September 11th attacks, given the assumption that a relationship exists between radical Islamic ideology and terrorism, a model of moderate Islam for democratization of the countries in the region is often addressed internationally as a way out. The Turkish military finds this situation to be destabilizing for a secular Turkey. In a nutshell, what is seen as a formula to get rid of some of the instabilities in the Middle East can be destabilizing for Turkey. Warnings are made that a shift from the moderate to radical is just as possible as a shift from the radical to moderate¹⁰³ and that it would be misleading to deduce that countries with Muslim populations can easily turn democratic by showing Turkey as an example.¹⁰⁴

Conclusion

The following points summarize the contours of military's thinking on regional instability:

- Turkey is in a "difficult" geography and is adversely influenced in many ways from the instabilities of her neighborhood.
- The Cold War paradigm cannot be an answer to today's asymmetrical and varied security risks and threats. New types of threats and risks have emerged. A new definition of threat is needed. Security threats are now global. Security threats are also multidimensional.
- In Turkey's neighborhood, the new types of threats and risks are especially dangerous.
- Terrorism, as a phenomenon, is at the very center of the new threats and risks. Terrorism is also fed by instabilities and the new risks and threats created by the post Cold War era. Terrorism is an instrument of destabilization.
- The role that is apparently cast for Turkey in the West to find a way out of the so-called "Clash of Civilizations", as a "moderate Islamic country", is a result of the instabilities in her region. Yet, this kind of labels are strongly opposed by especially the secular circles in Turkey, and it is argued that such a formula has great potential for creating instability within Turkey being a secular and democratic republic by its Constitution.
- Globalization as a phenomenon exacerbates the effects of these new risks and threats. In a global world, one cannot escape from security risks even in far away regions of the world, so instabilities in other regions also have negative effects on security.

How do these points influence the foreign policy approaches of the military? Three major concluding remarks follow:

First of all, the military acknowledges that the marginalization of countries from the international system provokes instabilities and also finds it dangerous to use political instabilities of a country or countries as an instrument of political interest.¹⁰⁵ "Stability" is seen as the basis of

¹⁰³ İlker Başbuğ, "Genelkurmay II nci Başkanı Orgeneral Başbuğ'un Amerikan...", 6 June 2005

¹⁰⁴ Hilmi Özkök, "Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Hilmi Özkök'ün Harp Akademileri...", 20 April 2005

¹⁰⁵ Yaşar Büyükanıt, "Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Yaşar Büyükanıt'ın 'Güvenliğin Yeni Boyutları...' 31 May 2007

security perceptions of countries: in this sense, international organizations are regarded as institutions with overlapping areas of activity and as complementary to each other for stability.¹⁰⁶ Whatever the motivation for establishment, creation of stability is deemed as one of the most important functions of international organizations.¹⁰⁷ Even NATO developed its relations with the countries of Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Balkans and the Middle East in an attempt to expand the area of stability in the early 1990s as well as developing its mission and its military capabilities.¹⁰⁸ These are the very regions that suffer from power vacuums and this situation worsens global uncertainties. Alongside the international organizations, stable regional powers also help for stability. The role of Turkey as a stable regional power and its contribution to regional stability at the very center of this newly forming political geography is often addressed by the military in this sense.¹⁰⁹ Alongside the instabilities of the regions surrounding Turkey, the stability of Turkey is also addressed as an asset for the neighboring countries. Should Turkey destabilize, just like a stone thrown into a pond, this situation would create effects in larger waves and Turkey's neighbors would have to face its consequences.¹¹⁰

Secondly, in the international arena the military enters into more cooperation. The military acknowledges that no problem area is limited to only two countries.¹¹¹ Conscious of the fact that the security of any country is dependent upon establishing, preserving and increasing regional stability, the Armed Forces have engaged in increasingly more military education cooperation, partnerships for peace, organization of international peace forces and support for peacekeeping operations.¹¹² It has actively taken part in peacekeeping operations in places of instability such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Lebanon as well as served in observer missions in some

¹⁰⁶ Yaşar Büyükanıt, "Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Yaşar Büyükanıt'ın 'Güvenliğin Yeni Boyutları..." 31 May 2007

¹⁰⁷ Yaşar Büyükanıt, "Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Yaşar Büyükanıt'ın 'Güvenliğin Yeni Boyutları..." 31 May 2007

¹⁰⁸ Hilmi Özkök, "Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Hilmi Özkök'ün İpek Yolu Semineri- 2006 General-Amiral Semineri'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma", 3 July 2006, http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konusmalar/2006/ipekyolusemineri_03072006.html

¹⁰⁹ For example see Hilmi Özkök, "Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Hilmi Özkök'ün TSK Şeref ve Üstün Hizmet Madalyası Tevcih Töreni'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma", 23 August 2006, http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konusmalar/2006/tskserefveustunhizmetmadalyasi_23082006.html

¹¹⁰ İlker Başbuğ, "Genelkurmay II nci Başkanı Orgeneral İlker BAŞBUĞ tarafından, 02 Kasım 2004 tarihinde Genelkurmay Karargahında icra edilen basın toplantısı", 2 November 2004 http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_6_Toplantilar/kasim2004/ana.html

¹¹¹ Yaşar Büyükanıt, "Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Yaşar Büyükanıt'ın Harp Akademileri..." 2 October 2006.

