2023

BORDER SECURITY IN CONTESTED ENVIRONMENT WORKSHOP

CENTER OF EXCELLENCE DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM

14-16 June 2023

ANKARA, TÜRKİYE

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Workshop Team

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Taha KALAYCI (TUR)

Program of the Workshop

Day One (14.06.2023)	
09.10 – 09.20	OPENING REMARKS, INTRODUCTION OF PARTICIPANTS, SUBJECT AND AIM.
09.20 – 09.25	WELCOME ADDRESS BY COS COE DAT
09.25 – 10.05	SESSION #1: BORDER SECURITY, AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS – AN INTRODUCTION İNTRO: MR ROCCO MESSINA (OCT/UNCCT) – RECORDED DR CEM KARADELI: BORDER SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS
10.05 – 10.20	BREAK
10.20 – 11.20	SESSİON #2: BEST PRACTICES, BORDER SECURITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM MR MARTON HEGEDÜS: 'THE CONTAGİON OF VİOLENT EXTREMİSM İN WEST AFRİCAN COASTAL STATES' MR DONATO COLLUCCI: CHALLENGES AND BEST PRACTICES IN BORDER SECURITY – DISPLACED PEOPLE
11.30 – 13.25	İCEBREAKER/LUNCH AT COE DAT GARDEN
13.30 – 14.30	SESSİON#3: INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES IN BORDER SECURITY AND THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM: MR HAKAN EHLİZ: INTERPOL'S CHALLENGES AND BEST PRACTİCES İN BORDER SECURİTY AND COUNTERTERRORİSM MS ELENA BEGANU: NATO COUNTER TERRORISM POLICY AND THE ALLIANCE'S ROLE IN BORDER SECURİTY (ONLİNE PRESENTATİON)
14.30 – 15.45	BREAK
14.45 – 15.45	SESSİON #4: BORDER SECURITY, COUNTERRORISM, AND BORDER TRANSITION IN EASTERN AFRICA MR ABEBAW BELANCHEW: SECURITY CHALLENGES IN PEACE AND SECURITY IN IGAD REGION: BORDER SECURITY AND BORDER TRANSITION ISSUES (ONLINE PRESENTATION) MR DAOUD ALWAN: BORDER SECURITY CHALLENGES – DEVELOPMENT & SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE HORN AND EASTERN AFRICA: A PERSPECTIVE FROM THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT.
15.45-16.00	BREAK
16.00 – 16.30	DISCUSSION, WRAP UP, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
16.30 – 17.00	TRANSPORT TO ACCOMMODATION

Day Two (15.06.2023)	
08.55 – 09.05	ADMİN İSSUES, CONCLUSİON OF 1ST DAY, OPENING 2ND DAY
09.05 –10.05	SESSİON #5: CONTEMPORARY ILLEGAL MIGRATION, BORDER SECURITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM IN EUROPE DR JANOS BESENYÖ: ILLEGAL MIGRATION TO EUROPE, ON WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN DR ELIF ÖZDILEK: EU, BORDER SECURITY AND PREVENTION OF TERRORISM
10.05 – 10.20	BREAK
10.20 –11.20	SESSİON #6: SECURITY CHALLENGES AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN DIFFERENT ENVIRONMENTS-1: THE CASES OF GEORGIA AND RWANDA MS NATIA SESKURIA: BORDER SECURITY, GEORGIA AND THE CAUCASUS REGION LTC PAUL MILAS: AFRICA, COUNTERTERRORISM AND SECURITY: THE CASE OF RWANDA
11.20 – 11.50	TRANSPORT TO LUNCH
12.00 – 13.00	LUNCH
13.05 – 13.25	TRANSPORT TO COE DAT
13.25 – 14.25	SESSİON #7: SECURITY CHALLENGES AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN DIFFERENT ENVIRONMENTS-2: IGAD AND OSCE APPROACHES MR ABABE MULUNEH: SECURITY CHALLENGES IN PEACE AND SECURITY IN IGAD REGION: TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND THEIR IMPACT ON AFRICAN PEOPLE (ONLINE PRESENTATION) MS COLLEEN RYAN: OSCE AND BORDER SECURITY MANAGEMENT IN EUROPE
14.25-14.40	BREAK
14.40 – 15.10	SESSİON #8: UNITED NATIONS AND BORDER SECURITY AND GENERAL EVALUATION MR ULRIK AHNFELDT-MOLLERUP: UN GOOD PRACTISES IN BORDER SECURITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM
15.10-15.25	BREAK
15.25 – 16.00	DISCUSSION, WRAP UP, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
16.00 – 16.30	TRANSPORT TO ACCOMMODATION/ GROUP PHOTO
18.30 – 19.00	TRANSPORT TO DİNNER
19.00 – 20.30	HOSTED DİNNER
20.30 – 21.00	TRANSPORT TO ACCOMMODATION

Day Three (16.06.2023)	
09.00 – 09.10	ADMİN İSSUES, OPENING 3RD DAY
09.10 – 10.10	CONCLUSİON OF THE WORKSHOP, LESSONS LEARNED
10.10 – 10.25	BREAK
10.25 – 10.50	OPEN İSSUES/DİSCUSSİON
10.50– 11.00	WAY AHEAD
11.00 – 11.30	CLOSİNG REMARKS
11.30 – 11.50	TRANSPORT TO LUNCH
12.00 – 1300	LUNCH
13.10 – 15.30	CULTURAL PROGRAM (OPTİONAL)
15.30. – 15.50	TRANSPORT TO ACCOMMODATION

Biographies of Participants

Professor Cem Karadeli

Professor Cem Karadeli is the head of Department of Political Science and International Relations at Ufuk University, Ankara, Turkiye. He had his bachelor and master's degrees from Middle East Technical University in Ankara, Turkiye and his PhD from Glasgow University in Glasgow, Scotland. He worked as a full-time lecturer at the Middle East Technical University, Çankaya University, and Ufuk University. He has been the general secretary of Çankaya University for 7 years. Professor Karadeli works on International Politics focusing mainly on political regime change, the Cold War, Eastern Europe, Foreign Policy Analysis, and Globalization and Counter-Globalization. He is a member of the international institutions ISSEI and EIRD. Professor Karadeli published three edited books, a lot of research articles and book chapters on the Cold War, Eastern European politics, and current global conflicts. He is the academic advisor for this workshop.

Daoud Aboubaker Alwan

Daoud Aboubaker Alwan is a Djibouti citizen. He is currently the Counterterrorism and Maritime Security Head of the Security Sector Program (SSP) of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD). Prior to joining IGAD, Mr. ALWAN held various responsibilities as Senior Analyst of the Government of Djibouti on issues pertaining to the bordering countries of the Republic of Djibouti (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Yemen). Mr Alwan is holder of a B.A in humanities from the French University of Dijon (1986) and a master's degree in Peace and Security Studies from Addis-Ababa University/Ethiopia. Among its most notable publications Mr Alwan is the author of a reference research tool on Djibouti and its region namely: The Historical Dictionary of Djibouti, Scarecrow Press Inc, Lanham, Maryland, USA, (2000).

Professor Dr. János Besenyő

Professor Dr. János Besenyő served in the Hungarian Defense Forces 31 years as NCO, and later officer. Between 2014-2018 as a colonel, he had to build up and led the Scientific Research Center of General Staff of HDF. Now he is a professor in Óbuda University and is leading the African Research Institute. Currently, he is teaching African history, European-African cooperation, European security and defense, and conflict management. Also gives lectures in National Public Service University and some other civilian Institute (Budapest, Eger, Pécs, Szeged) about African History, African conflicts, Hungarian participation in African peace operations, Western Sahara, terrorism, migration, Christian-Muslim relations, Hungarian-African relations.

Mr. Donato Colucci

Mr. Donato Colucci is the "Senior Border and Identity Solutions (BIS) Specialist based at the IOM Headquarters in Geneva. He provides to IOM offices and Governmental counterparts expertise, planning and guidance in the development, coordination, and implementation of capacity building initiatives, in particular on border and identity solutions, border and migration management policies and strategies, including Integrated Border Management and data collection and analysis. He assists IOM Regional Offices and Governmental counterparts in developing, implementing and monitoring IOM's capacity building strategies as well as training initiatives at national as well at regional level, undertaking, when requested, technical field assessments. With the IOM IT-Expert, he provides technical support for assessing, budgeting, installing and training on Border Management Information System (BMIS) and trains on

various IBM topics including passport examination procedures. Prior he was "Migration Management Specialist" at the African Capacity Building Centre (ACBC), in Moshi (Tanzania), IOM's center of excellence for capacity building, before being appointed as "Senior Immigration and Border Management regional Specialist" for North Africa and Middle East first and Asia and the Pacific after. With the United Nation he was Police Commander of the international airport of Pristine, seconded from the Italian Police Department (Polizia di Stato) to the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). In Italy, he is a Police Officer from the Central Directorate of Immigration and Border Police of the Italian Ministry of Interior, currently on special leave for serving IOM as an expert on migration management issues. Mr. Colucci completed cum laude a Master of Art Degree in "Strategic Studies and Diplomatic Science" (Italy -Rome) and a Bachelor degree in "Political Science and International Relations" (Italy – Rome) Mr. Colucci can provide support in English, French, Spanish and Italian (mother tongue).

Mr. Hakan Ehliz

Mr. Hakan Ehliz is the Criminal Intelligence Officer with the Interpol Counter-Terrorism Directorate, responsible for the European and MENA regions. I am the planner and coordinator of the INTERPOL NEPTUNE Border Control Operations. Neptune operation is a large-scale border control operation which is targeting FTFs' movement and other serious organized crime activities in Mediterranean region with the participation of 8 countries from European and MENA regions. Mr. Ehliz was a superintendent and seconded from Turkish National Police Counter-Terrorism Directorate. He worked in Istanbul Police Department for 11 years and I was the Head of Unit for Transnational Terrorism and Violent Extremist Movements Bureau. He was the head of the team investigated DAESH suicide bombing terrorist attacks in Istanbul, Türkiye in 2015 and 2016.

Mr. Marton Hegedűs

Mr. Marton Hegedűs is working since 2020 in the NATO Strategic Direction-South HUB as military analyst. NSD-S HUB (based in Naples, Italy) was designed to increase NATO's understanding of the regional dynamics of North Africa, the Middle East, the Sahel, Sub-Sahara and adjacent areas. During his mission in the HUB, Mr. Hegedüs have participated projects in wide areas, analysing terrorism, environmental security, gender issues, energy security both in Africa and in Middle East. Previously he worked in the Ministry of Defence of Hungary in the field of international cooperation and defence policy. He also worked for two years in NATO's KFOR mission as political advisor to COMKFOR. Mr. Hegedüs graduated from the University of Public Service and in Budapest Business School.

LTC Paul J. Milas

Lieutenant Colonel Paul J. Milas is the Director of African Studies in the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College. He received his commission as an Aviation officer from Indiana University and transitioned to the foreign area officer functional area with a focus on sub-Saharan Africa. Prior to his arrival to Carlisle Barracks, he was assigned to US Embassy Kigali, Rwanda, where he served as the Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché. As a foreign area officer, Lieutenant Colonel Milas has also served in the Middle East/Africa Regional Center and at the US Embassy Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Previous aviation assignments included: deputy chief of the officer training branch, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, Ft. Rucker, Alabama; small group leader for the Aviation Captains Career Course, Ft. Rucker, Alabama; troop commander, Fort Drum, New York, where he deployed to Operation Enduring Freedom; assistant operations officer, Fort Drum, New York, where he deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom; and platoon leader and executive officer. Lieutenant Colonel Milas holds a Master of

International Public Policy degree from Johns Hopkins University and a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from Indiana University. He is a graduate of the Basic Officer Leader's Course, OH-58D qualification course, Aviation Captains Career Course, Airborne School, the Command and General Staff College, Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center French Basic Course, and the Security Cooperation Organization/Officer Course

Dr. Elif Özdilek

Dr. Elif Özdilek holds a Ph.D. degree from Middle East Technical University (METU), Ankara. She is an experienced Teacher with a demonstrated history of working in the higher education industry, skilled in Lecturing, International Relations, English, Strategic Planning, and Marketing Strategy. As of June 2022, she works as an Assistant Professor in Ufuk University.

Ms. Colleen Ryan

Ms. Colleen Ryan currently serves as the Border Adviser in the Border Security & Management Unit at the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna, Austria. In this role, Ms. Ryan manages the project on forged travel documents and provides policy advise and guidance on border security issues in the OSCE region. Ms. Ryan has more than ten years of experience in law enforcement and human rights at the international level. Prior to joining the OSCE, Ms. Ryan worked with a humanitarian NGO in Southern Ukraine assisting IDPs impacted by the war. Until evacuation of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, she worked with the Donetsk Patrol Hub as a Ceasefire Monitoring Officer and Deputy Patrol Group Leader. Before that, she served as a police officer in the United States for nearly seven years, patrolling one of the busiest policing districts in the Midwest. Ms. Ryan holds a Master's Degree in Human Rights with a focus on Women, Peace and Security issues.

Ms. Natia Seskuria

Ms. Natia Seskuria is an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). She is also a Founder and Executive Director of the Regional Institute for Security Studies (RISS), a Tbilisi-based think tank and an official partner of RUSI. Additionally, Ms. Seskuria holds an advisory position at Chatham House and is a lecturer in Russian politics. She has a broad experience in policy-making, strategic foresight and provides analysis on defence and security issues. In the past, she served at the Office of the National Security Council of Georgia and the Ministry of Defence of Georgia. Seskuria's research focuses on Russia's domestic and foreign policy, in particular Russia's relations with its neighbours, strategic approach to occupied regions, relations with the West and the use of active measures. She also specialises in conflicts and security in the South Caucasus and the Black Sea region and regularly contributes to leading academic journals and online magazines. She is a frequent commentator on major media outlets including BBC, France 24 and CNN. Prior to her current roles, Seskuria was a Black Sea Fellow at the Middle East Institute (MEI). She also worked for the Foreign Editor of *The Sunday Times* of London, and in the International Security Studies Department at RUSI, where her work focused on security dynamics in Russia and Eurasia. Additionally, Natia has acted as an independent consultant in London, advising private sector companies on political, strategic and operational risks. Seskuria holds an MA in Politics, Security and Integration and a BA (Hons) in Politics and East European Studies from the School of Slavonic and East European Studies at University College London (UCL).

Mr. Ulrik Ahnfeldt-Mollerup

Ulrik Ahnfeldt-Mollerup holds BA from University of Copenhagen and MA in Law and Diplomacy, Public International Law and Conflict Resolution from Tufts University. Mr. Ahnfeldt-Mollerup led the UN Counter-Terrorism Centre Capacity-Building Unit, including by managing, mentoring and coaching staff and consultants; planned and oversaw the management of field and HQ-based projects and activities undertaken by the Unit Currently, he works as a senior political affairs officer for the Head of Section at UN Office of Counter-Terrorism/UNCCT and leads the Countering Terrorism Section of the UN Counter-Terrorism Centre in the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism, incl. capacity building for Member States on Border Security and Management, Cyber, Countering the Financing of Terrorism, CBRN terrorism, and South-South Cooperation.

Opening Remarks

Dear Ladies and Gentlemen,

Distinguished Speakers, all participants,

I am Captain Erdost YENER, Chief of Staff of the Defence Against Terrorism Centre of Excellence.

Let me welcome you all both around the table and participating online to our second Border Security in Contested Environment Workshop.

You may know that this Centre is the Department Head for NATO's counter-terrorism education and training.

We also act as a think tank supporting NATO's transformation efforts with the pillars of Analysis and Lessons Learned, Concept Development and Experimentation, and Doctrine Development and Standardization through research projects, books, conferences, and workshops like this.

I know that some of you already have participated multiple times in these workshops but I would like to remind the background of the Best Practices in Border Security Workshop briefly since in Mr Ricardo MESSINA's speech these will mentioned in more detail.

The first Best Practices in Border Security Workshop was held in Jordan in 2019, while a Lessons Learned Workshop was organized by our Centre online in December 2020. The outcome of the second workshop was the "13 Identified Good Practices" which were introduced to Partner Nations during the Border Security Regional Workshop that took place again in Jordan in March 2022.

Thus, this second Workshop in our Centre is conducted with the speakers, subject matter experts and participants from different organizations who are committed to this area.

The results of the Workshop will be released as a report and published as a booklet both for the Alliance and the Partner Nations with the highlights on the role of military in border security.

Therefore, I kindly request you actively participate in the discussions, ask questions and utilize this workshop to build an interactive platform of international expertise about the methods, strategies, and national responses in Border Security in Contested Environment and on counter-terrorism.

So, I would like to express my special gratitude to all of you in advance, since your participation, in person or online, reflects your dedication which has already ensured the success of this workshop.

Without further due, welcome again and I'm looking forward to hearing the fruitful discussions around this table.

Thank you all.

Closing Remarks

Dear Distinguished Speakers and all participants,

Let me start my closing remarks by emphasizing a great appreciation to all of the lecturers and participants for your two-and-a-half-day hard work.

To tell you the truth, after hearing all fantastic presentations reflecting different angles on Border Security, I deem we might spare even more time for discussions.

I also would like to express my gratitude to our staff Captain Tamas Kender and his team, besides our academician Professor Cem Karadeli for their tremendous effort to make this event happen.

Special thanks for the IT department who worked around the clock for ensuring virtual participation and to all the personnel providing administrative and logistic support throughout.

As you know this work will not stop here and now, but continue with concluding the outcomes in a Workshop Report that is to be turned to a booklet with the contribution by some of you dear academicians. Our purpose is to serve the Alliance and the Partner Nations with the advises on Good Practices in border security.

I hope that besides the fruitful discussions during the workshop, you also could enjoy being in Ankara and the Turkish cuisine. Also, some of you will enjoy the short cultural tour today afternoon giving a bit more sense of Türkiye.

However, time has come to say farewell and wish you all safe trip back to your countries or duty stations.

Thank you all and hope to see you again in our Center.

Summary

The workshop covered a wide range of topics related to border security and terrorism, featuring speakers from various institutions who shared their insights and practices. Discussions spanned from theoretical concepts of border security to real-life case studies from different regions such as Africa, Europe, and the Middle East.

One of the key takeaways was the recognition of international and intergovernmental cooperation as crucial elements in effectively addressing border security challenges. Participants emphasized the need for collaboration among diverse organizations, including NATO and the United Nations, to efficiently tackle border security issues.

The workshop highlighted the significance of intelligence cooperation and information sharing programs in combating terrorism and addressing migration-related challenges. Capacity-building measures were recommended, which included providing training and support for local security forces to enhance border security capabilities.

Moreover, the importance of community engagement, public communication, and gender integration in border security initiatives was emphasized. Establishing a clear and well-structured organization to handle border security issues was deemed essential for successful outcomes.

The workshop concluded with comprehensive recommendations to address migration problems and enhance border security efforts. These recommendations included fostering international and intergovernmental cooperation, creating well-structured organizations with defined roles, promoting intelligence cooperation, and supporting capacity-building measures for local security forces.

Furthermore, engaging with communities and implementing gender-sensitive approaches in border security initiatives were suggested. Encouraging collaboration among various organizations, conducting regular risk assessments, developing actionable policies and procedures, and forming partnerships with universities for research and data-driven strategies were also emphasized.

Finally, it was emphasized that border security initiatives should prioritize human rights and respect for international law in dealing with migration and refugees. Overall, the workshop provided valuable insights and data-driven approaches to address migration challenges and enhance border security efforts, offering a comprehensive framework to tackle the complex issues in this field.

Good Practices



Potential GPs for MİL - Still valid?	Y	N	change
Good Practice 1: Enhance intra-agency cooperation (GP1 of the existing UN good practices focused on civil border agencies)			
Good Practice 2: Enhance inter-agency cooperation (GP2 of the existing UN good practices focused on civil border agencies) o Military expertise in operational planning is not often matched by other agencies. The military can facilitate a combined, interagency environment with the capacity to interconnect multiple agencies to coordinate efforts			
Good Practice 3: Develop and establish comprehensive remote border area surveillance programs (GP4 of the existing UN good practices focused on civil border agencies)			

Good Practice 4: Engage with and empower border communities as key contributors in BSM; recognizing continuity to understand local issues is a key contributor in BSM (GP5 of the existing UN good practices focused on civil border agencies)			
Good Practice 5: Develop and implement BSM information exchange programs and mechanisms (GP7 of the existing UN good practices focused on civil border agencies) o 1) Providing on-the-ground intelligence collection, exploitation, and assessments to enhance overall situational awareness; o 2) Sharing of relevant counter-terrorism information with key non-military actors (law enforcement and emergency services);			
Good Practice 7: Conduct an effective risk analysis assessment (GP12 of the existing UN good practices focused on civil border agencies)			
Good Practice 8: Create National Border Management Strategies and Action Plans (GP13 of the existing UN good practices focused on civil border agencies)			
Good Practice 9: Identify corruption as a serious risk for effective and robust BSM (GP15 of the existing UN good practices focused on civil border agencies)			
Good Practice 10: Conduct joint and coordinated border patrols with law enforcement as the lead agency, as well as joint multiagency and interdisciplinary operation exercises (mostly GP 10 from the UN with LE added)			
Good Practice 11: Develop policies and procedures for military support during crisis periods to provide support as first responders, during mass casualty events, and reinforce civil law enforcement			
Good Practice 12: Build physical infrastructure to support border security			
Good Practice 13: Training, advising, and assisting host nation security forces.			

BORDER SECURITY IN CONTESTED ENVIRONMENT WORKSHOP

SESSION 1: BORDER SECURITY, AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS – AN INTRODUCTION

Introduction: Mr. Rocco Messina (Oct/UNCCT)

Esteemed Excellencies, colleagues, and friends,

Good morning from NY.

I regret not being in Ankara with you, but the incumbent CT week requires my presence here. Since I was one of the founders of this project, I would like to remind you that the triggering event of the workshop you are attending was a brainstorming session with the former deputy director of the Centre of Excellence Defence against Terrorism, Col. Dan Stone, on the side of the "Best Practices on Border Security for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Advanced Research Workshop (ARW)," which was conducted by the Centre in collaboration with NATO Emerging Security Challenges Division and Jordan Armed Forces from 7 to 9 October 2019 in their facility.

As a follow-up, a two-day online event was held in December 2020, organized by UNCCT and the Centre, attended by experts with law enforcement and military background. As part of these events, United Nations Counter-terrorism Centre (UNCCT) BSM Unit presented the "Good Practices in the Area of Border Security and Management in the Context of Counter-terrorism and Stemming the Flow of "Foreign Terrorist Fighters" designed to inject security elements in border strategies aimed to prevent terrorist groups/transnational criminal organizations to illegally cross porous land borders to traffic Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), ammunition & explosives, drugs, contraband, other illicit goods and human beings and to deploy terrorist operatives to conduct attacks and/or gather intelligence. Members of terrorist and transnational organized crime groups, as well as FTFs, target the gaps in weak border infrastructure and continue to exploit with impunity porous and uncontrolled borders. FTFs make use of forged and/or fraudulently obtained travel documents and visas or abuse genuine travel documents of others to cross international borders to conduct attacks or join extremist groups elsewhere. As you all know, international peace and security are adversely affected as this activity undermines States' efforts to counter terrorism and restrict cross-border organized crime, increases the vulnerability of affected populations, and provides financing to terrorist and criminal networks. It is the obligation of every Member State to prevent the travel of FTFs, just as it is imperative for States' mutual security to stand against violent extremist groups such as al-Qaeda, DAESH, and their affiliates. Border demarcation or delimitation issues between States may complicate border security and management (BSM) related issues. Exercising sovereign jurisdiction through routine border operations may lead to an escalation of

demarcation matters if they are under dispute. At the same time, exercising caution in this regard could help terrorist organizations cross borders more easily. Several factors need to be addressed to combat the terrorist threats at borders, and the military's role may facilitate and supports the other stakeholders' actions. The military may conduct certain functions essential to a counterterrorism border management strategy. These include but are not limited to:

1. Providing on-the-ground intelligence collection, exploitation, and assessments to enhance overall situational awareness;
2. Sharing of relevant counterterrorism information with key non-military actors (law enforcement and emergency services);
3. Maintaining a system of indicators and warnings to facilitate early detection of imminent threats;
4. Promoting, through engagement and strategic communication, a shared understanding of counterterrorism concepts and the potential military contributions to counterterrorism efforts;
5. Eliminating threats and targeting critical leaders in a terrorism network to dismantle its operational capabilities and discourage its growth and
6. Training, advising, and assisting host nation security forces.

Additionally, military expertise in operational planning is not often matched by other agencies. The military can facilitate a combined, interagency environment with the capacity to interconnect multiple agencies to coordinate efforts. The military may also be called upon as first responders, operating in areas lacking the civilian capacity to respond to terrorist attacks. Furthermore, there are several scenarios where the military could find itself in a position to collect evidence or arrest suspects on behalf of law enforcement, including in conflict and non-conflict situations. Although the militarization of border security is not the solution, it can be relevant on the long green border where patrolling is a challenge due to geographical conditions, but it cannot be a long-term solution. If the solution empowers the military, empowers the intelligence agencies, downsizes the role of law enforcement, and militarizes security. The militarization of security may lead to the utilization of more and more kinetic forces, which may create more discontentment in the border communities and more opportunities for terrorist groups to recruit new members. Therefore, the customary thinking about the use of the military is quite challenging as the scope of the problem goes beyond the abilities of the military. Taking into account that counterterrorism, in essence, is a national security aspect belonging to a law enforcement and intelligence area, and it is their specificity of the use of hard power in this context. Consequently, the individual experiences of nations facing the most serious border security problems show that an integrated, layered approach to border management is the most efficient option and that no single strategic structure or operational concept will be sufficient for any nation. However, in countries in which democratic gains are fragile and the border are contested, it is essential to set security reforms and institutions, as part of a comprehensive strategy, according to a clearly specified legal framework in which the role of the military is well determined. All the entities should interact together in a harmonized and sustainable fashion.

Our intent is based on an in-depth analysis of current border security gaps in the context of border security and management and, through an exchange of expertise, collects and promulgates best practices in border security in contested environments, including counterterrorism elements.

I wish you all a very fruitful workshop and hope to meet you all soon in person.

Border Security and International Security Concern

Dr. Cem Karadeli

Since the Cold War, we have experienced quite a few changes in the world order, and this obviously included the collapse of the Soviet system, the Soviet Union, the establishment of the European Union and the Schengen area, wars in the Balkans and new countries, the creation of nation-states in Eurasia, global war against terrorism (GWOT) after the 9/11 attacks, invasion of Afghanistan and then Iraq, globalization which kept on building up and came into being a political process and concept itself. Most recently, the war in Ukraine has also been another turning point to depict the current fragility of the system.

In this context, we have experienced a rise in different concepts of terrorist threats, and instead of local groups which were politically motivated, we have seen very interesting developments in terms of terrorism, transnational and global terrorist activities. We have witnessed terrorist organizations that occupy an area and establish their own territories.

All these obviously have had an impact on border security and how we *define* a border because globalization came with ideas, for instance, how to keep our borders secure while pursuing other relations. However, globalization also opened a room for malicious groups to find untraditional ways to penetrate the borders and threaten the border security. Obviously, our national security has been affected, and we need to manage our borders. Therefore, as a consequence of these things, all these developments led to new security concerns, including intra and inter-state conflicts and destabilization which put the borders in danger. These conflicts increased the possibility of mass mobilization in Serbia, African countries or in Central Asian countries or at the moment, in Ukraine. Additionally, irregular migration, cross-border organized crime, illicit cultivation/fabrication, trafficking of narcotics, and smuggling goods emerged as serious threats to border security along with economic and social problems.

The arrival of foreign fighters to the combat zone was not a usual phenomenon that we priorly witnessed before. Regional conflicts and instabilities reshaped terrorism and how terrorists exploited the current conjuncture. Recruits from Central Asia, Caucasus, Europe and ones from other parts of the world pledge allegiance to DAESH and other terrorist organizations. These people fought for various causes which have no direct relation to their values or were not even related to their countries. This opened a totally new area in terms of border security.

Currently, one of the significant issues that complicate securing borders is mass population migration. People choose different destinations due to economic, political, social, and security-linked reasons which are not provided by their own countries. Especially with the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, we have seen the extent that migration threatens not only the borders but also the host countries' stability. Another problem brought by irregular migration is the contamination of diseases, even epidemics endemic to the land of origin. Many diseases that were eradicated in one country may re-emerge due to the sudden movement of masses triggered by war, other types of armed conflict, or natural disasters.

The recent form of terrorism proves to be "*regarded as a calculated means to destabilize the West as a part of a vast conspiracy*" according to one of the prominent Terrorism Studies scholars, Bruce Hoffmann (2006). Terrorist organizations like Lashkar-e-Taiba, al-Qaeda, and DAESH's way of life that we are used to continue. Because their activities will be pursued beyond national borders, the consequences will be in the international level. As a result, the United Nations, EU, NATO, African Union, and other important international collaborations

between states try to find ways to tackle these issues. In addition, the case of external support for terrorist organizations constitutes a vast problem which in the long run requires particular policies to overcome it.

While integrated border security (IBS) is a problem, we need a common solution to this problem. Countries or organizations could possess different approaches and implement different practices. National priorities involve in this sense and change the course. For instance, India does only counter terrorist organizations, but it also tries to create a ground for political dialogue with neighboring countries, especially for the Kashmir question whereas Türkiye's or Israel's concerns for the integrated border security differ from each other.

Terrorists and organized crime organizations go hand in hand in borders and backs each other in these areas to ease their activities. Due to this malicious collaboration, significant problems including extortion, human trafficking, racketeering, armed robbery, money laundering and illicit tobacco trade in the West Africa, the Gulf Region, Central Asia, the Southeast Asia, the South America, and the Balkans worsen daily. Therefore, we have seen an ***internationalized problem*** here.

In terms of human trafficking, the traffickers often use violence or fraudulent employment agencies and fake promises of education or job opportunities to trick and coerce their victims who are in search of a safer, better life. However, these people who seek for a better quality of life just found themselves enslaved by these organizations.

To solve these problems, we have integrated border security as a necessity and emerges as a solution to things aforementioned. Since it is a necessity and it is a good solution in itself, the principle of integrated border management or border security can be summed up as "***a combination of national and international coordination and cooperation amongst all the relevant authorities and agencies involved in border security and trade facilitation.***" Therefore, with the involvement of ***Border Security Management (BSM)***, it would be easier to establish efficient and integrated border management systems so that we can have open but well-controlled and secure borders. On the other hand, increasing border security and integrating the efforts is one cycle of the issue and there are also social consequences, but that it is one place to start.

Expectedly, when we speak about the IBS we have to take the 15 good practices of the United Nations that enhance intra-agency/interagency/international cooperation, developing and establishing comprehensive remote border area surveillance, engaging in engaging with an empowering border communities as key contributors and border security and management, developing and implementing border community policy programs, establishing border cooperation centers, nominating and assigning border liaison officers that would ease the communication between countries managing the same issues with regard to the border security, defining parameters for cross-border operational engagements, conducting effective risk analysis, creating national border management strategies and action plans.

To sum up, these principles should cover most of the issues at hand and we should understand how things actually work. Border security is a problem that has increased in the last twenty years. We now have new methods, new guidelines, comprehensive experience, stronger border security integration for security efforts among nations, stronger military and political action against terrorist organizations to deal with it.

Question1.1: What are the challenges to both itself and the implementation of Integrated Border Management?

That is the main issue. If we consider the good practices of the UN, we may think that every single nation-state willingly wants to cooperate with their neighbors. Several instances including Greek-Turkish and Syrian-Iraqi tensions displayed a different portrait in this sense. Even the COVID-19 Pandemic made a serious impact on the understanding of border security. The fear of contamination of the virus urged some states to close their borders and they did not let in or out people of their countries for more than a year. Therefore, it is not easy to fully cooperate when Border Security is the issue. However, cooperation is what the authorities actually need if they are to implement an integrated efficient approach. This is what we need to do.

In addition, the free movement between Schengen countries proves a solid example. However, if one malicious group infiltrates a Schengen country, then it means that it can access the others. This also points out a vulnerability. There are many positive and negative experiences.

There are also numerous conflict zones in the Balkans, Caucasus and all around the world which are even concerning the border security in particular, international security in general. Therefore, we may need a supra-national authority to arrange all of these issues and find a moderate way between the implementations of the states. International Relations has always been dynamic; therefore, borders are changing, which comes with conflict of interest.

Question 1.2: You mentioned that countries' experiences could possess significant experiences for other countries. In this sense, does Türkiye have good practice regarding border security and Türkiye's approach?

There are some positive and negative experiences. However, the important thing lies in the arranging political relations with problematic borders and neighbors. Türkiye tries to establish reliable relations with the Northern Iraqi Regional Government/Authority. Therefore, we can say that nowadays Turkish-Iraqi relations in this context is developed. The same is true with Iran; however, there are some human trafficking problems going on there. Yet, the main issue that Turkish government emphasized in the last decades depends on the fact that as long as a country does not establish good relations and balance with other countries that have the same issue, it is not possible to achieve success or an integrated border security approach alone. Cooperation is the key. Additionally, NATO membership brought so much to Türkiye to use the expertise of other countries.

Question (Comment) 1.3: Türkiye has long been countering the terrorist organization, PKK/KCK. However, counter-terrorism is not only dependent upon military measures. If it was so, then the task would be so easy to accomplish. We have failed states around us, which mobilized millions of people to our borders, making it even more difficult to military secure the borders.