¹¹² "Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin Bölge Barışına Yaklaşımı", www.tsk.mil.tr/4_ULUSLARARASI_ILISKILER/4_6_Turkiyenin_Barisi_Destekleme_Harekatina_Katkilari/konular/Turk_Silahli_Kuvvetlerinin_Bolge_Barisina_Yaklasimi.htm
Also see "Akdeniz Diyalogu", http://www.tsk.mil.tr/4_ULUSLARARASI_ILISKILER/4_10_Akdeniz_Diyalogu/Akdeniz_Diyalogu.htm

others.¹¹³ Today, Turkey is a country whose participation in peacekeeping missions is often sought by the international organizations. Turkey is seen as playing a key role for over 50 years in establishing stability and security in her region, which is one of the most problematic of Eurasia and of the world. Thus in the post-Cold War world, Turkey favored entering into security dialogues with many countries of her region.¹¹⁴ The military refers to the globalization of threat perceptions and iterates its belief in international cooperation arguing that concrete results for international peace, security and stability can only be achieved by those who act in cooperation.¹¹⁵ Lack of cooperation results in uncertainty and creates suitable ground for terrorism.¹¹⁶ A common understanding against new types of threats is key for countering these threats and providing a relative stability in international relations.¹¹⁷

Thirdly, post-1990s foreign policy perspectives of the military put the emphasis on the international connection of domestic threats. The military admits it cannot downsize even though the primary adversary of the Cold War is now gone.¹¹⁸ One of the reasons why the military cannot downsize can be attributed to surrounding instabilities and the perception of threat created by the instabilities as an external threat. Instability is a threat because it creates the right political climate from which all other threats can spring. When instabilities are perceived as threats, what is domestic and what is international becomes blurred given the above explained dynamics between domestic and regional instabilities. The military feels it can no longer focus on only existing threats but focuses also on potential threats. Without understanding this situation, the increased role of the military in foreign policy making in the aftermath of the Cold War cannot be fully understood.

¹¹³ For a complete list of the Turkish Military participation to international missions, see "TSK Barışı Destekleme Harekatına Katkıları", www.tsk.mil.tr/4_ULUSLARARASI_ILISKILER/4_6_Turkiyenin_Barisi_Destekleme_Harekatina_Katkilari/konular/Turk_Silahli_%20Kuvvetlerinin_Barisi_Destekleme_Harekatina_Katkilari.htm

¹¹⁴ Hilmi Özkök, "Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Hilmi Özkök'ün Eurasian Star 2004 Tatbikatı Açış Konuşması", 16 June, 2004, http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konusmalar/2004/Eurasian_star_04_konusmasi_160604.html, accessed 13 September 2008

¹¹⁵ Hilmi Özkök, "Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Hilmi Özkök'ün İpek Yolu Semineri- 2006 General-Amiral Semineri'nde Yaptıkları Konuşma", 3 July 2006, http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konusmalar/2006/ipekyolusemineri_03072006.html

¹¹⁶ Hilmi Özkök, "Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Hilmi Özkök'ün Uluslararası Sempozyum Açış Konuşması", 23 March 2006, http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konusmalar/2006/sempozyum_konusmasi_23032006.html

¹¹⁷ Ergin Saygun, "Genelkurmay II nci Başkanı Orgeneral Sayın Ergin Saygun'un Sempozyum Kapanış Konuşması", 1 June 2007, http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konusmalar/2007/kapanis_konusma_sempozyum01062007.htm

¹¹⁸ Hilmi Özkök, "Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Hilmi Özkök'ün Harp Akademileri...", 20 April 2005

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Terrorism Threat Assessment and Management

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Abstract: *The dynamic adaptive nature of terrorism requires a systematic and methodical intelligent strategy for terrorism threat assessment and management. Unwitting weaknesses in approach and deficiencies in scope invite strategic surprise. Effective decision-making on managing terrorism risk benefits from insights available from quantitative thinking across the range of significant risk factors. This way of thinking about terrorism is presented in a manner accessible to military and security personnel, emphasizing key conceptual principles and ideas, whilst minimizing technical mathematical detail.*

Keywords: *Terrorism, Risk modeling, Counter-terrorism.*

Introduction

This review begins with an outline framework for terrorism risk modeling, developed from construction of a spectrum of future attack scenarios. Terrorist targeting, attack mode and multiplicity are analyzed, and the prioritization of targets for attack and defense is assessed according to criteria of societal criticality, attack vulnerability, and terrorist capability. The role of counter-terrorism forces in limiting the ambition and success of major plots is reasoned quantitatively, and evaluation procedures are suggested for comparing terrorist threats. Measures to mitigate and avoid terrorism risk are reviewed, with a focus on the need for a joined-up global approach, taking account of threat shifting at all geographical scales, and adopting a sensible risk-informed approach to counter-terrorism resource allocation.

Terrorism Threat Assessment

Terrorism Risk Model

On 11 December 2007, two 800 kg vehicle bombs were exploded in Algiers by martyrs of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). One struck the Algerian Constitutional Court

at approximately 9:30 am. Twenty minutes later, a similar bomb detonated at the UN offices, destroying the building and severely damaging surrounding structures. Seventeen UN personnel were killed and 40 injured. Amongst the victims was a UN security advisor credited with routinely raising concerns about the threat. His warnings went unheeded. For several years, UN officials had questioned the consolidation of the organization within one building, and its vulnerable location in a small narrow street in downtown Algiers. The August 2003 UN Baghdad bomb had made it all too evident that UN facilities or individuals were likely terrorist targets.

On 11 April 2007, a vehicle bomb had targeted the main Algerian government building. On the same day, a similar attack was conducted against a police station just outside the city, and a third attempt failed in the vicinity of the World Bank and Danish Embassy. This prompted a UN request to the Algerian authorities for the installation of speed bumps and bollards, and the introduction of a local one-way traffic system. Police presence was increased, but the request was not implemented. The UN considered moving premises, but did not identify a suitable new office. A security risk assessment in October 2007 rated the risk of terrorist attacks, including vehicle bombs, as critical and very likely, with a predicted critical impact. However, under pressure from the Algerian Government, the UN failed to raise the threat level.

Following the bombings, a panel of enquiry was set up, headed by the senior UN official, Lakhdar Brahimi. The panel concluded that institutional safety culture demanded personal accountability of those entrusted with the safety and security of personnel. This precipitated the resignation of the eminent international security expert, Sir David Veness, UN under-secretary-general for safety and security, and former head of counter-terrorism at the Metropolitan Police. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said Sir David accepted personal responsibility for the failures, and that the enquiry report recognized “that risk management is not consistently understood or applied.”

How should this best be accomplished? All risk management should be informed by a risk assessment. Typically, this is qualitative and subjective; but, the desire for risk management to be consistently understood and applied points to a more structured and objective approach to risk assessment: one which uses the quantitative methods of risk modelling. Exposition of the basic concepts underlying such an approach is the purpose of this paper.

Quantitative risk modeling allows uncertainty in judgments to be accounted for explicitly, and exposes behavioral frailties such as group-think and cognitive dissonance. It also helps to detach risk analysis from external political pressure over the setting of threat levels. Furthermore, through the capacity to evaluate key risk metrics, the efficiency of crisis and disaster management can be gauged and then improved.

A terrorism risk model encompasses analysis of the threat, modus operandi, choice of weapon mode, targeting, and human and economic loss estimation. Any quantitative model has to be based on the best conceptual understanding of the underlying behavioral processes, without the bias of value judgments about political militants. This sentiment is well put in a quote from the Dutch philosopher, Spinoza, cited by Gilles Kepel in his exposition of the roots of radical Islam:

In order to preserve in political science the freedom of spirit
to which we have become accustomed in mathematics,
I have been careful not to ridicule human behaviour,
neither to deplore nor to condemn, but to understand.

The search for a risk-informed understanding of conflict and cooperation is supported by the award of the 2005 Nobel Prize in economic sciences to Thomas Schelling. He applied game theory principles to the real world problem of nuclear deterrence, and it is natural to seek practical applications to another potential existential threat, which also presents a specter of a nuclear detonation: terrorism. If terrorism were simply a Manichaeian struggle between good and evil, or if terrorists were stupid and crazy, theorizing would be futile. Belief in the one goes with belief in the other.

Reality is otherwise: terrorists posing a significant threat are both rational and intelligent. The latter attribute is well attested. Terrorists have to be intelligent in order to make an impact in asymmetric warfare. Dr. George Habash, co-founder of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, categorized terrorism as a thinking man's game. Osama bin Laden honored Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the 9/11 mastermind, with the title 'mukhtar', meaning 'the brain'. Indeed, it may be argued that the most powerful biological weapon in the terrorist's arsenal is not any deadly virus but the human brain itself.

In applying game theory to terrorism, it is important to return to the formal mathematical definition of rational behavior, namely that actions are taken in accordance with a specific preference relation. There is no requirement that a terrorist's preference relation should involve economic advantage or financial gain. Much of the purpose of terrorism is psychological: inspiring the global Jihad; whipping up malicious joy at seeing a great political power suffering loss; and terrorizing the general public. Nor is it necessary that a terrorist's preference relation conform to those of society at large. Game theory is not restricted to any one cultural or religious perspective.

But is it rational for a terrorist to undertake a suicide mission? Yes, according to the 17th century French philosopher, Blaise Pascal. Given the promise of eternal paradise after a martyr's death, and a non-zero likelihood of this promise being actually realized, it is perfectly rational for a terrorist to take Pascal's wager, and bet on this outcome of a martyrdom mission. It is known that some terrorists have followed this line of philosophical thought. In the words of one Palestinian: "If you want to compare it to the life of Paradise, you will find that all of this life is like a small moment. You know, in mathematics, any number compared with infinity is zero."

Nobody can predict the precise timing of the next major terrorist attack. Randomness plays a significant part in any human conflict. This is the essence of Otto von Bismarck's perceptive comment that when you draw the sword, you roll the dice. But, as with natural hazards, there are causal non-random factors in man-made hazards as well. These shape the conflict landscape, and influence the temporal pattern of successful attacks. In constructing a stochastic model of the recurrence of terrorist attacks over time, these non-random factors need to be taken into account through invoking an appropriate conceptual paradigm: cybernetics. Dr. Magnus Ranstorp, Swedish Defence College, has referred to Al Qaeda operatives as parasites on globalization. In common with other prey-predator situations, the conflict between the forces of terrorism and

counter-terrorism may be represented using the principles of cybernetics. At any moment in time, the predator (e.g. Al Qaeda) is in some specific state of attack preparedness, whilst the prey (e.g. USA) is in some corresponding state of defense preparedness.

In a democracy, there are rigorous checks and balances imposed on the law enforcement and security services. Democracies are prevented constitutionally from mounting an unlimited war on terrorism. As Director-General of MI5, faced with the IRA terrorist threat, Stella Rimington pointed out, "It is a feature of a democracy that a security service will follow a new security threat, rather than foreseeing it." At such a statement a cyberneticist would invoke Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety:

If a defender's move is unvarying, then the variety in outcomes will be as large as the variety in the attacker's moves; only variety in the defender's moves can force down variety in the outcomes.

With variety in moves to counter a broad, diverse range of potential threats, the great majority of terrorist plots in the leading industrialized nations are interdicted through intelligence, public vigilance, and some good fortune. However, some planned attacks are nonetheless successful. Although, in democracies, counter-terrorism action is commensurate with the threat, whether high or low, and each successful attack is sure to be met with a swift counter-terrorism response which suppresses the threat of future attacks, albeit at a cost of the erosion of some civil liberties, e.g. increased surveillance and screening, stricter immigration checks etc.

Terrorism Threat Analysis and Scenario Development

"Now an army may be likened to water, for just as water avoids heights, and hastens to the lowlands, so an army avoids strength and strikes weakness." This saying of Sun Tzu is a fundamental precept for the terrorist conduct of asymmetric warfare against a much more powerful adversary. Transcribed later in the scientific language of the French savant, Pierre de Maupertuis, "The great principle is that, in producing its effects, Nature always acts according to the simplest paths."

The notion that the principle of least resistance may guide the probability distribution of certain human actions originated in sociology, and may be considered in the context of attack mode preferences. One of the main signposts on the path of least resistance is adaptive learning. Terrorists are eager to learn from past terrorist experience – the successes and failures of attacks perpetrated by its own network, and by other terrorists around the world. Terrorists tend to 'copycat' methods which have either proven to be successful, or are perceived to have the potential to be successful. If an attack mode has demonstrated effectiveness, or has the promise of being effective, it is likely to become an attack option. Development of a scenario leads from weapon attack mode to attack multiplicity, targeting, and loss estimation. These are considered in turn.