Border Security and Security Concerns

Prof Cem Karadeli, PhD
Ufuk University

Border Security Since Cold War

2

- Since the end of the Cold War, the world experienced many changes including
- The collapse of the Soviet system,
- Establishment of the European Union and the Schengen Area,
- Wars in the Balkans,
- Creation of new nation-states in Eurasia,
- The 9/11 attacks,
- The War Against Terrorism,
- Invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq,
- Globalization and its effects on all the world states,
- The war in Ukraine,
- Rise of a different kind of terrorist threat,
- Ease of movement for people, workforce, financial products, capital, technology, and ideas,
- And, all these affected the concepts of borders, national (and border) security, border management, and measures for counterrorism

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Consequences of border changes and conflicts

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- All these developments led to new security concerns in the modern world. Consequently, we saw a rise in:

- internal and inter-state/cross border destabilization and conflicts,
- mass eviction of populations, irregular migration and illegal immigration,
- cross-border organized crime
- illicit cultivation, fabrication, and trafficking of narcotic drugs,
- trafficking in human beings and people smuggling,
- epidemics and pandemics due to forced migration,
- smuggling of goods,
- significant deterioration of socioeconomic circumstances in a regional context,
- terrorism, foreigners fighting abroad to support terrorist organizations and violent extremism, and,
- other forms of serious transnational crime.

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Irregular Migration and Mass Evictions-1

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- Border security and the associated issues of smuggling and illegal immigration have recently become highly politicized issues. One of these issues is the irregular migration issue and the issue of mass eviction due to violent conflict.
- Irregular migration is caused to a considerable extent through the reciprocity of economic, political, social and security-relevant factors in the countries of origin, and, it directly affects border security and management-related issues of the transit and target countries along the respective migration routes.
- Sovereignty and border control lie at the heart of a regulatory framework that distinguishes "insiders" from "outsiders" based on particular understandings of national identity. Sovereignty is exercised and preserved through government, which relies on constructions and representations of the undocumented alien, "illegal immigrants," "illegals," "aliens," and other degrading terms casting those without "appropriate" paperwork as threatening outsiders. This enemy-creation process is fundamental to maintaining the boundaries of nation both in terms of nationhood and of geographical definitions.

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Irregular Migration and Mass Evictions-2

5

- One of the intuitive explanations of antimigrant hostility has to do with competition between nationals of the country that received migration, and the newcomer groups in the fields of jobs, income, housing, and other socioeconomic and even symbolic functions.
- Another issue rises from the process of assimilation or the lack thereof. Integration to the host nation may cause not only socially awkward positions, but also increasing radicalization, turn to measures against the locals who allegedly denied them equal status, and hence leading to association with terrorist organizations.
- A different problem with irregular migration is the carrying of diseases, even epidemics, endemic to the country of origin. Many diseases that were eradicated in one country may reemerge due to sudden movement of masses due to war, other types of armed conflict, or natural disasters.
- Finally, the issue of human trafficking creates serious problems for border security.

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Cross-border Terrorism – 1

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- In recent times, terrorism "came to be regarded as a calculated means to destabilize the West as a part of a vast conspiracy" (Hoffman 2006, p. 17). This is probably especially true in the case of terrorist organizations such as ISIS, al-Qaida, Lashkar-e-Taiba whose actions are mainly directed to confront and contest the Western order.
- Because the actions of groups like these go beyond the national borders and have consequences that are international, their kind of terrorist activity is considered as international and/or cross-border terrorism. Nevertheless, nowadays the term terrorism is usually designated as an illegal type of violence carried on by non-state actors whose actions are aimed at a coercion of a government in order to obtain specific political results. There were attempts at defining terrorism and international terrorism by the UN, the EU, and the African Union, but, we couldn't reach a globally accepted definition of the term yet. Still, terrorist activities are quite clear in the mind of most people.

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Cross-border Terrorism – 2

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- Many terrorist groups are given international support, and sanctuary so they can destabilize competing countries and prevent targeting of country's population but it turned out to be not a reliable option. For example, until 1986, France had a "sanctuary doctrine," essentially giving terrorists considerable freedom to operate within French borders in the hopes of minimizing international terrorism on French soil - PLO, ETA, Asala are examples of such terrorist groups. However, this did not help France's security and in the long run they returned to use counter terrorist measures
- In other countries where securing the borders is not easy due to several problems ranging from weak or failed state structures to demographic challenges, the problem is not whether or not supporting terrorist groups but to prevent them from crossing borders Lashkar-e-Taiba that has camps in Pakistan can easily hit targets in Jammu Kashmir and India and return back to their camps. Alternatively, Boko Haram in Africa can cross borders or use their terrorist based in several countries in their acts of terror Such border-crossing is a real problem to be faced. In the European Union, the Schengen Area provides open borders between 26 EU member states and that has alarming results in terms of inspecting the movement of terrorists
- Integrated Border Security is a solution for these issues. In this respect, to monitor migration management, EU agencies such as FRONTEX, and numerous technology-laden border-control operations come to mind.

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Cross-border Terrorism-2

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- Other countries may adopt different approaches. For instance, India's response to terrorism in Kashmir is multidimensional, as it includes military response to deal with terrorists, border management to prevent infiltration, political dialogue and negotiations with all parties that have given up violence, economic measures to improve the living conditions and job prospects of the local population, diplomatic initiatives toward peace to include confidence-building measures neighboring countries, and, international counterterrorism cooperation with friendly countries.

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Human Trafficking

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- Terrorists and organized crime are operating in other kinds of activities in cross-border environments in addition to violent activities. These include extortion, human trafficking, racketeering, armed robbery, money laundering, the illicit tobacco trade,. West Africa, the Gulf Region, Central Asia, South East Asia, South America, and the Balkans are some of the regions often cited as key smuggling routes for drugs and other substances, as well as human trafficking. These activities obviously cause additional violence and disruption, and the need to develop new countermeasures by the authorities. In short, while terrorism is a serious challenge with significant impact across the world, the negative effects of organized crime, including human and drug trafficking, seem even greater.
- In human trafficking, the traffickers often use violence or fraudulent employment agencies and fake promises of education and job opportunities to trick and coerce their victims who are in search of a safer, better life. In terms of the victims, the trauma caused by the traffickers can be so great that many may not identify themselves as victims or ask for help, even in highly public settings. On the other hand, the target countries for human trafficking suffer from other issues as population control, border security issues, integrating the illegal immigrants to their society or prevent the offering of cheap labor force.

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Integrated Border Security

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- To solve the problems caused by the issues I have discussed so far, integrated border security is a necessity. Integrated Border Management system is a possible solution in this context.
- The principle of Integrated Border Management can be summarized as a sum of national and international coordination and cooperation among all the relevant authorities and agencies involved in border security and trade facilitation. With integrated border management, it would be easier to establish effective, efficient and integrated border management systems, in order to reach the objective of open, but well controlled and secure borders. The main issue here is the degree of trust and the degree of cooperation among the participating countries and international organizations.
- Increasing border security and integrating the efforts is one side of the issue. There are social consequences as well. There may be some suboptimal outcomes such as increasing border security, but allowing illegal migrants to get jobs once inside the country and such outcomes should be prevented, as well.

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Conclusion

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- In conclusion, border security is a problem that has increased since the end of the Cold War. Such problematic issues as trans-border terrorist activities, undocumented migrants crossing borders, organized crime activities rose more dramatically in the globalized world.
- Solutions to these problems include stronger border security, integration of security efforts amongst different countries, integration of migrants into the host societies without creating problems for either side, and stronger military and political action against terrorist organizations.

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Thanks

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- Thank you kindly for listening to me. I hope we all have a great panel.

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SESSION 2: BEST PRACTICES, BORDER SECURITY AND COUNTER-TERRORISM

The Contagion of Violent Extremism in West African Coastal States

Mr. Marton Hegedüs

This session focused on the issue of terrorism and border security in West Africa by introducing the project entitled "**The Contagion of Violent Extremism in West African Coastal States**" conducted last year in collaboration with the COE-DAT, African Center for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), NSD-S HUB and various partner organizations. The project aimed to assess the level of threat posed by extremist groups in the region and identify factors in local communities that might lead to support or recruitment for these groups.

Over the past 15 years, there has been a significant increase in extremist activities in West Africa, particularly in the Sahel region. The growth of incidents has been exponential, causing the death of over 22,000 people in recent years. The presence of global terrorist groups like IS and AQ in the region has contributed to the rise in extremism. However, there are smaller local groups that contribute to the instability of the affected countries (focus countries of the project were Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, Benin). The project sought to identify factors in local communities that might expose people to extremist groups or lead to their support. The lack of governance and basic social services in certain areas, historical grievances, exclusion, discrimination, and marginalization were among the key factors contributing to communities' vulnerability to extremist influence. Economic and social development, opportunities for employment, and access to education were identified as crucial in countering extremism.

The project outlined structural fault lines that could contribute to the process of extremism. These included headings as;

i. '*ideological and religion-inspired extremism*': growing presence of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and transnational criminal groups; strategical, ideological, financial support by al-Qaeda and ISIS,
ii. '*governance deficits*': rampant corruption; lack of governance and amenities; weakened P/CVE actions,
iii. '*structural socioeconomic conditions*': economic exclusion, high level of unemployment in youth but also among educated people; effects of pandemics, and
iv. '*historical grievances and rivalries*': exclusion, discrimination, marginalization of certain societal groups, inter-communal tribal violence; unresolved and prolonged conflicts.

2016 has been a turning point for the countries such as Ghana, Togo, Benin and Ivory Coast to take a more proactive to counter extremism. They reshaped their policies to have a comprehensive approach that prioritizes not only the military realm but also other requirements.

Ghana. Ghana created a national strategy that included their countering violent-extremism plans. This strategy document has become an umbrella for Ghana's security understanding to harmonize and coordinate its policies, pursuing information sharing and synchronizing the efforts. The collaboration of numerous local and central institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) was highly stressed for reconciliation, dialogue, and understanding of

local concerns. Ghana realized that the involvement of local authorities and communities is a must to hold a holistic approach. These efforts should be supported by economic development. The country should provide opportunities for people to prevent them from terrorist organizations that aims to exploit the economic deprivations of their target individuals.

Togo. Togo established two institutions to coordinate the efforts to counter violent extremism: Inter-ministerial Committee for the Prevention and Fight Against Violent Extremism (CIPLEV) and Cross-border Regional Early Warning Committee (CTRAP). CIPLEV is on the action since 2019, they help with the coordination of state bodies on fighting against terrorism. CTRAP enables the cross-border cooperation and coordinates the information sharing between institutions regarding the violent extremist activities. They are also interacting with local communities to support each other. These efforts also represented a turning point in terms of Togo's politics because after 32 years, Togo's public elected its local representatives in 2019. In terms of the security realm, they started the Operation Koundjoare at the northern border in 2018. It was not just a military operation. As soon as Togo launched the operation, the country started to provide medical support, water supply to have better relations with local population.

Benin. Benin also has its own institutions to manage the borders. These institutions also pool and coordinate the efforts of different bodies specialized in fighting against terrorism. Benin also acknowledges the importance of local communities and intensified its efforts to classify the information provided by local people. Additionally, Benin established High Level Committee for Fighting Against Terrorism at the borders. It also functions for synchronizing the efforts. Benin enabled the inter-operability ground with the military and police with 12,500 personnel, deployed special units at the borders, strengthened the national guards, and increased the military budget.

Ivory Coast. In the case of the Ivory Coast, investing in economic development is required to go in parallel with military action. In 2021, the country declared its plan to invest more in the northern area to support economic development. Ivory Coast also scrutinized youth extremism and prioritized the youth employment as a tool to prevent violent extremism. In addition, with the support of France and the US, Ivory Coast is running the International Academy for the Fight Against Terrorism (AILCT), which was inaugurated in June 2021 and trained military personnel at the disposal of the border security management.

Besides these national efforts, there are also regional initiatives and international partners in the West Africa, including coastal countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Togo as member states; Mali and Niger as observer states) **Accra Initiative** that aims to increase the military cooperation among the member states conducting military operations. The West African regional body, ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), was mentioned as an important player in the regional security efforts. The Peace and Security Department of ECOWAS plays a vital role in coordinating security initiatives among member states. A considerable amount of budget between 2021-2024 was allocated for activities to prevent violent extremism.

The outcome of the project acknowledged that some West African countries have been using mainly military approaches to address terrorism and secure their borders. However, there was a growing recognition that a holistic and cooperative approach is necessary. The project identified the need for regional cooperation and information sharing between security forces and intelligence agencies to effectively combat extremism.

The project highlighted some challenges faced in countering terrorism in West Africa. The porous nature of borders and the difficulty in controlling maritime borders were mentioned as significant concerns. The need for more resources and international support were also identified as obstacles to implementing effective counter-terrorism strategies.

The results of the project emphasized the need for a multi-faceted approach that includes not just military actions but also social and economic development, good governance, and community engagement. Cooperation between government and non-governmental organizations, civil society, and international partners was seen as crucial to addressing the root causes of extremism and fostering stability in the region.

In conclusion, the project brought attention to the pressing issue of terrorism and border security in West Africa. The joint project with ACSRT and partner organizations shed light on the factors contributing to extremist activities and the importance of regional cooperation and comprehensive strategies to combat terrorism effectively. The conference participants called for continued efforts to address the root causes of extremism and work towards a more secure and stable future for the region.

Question 2.1.: You mentioned the importance of the involvement of the local authorities and communities. Is there a resolute example or good practices of this cooperation?

Unfortunately, this project has not devoted a special place for measuring the effectiveness of the implemented policies. However, in the cases of Ghana and Ivory Coast, they have been conducting several projects to work together with local bodies. The answer to this question needs further research.

Question 2.2.: Do Togo's joint operations with CIMIC units represent good practice in terms of border security? African countries mostly use the military bodies to tackle extremist threats, and it is intriguing to figure out the other perspective.

Especially in the Benin case, we have seen that the conventional military approaches do not answer to the current threats. Therefore, countries, including Benin, started to make additional efforts to these traditional approaches and bring new measures for countering violent extremism. Methods other than military measures are still in the initial stages, which makes it challenging to come up with the idea that these states moved to totally new implementations.

Question 2.3.: Is there a down-trend after 2021 in violent extremism cases?

There was an increasing trend until the pandemic. The pandemic brought a decrease in the number of violent extremism-related events. However, with the onset of the pandemic, this situation was reversed. The Global Terrorism Index reported that the Sahel Region witnessed more cases in 2022 than the MENA and South Asia. Therefore, here is the epicenter of violent extremist activities in the world, and it is growing. Borders are quite porous here, and securing and controlling malicious activities is difficult.

Question (Comment) 2.4.: What we talked about was mainly on the land borders, but what about the maritime borders? We should consider how we manage to control those which is extremely difficult since there are already disputes regarding the maritime borders.

THE CONTAGION OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN WEST AFRICAN COASTAL STATES

JUNE 2023

Marton Hegedus, Military Analyst, NSD-S HUB

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Agenda

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- Introduction of the project
- The spread of violent extremism to the coastal states
- Potential vulnerabilities and specific community grievances
- State efforts for preventing the spread of violent extremism
- Conclusions

Introduction of the project

PURPOSE:

- The objective is to create a comprehensive report of the key vulnerabilities and the counter-extremist efforts in the West African coastal states.
- In order to enhance the content value, it was important to include local Subject Matter Experts into the research process.
- The cooperation between the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) and the NSD-S HUB was strengthened by this project.

PROJECT DEVELOPMENT:

- 1st Step: individual report drafting with the ACSRT;
- 2nd Step: joint workshop with ACSRT and other local SMEs;
- Workshop on 4 panels: threat assessment; vulnerability factors; community-level grievances ; P/CVE efforts.
- Local SMEs joined to the workshop from GOs, NGOs, IOs from West Africa



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The spread of violent extremism to the coastal states

- Drastic change in the dynamics of terrorism in the Sahel from 2012
- 2019-2021: pike period of attacks in West Africa
- Growing presence of terrorist groups in coastal West Africa from 2021



Violent Extremist and Terrorist Acts in Sahel and coastal West Africa 2012 – 2017 – 2022 Source: ACLED Dashboard - ACLED (acleddata.com)

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Potential vulnerabilities and specific community grievances

Structural fault lines have been identified as factors which could be exploited by TVEOS:

- Ideological and religion-inspired extremism: growing presence of foreign terrorist fighters and transnational criminal groups; strategical, ideological, financial support by AQ and IS
- Governance deficits: coups; rampant corruption; mistrust by the people; lack of local governance and amenities; weakened P/CVE actions
- Structural socioeconomic conditions: economic exclusion; high level of unemployment in youth but also among educated people; effects of pandemics
- Historical grievances and rivalries: exclusion, discrimination, marginalization of certain social groups; inter-communal tribal violence; unresolved and prolonged conflicts

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State efforts - Ghana, Togo

Ghana:

- Numerous local and central institutions for reconciliation, dialogue and understanding of local concerns
- Non-kinetic approach to conflict resolution
  - Decentralized institutions
  - Economic development actions

Togo:

- Important institutions for VE prevention:
  - CIPLEV – synchronization of actions
  - CTRAP – cross-border cooperation
- Important milestone: local elections in 2019 after 32 years
- Operation Koundjoare at the Northern border since 2018

CIPLEV (top) and CTRAP (bottom) meetings
Source: unodc.org, savoirnews.net

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State efforts – Benin, Ivory Coast

Benin:

- Benin authorities engagements for northern security:
  - Economy, infrastructure development
  - Pooling and coordinating CT efforts
- Northern theatre for military-police actions since 2020 with 12,500 personnel

Ivory Coast:

- Military actions and economic development in lagging areas in parallel
- Youth employment as economic VE prevention
- Strong international support for military
- Cross-border operations and active military presence in North

International Academy for the Fight Against Terrorism Source: alarmy.com

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International Cooperation

- Active international presence:
  - Regional initiatives
  - International partners
- Accra Initiative as a promising local approach
- ECOWAS – both economic and security contribution

Members and observers Accra Initiative
Source: ecfr.eu

MINUSMA

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Conclusions

- Activities of TVEOs are growing in the Sahel, spreading to coastal states
- Local populations are exposed to extremist influences, especially if their basic needs are not met, or not provided by the state
- Conventional P/CVE approaches are still the most widely employed by the various stakeholders
- Economic circumstances would likely deeply influence the attitude towards extremism
- There is a need for strong regional cohesion and cooperation in P/CVE
- P/CVE actions, strategies must include the human security factor

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Ensuring Border Security in Contested Environment: Humanitarian Border Management Perspective

Mr. Donato Collucci

People increasingly turn to internal and international migration as a means of adaptation. Millions of people are displaced due to economic disparities, political instabilities, coercion, climate- and weather-related disasters. The transformation of the geological structure over time will force people to migrate. For example, people living in lands that will be submerged in areas where the water level rises will begin to seek residences in different parts of the world. Military conflicts are also endangering people's daily lives. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to say that severe conditions drive people to be mobilized. As of today, 10 million people are mobilized to these harsh circumstances.