The basic arsenal for terrorists contains a range of conventional weapons: improvised explosive and incendiary devices, and standard military weapons such as automatic rifles, grenades, mortars, and surface-to-air missiles. Sticking with off-the-shelf or tried-and-tested weapons might seem to be the easiest strategy, but further variety in attack modes is necessary

from time to time as it keeps counter-terrorism forces guessing. This necessity leads to the invention of unconventional attack modes: industrial, infrastructure and agricultural sabotage, hijacked jets, helicopters and ships, bomb-laden boats and planes, chemical-biological-radiological-nuclear (CBRN) weapons, cyberspace hacking, food and drink contamination etc.

A hallmark of Al Qaeda operations is having multiple synchronous points of attack. High multiplicity assists Al Qaeda in meeting its objective of inflicting maximal loss, and success is still claimable even if some of the synchronous attacks fail, as happened on September 11, 2001 in the USA and March 11, 2004 in Spain. Furthermore, multiple benefits can be gained from deployment of a specific surprise attack mode; defense against such an attack mode would be hardened afterwards, as with aircraft impact. Money and material continue to be available for multiple attacks, thus the limiting constraint for Al Qaeda on the multiplicity of an attack will be the likelihood of detection.

As the multiplicity increases, so more targets need to be surveilled, more attack weaponry procured, and more terrorists involved in planning and preparation. Progressively, there is an increasing chance that the whole plot will be undermined by a security lapse. At some point, it would be foolhardy to expand the attack size; instead, it would be best to call a halt to ambition, and stick with the existing multiplicity. The dilemma faced by a terrorist organization in increasing attack multiplicity is analogous with other types of criminal activity. Operational research analysis (Haggstrom, 1967) defines when it is optimal to stop, rather than continue and risk losing existing gains.

In a real-time terrorist crisis, after the first attack has occurred, civic authorities will be vigilant about further attacks. Anticipation of the likely multiplicity of attacks is helpful for preparedness, as is insight into likely targets. Terrorist targeting of synchronous attacks is generally gauged from the history of previous successful or interdicted attacks, terrorist communications and interrogation, as well as from terrorist open publications in printed, broadcast and virtual form. The range of targets may be narrowed by intelligence relating to an imminent attack. The efficient deployment of resources to respond to such intelligence would depend on constructing scenarios consistent with the threat update.

Criticality Analysis

As a general rule, the more attractive a target is to the terrorist, the better security it needs to have: offered two targets of equal security, the terrorist will typically prefer to attack that which is more attractive. The marginal cost of extra security is that which would encourage a terrorist to substitute a softer equivalent target. A major challenge for governments is to protect critical infrastructure, which is essential for the maintenance of basic societal functions and thereby attractive to terrorists.

Some critical infrastructure can be accorded enhanced protection: principal government buildings, power plants, oil and gas installations, water utilities etc. Site perimeters of important properties can be made secure against intruders through advanced surveillance technology and physical barriers. To protect against malicious visitors, identity and baggage checks can be made routine. However, extra monitoring requires additional security staff, which is an additional financial burden on operating expenditure.

By contrast, open access to public transportation limits the scope of significant security improvement. It is notable that, on the modern Beijing metro, security against Uighur and Tibetan separatist violence extends even to comprehensive passenger bag screening. However, in the western democracies, such heightened security would neither be feasible nor affordable, even if it were publicly acceptable. Crisis management plans need to be developed to cope with disruption to metropolitan transport infrastructure. This is too open to be affordably protected – it would require at least three thousand policemen to provide round-the-clock security across the London Underground. Preparedness must make do for protection: optimally from a risk perspective, CBRN disaster preparedness exercises in UK focus on an attack at a London Underground hub.

Vulnerability Analysis

The efficiency of metropolitan crisis management depends on a reliable up-to-date image of urban vulnerability to the different modes of terrorist attack. Mobile security assets should be deployed where they are most needed. With intensive counter-terrorism measures instinctively taken by a government to protect its own critical property, there will be a deflected terrorism risk dispersed among softer commercial targets. Commercial property is generally not heavily defended. Organizing protection requires a clear understanding of terrorism risk, so that efforts at corporate risk mitigation are prioritized in a financially optimal manner. More than for government and civic authorities, terrorism security expenditure for commercial organizations has to be justified on a cost-benefit basis. Security is costly, both in terms of manpower and equipment, hence security measures at a particular location should match the local terrorist threat. In the aftermath of the Mumbai hotel attacks on 26 November 2008, negative security comparisons have been made with Jakarta hotels, where security has been markedly upgraded since the Marriott was bombed in August 2003.

Other than at military bases, security guards are not normally trained or authorized to use deadly force as a response. The great majority of buildings allow vehicle access right up to the building; a minority have vehicle stand-off limits of 15 to 50 meters, with the greater distance rarely imposed. Although it may be thought profligate to have large stand-off limits, for obviously attractive targets this may be a price worth paying. Retrospectively, after Glasgow air terminal was rammed by terrorists on 30 June 2007, stand-off distances at airports were increased. The list of buildings protected in this way has been progressively extended since 9/11: military facilities; government offices and embassies; critical industrial facilities; high-rise commercial properties and sports stadiums.

Military manuals guide terrorists in the effective use of bombs, but no training camp tutorial can compare with lessons from actual attacks. In October 2003, at the Baghdad Hotel, a car crashed through the security barriers. Security guards responded by shooting out the tires, and the half-ton bomb detonated 50 meters from the hotel itself. The blast still killed eight people, ripped cladding from the hotel, and broke windows for two blocks. Had the car reached its objective, the impact would have been far worse. Blast modeling indicates that the half-ton bomb detonated 50 meters away generated a blast pressure of about 5 to 10 pounds-per-square-inch at the hotel. Up close, the bomb would have generated blast pressures almost eight times as severe, which would have caused double the damage and many more casualties.

Where standoff is limited, physical barriers provide a key line of defense. Visible security in the form of gates, chicanes, planters, trees and street furniture, now a familiar aspect of post 9/11 urban architecture, will be readily observable during terrorist surveillance operations, and will serve as a deterrent, encouraging the search for a softer target. The ring of steel built around the city of London is known to have deterred the IRA. Furthermore, enhanced blast-protection is increasingly featured in building construction. As with all risk exposure, it is prudent to have multiple layers of protection against terrorism. These may be summarized by the three D's: Deter, Detect, and Deny. Should an attack be launched, CCTV cameras and electronic equipment should be at hand to detect unauthorized intrusion. In the event of a terrorist break-in, opportunities for sabotage, fraud, or other criminal business disruption should be denied the terrorist through tight internal security measures.

Capability Analysis

The May 11, 2009 appointment, of asymmetric warfare expert Lt.Gen. Stanley McChrystal, as the top allied commander in Afghanistan, affirms US resolution to suppress the capability of Al Qaeda to plan spectacular attacks from its mountain strongholds in Afghanistan-Pakistan. His predecessor, Gen. David McKiernan (2009) had stated succinctly, but not resolved, the politico-military challenge: "NATO and regional stakeholders simply cannot allow the Northwest Frontier Provinces, Federally Administered Tribal Provinces, and Baluchistan to remain areas of sanctuary for extremists and places for planning and training global terrorists."

Al Qaeda operational decision-making is decentralized from this conflict zone with many technical and tactical skills learned online from jihadist websites. However, as in real space, terrorist use of cyberspace is subject to counter-attack by security services, which are assiduous in taking down extremist propaganda websites, and limiting the ability of terrorist groups to recruit members, and plan and perpetrate damaging attacks.

The loss of individual operatives is rarely a significant setback; there is no shortage of Muslim recruits ready to fill the ranks. Even though Islamist militants may minimize or disguise communication, such links may become manifest through clandestine surveillance of their meeting places and modes of interaction. Human intelligence, by way of tip-offs, moles, or double-agents, may provide some information on Islamist militants. Otherwise, information can be gleaned from data-mining and eavesdropping, such as communication interception. Any communication between two operatives, whether via a meeting, letter, phone, email, or internet, and however secretive, carries a finite risk of interception by security services.

Finding terrorists is easier if the network is larger and more network connections can be identified. Intuitively, the larger the community of active operatives, the larger the number of random detected links that may arise between them, and the easier it becomes for counter-terrorism forces to join the dots, make arrests and accumulate sufficient evidence to make charges and to secure convictions. The organizational worry for terrorists is that if there is excessive planning activity for one spectacular attack, or for a wave of attacks during a short period of time, there will be a greater likelihood of more links being randomly detected, thereby making the security services' task of joining the dots much easier. It only takes one operative to be seen to be

acting suspiciously to jeopardize an entire operation. Too ambitious or too many planned attacks would prove ultimately to be counter-productive and wasteful of terrorist resources.

Organizing less ambitious planned attacks would be a more resilient and patient approach, better capable of withstanding concerted counter-terrorism efforts at network disruption. Recent armed attacks in Mumbai and Islamabad illustrate the tactical advantage. There has yet to be a successful jihadist terrorist attack using chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons, notwithstanding the intent to develop such attack capability, and the readiness to deploy such weapons. Under sustained counter-terrorism pressure, the terrorist capability remains low.

Risk Calculation

Especially during a terrorist crisis, decision-makers should be taking calculated, rather than reckless risks. Information overload can lead to poor decisions. Processing of risk information is expedited by prior risk calculation, which involves extensive computer simulation of large numbers of possible threat/counter-terrorism outcomes, graded according to plausibility. To quantify a terrorist threat, a number of risk metrics can be calculated. Serving as a medium-term reference baseline is the annualized average human or economic loss, segmented according to geography, and attack mode. A key risk metric during a terrorist crisis is the likelihood of mass casualties or enormous economic loss, and the cost-effectiveness of risk mitigation measures or crisis management action. Red-teaming exercises can be extended in a risk direction by evaluating the risk implications of alternative terrorist moves.

Common to all risk metrics is an estimation of loss consequent on a terrorist attack being successful. Loss estimation involves a series of problems in the domain of the engineering, physical, chemical and biological sciences: evaluating the blast effect of a bomb detonation; the extent of fire from a fuel tanker explosion; the radiation fall-out from a radiological dispersal device; the spread of contagion from a smallpox outbreak etc. These problems are technically complex and challenging, but at least the core computational models for blast analysis, conflagration, atmospheric dispersion, pollution transport, epidemiology etc. are founded on consensus scientific principles.

Demanding more innovative thinking is the task of estimating the likelihood of rare attacks. For this, risk modelers use probabilistic event-tree models that delineate the multitude of branches and pathways by which such attacks might occur. Even with insights of intelligence experts, there remains significant modeling uncertainty over the possibility of novel spectacular attacks. However, counter-terrorism constraints on the plot effectiveness of terrorist networks limit the range of practical possibility, and intelligence information can update the likelihood estimates during a time of crisis.

Comparison and Evaluation of Terrorism Threats

A quantitative approach provides a direct means of comparing terrorist threats, once they are evaluated in a probabilistic sense. So, what about unknown threats? Donald Rumsfeld's enigmatic and celebrated Department of Defense news briefing on February 12, 2002, brought to public notice the intelligence conundrum of dealing with the 'unknown unknowns'. The public

perplexity which this briefing generated reflects the quagmire entered when words alone are used to analyze reports of questionable reliability. Rumsfeld's philosophical reference to 'known knowns, known unknowns and unknown unknowns', was a commendable if confusing attempt to address what are fundamentally deep epistemological issues. Faced with interpreting the most complex dubious baffling evidence, intelligence officers would benefit from quantitative analytical methods that combine statistics with philosophy, specifically evidence science with epistemology - Bayesian epistemology.