To take the Western Balkans as an example of the destination of mobilized people, only in 2022, 192,266 migrants have been officially registered. In comparison with the same period of 2021, this number shows 59,5% increase. The number even triples compared to the same timeline of 2018, skyrocketing to a 348% increase.

To ease the burden on the destination countries and others dealing with irregular migration, four pillars are defined to help reshape the migration management policies:

i. ***Situation and Needs Assessment***: Evaluate the capabilities, develop context-specific methodology, and prioritize intervention based on risk/probability evaluation.
ii. ***Humanitarian Border Management (HBM)***,
iii. ***Community Engagement and Policing***,
iv. ***Extensive Assistance***.

The overall framework for effective border management comprises regulatory, administrative, operational, and information management arrangements. In terms of regulatory arrangements, policies, legislation (acts and regulations), international agreements, and inter-agency and regional cooperation play pivotal roles in shaping border management strategies. On the administrative front, the focus lies on agency structure, resource allocation, recruitment processes, performance standards, comprehensive training programs, staff turnover management, and fostering values and conduct with robust anti-corruption measures. Operational arrangements encompass Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for various border management aspects, including entry and residence procedures, passenger processing, intelligence gathering, prosecution protocols, detention procedures, removal processes, and the provision of humanitarian aid and health services. Lastly, information management involves efficiently operating border management information systems, maintaining alert lists, ensuring system integrity, facilitating interoperability of systems, and establishing linkages with other critical systems such as the API (Advance Passenger Information) and Interpol databases. These comprehensive arrangements are essential for ensuring a secure and streamlined border management system.

On the other hand, humanitarian border management (HBM) aims to ensure fundamental human rights and international protection as well as sustain national security and integrity of borders. HBM of a country should consider both protecting its own society and addressing the needs of incoming communities. Adaptability is crucial, and the implementation should start

before a crisis begins, as handling the influx of people will become challenging without proper preparation.

The best practice example of HRM in Ukraine demonstrates that implementing it from outside is easier than from within, particularly from a military perspective. Ukraine chose to secure its society outside the country through neighboring countries while also ensuring the registration of individuals in the destination countries.

Community engagement and policing play a significant role in promoting good social cohesion and coping mechanisms and jointly identifying and resolving security-related issues. In addition, it should also aim to build trust between police and the community it serves. The local people could provide the police forces with information they do not possess. Therefore, building trust and reliable relationships are required to have a comprehensive approach. This interactive relationship could help police forces to implement more proactive strategies.

Extensive assistance is necessary after a crisis, including documenting legal identity and ensuring fundamental rights and protection. IOM's institutional strategy on legal identity is crucial in this regard.

In conclusion, a humanitarian border management framework should be developed, taking into account mass cross-border flows. Planning before a crisis begins is easier, as it allows for better communication without political pressure. Early warning systems can address risks, and funding should be allocated for establishing humanitarian assistance beforehand. Multilateral efforts contribute to the success of policies, not limited to neighboring countries but also encompassing those involved in the crisis. Border and migration management framework should provide humanitarian assistance to migrants in vulnerable situations, consider integration and social cohesion as a preventive measure, and strengthen law enforcement and intelligence capabilities.

Question 2.5.: You mentioned the information management systems of IOM. Is it integrated into the INTERPOL's system? There are different sections in INTERPOL to gather the data from the national departments that collect biometrics, and observe migration movements and migrants. How can we improve international cooperation in terms of information management?

First of all, IOM is not a law enforcement agency. It just provides the support that countries require. We have different databases for migrants and we keep on cooperating with INTERPOL.

Question 2.6.: As far as I understood, the management starts out of the border. In a couple of years, hundred thousand people from South America headed to the US. Before the collapse of Afghanistan, the Europeans were concerned that the destination of Afghanis would be Europe. Therefore, how early can we go away from the border with regard to border security?

The migration does not start at the gates of our borders. Migration represents a journey when a potential migrant decides to move. What we should be tracking is the ***mobility,*** and the arrival of the migrants in our border is not the early stages of this journey. Cooperating at this level could also help states track people's flow.

Question (Comment) 2.7.: You emphasized the Humanitarian Border Management (HBM) concept. This requires a lot of work and cost. Most countries probably think that defending the border is considerably cheaper than managing it. Therefore, they only act when the migrants

arrive at their borders. We saw this mentality in the Balkans, Hungary, and Austria in 2015. Nobody really considered managing the borders. In a nutshell, there is a long way to agree upon the management cycles.

In addition, the Ukrainian migrations made a great impact on the migration composition in Europe. Since they share common religious, cultural, and values with the European countries, they are easier to integrate into societies. After these people fled from Ukraine after the war outbroke, several countries started to change their migration policies and decided that they no longer needed Africans as workers. There are already Ukrainians waiting to be recruited. This will lead to another problem in the long run. First, you call them to your soil since you need workforce, and then, you try to send them back because you replaced them with their unexpected alternatives.

The information and views expressed in this presentation/ are solely those of the Organization with which the Speaker is affiliated and may not represent the opinions and policies of NATO, COE-DAT, NATO member countries.

IOM UN MIGRATION

Scene Setting

Milions of people displaced

Economic disparities and Political instabilities

Climate- and weather-related disasters

People **increasingly** turn to **internal and international migration** as a means of adaptation.

IOM UN MIGRATION

- **In 2022,**

✓ 192,266 migrants officially registered

✓ +59.5% compared to same period of 2021

✓ +348% compared to same period of 2018



The number of migrants registered by authorities in the Western Balkans

IOM UN MIGRATION

High Mobility migration patterns



Average number of days migrants are staying in transit reception centre, Bosnia & Herzegovina

IOM UN MIGRATION

4 P illars

- Situation and Needs Assessment
- Humanitarian Border Management
- Community Engagement and Policing
- Extensive Assistance

IOM UN MIGRATION

- Be aware of current capacities - identify gaps and subsequent needs
- Context-specific methodology was extremely important
- Strategically prioritize intervention based on risk/probability evaluation

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HBM: objectives

Ensuring fundamental Human Rights and international protection

Ensuring national security and integrity of the borders

Activities (among others):

- Registration and management of the assisted population
- Analysis on migration dynamics and trends
- Training and capacity development tools for screening vulnerable

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SECTOR HIGHLIGHTS

+30

BORDER CROSSING POINTS (BCPS) AND ARRIVAL LOCATIONS WITH HUMANITARIAN BORDER MANAGEMENT (HBM) PROGRAMMING

Including support for:

- uninterrupted operation of BCPs through equipment upgrades, capacity building, and technical assistance on streamlining and strengthening processing operations;
- monitoring protection concerns for people crossing, including children, at the request of EU border and coast guard agency (FRONTEX); and
- arrivals can make timely and informed decisions upon receipt of multi-lingual information leaflets.

IOM UN MIGRATION

Best Practice: HBM Ukraine

- Advising on streamlined procedures
- Decongesting BCPs
- Equipping border authorities with registration systems
- Distributing multi-lingual information leaflets
  - safety tips
  - helpline numbers
- Facilitating cross-border delivery of humanitarian aid and fuel

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3. Community Engagement and Policing
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
ommunity Engagement and Policing
Contribute to good social cohesion & coping mechanisms
Jointly identify and resolve security-related issues
Build trust between police and community it serves
1 Site Selection
2 Security Mapping
3 Coordination Meeting
4 Training
5 Community Policing Forum Establishme
6 Developmen t of Community Safety Plans
7 Implementation of Community Safety Initiatives (CSI)
8 Evaluation of CSIs
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Consular Assistance: objectives

Ensuring fundamental rights and protection

Documenting legal identity

Activities (among others):

- Technical and operational support to help register and issue temporary residence documents
- Information outreach
- Access safe and legal visa route

IOM UN MIGRATION

IOM INSTITUTIONAL
STRATEGY
ON LEGAL IDENTITY
IOM
UN MIGRATION

Conclusions

Thank you
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IOM UN MIGRATION

SESSION 3: INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES IN BORDER SECURITY AND THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

INTERPOL's Challenges and Best Practices in Border Security and Counter-terrorism

Mr. Hakan Ehliz

Crimes are increasingly international and interconnected; hence, we need a structured approach. This is what INTERPOL works for and possess a global structure. Its headquarters reside in Lyon, and has a center in Singapore. INTERPOL has many objectives in different regions with its 195 member countries. INTERPOL connects these members to each other through a secure network, **I-24/7** and provides a secure communication channel for the member countries to communicate with each other and the secretary.

INTERPOL has four global crime programs, including (i) *counterterrorism*, (ii) *cybercrime*, (ii) *organized and emerging crime,* and (iv) *financial crime and corruption.* INTERPOL is specialized in supporting member countries to enhance their investigative capabilities such as criminal analysis, innovation, fugitive investigative support, police data management, forensic support, capacity building and training, command and coordination center, and special projects. To support the member countries, INTERPOL initiated 19 different databases. Furthermore, through its different notices, INTERPOL answers international calls for cooperation and alerts to share information about critical crimes. The notices and purposes can be found below.



INTERPOL enables the world's police to meet the challenges of fighting international crime. Through its activities and programs, INTERPOL tries to offer comprehensive solutions. Within the counter-terrorism program, INTERPOL identifies suspects, and manipulators, and develops programs for terrorist-financing. INTERPOL's databases currently hold details of more than 87,000 foreign terrorist fights and some 1.6 million pieces of terrorist-related information. In

the context of FTFs, preventing terrorist travel is among INTERPOL's tasks. The Terrorist-Financing Unit of INTERPOL deals with the flow of illicit money and its trafficking in cooperation with The **Financial Action Task Force** (FATF). INTERPOL also possesses a Social Media team that is responsible for tracking online terrorist activities and cooperates with its members to gather data for terrorist organizations' online activities.

INTERPOL aims to understand and share information about the methods, motives, and money (finance) of terrorist organizations, which is critical to identify terrorists and disrupt their activities. INTERPOL's policies and training on tackling terrorist incidents depends on ***Deter, Detect, Disrupt*** policy.

Furthermore, INTERPOL possesses an analytical program entitled **Counter Terrorism (CT) Crime Analysis File (CAF)** that enables the gathering and processing of a large amount of global information for analytical purposes on terrorist events and travel routes, the modus operandi, the communication and financial means the networks used by terrorists.

INTERPOL initiated a database that aims to maintain the data flow from military units to law enforcement bodies, coined **Military-to-Police Information Exchange Model** (Mi-Lex). First, the military collects information from the battlefield during operations, and this declassified information is shared with the relevant INTERPOL National Central Bureau (NCB). INTERPOL NCB processes criminal data according to INTERPOL's rules. Information is entered into global databases and analytical files. Authorized frontline officers in member countries could access the information via INTERPOL's secure communication network. The institution also has regional counter-terrorism initiatives as follows: Amazon Nexus, Kalkan, Baobab, al-Qabdah, and Pacific.

INTERPOL's ***Neptune Operations*** are conducted to have a straight border control which disrupts the FTFs' and crime organizations' routes utilizing the maritime routes across the Mediterranean Sea. Its main goal is to strengthen border controls in the Mediterranean Sea. In 2022, Operation Neptune IV was conducted. For the summer of 2023, INTERPOL plans to initiate Operation Neptune V. The operation also attempts to locate and intercept individuals and groups responsible for border crimes, including people smuggling, human trafficking, firearms trafficking, bulk cash smuggling, drug trafficking, illegal distribution f precursor chemicals and other Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and other transnational crimes.

Officials at the ports and airports in eight countries –Algeria, Cyprus, France, Italy, Lebanon, Morocco, Spain, and Tunisia—carried out more than 2.6 million checks across INTERPOL's databases for stolen and lost travel documents, nominal data and stolen vehicles via its I-24/7 secure global police communications network. These checks generated 140 hits within the related INTERPOL databases, resulting in 14 additional arrests following seizures worth USD 3ç.6 million, including other illicit things. The operation also targeted illicit migrant flows, with authorities in France, Italy, and Spain arresting human traffickers and people smugglers and intercepting 13 migrants.

Question 3.1.: Your presentation recalled that the most important thing while countering terrorism is the ***information.*** Considering the 15 good practices of the UN, inter-agency cooperation is highly emphasized. You also stressed the cooperation between the military and police. INTERPOL utilizes the data gathered by the member countries. However, how do countries support INTERPOL's data collection process? It could be easier to get the data from Türkiye, Spain, and France, but it is not the case for Syria or Iraq.

It is not so easy to collect the data in the combat zones. However, we have other initiatives and other projects on data collection in the conflict zones. For example, we had an Iraq Project (I). To collect the data, our officers flew to Iraq and visited the Iraqi prisons. They collected biometrics and also inserted them into our database. Such projects are up to the national calls and requirements. We aim to support them better and share the information with member states to have a more secure world.

CRIMES ARE INCREASINGLY
INTERNATIONAL AND CONNECTED
INTERPOL

A GLOBAL STRUCTURE
INTERPOL Liaison Bureau at Europol
Office of the Special Representative of INTERPOL to the European Union
Liaison Office
General Secretariat
Representative of INTERPOL to the United Nations
Representative of INTERPOL to the African Union
INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation
San Salvador, El Salvador
Regional Bureau
INTERPOL Liaison Office for the Caribbean
Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire
Regional Bureau
Nairobi, Kenya
Regional Bureau
Buenos Aires, Argentina
Regional Bureau
Yaoundé, Cameroon
Regional Bureau
Harare, Zimbabwe
Regional Bureau
INTERPOL

195 MEMBER COUNTRIES CONNECTED
THROUGH A SECURE NETWORK
INTERPOL

FOUR GLOBAL PROGRAMMES
COUNTER-TERRORISM
CYBERCRIME
ORGANIZED AND EMERGING CRIME
FINANCIAL CRIME AND ANTI-CORRUPTION
INTERPOL

INTERPOL
OUR EXPERTISE
TO SUPPORT
MEMBER COUNTRY
INVESTIGATIONS
CRIMINAL ANALYSIS
INNOVATION
FUGITIVE INVESTIGATIVE SUPPORT
POLICE DATA MANAGEMENT
FORENSIC SUPPORT
CAPACITY BUILDING AND TRAINING
COMMAND AND COORDINATION CENTRE
SPECIAL PROJECTS

INTERPOL
19 DATABASES
125 MILLION
POLICE RECORDS
5.9 BILLION
DATABASES SEARCHES
16 MILLION
SEARCHES PER DAY
187
SEARCHES PER SECOND
1.4 MILLION
HITS
0.5 SECONDS
RESPONSE TIME
the time it takes a country to get the answer


INTERPOL
INTERPOL NOTICES
PURPLE NOTICE
MODUS OPERANDI
INTERPOL-UN SECURITY COUNCIL SPECIAL NOTICE
GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS SUBJECT TO UNSC SANCTIONS
RED NOTICE
WANTED PERSONS
YELLOW NOTICE
MISSING PERSONS
BLUE NOTICE
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
BLACK NOTICE
UNIDENTIFIED BODIES
GREEN NOTICE
WARNINGS AND INTELLIGENCE
ORANGE NOTICE
IMMINENT THREAT
December 2022


INTERPOL
CONNECTING POLICE REAL-TIME ACCESS
TO CRITICAL CRIMINAL DATA DAY AND NIGHT

INTERPOL
TRAINING AND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT
TO MEMBER COUNTRIES


INTERPOL
RESOURCES
IN 2022
120 NATIONALITIES
1,081
STAFF
273
SECONDED
808
CONTRACTED
December 2022

ENABLING THE WORLD'S POLICE TO MEET
THE CHALLENGES OF FIGHTING
INTERNATIONAL CRIME
INTERPOL
INTERPOL

Terrorism
Identifying terrorist suspects
INTERPOL's databases currently hold details of more than 87,000 foreign terrorist fighters and some 1.6 million pieces of terrorist-related information.


Terrorism
Methods, motives and money
Understanding and sharing this information is critical to identifying terrorists and disrupting their activities.
Deter, detect, disrupt
These are the basis of our police training on the use of chemicals in terrorist incidents.


The CT CAF identifying terrorist networks and movements fighters
INTERPOL's Counter Terrorism (CT) Crime Analysis File (CAF) enables the gathering and processing of a large amount of global information for analytical purposes on terrorist events and the travel routes, the modus operandi, the communication and financial means and the networks used by terrorists
96
Contributing countries
48,858
Terrorism Notices/Diffusions
135,493
Terrorist subjects

INTERPOL
MI-LEX: MILITARY TO LAW ENFORCEMENT DATA EXCHANGE
BRINGING BATTLEFIELD INFORMATION TO FRONTLINE OFFICERS
1
Military collects information from battlefield during operations
2
Information is declassified and shared with the relevant INTERPOL National Central Bureau (NCB)
3
INTERPOL NCB processes criminal data according to INTERPOL's rules
4
Information is entered into our global databases and analytical files
5
Authorized frontline officers in member countries access the information via our secure communications network


Counter-terrorism regional initiatives
AMAZON
NEXUS
KALKAN
BAOBAB
AL-QABDAH
PACIFIC
INTERPOL


Terrorism
Preventing terrorist travel


Terrorism
Tracing terrorist finances
INTERPOL

Terrorism
Analysing social media

INTERPOL NEPTUNE OPERATIONS
INTERPOL
OPERATION NEPTUNE IV
Disrupting the Terrorist Fighters Routes
COUNTER-TERRORISM

INTERPOL NEPTUNE OPERATIONS

- Operation NEPTUNE (Mediterranean Sea) is a large-scale border control operation led by INTERPOL Counter-Terrorism Directorate that targets the movement of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) utilizing the maritime route across the Mediterranean Sea.
- Its goal is to strengthen border controls in the Mediterranean Sea.
- The Operation also attempts to locate and intercept individuals and/or groups responsible cross border crimes including people smuggling, human trafficking, firearms trafficking, bulk cash smuggling, drug trafficking, illegal distribution of precursor chemicals and other Improvised Explosive Device (IED) components and other transnational crimes.

INTERPOL NEPTUNE IV OPERATION in 2022

- Operation Neptune IV (1 July – 3 September 2022) targeted terrorist suspects and other criminals involved in serious organized crime travelling via maritime routes between North Africa and Southern Europe.
- Two terrorist suspects wanted internationally under Red Notices have been arrested and another eight investigative leads linked to terrorism were generated during the Operation NEPTUNE IV international maritime border control operation coordinated by INTERPOL Counter-Terrorism Directorate
- The intelligence led operation was supported by an INTERPOL team on the ground, and also targeted criminal networks involved in the drugs trade, firearms trafficking, human trafficking and people smuggling.

INTERPOL NEPTUNE IV OPERATION in 2022

- Officials at seaports and airports in eight countries – Algeria, Cyprus, France, Italy, Lebanon, Morocco, Spain and Tunisia – carried out more than 2.6 million checks across INTERPOL's databases for stolen and lost travel documents, nominal data and stolen vehicles via its I-24/7 secure global police communications network.

- These checks generated 140 hits, resulting in 14 additional arrests following seizures worth USD 3.6 million, including: 33 kg of cocaine, some 39,400 ecstasy pills, 133 kg of cannabis, and ten stolen cars. Ten firearms were also seized.

- The operation also targeted illicit migrant flows, with authorities in France, Italy and Spain arresting suspected human traffickers and people smugglers and intercepting 13 irregular migrants.

NATO Counter-Terrorism Policy and The Alliance's Role in Border Security

Ms. Elena Beganu

This session briefly describes NATO's mandate in countering terrorism as a defense political alliance and then illustrate the different role NATO plays in border security. NATO has a less operational role but is more dedicated to capacity building, considering we do not have the whole spectrum of competencies like the UN or the EU.

What is NATO's role in counter-terrorism? What are the latest policy developments in this field? The nations are primarily responsible for the security of their citizens and territory. In this regard, those added-value as a defense alliance define NATO's supporting role. In 2012, NATO's allies recognized three main pillars: ***awareness, capabilities,*** and ***engagement.***

Awareness. The first pillar is about better understanding the threat and its evolution, which should not be done exclusively without intelligence channels. This is also based on political dialogue and trying to reconcile nation's different understandings of terrorism.

Capabilities. The second point concerns developing capabilities to defend against terrorist threats and how this support can assist our member states in their fight against terrorism in their homeland.

Engagement. NATO is keen to work with other international stakeholders and partner nations to contribute to the global fight against terrorism, following the United Nations' global counter-terrorism strategy of 2016, especially for the pillar on combatting terrorism and capacity building.

NATO is not working in isolation to counter-terrorism. Since 2012, NATO has achieved progress in counterterrorism. Here, the Counter-Terrorism Action Plan played a significant role. Such achievements increased NATO's contribution to enhancing border security. NATO also produced Further Action Plan approved in 2017, which included chapters on Awareness, Operation, Resilience, Capabilities, Capacity Building and Partnerships, and Strategic Communications. In addition, NATO has a biometrics policy that enables us to collect and manage data in accordance with privacy and international conventions. There's also a battlefield evidence collection policy and technical exploitation policy. NATO also worked on addressing the preventive judicialization of the battle space in dealing with other types of threats, such as countering drones. NATO now has a policy and a program for dealing with drones, including collaboration with civilian interlocutors.

Now, let's move on to border security, where we work closely with Jordan. Our workshops involve various actors, including the Jordan Armed Forces, customs, police, and maritime authorities. We aim to avoid a militarized solution and advocate for an interagency approach in collaboration with organizations like UOSE. We are also developing a pilot training course for border security in NATO.

The NATO allies have recognized border security as one of the main elements that enable allies to bring an added-value to the collaboration with the partner nations. Border security in NATO is not a single-standing field. It does not have a dedicated policy nor a dedicated effort. It is evaluated through a counter-terrorism lens. Yet, NATO acknowledges that border security is a broad concept.

NATO does support the promotion of integrated border security and management. This is also relevant for inter-agency cooperation, which is a prerequisite for an effective and successful fight against terrorism for the security of borders.

The first example is ***Jordan.*** During NATO's interaction with Jordan, the point of entry for NATO was Jordanian Armed Forces for counter-terrorism and border security collaboration. NATO worked by the collaboration led by Jordanian authorities in charge of border security. In the previous workshops held in Jordan in 2019 and one about maritime border security in 2023, NATO benefited from the experiences of the Jordanian partners, which are representative of national competencies on border security. These showed a multilayered approach to border security. The objectives were to have a better understanding of border security constructs.

Similarly, the scenario-based discussions organized by NATO reflect the various challenges we are currently confronting in both civilian and military realms of border security. It also enables us to reflect on the existing bilateral assistance and ensure NATO's contribution in border security.

The maritime aspect of border security should not be neglected. NATO is keen to collaborate with authorities in charge of ensuring maritime border security.

NATO acknowledges that borders that are quite porous and non-permissive are hard to manage by bilateral relations to make significant contributions. Therefore, NATO's second effort in border security is dedicated to regional integration of border security and promoting these best practices to the wider regional level.

In conclusion, border security is a priority for NATO. We support partners in this area, and it's also an important topic for them. NATO plays a different role in counterterrorism and border security, and our supporting role requires active coordination with other international stakeholders.

Question 3.2.: Does NATO take migration into account within the scope of border security in terms of inter-agency cooperation?

In the NATO border security and counter-terrorism work, we are very cautious about linking irregular migration with these threats. and counterterrorism and border security.

In this perspective, we rely on the assessment of our partner countries and the collective assessment of our international partners in identifying the specific threats that are localized and specific to certain environments. We are very cognizant that there is a necessity to understand the diversity of threats at the border, including those potentially linked with irregular migration. We refer to the assessment of our partner nations regarding what types of threats they identify as priorities.

In the NATO work through the competencies and the mandate that we have, we primarily work with the armed forces and the threats that they face in the green borders, not crossing points, and trying to identify the modalities and opportunities to reinforce their capacity to deal with these threats in ways that are respectful of human rights, privacy, and international conventions related to all of these fields.

SESSION 4: BORDER SECURITY, COUNTERRORISM, AND BORDER TRANSITION IN EASTERN AFRICA

Development and Security Cooperation in the Horn and Eastern Africa: A Perspective from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

Mr. Daoud Alwan

This session focuses on the perspective of development and its significance in eradicating conditions conducive to terrorism and violent extremism. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has always emphasized the importance of development in its peace and security strategy.

The IGAD sub-region connects three significant zones – the Northeastern, the Horn, and the South-Eastern part of the African continent. It comprises eight member states as follows: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda.

This session delves into the development and security interaction in the IGAD region, discusses the regional and international approach to border security, and explores potential ways forward in collaboration between regional organizations like IGAD and NATO.

To begin, The United Nations' pillars reside in the establishment charter. At the core of these pillars are peace and security followed by the rule of law, development, and human rights, playing a central role in shaping the discourse and practices of counter-terrorism worldwide. However, the development aspect of addressing conditions conducive to terrorism has often been given less attention. Following the 9/11 attacks, we followed the UN Global CT Pillars, which are composed of four objectives:

1. To address conditions conducive to terrorism,
2. To prevent and combat terrorism,
3. To build state capacities to prevent and combat terrorism and strengthen the role of the UN system,
4. To ensure respect for human rights and the rule of law as fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism.

Efforts mainly prioritized the second objective, which is preventing and combatting terrorism. However, other objectives seem to be weaker aspects when it comes to the practices of counter-terrorism.

What is a contested border? Is it a combat or conflict zone? These are central questions to the topic. In terms of the organizations examined here, NATO is a defense alliance, and IGAD is a regional economic development organization.

The IGAD region faces various threats, including inter-state conflicts, economic and social challenges, transnational organized crime, proliferation of CBRN weapons, and even interstate proxy conflicts. Given the interconnectedness of these challenges, it becomes crucial to focus on state credibility and capacity building in addressing these issues.

IGAD was established in 1986 in Djibouti as ***The Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD)*** and rebranded in 1996. IGAD is part and parcel of eight Regional Economic Communities (REC), the sub-regional building blocks of the continent-wide African Union. All IGAD member states share extensive terrestrial and maritime borders of critical importance with all other RECS except the ECOWAS. IGAD is often labeled as a ***geopolitical*** regional regrouping reflecting its global strategic importance. The promotion of development cooperation is the priority of the sub-regional organization and is clearly stated in its two constituent legal texts of 1986 and 1996.

Development and security are interlinked areas, particularly in the case of the member states of the Horn and Eastern Africa region. Political, economic, and social dynamics reflect the complexities of the direct interdependence between the imperatives of development and security and the duty of every state to protect its citizens from need, want, and harm. Determining the nature and the type of interconnectedness between development and security challenges within the state is critical in properly understanding and providing solutions to the growing threats of terrorism and other transnational crimes.

Border security is of paramount importance in the IGAD member states, with shared borders playing a vital role in stability, development, and the exercise of sovereignty. IGAD is committed to enhancing cooperation against threats through joint security interventions, early warning mechanisms, and intelligence cooperation. Analyzing the development-security conundrum in the IGAD region requires a relevant understanding of the external and global dynamics. Hybrid and asymmetric security threats in the region are taking place within each state's socio-economic, environmental, and political dynamics but there are also imperatives of external politics.

After the 9/11 attacks, GWOT continues to shape the current discourses and practices in counter-terrorism all around the world, with the securitization discourse coming on the top of the development agenda. Counter-terrorism approaches and policies acquired high visibility at national, regional, and global levels with the proliferation of a series of sub-regional, continent-wide and global organizations tackling the multiple dimensions of terrorism and related violent extremism.

Borders and borderlands are central to the policies of IGAD members as a way to strengthen regime stability, deliver to the needs and concerns of the communities and citizens and in the exercise of sovereignty and jurisdictional rights in respect of the integrity of the national states. Development and security cooperation among IGAD member states are interconnected and more molded into the perceptions, understandings, and practices developed by each member state in relation to their respective borders. Thus, borders and borderlands are critical to the national security and development policies of IGAD members.

The IGAD region is the strategic geopolitical hub of the world with global dynamics and competition of different types of opposing contenting powers like the United States, EU, China and Russia. This geopolitical competition remains an enduring reality, at least since the End of World War Two. The Horn of Africa indeed is located along the Strategic funnel of the Red Sea, Bab-El Mandeb and Gulf of Aden connecting the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. The Sub-region has also witnessed the presence of multiple external military infrastructures with proxy wars since the Cold War era.

Nowadays, and since the launch of the Global War on Terror after 9/11, partnerships on counter-terrorism in the Horn and Eastern Africa region could be described as part and parcel of broader

defense and security imperatives of mainly external powers. The European Union Naval Forces off the coasts of Somalia could be given as an illustration of the broader "Great Game" between external contenting powers.

Considering the central geopolitical significance of the IGAD region, the question arises whether there could be a framework for cooperation between IGAD and NATO, particularly in countering terrorism. The IGAD sub-region is already hosting critical counter-terrorism and defense infrastructures of some prominent NATO member states like the United States Joint Anti-Terrorist Task Force at Camps Lemonier in Djibouti or Türkiye TURKSOM base in Somalia. Experiences and best practices gained through the presence of these NATO forces in the region could serve as a base for building strategic partnerships that address the root causes of terrorism and promote regional peace and stability. In conclusion, by focusing on development and state capacity building, IGAD and NATO can forge a meaningful and cooperative relationship in countering terrorism and addressing regional security challenges.

IGAD MEMBER STATES

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SCOPE

1. DEVELOPMENT & SECURITY IN THE IGAD REGION

2. REGIONAL & INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS IN BORDER SECURITY

3. WAY FORWARD: IGAD & NATO?

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UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL CT PILLARS

1. TO ADDRESS CONDITIONS CONDUCIVE TO TERRORISM

2. TO PREVENT & COMBAT TERRORISM

3. TO BUILT STATES CAPACITIES TO PREVENT & COMBAT TERRORISM AND STRENGHTEN ROLE OF THE UN SYSTEM

4. TO ENSURE RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & RULE OF LAW AS FUNDAMENTAL BASIS OF THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

UNITED NATIONS PILLARS



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THREATS TO PEACE AND SECURITY

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1. DEVELOPMENT & SECURITY IN THE IGAD REGION

- **Established in 1986** in Djibouti as ***The Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD)***& ***rebranded in 1996 as IGAD***; The Authority regroups ***8 Member States*** namely (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan & Uganda);

- ***IGAD*** is part and parcel of ***8 Regional Economic Communities (REC)*** which are the sub-regional building blocks of the continent-wide ***African Union (AU);***

- All IGAD Member States shares ***extensive terrestrial and maritime borders of critical importance with all other RECs except the ECOWAS;***

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1. DEVELOPMENT & SECURITY IN THE IGAD SUB- REGION (Cont.1)

- ***IGAD is often labelled as a " Geopolitical" regional regrouping reflecting its global strategic importance:*** ***IGAD Sub-region is the Strategic Geopolitical Centre of Global Dynamics***

- ***The promotion of development cooperation is the priority*** of the sub-regional organisation and is clearly stated in its ***two constituents legal texts of 1986 & 1996;***

- The **14 Ordinary Summit of Heads of States of IGAD (12 JUNE 2023)** endorsed the **Treaty Establishing** Officially **IGAD as Regional Economic Community** in line with the Abuja Treaty of 1991.

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

IGAD IS THE GEOPOLITICAL HUB OF THE WORLD

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1. DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY IN THE IGAD REGION (CONT.2)

- Development & Security are interlinked areas particularly in the case of the Member States of the Horn and Eastern Africa region;
- Political, economic and social dynamics are reflecting the complexities of the direct interdependence existing between the imperatives of development and security and the duty of every state to protect its citizens from need, want and harm;
- Determining the nature and the type of the interconnectedness between development and security challenges within the State is very critical in properly understanding and providing solutions to the growing threats of terrorism and other transnational crimes;

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1. DEVELOPMENT & SECURITY IN THE IGAD REGION (CONT.3)

- Analysing the **development-security conundrum** in the IGAD region requires a relevant understanding of the External and Global Dynamics. **Hybrid and Asymmetric** Security **Threats** in the region are tacking place within the **socio-economic, environmental and political dynamics** of each State, but also according the **imperatives of external politics**;

- After the 9/11 attack in the United States, **The GWOT** continues to shape current discourses and practices on Counter-Terrorism all around the world with the securitization discourse coming on the top of development agenda.

- **Counter Terrorism policies and approaches** acquired high visibility at national, regional and global levels with the proliferation of series of sub-regional, continent-wide and global organisations tackling the multiple dimensions of terrorism and related violent extremism;

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1. DEVELOPMENT & SECURITY IN THE IGAD REGION (CONT. 4)

- Borders and Borderlands are central to the Policies of IGAD Member States as a way to strengthen regime stability, deliver to the needs and concerns of the communities and citizens and in the exercise of sovereignty and jurisdictional rights in the respect of the integrity of national spaces.