As with other dangerous adversaries, Al Qaeda places a high strategic value on surprise as an attack weapon. As the war theorist Clausewitz remarked, surprise confuses the enemy and lowers his morale, and furthermore, it invigorates the forces conjuring up the surprise. Surprise can be inflicted on an unwary adversary at many levels. Alas, surprise, almost by definition, may be one of the hardest weapons to overcome. The 9/11 Commission report stated that "it is crucial to find a way of routinizing, even bureaucratizing the exercise of imagination." In the interpretation of intelligence information, the exercise of imagination is impeded by the human frailty of cognitive dissonance. If evidence conflicts with one's prior world view of terrorism, it is simplest to resolve this dissonance by downgrading the reliability of the evidence.

In the domain of communications monitoring, a natural endeavor is to attempt to tune in to that part of the communications spectrum that might be used by evasive smart terrorists, and amplify the electronic signal received. An analogous endeavor in the domain of human behavioral psychology is to attempt to 'tune in' to terrorist behavior, and step up the gain on the corresponding behavioral signal. The terrorist behavior to which counter-terrorism officers would be especially keen to 'tune in' is of a devious, imaginative and surprising kind.

To be surprised is to be caught unprepared. Inadequate preparedness takes many forms: lack of physical security; lack of security personnel; poor intelligence etc. Clearly, access to direct intelligence information about potential surprise terrorist plots would always be welcome; but, even in the absence of such intelligence, there is much that counter-terrorism forces can do to prevent strategic surprise, which is first and foremost a reaction of the human mind. Those who are mentally well prepared are much less likely to be surprised.

Counter-terrorism information is intrinsically uncertain, and consists of occasional threat reports of varying degrees of confidence, plausibility and reliability. In order to treat such soft information in a systematic manner, minimizing subjectivity, one needs to address fundamental epistemological issues concerning differing states of counter-terrorist knowledge. Specifically, one needs a method for weighing the likelihood of the truth of a threat hypothesis according to various criteria:

- How many information sources are there? Does the information come from a single source, or from several sources? Are the sources independent?
- How reliable are each of the sources? How likely is it that a source would make a false report?
- How coherent is the information? Are the source reports collectively consistent with each other, or are they partially contradictory? To what extent do the reports confirm each other?

- How surprising is the information? Are several sources providing the same surprising information?

Also, if intelligence happens to be very specific, it should make an intelligence officer wonder why and how the source originated it. The surprise/specificity index can be assigned with reference to qualitative descriptions of the kind tabulated in Table 1.

TABLE 1: SURPRISE / SPECIFICITY INDEX

SURPRISE/ SPECIFICITY INDEX	EQUIVALENT QUALITATIVE DESCRIPTION
0.1	Extremely precise and weird
0.2	Very precise and surprising
0.3	Moderately precise and surprising
0.4	Quite precise and surprising
0.5	Neutral or no opinion
0.6	Unsurprising
0.7	Vague and imprecise
0.8	Uninformative
0.9	Very uninformative
1.0	Extremely uninformative

In the aftermath of the 7/7 London transport bombings, organized at cell level by a well respected primary school teacher, Mohammed Siddique Khan, the metaphor of a chameleon has been used to portray the adaptive capability of Jihadis to blend into the background and avoid suspicion. A merit of Bayesian epistemology is that no such adaptation, however cunning and resourceful, would be impervious to counter-terrorist action, provided there was some fragment of prior intelligence. Such indeed was the case regarding the organizer of the 7/7 plot, who was briefly tailed by MI5 through links with another terrorist conspiracy under investigation.

The value of surprising information can be analyzed more systematically using the methodical principles of Bayesian epistemology, which provides a formal quantitative framework for considering whether surprising information should be believed. Sometimes, a report can be too odd not to be true. In scanning the horizon for Rumsfeld's 'unknown unknowns', the epistemological realm of the proverbial black swan, additional telescope capability is provided within the framework of Bayesian epistemology. By definition, an unknown unknown is off the threat radar screen. However, it is often the case that there are vague dubious precursory signals of

the looming black swan. Inevitably, such signals are surprising, as well as of questionable reliability, and thus hard to detect using conventional methods.

Terrorism Threat Management

Identification of Preventative Measures and Strategies for Terrorism Threats

Preventative measures start with counter-terrorism operations: plot interdiction is an optimal policy. As far as counter-terrorism security services are concerned, the group of active supporters of political violence constitutes a very large social network, interlocking sub-networks of which may be involved in terrorist plots at any given time. Key to the disruption of plots is the discernment of links between nodes of a terrorist sub-network. The higher the likelihood of identifying a link between two terrorist nodes, the clearer a pattern of connections will become, and the easier it becomes to 'join the dots' to disrupt a terrorist plot, and gain the necessary corroborative evidence for criminal proceedings. As a conspiracy expands in size, or as a series of conspiracies are interlocked, so the discernible signature of plotting becomes increasingly recognizable. The intuition that too many terrorists spoil the plot, can be expressed in a quantitative way utilizing modern developments in network analysis.

Suppose that, within the large disparate population of terrorist supporters, there is a group who are actively involved in operational planning at a particular time. It is in the general terrorist interest to tend to randomize network connections, to keep security services guessing about plot involvement, and defeat efforts at profiling. However, even with randomization, there is a tipping point in the size of the group, beyond which the presence of conspiratorial plotting should become increasingly manifest to the security services. Even the most careful plotting may be dashed by excessive numbers of operatives. As Niccolò Machiavelli noted in his discourse on the security of Roman emperors: conspiracies should be kept small.

Population clusters forming within random networks may be analyzed graphically in terms of a basic clique of three people, who all are interlinked. Graph theory analysis reveals a dramatic change in the connectivity features of a graph, i.e. a tipping point transition, when the link detection probability attains the value: $p=(2N)^{-1/2}$, where N is the size of the group. Rearranging this formula, the tipping point arises where the size of group exceeds one half of the inverse-square of the link detection probability. The nonlinearity embedded in the expression for the link detection probability embodies in a concise manner the rapidly escalating dependence of counter-terrorism performance on surveillance capability. The greater the link detection probability, the smaller the size of conspiracies that can be disrupted. Conversely, the smaller the link detection probability, the more tenuous is the prospect of identifying plots.