- Development and Security Cooperation among IGAD Member States are interconnected and are molded into the perceptions, understandings and practices developed by each Member State in relation to their respective borders;

- Thus, borders and borderlands are critical to the national security and development policies of IGAD Member States;

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1. DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY IN THE IGAD REGION (CONT.5)

- Since the **1960's** the **Organization of the African Unity** renamed in **2002** as The **African Union** is spearheading policies and concepts promoting integrated and holistic borderlands cooperation and collaboration in line with its Principle of Pan-Africanism Solidarity, as the ultimate goal of ending the era of contestations and inter- States border conflicts;
- **African Union Vision and Policy on Borders** and Borderlands are shared by its **54 Member States** and encapsulated in the **AU Convention on Cross-Border Cooperation also called Niamey Convention (June 2014);**
- IGAD's Member States are sharing the principle of peaceful and secured borders for the promotion of regional integration as enshrined into the legal framework establishing the Intergovernmental Authority;

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1. DEVELOPMENT & SECURITY IN THE IGAD REGION (END.)

- Regional Cooperation among IGAD's Member States evolved **since the 1980's** with a global context characterized by the direct confrontation of the two opposing worldwide Defensive Alliances, **Warsaw and NATO,** each entity attempting to control the **Strategic FUNNEL** of the Horn of Africa, the **Red Sea- Bab El Mandeb- Gulf of Aden;**
- Due to these Global geopolitical dynamics, the IGAD Sub-region with the **South-East European BALKANS** have witnessed a **reconfiguration of the international borders** with the appearance of newly **recognized States**. **Eritrea** and **South Sudan** **who respectively joined IGAD in 1993 and 2011 are resulting from these geopolitical reshuffling.**
- With the changes in the international context, revitalized IGAD organization identified the growing challenges of hybrid, unconventional security threats like **terrorism** and other **serious forms of transnational criminality** which are exploiting **the governance weaknesses of cross-border areas and their socio-economic marginalization.**

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2. REGIONAL & INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS IN BORDER SECURITY

- STATES BORDERS ARE THE RESULT OF HISTORY AND SPECIFIC GEOGRAPHICAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

- IGAD as Regional regrouping is promoting the following principles of the AU:

- INTANGILITY PRINCIPLE
- NEGOCIATED SETTLEMENT OF BORDER DISPUTES
- SHARED COMMITMENTS TO WORK ON DELIMITATION & DEMARCATION
- PRAGMATIC BORDER MANAGEMENT PROMOTING PEACE, SECURITY STABILITY AND CROSS BORDER COOPERATION

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2. REGIONAL & INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS IN BORDER SECURITY (END)

- ENHANCE SECURITY COOPERATION ON ALL TYPE OF THREATS & CRIME (ISSP TRANSNATONAL SECURITY THREATS APPROACH):
- ALLOW JOINT SECURITY INTERVENTION TO FIGHT CROSS-BORDER THREATS
- CONTINUOUS BORDER ASSESSMENTS ANALYSIS
- SET UP & EXPAND EARLY WARNING INFRASTRUCTURES ALONG SENSITIVE BORDERS
- ADOPT REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL MECHANISMS AND INSTRUMENTS ON SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION (AFRICAN POLICE COOPERATION/ CISSA/UNODC…)

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3. WAY FORWARD: IGAD & NATO?

- PARTNERSHIPS ON COUNTER-TERRORISM IN THE HORN AND EASTERN AFRICA ARE INTEGRATED TO BROADER DEFENSE AND SECURITY IMPERATIVES OF EXTERNAL POWERS.THE EUROPEAN UNION NAVAL FORCES OFF THE COASTS OF SOMALIA COULD BE GIVEN AS AN ILLUSTRATION OF MUCH BROADER « GREAT GAME » (AD-HOC APPROACHE/ BILATERAL BASIS)

- A MUTUALLY AGREED IGAD & NATO FRAMEWORK OF COOPERATION AGAINST TERRORISM ?

THE HORN & EASTERN AFRICA REGION IS THE CENTER STAGE OF THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR WITH THE IGAD REGION HOSTING CRITICAL COUNTER TERRORISM AND DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE OFSOME IMPORTANT NATO STATES (USA/ UNITED STATES JOINT COUNTER-TERRORISM TASK FORCE/ TURKIYE/ TURKSOM/ FRANCE) AND OTHER ALLIED NATIONS (JAPON);

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BORDER SECURITY RISKS ASSESSMENT



QUESTIONS??????????????????????????????

ALWAN ABOUBAKER DAOUD
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MARITIME SECURITY

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Discussion and Wrap-Up Session of the 1st Day

The roundtable discussion focused on border security and management, especially in the context of countering terrorism and transnational crime. The participants discussed various issues related to good practices, terminology, challenges, and cooperation at the national and international levels.

1. ***Good Practices and Guidelines***: The participants acknowledged the importance of good practices and guidelines developed by organizations like the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and others. These practices serve as valuable resources and help improve border security measures.

2. ***Terminology***: There was a consensus that having a common terminology is essential for effective communication and cooperation. Different organizations and countries may use varying terms, leading to confusion. Participants emphasized the need for a shared understanding of terms like border management, border defense, and border security.

3. ***Challenges and Contextual Differences***: It was recognized that each country and region face unique challenges due to geopolitical, economic, and sociocultural factors. Applying successful case studies directly to other situations may not be feasible. Participants stressed the importance of considering local contexts when implementing best practices.

4. ***Proactive Approach***: The discussion highlighted the significance of a proactive approach to border management. Rather than merely reacting to security threats, preventive measures and cooperation among security agencies were emphasized as vital strategies.

5. ***Involvement of Security Agencies***: The discussion pointed out the need to involve various security agencies, including customs, law enforcement, and local border guards, in border security efforts. These agencies play a crucial role in countering terrorism and transnational crime at the border.

6. ***Technological Advancements***: Participants recognized the importance of adopting new technologies to address evolving security threats. They agreed that technology can enhance border control and intelligence sharing but also acknowledged the challenges of resource limitations.

7. ***International Cooperation***: The participants stressed the significance of international cooperation in tackling border security issues. Collaboration between countries, regional organizations, and international bodies like NATO and the UN is crucial for effective counterterrorism efforts.

8. ***Framework and Terminology***: It was suggested that a comprehensive framework with agreed-upon terminology should be developed to guide border security efforts. This framework can serve as a reference for policymakers and practitioners in the field.

9. ***National-Level Challenges***: Small states facing security threats from larger neighbors with limited resources face unique challenges. A framework that accounts for such particular situations can be beneficial for these countries.

Overall, the discussion provided valuable insights into the complexities of border security and management, emphasizing the need for cooperation, proactive strategies, and a shared understanding of terminology to combat terrorism and transnational crime at the borders effectively.

SESSION 5: CONTEMPORARY ILLEGAL MIGRATION, BORDER SECURITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM IN EUROPE

Illegal Migration to Europe on Western Mediterranean

Dr. Janos Besenyö

Dr. Janos Besenyö elaborated the subject of migration, with a specific focus on illegal migration and migration routes to Europe. Dr. Besenyö provided an overview of the main migration routes commonly used by migrants to reach Europe, namely the **Mediterranean route** (Eastern Mediterranean route, Central Mediterranean route, and Western Mediterranean route), Sub-Saharan Route, **Balkan Route**, **Eastern Route** (Belarus and Ukraine), **Western African Route** and **Eastern African Route.** The speaker focused on the Mediterranean Route and **Sub-Saharan Migration.** The challenge of migration in Spain was also discussed, including the role of Frontex, the EU agency responsible for improving border control and management across member states. Dr. Besenyö ended his presentation by recommending a comprehensive approach to address the challenges posed by illegal migration and the influx of migrants.

Terminology and Migration Routes to Europe

The conference started by briefly defining migration and continued with the main topic of illegal migration. Dr. Besenyö highlighted that migration routes to Europe are diverse, and migrants can choose their paths based on various factors such as origin, available transportation, and financial capacity. Additionally, Dr. Besenyö shared the maps of the most common migration routes to Europe.

Eastern Mediterranean Route

The Eastern Mediterranean route refers to the path taken by individuals and families from the countries in the Middle East and North Africa who seek to migrate to Europe through the Eastern Mediterranean. The Eastern Mediterranean route involves travelling through Türkiye to Greece by crossing the Aegean Sea.

This route gained popularity due to the Syrian civil war, displacing millions of people who tried to take refuge in neighboring countries. However, as conditions in the host countries became less stable, more people sought safety and stability in Europe. The journey along this route is dangerous, with many migrants facing dangers such as overcrowded boats, drowning, and exploitation by human smugglers. European countries have implemented stricter border controls and policies to manage the influx of migrants.

Central Mediterranean Route

The Central Mediterranean route refers to the path followed by migrants from North Africa and the Middle East who cross the Mediterranean Sea to reach Europe. It starts from the coasts of Libya and Tunisia and heads toward Italy and Malta.

The conditions of the route and overcrowded vessels put the lives of migrants fatal risk, leading to a humanitarian crisis. The **United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees** has called for international efforts to address the challenges along this route. The number of detections along the Central Mediterranean route has increased by more than half in 2022, with over **100,000 detections**. Libyans and Tunisians have been the nationalities with the highest number of arrivals in Europe via this route since 2017.

Western Mediterranean Migration Route

The Western Mediterranean migration route is a migration route used by thousands of migrants who cross from North Africa to Southern Europe through the Mediterranean Sea. It begins in the countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, and the destination is mainly Spain, Italy, and Malta.

The route is used by thousands of migrants crossing from mostly from the Northwest African countries to Southern Europe through the Mediterranean Sea. The number of Sub-Saharan Africans and Syrians also increased significantly. The journey is hazardous, with overcrowded boats leading to tragedies. Spain is the primary entry point for migrants in this region **(Canary Islands/Ceuta and Melilla)**, and the country has been collaborating with European and African countries to manage and tackle illegal migration more effectively.

Sub-Saharan Migration

Dr. Besenyö explained the main elements of Sub-Saharan migration to Europe by highlighting the migration patterns, reasons, challenges, and outcomes. He emphasized that Sub-Saharan Africans aim to migrate to Europe for better life conditions due to issues such as conflict, poverty, high unemployment rates, poor governance, natural disasters, and lack of food and shelter.

The migrants in Europe face challenges such as socio-cultural challenges, communication, unemployment, and lack of professional incompetence.

Fighting against Illegal Migration in Spain - Role of Frontex

Spain's popularity among illegal migrants can be attributed to three key factors: its geographic location, economic situation, and political context. Spain faced an estimated influx of over 35,000 asylum seekers and migrants via the Mediterranean Sea in the year 2020. The migrants mostly used Western Mediterranean route. Additionally, migrants from the MENA region targeted North African Regions of Spain, namely Ceuta and Melilla.

Dr. Besenyö discussed the role of **Frontex**. Frontex is an EU agency whose primary objective is to improve the operational efficiency of control border and management across the European Union. The agency is responsible for enhancing the operational efficiency of border control and management across member states. Frontex has played a crucial role in managing external borders, especially in the context of migration and the fight against cross-border crime. Joint operations such as **Joint Operation Indalo** in Algeciras, Malaga, Motril, Almeria, Cartagena, and Alicante were conducted to fight illegal immigration from North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. Additionally, Frontex established a standing corps to address border situations as they emerge in order to provide the necessary manpower and resources.

Recommendations

To address the challenges of migration effectively, Dr. Besenyö concluded with several recommendations:

1. **Comprehensive Plan:** A comprehensive plan focuses on equitable policies, human rights, and social justice concerns.

2. **Addressing Root Causes:** Collaboration between the EU and immigration authorities in migrants' home countries is essential to tackle the issue at its source. Economic and social conditions in countries of origin must be improved to reduce the incentive to migrate.

3. **Improved Border Control Measures:** Stricter measures should be implemented to limit illegal crossings, but the focus should also be on improving asylum processes, involving the judiciary in decision-making, and ensuring the protection of human rights for migrants.

4. **Host Country Responsibilities:** Hosting countries should take proactive measures to ensure fundamental human rights for immigrant communities, promoting mutual understanding and supporting education for all, regardless of citizenship status.

5. **International Cooperation:** The EU should work with organizations like the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the International Rescue Committee to provide basic needs and necessities to immigrant communities, facilitating their integration into host countries.

The speaker explained the complex issue of illegal migration and the different migration routes to Europe. Dr. Besenyö emphasized the importance of a comprehensive approach prioritizing humanitarian policies, human rights, and social justice. Europe can work towards a more secure and inclusive future by investing in the countries of origin, improving border control measures, and promoting integration. Additionally, collaboration and international cooperation are crucial to address the challenges posed by migration effectively. Lastly, the speaker said that the role of media in shaping public perception of migration is indeed significant. He said that migrants share their migration route on Twitter and Facebook to call people from their home countries.

Question 5.1.: You mentioned Spain and Algeria, and other countries having agreements to repatriate citizens or migrants back to their home countries. What are your thoughts on the United Kingdom's deal with Rwanda to ship citizens or migrants to one who may not have come from there?

Yes, I agree If they have migrants from these countries, they have to deal with the complexities that come with it. As I mentioned yesterday that the Kenyan authorities dealing with Somali pirates, and trying to send them back to Kenya for prosecution rather than keeping them in Great Britain. The issue is that sometimes the legal system in one country may not be suitable for handling such cases, which is something European countries should also consider. It's not enough to turn back migrants at the border. If they manage to enter the country, they must be dealt with appropriately, which can cost a lot of money and time. For example, I know that in Hungary, an illegal migrant spends at least three years without a solution. Too many refugees are arriving in Hungary seeking refugee status without proper documentation. You have to find

out who is who. It becomes a complex process of determining their identity and handling their cases properly. If they go to another country and involved in terrorist activities, Hungary becomes guilty. In Rwanda's case, authorities should send them back as they arrived if they do not have the right to become a refugee.

Question 5.2.: I fully agree that media play a vital role. And I remember in the first couple of days when the war in Ukraine started, there was so much stigmatization in the media. On a leading news channel, a commentator said, "Ukrainians are similar to us with blonde hair and blue eyes." How can we address the biases and stigmatization in media coverage related to migration?

This is the role of the media. The media tells you who to support. It is very difficult to reach accurate information. We have not only academics but also practitioners and NGOs, collaborate to reliable information. All immigrants are not evil, and at the same time, all immigrants are not angels. From one point, migration is very important; from another point we have to stop it if it is illegal because it could be risky. For example, Poland and Hungary invite people from other countries to work there because of the lack of manpower.

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Agenda

- Migration
- Illegal Migration
- Migration Routes to Europe
- Sub-Saharan Migration
- Fight against Illegal Migration in Spain on Western Mediterranean
- Frontex Standing Corps
- Conclusions, Recommendations

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Migration

Migrations are an integral part of human history. Migration in the Modern Age Europe is exposed to has become so intensive recently, which was not experienced for a long time. Many compare its intensity and size to the great historical migrations in Europe.

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Illegal Migration

Illegal migration refers to the movement of people across national borders without proper documentation or legal authorization. This may include crossing borders clandestinely, using fake documents, or overstaying a visa. Illegal migration is often motivated by economic, social, or political factors, such as poverty, war, or natural disasters, or by a desire to join family members who are already living in another country. Illegal migration can create significant challenges for both the countries of origin and destination, including legal, social, and economic issues. It is also a subject of political debate and controversy, with some arguing for stricter immigration policies and others advocating for compassion and the protection of human rights.

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Migration Routes to Europe

There is no single or fixed route for migrants. However, there are several known routes commonly used by migrants to reach Europe. These routes include:

The Mediterranean route: This is the most popular migration route to Europe. It involves crossing the Mediterranean Sea from North Africa to Southern Europe, especially Italy, Greece, and Spain.

- *Eastern Mediterranean migration route*
- *-The Central Mediterranean migration route*
- *-The Western Mediterranean migration route*

The Balkan route

Eastern route (from the direction of Belorussia and Ukraine)

The Western African coastal route

Eastern African route

Overall, migrants choose their routes depending on their origin, available transportation, and financial capacity.

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

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Eastern Mediterranean Migration Route

The Eastern Mediterranean migration route refers to the path taken by individuals and families who are seeking to migrate from countries in the Middle East and North African region to Europe, specifically through the Eastern Mediterranean. The route typically involves travelling through Turkey, crossing the Aegean Sea to Greece, and then continuing to other parts of Europe.

This migration route has become increasingly popular in recent years, particularly since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011. The conflict has displaced millions of people, many of whom have sought refuge in neighbouring countries such as Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. As the situation in these host countries has become less stable, many people have turned to migration to seek safety and stability in Europe.

However, the journey along the Eastern Mediterranean route migration can be perilous, with many migrants facing dangers such as overcrowded boats, drowning, and being exploited by smugglers. The route has also become increasingly difficult to navigate due to stricter border controls and policies in European countries designed to deter migration.

In 2022, there were about 42 800 irregular border crossings detected on the Eastern Mediterranean route. Syrians, Afghans and Nigerians were the top reported nationalities. Figures roughly doubled compared with 2022 yet remained below half of the figures in 2019.

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Central Mediterranean Migration Route

The Central Mediterranean migration route refers to the path followed by migrants from North Africa and the Middle East who cross the Mediterranean Sea to reach Europe. This route starts from the coasts of Libya and Tunisia and heads towards Italy and Malta, where migrants arrive after crossing the central Mediterranean Sea. The journey is perilous and often involves overcrowded and unsafe vessels, which puts the lives of migrants at risk. Organizations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees have called for international efforts to address the humanitarian crisis along the Middle Mediterranean migration route.

The number of detections in the Central Mediterranean rose by more than half to well over 100 000 detections in 2022.

Egyptians, Tunisians, and Bangladeshis were the top three nationalities in a year that saw the most arrivals in this region from Libya since 2017 and the most from Tunisia in recent history.

Western Mediterranean Migration Route

The Western Mediterranean migration route is a migration route used by thousands of migrants who cross from North Africa to Southern Europe via the Mediterranean Sea. This route begins from countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, and the destination is mainly Spain, Italy, and Malta.

The journey is dangerous and hazardous, as many migrants die during the voyage due to overcrowded and unseaworthy vessels. The migrant population is diverse, including people fleeing conflicts, poverty, and unemployment.

Spain is currently the primary entry point for migrants in the Western Mediterranean route, with the Canary Islands/Ceuta and Melilla serving as the most popular destinations. The Spanish government has worked with other European countries and African states to manage and curtail illegal immigration along the route.

The Western Mediterranean route saw a decrease in migratory pressure in 2022 with around a fifth fewer detections than in the previous year. While 80 % of the irregular migrants come from Northwest African countries, selected Sub-Saharan African nationalities recorded major increases, as did Syrians.

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

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Route	January-December 2022	December 2022	Jan-Dec 2021/Jan-Dec 2022	Top nationalities
Western Balkans	145 600	8 944	+136%	Syria, Afghanistan, Türkiye, Tunisia
Central Mediterranean	102 529	7 760	+51%	Egypt, Tunisia, Bangladesh, Syria
Eastern Mediterranean	42 831	1898	+108%	Syria, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Congo (Kinshasa)
Western Mediterranean	14 582	784	-21%	Algeria, Morocco, Syria
Western African	15 462	468	-31%	Morocco, Senegal, Guinea, Ivory Coast
Exits towards the UK	71 081	2 875	+37%	Afghanistan, Iraq, Albania

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

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Sub-Saharan Migration

Sub-Saharan Africans migrate to Europe in search of a better life and to escape several issues such as conflict, poverty, high unemployment rates, poor governance, and lack of basic needs such as food and shelter.

- **Migration Patterns:** longer-term migration trends, intraregional migration, rural-urban migration, refugee camps in Africa, etc.

- **Reasons for Sub-Saharan Migration to Europe:** growing population, relatively fewer economic opportunities, political instability, conflicts, natural disasters, etc.

- **Challenges Faced by Sub-Saharan Africans in Europe:** education, professional competences, job opportunities, family members, social-cultural challenges, language, etc.

- **Impact of Sub - Saharan Migration on Europe:** The third largest source of refugees in Europe, brain drain and brain gain, remittance flows (strengthens the economic crisis), etc.

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Fight against Illegal Migration in Spain on West - Mediterranean

Spain is located on the European continent's southern coast and has a shared border with the African continent. As a result, it is one of the primary entry points for migrants seeking to enter Europe.

Factors Contributing to Illegal Migration in Spain:

- Geographic Location
- Economic Situation
- Political Situation

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

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Illegal Migration in Spain - Overview

Illegal migration in Spain has become a significant challenge for the government and the society. It is estimated that over 35,000 asylum seekers and migrants arrived in Spain via the Mediterranean Sea in 2020. However, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), these figures only represent a part of the migration problem. The IOM estimated that over 150,000 migrants could have arrived in Spain illegally in 2020 through different routes.

Migrants' routes to Spain have varied, with many opting to cross the Strait of Gibraltar by boat, while others opt for the Western Mediterranean route, crossing from North Africa to the Spanish mainland along the Moroccan coast. Additionally, migrants from the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa have chosen to enter Spain through its enclaves in North Africa, Ceuta, and Melilla.

Ceuta and Melilla are popular entry points for migrants coming from Sub-Saharan Africa attempting to enter Spain illegally. Both cities are Spanish territories located in Northern Africa and are still viewed as entry points to Europe.

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Consequences of Illegal Migration in Spain

Social Consequences

Illegal migration in Spain has led to various social consequences, ranging from xenophobia to racism. The surge of irregular migration has also led to an increase in hate crimes perpetrated against immigrants, refugees, and ethnic minorities. The perception of immigrants as taking away jobs and taxing social services, as well as the association of immigration with criminality, have led to discrimination against these groups.

Economic Consequences

Illegal migration has also led to various economic consequences in Spain. The lack of authorized documentation, coupled with the irregular working status, has led to many immigrants working in low-skilled jobs with substandard wages. This situation, in turn, has created a situation where immigrants are vulnerable to exploitation, job instability, and mistreatment from their employers.

Political Consequences

The surge of illegal migration in Spain has led to debates on immigration policies and the country's place in the European Union. There is still much disagreement among political parties on how to handle the surge in illegal migration, leading to a polarized debate on the subject. Some political parties are pushing for more significant support of refugees and asylum seekers, while others argue against the country's open borders.

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Frontex in Spain

Frontex is an EU agency whose primary objective is to improve the operational efficiency of control border and management across the European Union. The agency's mandate includes enhancing the level of cooperation among EU Member States, supporting the development of a common European border policy, and assisting national authorities in carrying out their border control duties.

Frontex has been instrumental in improving the management external borders of the EU, especially in the context of migration and the fight against cross-border crime. One of the examples of the agency's cooperation with national border control authorities is its Joint Operation Indalo in different cities of Spain as Algeciras, Malaga, Motril, Almeria, Cartagena, Alicante, and probably later Palma de Mallorca since long years.

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Joint Operation Indalo in Spain

Indalo is a joint operation launched by Frontex in 2009 to provide a coordinated response to the growing number of migrants and refugees arriving at the borders of the EU. Spain is one of the primary focus areas, along with Italy and Greece, where Frontex has deployed significant resources to manage the influx of migrants and refugees entering the country. I will explore the Indalo joint operation in Spain, its objectives, strategies, and challenges, and the impact it has on Spain's immigration policies.

- **Objectives of Frontex Indalo Operation:** The aim of the operation was to combat illegal immigration from North Africa and Sub-Sahara, resulting from a cyclical seasonal increase as well as protracted crisis in Mali.

- **„Hot pot strategy"** - European borders (Spain, Italy, Greece) faced with extraordinary situations or crisis-levels of migratory pressure that are determined to require additional support from relevant EU agencies.

- **Challenges Facing Frontex Indalo Operation:** EU countries capabilities, cooperating with various countries, interagency cooperation, manpower, different legal environment, etc.

- **Impact of Frontex Indalo Operation:** support Spanish authorities, fight against human traffickers, reducing drug smuggling, save migrants life's, etc.

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Frontex Activities at the Canary Islands in Spain

Frontex's focus is border management and security at the external borders of the EU. In recent years, it has been involved in various operations across the Mediterranean Sea and the Canary Islands, working closely with national authorities and other EU agencies to address irregular migration and other border-related issues.

In the Canary Islands, Frontex has been part of several operations since 2006, when the migratory flows from West Africa to the archipelago surged. The agency has provided EU-funded technical and logistical support to Spanish authorities, including maritime surveillance, border surveillance, and search and rescue activities.

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Ceuta and Melilla

Ceuta is a Spanish territory located in North Africa, just across from the Strait of Gibraltar. The city has been a focal point for migration and refugee flows for many years, as it has a land border with Morocco and offers easy access to Europe. Over the past decade, the number of migrants attempting to cross the border into Ceuta has risen sharply.

The other important city in the fight against illegal migration is *Melilla,* a Spanish autonomous city, located on the northern coast of Africa in the Mediterranean Sea. Melilla is unique in that it has a culture that is a mix of European and African influences. It is a small city that holds a lot of historical and cultural significance and has gone through numerous changes throughout its history. In recent years, the number of migrants wishing to enter Europe has also increased significantly here.

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The Last Tragic Event at Melilla

On 24 June 2022, a group of migrants attempted to cross the border into Melilla, a Spanish enclave on the northwest coast of Africa. The incident resulted in clashes with security forces and the arrest of several migrants. This event highlights the ongoing migrant crisis that has been unfolding at Europe's southern borders since the start of the Syrian conflict in 2011.

The tragedy of Melilla is a result of several factors which I mentioned earlier and that have contributed to the larger issue of illegal immigration in Europe.

Additionally, the Libyan regime have decreased the number of available routes for migrants. This has caused an overflow of migrants in the neighboring countries, including Morocco, which has led to a swelling number of migrant camps in the country, most of which are in the city trying to access Europe through the Melilla and Ceuta enclaves.

In response to this, the Spanish government deployed more security forces and reinforced the border fences separating Spain and Morocco. However, this approach has only exacerbated the problem, rather than solving it. The Spanish government has also failed to properly address the underlying issues fueling the surge in migration.

Fences at Melilla

Possible Solutions

To prevent such tragedies from occurring in the future, a multi-faceted approach towards immigration policy must be adopted. Firstly, anti-immigrant policies, such as the ones currently being implemented by the Spanish government, are counterproductive and need to be replaced by more humane and pragmatic policies. Only then can we address the fundamental issues behind the migration crisis.

One potential solution may be to invest in aid and development programs for countries of origin. This would aim to reduce poverty and improve living conditions, providing people with better opportunities, and reducing the incentive for them to move to Europe. Additionally, addressing the issue of climate change and rolling out long-term programs would help countries to be more resilient to environmental changes and reduce the risk of forced migration.

European cooperation is vital also in implementing solutions that can resolve the migration crisis. As a unified block, the EU can use its economic weight and political influence on effect positive change in developing countries. Increased cooperation with international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) can also provide a cohesive approach in addressing the underlying issues of migration.

Lastly, the focus of policy should be shifted from oppressive border control to the human rights of migrants. This can be achieved through fair and expedient asylum processes, support for government and civil society initiatives to improve conditions in countries of origin, and better cooperation and coordination of international migration responses in the region.

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Cooperation in between Spain and Algeria

Algeria and Spain have been collaborating in recent years to combat migration through various measures. These measures include:

1. **Joint border patrols**: Spain and Algeria have launched joint patrols along their borders to prevent illegal migration. The goal of these patrols is to deter migrants from attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea.

2. **Immigration agreements**: The two countries have signed agreements aimed at regulating the flow of migrants. The agreements provide for the repatriation of illegal migrants and the exchange of information on migration.

3. **Investment in Algeria**: Spain has invested in development projects in Algeria, such as the building of a new port in the city of Algiers. These projects are aimed at creating employment opportunities in Algeria as a way of reducing the incentive for people to leave the country in search of jobs.

4. **Diplomacy:** The two countries have engaged in diplomatic efforts to address the root causes of migration, such as poverty, lack of economic opportunities, and political instability. They have also advocated for greater cooperation between European and African countries to address migration.

While these measures have had some success in reducing migration, they have also been criticized for their restrictions on the movement of people.

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Cooperation in between Spain and Morocco

The countries are separated by a narrow strip of water, the Strait of Gibraltar, which has become a major transit point for migrants from Africa to Europe. Morocco a transit point for migrants from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe and it is a natural gateway for migration flows. Spain is a popular destination for migrants from African countries, including Morocco. Spain has taken several measures to address this situation, including the establishment of reception centres, signing of international agreements, and working with its neighbouring countries.

Morocco and Spain's cooperation can be traced back to the 1990s. One example of this cooperation is the 1992 **Bilateral Agreement on Readmission**. This agreement allowed for the repatriation of migrants who entered Spain through Morocco illegally. Under this agreement, Morocco agreed to readmit its nationals who entered Spain from its territory. In exchange, Spain agreed to provide Morocco with financial support to develop its border control infrastructure. This agreement was the first of its kind between an African country and a European one and remains in force to this day.

Another significant development was the creation of the **Rabat Process in 2006**. The Rabat Process is a regional initiative that aims to bring together African and European countries to address the challenges of migration.

One of the critical measures taken as part of this initiative is the **Programme for the voluntary return of migrants.**

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Frontex Standing Corps

The Frontex Standing Corps was established in 2019 to enhance the EU's external border management. It comprises border and coast guards from EU member states who are in a state of readiness to deploy at short notice to support national border authorities. The standing corps consists of up to 10,000 personnel that can be deployed rapidly to help EU member states in situations of increased migratory and security pressure.

The standing corps is intended to assist EU member states in managing their external borders more efficiently, assisting national border guards in carrying out border checks, preventing unauthorized entry into the EU, and preventing cross-border crime. The standing corps will ultimately become Frontex's permanent operational body responsible for conducting joint operations and increasing operational capacity.

- Challenges facing the Frontex Standing Corps
- Effectiveness of the Frontex Standing Corps

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Frontex Standing Corps



Source: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 19/12151.
Note: There is currently no indication about deployments to the Rapid Intervention Reserve post 2024 .

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Possible Solutions to Illegal Migration to Europe 1.

Europe needs to work out a comprehensive plan, one that ensures that policy is guided by the principles of equity, respect for human rights, and concerns about social justice. The plan should address the root causes of migration, both on a regional and international level. The European Union should make a concerted effort to collaborate with immigration authorities in migrants' home countries. This will address the problem at the source and prevent migration in the first instance.

Improving economic and social conditions within migrants' home countries is crucial. Efforts should focus on providing access to education, building stable institutions, reducing corruption and increasing transparency, strengthening security and justice systems, and promoting economic and social integration, which will reduce the economic disparity between the migrants' countries of origin and Europe.

Furthermore, to reduce the appeal of illegal migration to Europe, the EU should collaborate with migrants' home countries to create employment opportunities for their citizens. This will reduce the occurrence of illegal migration by providing migrants with alternatives in their home countries, thereby preventing them from the risk of traveling to Europe. The EU should also invest in these countries by building infrastructure, facilitation of trade, and reducing foreign debt burdens.

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Possible Solutions to Illegal Migration to Europe 2.

In addition, stricter measures must be taken to curb illegal migration, including border control mechanisms. Frontex, the EU's border management agency, should be given more resources to limit illegal cross-border migration. Additionally, the EU should improve its asylum processes, ensuring the involvement of the judiciary in decision-making processes, ensuring that asylum not is a mere bureaucratic process, but a process that ensures justice and protection for those who need it. To tackle integration challenges, hosting countries should take proactive measures to ensure the universality of basic human rights for immigrant communities. This can be achieved through the facilitation of language-training programs, the promotion of mutual understanding between the host country and new immigrants, and the promotion of the right to education for children of all backgrounds regardless of their citizenship status.

Lastly, the EU needs to increase humanitarian aid to refugees and migrants. Organizations such as the International Red Cross or the International Rescue Committee, should facilitate programs that provide basic needs and necessities, such as food and water, healthcare, education, and housing. This creates an opportunity to support immigrant communities and facilitate their integration into the host country.

Conclusion

Illegal migration remains one of the most complicated problems for Europe. Action must be taken to ensure that sufferance is minimized, and action is expedited to stem the tide.

The solutions suggested above underline the significance of placing equitable policies that foster the well-being of all including the migrants.

The EU must support nation states through building institutions, reducing corruption, and promoting socio-economic stability.

The mitigation mechanisms within the European Union should encompass improving border control, improved asylum procedures, and handling refugees and migrants humanely.

By promoting equitable policies, promoting human rights, and creating an environment that promotes social justice, Europe can take a step forward towards resolving one of its greatest challenges – illegal migration.

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Questions?

Thank you for your attention!

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EU Border Security and Prevention of Terrorism

Dr. Elif Özdilek

Dr. Elif Özdilek started her presentation by giving the historical context of today's international relations, particularly the transformative effects of the Industrial Revolution and its impacts in modern times. She emphasized the impact of globalization, technological developments, and global threats on global politics and the important need for effective cross-border security management.

The Industrial Revolution has dramatically changed perceptions of the international relations and led to a more complex international environment. The oil crisis in 1973 further impacted the interdependence of Middle Eastern countries and created closer relationships among these nations. Globalization and advances in communication technology gave rise to transnational civil societies and increased the complexity of global threats, including terrorism, human trafficking, and climate change.

The European Union (EU) faced challenges in managing its borders, particularly with the expansion of the union. Migration management emerged as a multifaceted issue requiring long-term strategies and cooperation among EU member states and neighboring countries.

The EU has been exposed to terrorist attacks such as the 2004 Madrid bombings, the 2005 London Underground attack, and the 2015 Paris terrorist attacks. Therefore, the EU accelerated its efforts to lay out policies to counter terrorism and strengthen cooperation in terms of joint security cooperation among the member states.

Various international organizations and initiatives were introduced to combat terrorism and radicalization. Collaboration and information sharing with the non-EU member states became crucial components in ensuring adequate border security.