This new type of terrorist network analysis has been applied to past and present terrorist campaigns. A topical important application is on the Jihadi terrorist threat to London, which has the highest terrorism hazard of any city in the western alliance. According to UK opinion polls, about 6% of adult British Muslims thought that the 7/7 London bombings were justified. Assuming this ratio approximately holds for the half million Muslim visitors, most of whom are from Pakistan, an estimated 100,000 Muslims within Britain might actively support the Jihad. Countering the rising UK threat of Islamist militancy since 9/11 through the doubling of its pre-

9/11 staff, the UK Security Service has around a thousand personnel for Islamist terrorism surveillance operations. With each secret agent being aided by informers and the local constabulary, as well as by receiving tip-offs from the general public, so as to keep reasonable surveillance of approximately five citizens, a surveillance ratio of approximately 100 to one equates to a link detection probability of about 1/10, and a moderate tipping point value N of 50. This serves as a constraint on the number of terrorists actively planning attacks in UK. Indeed, since 9/11, the most complex UK plots, involving many conspirators, have been successfully interdicted.

The conviction rate since 9/11 of those arrested under UK terrorism laws is only about 13%. More than half of detainees are not charged. For the terrorist threat to be lowered in democracies of the western alliance, heightened surveillance is not the answer; there has to be a reduction in the Muslim (Umma) sub-population who consider terrorism against these countries to be justified. Psychology has been an art of war for millennia, but the technological means of strategic persuasion have reached their zenith in the 21st century. Al Qaeda's chief strategist, Ayman Al Zawahiri, wrote as follows to Musab Al Zarqawi in July 2005: "I say to you: that we are in a battle, and that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our Umma." Overseeing propaganda is the head of Al Qaeda's Media Committee, Abu Abdel Rahman Al Maghrebi, the son-in-law of chief strategist Dr Ayman Al Zawahiri. Under dynamic leadership, Al Qaeda's media arm, Al Sahab, has substantially increased its annual output of audio and video messages.

For security in UK, with its traditional colonial links with Pakistan and large diaspora community, there is a need to win hearts and minds of young Pakistanis. This was recognized in an address on July 27, 2007, to the Pakistan Youth Parliament, by the British Foreign Secretary. David Miliband delivered the following qualitative message on international relations, which is supported by quantitative terrorism risk analysis: "Diplomacy needs to change to be about winning hearts and minds, instead of bureaucrats holding meetings behind closed doors."

Risk Reduction

Terrorism risk can be reduced systematically by raising the level of security, but it has to be at an acceptable cost. Special protection technology, such as the installation of anti-MANPAD devices on planes reduces aviation risk, but at a high cost which airlines can ill afford and passengers would generally be unwilling to pay. More affordable on-land vigilance includes installing additional CCTV, hiring extra security guards and marshals, introducing intensive screening, showing of picture/biometric ID, extending police stop-and-search, strengthening border and perimeter security. Risk can also be reduced through decreasing vulnerability to opportunist attacks. Examples include the removal of public receptacles (e.g. waste bins), in which package bombs might be hidden, as they were by the IRA in their London bombing campaign.

Relocating staff away from buildings under heightened threat, e.g. Dutch embassy staff accommodation in Islamabad, reduces personnel risk. More drastically, overseas nationals might be repatriated away from a designated threat zone. An alternative is to move offices to sites with fewer security weak points. US embassies are hardened by relocating to more isolated, secure sites, e.g. around Istanbul, the Hague, London, etc.

The IRA often telephoned coded bomb warnings to provide some time for a target to be evacuated. The area evacuated might be a building, street or city block. Fortunately, the IRA did not contemplate the use of a dirty bomb or other CBRN weapon, which might threaten much larger urban regions, the evacuation of which would have been a logistical nightmare, on a par with large-scale evacuation in a hurricane or volcanic crisis. But what if a terrorist group issued an anthrax dispersal warning for a capital city center, as might hypothetically happen in the future, perhaps as a political blackmail gambit?

Recognizing that dispersal of an anthrax device would be most effective in a high-density urban area, action to reduce the city centre population might be worthwhile. A decision to mandate a short-term evacuation in the face of an uncertain threat falls within a common important category of economic decisions: pay a sum now to avert paying a larger sum later, contingent on the occurrence of an uncertain hazard event. Evacuation is a form of insurance protection. The significant socio-economic expense of evacuation is the premium deemed worth paying so that, in the event of a terrorist atrocity, the much higher cost of mass casualties is avoided.

The economic character of this class of decisions is exemplified by a basic cost-loss model. Consider a situation where a decision-maker has to choose between two actions: (a) protect; (b) do not protect. The cost of protection is C . In the absence of protection, the decision-maker incurs a loss L which exceeds C , if an adverse hazard state arises. The corresponding expense matrix is shown below:

TABLE 2: LOSS-COST EXPENSE MATRIX

ACTION	Adverse Hazard State	No Adverse Hazard State
[a] Protect	C	C
[b] Do Not Protect	L	0

Let the probability of the adverse hazard state arising, within a specified time window, be denoted by p . If the expected expense is to be minimized, then the optimal policy is to protect, if $p > C/L$, but not to protect if $p < C/L$. The minimal expense is then $\min\{C, pL\}$. In the present context, protection would be evacuation, which carries a cost of C . The adverse hazard state here is one of a terrorist attack, for which a decision not to protect carries a large loss penalty of L , measured in human fatalities. Given the enormous societal cost associated with urban evacuation, the probability p would have to be substantial for this even to be considered. But this situation might arise if it were known that a viable CBRN device had already fallen into terrorist hands. Indeed, if publicized, this might precipitate an urban exodus.

Risk Avoidance

Most risk avoidance decisions require some basic level of cost-benefit analysis to justify the imposition of any additional corporate or societal burden. The British Airways passenger service from London to Washington DC has been grounded on occasion because of a credible terrorist

threat. Following the 7/7 London transport bombings, many travellers avoided the perceived high terrorism risk associated with public transport, but such risk avoidance soon lapsed with the need to resume daily life. To avoid terrorism risk by giving in to specific terrorist demands is morally objectionable, but nevertheless might be prudent. Where risk is avoidable at comparatively modest cost, it makes sense at least to consider this option.

The March 3rd, 2009, gun assault on the Sri Lankan cricket team coach, en route from hotel to cricket stadium in Lahore, reflects a risk which might have been avoided had the team been taken by helicopter to the stadium as they were ultimately taken out. Would the risk have justified this apparent extravagance? Randomness plays its part in inadvertent risk avoidance. Pakistan's leaders were planning to dine at the Marriott Islamabad on September 20, 2008: a fortunate late change of plan saved them from the half-ton terrorist bomb and subsequent fire which engulfed the hotel.

Where financial risk is a major concern, it may be avoided by transferring it to an insurer. Terrorism insurance provides a valuable public function by helping to maintain commercial activity in areas specially threatened, e.g. in key target-rich metropolitan areas. For example, bank loans for business development in high risk areas may require terrorism cover. Recognizing the societal value of terrorism insurance as well as the responsibility of government for national security, public-private partnerships in providing terrorism cover include national terrorism insurance pools and backstops in many countries of the western alliance.

Risk Shifting

Terrorist target substitution operates on all geographical scales: from individual to street, to city, to national level. At an individual level, the assassination of Theo van Gogh in November 2004 was a textbook example: a knife in the film-maker's chest affixed a letter addressed to the prime source of the terrorist's fury, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, the self-styled infidel subject of his provocative film. At the other end of the scale, analysis of terrorism threat shifting away from the U.S. shows that the U.S. is not isolated as a target from others in the western alliance: Islamist gunmen who terrorized hotel guests in Mumbai in November 2008 singled out both Britons and Americans.

The test of any mathematical risk model is its explanatory and predictive capability. Game theory predicts that, as prime targets are hardened, rational terrorists will tend to substitute lesser softer targets. Whilst serving as CIA director, George Tenet, testified on February 7, 2001, (prior to 9/11): "as security is increased around government and military facilities, terrorists are seeking out softer targets that provide opportunities for mass casualties." Target substitution, as this is called, is a prediction about the rational behavior of terrorists, affirmation of which must ultimately come from the terrorists themselves. Indeed, explicit admission of this soft target strategy has come from Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the Al Qaeda chief of military operations, who was arrested in March 2003.

In November 2003, Islamist terrorists struck yet another city of great recognition: Istanbul. The local US embassy was too hard a target to hit; it had been relocated out of the city for security reasons. Instead, terrorists struck the much softer target of the British consulate, where a desire to foster closer community links precluded such tightening of security. The lesson of Istanbul was

learned fast; concrete blocks were rapidly installed outside the British embassy in Sofia, Bulgaria. An abiding lesson is that, with a terrorist threat to a number of prize targets, the most vulnerable generally have the highest probability of being attacked. As with the installation of burglar alarms, self-protection carries the externality of shifting criminal risk to neighbors.

Acceptance of Risk

For the vast majority of possible terrorist targets, significant expenditure to reduce vulnerability is not justified by the low ambient risk. If security levels in target countries were adjusted approximately so as to equalize risk, the annual probability that any one target would be attacked would be minuscule: as in the jungle, prey have safety in numbers. Governments should attempt to compare and reconcile the residual terrorism risk level to which citizens are exposed with the ambient risk level from ordinary criminal acts and natural hazards. Terrorism risk is higher in metropolitan areas, and so is the regular crime rate of mugging and burglary.

Conspicuous security presence around soft targets in crowded places may be justifiable if security staff have regular crowd management duties as well, which is the case at night-clubs and casinos, which are known Islamist decadent targets. However, as shown by the attempted club bombing in central London on 29 June 2007, unarmed doormen may not deter determined terrorists, and armed doormen, if legally allowed, might deter customers. Where security is deficient, system recovery must be resilient.

As a showcase for disaster resilience, the HSBC bank headquarters in Istanbul managed to resume business a day after being bombed on 20 November 2003, thanks to the implementation of their earthquake disaster plan. This offered an implicit degree of redundancy of a creative kind which makes residual risk acceptance a tolerable crisis policy. Meticulous disaster preparedness and post-event rapid response are essential for mitigating loss. Cost-effective are new technological advances, such as in personal protective equipment, which protect first responders better against toxic substances, and increase mobility and access. Deploying well-equipped and trained rapid response teams makes excellent counter-terrorism sense, denying terrorists the maximal losses they crave. Risk managers should aim for total security, but settle for resilience.

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Note for Contributors

The *Defence Against Terrorism Review* (DATR) is an inter-disciplinary, biannual journal, publishing in-depth analyses of the complex issue of terrorism in a changing and globalised security environment. It includes political, legal, sociological, economic, and psychological approaches to the terrorism predicament. DATR intends to reach academics as well as practitioners and aims to publish theoretical as well as policy papers. It also encourages contributions from different cultural perspectives

Manuscripts submitted to DATR should be in the environs of 8,000 words and must be written in English. Each paper is screened at COE–DAT and then sent to referees for reviewing.

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Manuscripts should be organized as the title page, an Abstract (around 200-300 words), and Keywords (up to 5), Footnotes, and a Bibliography as shown below:

FOOTNOTES

1. Mustafa Kibaroglu and Aysegul Kibaroglu, *Global Security Watch – Turkey: A Reference Handbook*, Praeger Security International, Greenwood Publishing Group, Westport, Connecticut, USA, 2009, pp. 87-109.
2. Monica Den Boer, “The EU Counterterrorism Wave: Window of Opportunity or Profound Policy Transformation?” in Marianne Van Leuween (ed.), *Confronting Terrorism. European Experiences, Threat Perceptions and Policies*, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2003, p. 196.
3. Michael Doran, “Somebody Else’s Civil War”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 1, 2002, p. 32.
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