Dr. Özdilek presented EU Border Security Framework by explaining the major mechanism within the union. She explained the role of Frontex (European Border and Coast Guard Agency), EUROSUR (The European Border Surveillance System), IBM (Integrated Border Management), EES (The Entry-Exit System), and ETIAS (European Travel Information and Authorization System). The speaker also addressed challenges in border security management, including national interests, different states' priorities, and policies' application. Dr. Özdilek discussed strategies for enhancing EU border security, such as surveillance, cooperation, risk analysis, intelligence sharing, and crisis management.

The importance of interagency and international cooperation was emphasized, along with the need for flexible organizational structures to address cross-border threats effectively.

In conclusion, the presentation addressed the significant impact of historical events, globalization, and technological advancements on international relations and border security. Increased cooperation, information sharing are essential to address the diverse and complex challenges posed by global threats and to ensure the security and stability of Europe.

Key Issues

- Effective Management of Migration:
    - Borders have changed.

    - The EU has gained new neighbors, indicating the development of the European Neighborhood Policy, aiming for peace and order.
- Terrorism:
    - EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (ECTC) is established.
    - Prevention of Radicalization (EU) is one of the most significant issues within the EU as they do not want to be exposed to extremist ideologies that can create new threats.
- Understanding Terrorism in the EU:
    - A study was conducted that showed the European Movement is not well understood, even in Brussels.
    - The 3D approach (Democracy, Debate, and Dialogue) is used to gain public support. The European Constitution was not approved, and the concept of sovereignty gained prominence.
    - Training is crucial as terrorism can be taught. The goal is not to fight with each other, and prejudices matter.
    - Security and defense policy: Workshops are organized to promote peace and involve people from all backgrounds in the peace-making process.
    - Zone of confidence: Every segment of society and bureaucracy should be a part of these processes.
    - Global Brand Management: Companies now view voluntary activities and social responsibility as essential, not optional.
    - Schengen: Implemented in 1985, fully adopted in 1995 in 26 countries.
    - Frontex: Coordinates border management. The unlimited sharing of information and managing fake news are important tasks for international and transnational organizations to build communication patterns.
    - EUROSUR: Implemented in 2013 to increase surveillance capacity.
    - Integrated Border Management (IBM): Emphasizes intelligence sharing, and risk analysis, and prioritizes national security and public safety.
- Counter-Terrorism Initiatives:
    - ECTC within EUROPOL.
    - RAN (Radicalization Network Awareness).
    - EU Internet Referral Unit (EU IRU): Combats online terrorist content.
- Single models do not have a significant impact in the international arena. Cooperation and inter-agency dialogues are necessary to develop solutions.
- Intelligence pooling and sharing are easier for these IOs (international organizations).

- Organizations have their own strengths and weaknesses.
- Centralized organizations can make quick decisions, but the effectiveness and field implications may not be thoroughly examined, potentially failing to resolve conflicts.
- Matrix organizations, an interdisciplinary process, can be an alternative to centralized ones.



Crucial Role of EU Border Security

It is very essential in terms of maintaning stability, peace and order in all members of the European Union. Since it is a sui-generis organization composed of 28 states coming from different historical backgrounds and having different problems, EU is confronted with conflicts related with migration, terrorism, organize crime or smuggling. It compells the Union to take necessary precautions in advance and guarantee the well-being of all EU citizens.

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EU and Counter-Terrorism Initiatives

- Terrorism has been one of the vital global threat in the world particularly after 2000. The EU has also been exposed to terrorist attacks such as the 2004 Madrid bombings in Spain, 2005 London Underground attack and 2015 Paris terroriist attacks. They all give the signal that terrorism will be one of the main issues that the countries and international organisations should cooperate to tackle the issue and find some permanent solutions to preserve peace and order. Hence, the EU accelerated its efforts to lay out polices to counter-terrorism and strengthen cooperation in terms of joint security cooperation among the EU member states. Some notable terrorist attacks in the EU include the 2004 Madrid train bombings in Spain, the 2005 London bombings in the United Kingdom, and the 2015 Paris attacks in France. These attacks targeted civilians and result ed in numerous casualties, highlighting the threat posed by terrorism.

- To highlight the importance of the issue, the EU has taken various measures to upgrade their security and counter terrorism initiatives one of which is the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted in 2005 and focuses on prevention, protection, pursuit, and response to terrorist threats. The strategy emphasizes international cooperation, information sharing, and the need to tackle the root causes of radicalization and extre mism.

- Additionally, EU member states have established specialized law enforcement units and intelligence agencies to combat terrori sm. Europol, the EU's law enforcement agency, plays a crucial role in facilitating cooperation and information exchange among member states' law en forcement agencies.

- The EU has also taken steps to strengthen border security, improve aviation security, enhance intelligence sharing, and promo te deradicalization programs. Cooperation with third countries in areas such as information sharing, counter -terrorism financing, and capacity build ing is also an important aspect of the EU's counter -terrorism efforts.

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Key Issues:

- Effective management of migration
- Policies regarding Counter-terrorism
- Prevention of Smuggling
- Remedies to avoid Organized Crime
- Public Health and Bio-security
- Efficient implementation of Schengen Area

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Key Issues:

- Effective management of migration

A very complicated and multi-faceted issue requiring the involvement of countries, international cooperation and civil societies. Common European Asylum System, Border Management, Return and Readmission and the migration policies beyond the borders.

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Key Issues:

There are various policies and precautions implemented by the EU to fight against terrorism.

European Arrest Warrant: It guarantees the implementation of the same rules and sanctions against the people suspected or convicted of terrorist crimes within the EU territory.

EU Counter Terrorism Coordinator: An EU Coordinator was assigned to regulate the activities and policies, also provide coordination among the EU member states.

Europol: Europol is the EU's law enforcement agency, which plays a crucial role in combating terrorism. It supports member states by facilitating information exchange, coordinating investigations, and providing operational support to disrupt terrorist activities.

European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC): The ECTC, established within Europol, focuses on analyzing and sharing intelligence, coordinating operational actions, and assisting member states in preventing and responding to terrorist threats. It fosters collaboration among law enforcement agencies and strengthens the EU's overall counter-terrorism efforts.

Passenger Name Record (PNR) Directive: The EU adopted the PNR Directive, which requires airlines to provide passenger data to national authorities for the purpose of preventing, detecting, and investigating terrorist offenses and serious crime. This information is analyzed to identify potential threats and enhance border security.

European Travel Information and Authorization System (ETIAS): ETIAS is a new electronic travel authorization system introduced by the EU. It will pre-screen travelers from visa-exempt countries before their arrival, allowing authorities to identify potential security risks, including individuals associated with terrorism.

Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Standards: The EU actively implements and promotes the international standards set by the FATF to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. It ensures that financial systems within the EU are robust and resistant to exploitation by terrorist networks.

Prevention of Radicalization: The EU emphasizes preventive measures to counter radicalization and extremist ideologies. It supports research, community engagement, and educational initiatives to promote inclusivity, tolerance, and social cohesion while addressing the underlying factors that contribute to radicalization.

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Understanding Terrorism in the EU

- Terrorism can be defined as the deliberate use of violence, intimidation, or threats to create fear, cause harm, and achieve political, ideological, or religious objectives. It involves acts of violence targeting civilians, infrastructure, or governments with the intention of instilling fear, destabilizing societies, and undermining the rule of law. It has negative impact on both human beings, infra-structure of a country and also socio-economic conditions

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UNDERSTANDING TERRORISM

Increasing the measures in the borders helps to inhibit the terrorists entering into the countries without being detected.

Use of technological devices and software programmes will ease the identification of individuals having connections with the terrorist organizations.

Border security measures can prevent the globally affecting terrorist movements to occur and giving damage to the region.

Cooperation between the EU countries and joint policies will ease the detection and prevention of the terrorist attacks and helps to take proactive action when necessary.

It is also important to make the citizens feel safe. Using media effectively and creating a zone of confidence will eradicate the ambiguities and panic.

By impeding the mobility of the people who are suspected of radical ideologies, EU member states can reduce the risk of terrorist attacks and indoctrination.

While it is important to strike a balance between security and the free movement of people within the EU, robust border security measures are crucial for protecting citizens, preventing terrorist attacks, and maintaining the stability and integrity of the European Union.

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Schengen Area and Border Security

Explain the Schengen Area and its significance for border security in the EU.

The benefits of free movement within the Schengen Area for EU citizens and legitimate travelers.

The challenges of maintaining effective border security while preserving the principles of the Schengen Agreement.

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EU Border Security Framework

Present an overview of the EU's border security framework:

Frontex (European Border and Coast Guard Agency) and its role in coordinating border management.

The European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) and its contribution to situational awareness.

Integrated Border Management (IBM) approach for comprehensive border control.

The Entry-Exit System (EES) and the European Travel Information and Authorization System (ETIAS) for improved security checks.

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- Challenges in EU Border Security
- The key challenges faced in maintaining border security within the EU:
- External borders and varying terrain.
- Limited resources and funding for border control.
- Evolving tactics and strategies employed by terrorists.
- Balancing security measures with the facilitation of legal travel and trade.

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Strategies for Enhancing EU Border Security

Present various strategies and technologies that can enhance EU border security:
Strengthening cooperation and intelligence sharing among EU member states.
Advanced surveillance technologies such as drones, sensors, and maritime monitoring systems.
Enhanced use of biometrics and secure document verification.
Risk-based approaches for more efficient screening processes.
Cooperation with non-EU countries to secure external borders.

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EU COUNTERTERRORISM INITIATIVES

HIGHLIGHT EU INITIATIVES IN COUNTERING TERRORISM AND SECURING BORDERS:
THE EUROPEAN COUNTER TERRORISM CENTRE (ECTC) WITHIN EUROPOL.
THE RADICALIZATION AWARENESS NETWORK (RAN) TO TACKLE RADICALIZATION.
THE EU INTERNET REFERRAL UNIT (EU IRU) FOR COMBATING ONLINE TERRORIST CONTENT.
JOINT INVESTIGATION TEAMS AND INFORMATION SHARING PLATFORMS.

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Cooperation with Non-EU Countries

The significance of cooperation with non-EU countries to enhance border security:
Collaboration with neighboring countries to address shared security challenges.
Border management and capacity building initiatives in partner countries.
Information exchange and joint operations to disrupt terrorist networks.

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HUMAN RIGHTS AND EU BORDER SECURITY

INTRICATE BALANCE BETWEEN BORDER SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS WITHIN THE EU.
EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF TREATING INDIVIDUALS WITH DIGNITY DURING SECURITY PROCEDURES.
MANAGEMENT OF REFUGEE FLOWS WHILE MAINTAINING SECURITY MEASURES AND UPHOLDING HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS.

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CASE STUDIES

PRESENT RELEVANT CASE STUDIES TO ILLUSTRATE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EU BORDER SECURITY IN COUNTERING TERRORISM:
CROSS-BORDER INTELLIGENCE SHARING AND JOINT OPERATIONS RESULTING IN SUCCESSFUL COUNTERTERRORISM OUTCOMES.
IMPLEMENTATION OF ADVANCED SCREENING TECHNOLOGIES AND BIOMETRIC SYSTEMS LEADING TO THE IDENTIFICATION OF HIGH-RISK INDIVIDUALS.
EXAMPLES OF COLLABORATION WITH NON-EU COUNTRIES RESULTING IN THE DISRUPTION OF TERRORIST NETWORKS.

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Looking Ahead

- Explore future trends and challenges in EU border security and counterterrorism efforts within the European Union:
- Adapting to evolving terrorist tactics and strategies, such as the use of encryption and online platforms for recruitment and radicalization.
- Harnessing emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence and big data analytics, for more efficient threat detection and risk assessment.
- Strengthening international cooperation and partnerships, both within the EU and with non-EU countries, to share intelligence and enhance border security.
- Balancing security measures with the facilitation of legitimate travel and trade to ensure the smooth functioning of the Schengen Area.

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EU INITIATIVES FOR PREVENTING RADICALIZATION

DISCUSS EU INITIATIVES AIMED AT PREVENTING RADICALIZATION AND ADDRESSING THE ROOT CAUSES OF TERRORISM:
SOCIAL INCLUSION AND INTEGRATION PROGRAMS TO REDUCE MARGINALIZATION AND ALIENATION.
EDUCATION AND AWARENESS CAMPAIGNS TO PROMOTE TOLERANCE AND COUNTER EXTREMIST IDEOLOGIES.
SUPPORTING LOCAL COMMUNITIES AND CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR EFFORTS TO PREVENT RADICALIZATION.

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EU Initiatives for Preventing Radicalization

EDUCATION AND YOUTH PROGRAMS: THESE ARE THE EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMMES TARGETING THE YOUTH TO RAISE AWARENESS TO PREVENT RADICALIZATION SUCH AS THE INITIATIVES LIKE ERASMUS+, WHICH PROMOTES INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE, UNDERSTANDING, AND EXCHANGE AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE, FOSTERING A SENSE OF BELONGING AND PREVENTING SOCIAL EXCLUSION.

FUNDING FOR LOCAL PROJECTS: THE EU PROVIDES FUNDING FOR LOCAL PROJECTS AIMED AT PREVENTING RADICALIZATION AND PROMOTING COMMUNITY RESILIENCE. THIS SUPPORT ENABLES GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS, CIVIL SOCIETY GROUPS, AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES TO IMPLEMENT PREVENTION INITIATIVES TAILORED TO THEIR SPECIFIC CONTEXTS.

RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS: THESE ARE THE PROJECTS FINANCED BY THE EU TO CONDUCT RESEARCH. IT HELPS TO FIND OUT THE REAL CAUSES OF TERRORISM AND SHEDS LIGHT TO THE FORMATION OF PREVENTIVE POLICIES.

STRENGTHENING COMMUNITY RESILIENCE: THE EU SUPPORTS COMMUNITY -BASED APPROACHES TO PREVENTION BY PROMOTING DIALOGUE, SOCIAL INCLUSION, AND ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP. THIS INVOLVES WORKING WITH COMMUNITY LEADERS, RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS, AND CIVIL SOCIETY TO BUILD RESILIENCE, PROMOTE DIVERSITY, AND COUNTER RADICAL NARRATIVES.

SUPPORT FOR FAMILIES AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES: THE EU PROVIDES SUPPORT AND GUIDANCE TO FAMILIES AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES DEALING WITH INDIVIDUALS AT RISK OF RADICALIZATION. THIS INCLUDES TRAINING PROGRAMS, CAPACITY BUILDING, AND RESOURCES TO HELP IDENTIFY EARLY SIGNS OF RADICALIZATION AND PROVIDE APPROPRIATE INTERVENTIONS.

PROMOTING INTEGRATION AND SOCIAL COHESION: THE EU PROMOTES POLICIES AND INITIATIVES THAT FOSTER INTEGRATION, SOCIAL COHESION, AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES. BY ADDRESSING SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DISPARITIES, DISCRIMINATION, AND MARGINALIZATION, THE EU AIMS TO CREATE INCLUSIVE SOCIETIES WHERE INDIVIDUALS ARE LESS SUSCEPTIBLE TO RADICALIZATION.

THESE INITIATIVES REFLECT THE EU'S COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO PREVENTING RADICALIZATION, INVOLVING MULTIPLE STAKEHOLDERS AND ADDRESSING VARIOUS DIMENSIONS OF THE ISSUE. BY COMBINING EFFORTS AT THE LOCAL, NATIONAL, AND EUROPEAN LEVELS, THE EU AIMS TO BUILD RESILIENT COMMUNITIES, COUNTER EXTREMIST NARRATIVES, AND PROMOTE VALUES OF TOLERANCE AND INCLUSION.

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FRONTEX

European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union

Learning Outcomes

Highlight successful initiatives and outcomes in EU border security and counterterrorism efforts:

Increased operational capacity and efficiency of Frontex in coordinating border management activities.

Enhanced intelligence sharing among EU member states resulting in the identification and apprehension of individuals involved in terrorist activities.

Collaboration with international partners leading to joint operations and the disruption of transnational terrorist networks.

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Ethical Implications and Responsibility

- Ethical issues and accountability in EU border security practices:
- Guaranteeing that security measures do not infringe upon individuals' fundamental rights and civil liberties.
- Establishing mechanisms for accountability to prevent misuse of power.
- Acting in compliance with the principles of transparency and accountability in border control operations.

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Public Awareness and Involvement

- Public Awareness and Engagement
- Stress the importance of public awareness and engagement in EU border security and counterterrorism efforts:
- Encouraging citizens to report suspicious activities and cooperate with law enforcement agencies.
- Educating the public about the realities of terrorism and the role of border security in safeguarding society.
- Promoting a culture of resilience and preparedness in the face of terrorist threats.

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Conclusion

- The significance of EU border security in countering terrorism and maintaining the safety of the Schengen Area.
- The ongoing challenges and the need for continuous adaptation and international cooperation.
- Their repercussions on the future EU politics

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SESSION 6: SECURITY CHALLENGES AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN DIFFERENT ENVIRONMENTS -1:

Border Security, Georgia, and the Caucasus Region

Ms. Natia Seskuria

Ms. Natia Seskuria's presentation primarily centered on the security challenges specific to Georgia and Caucasus. She provided a brief overview of the internal dynamics of the region since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. She indicated that Georgia's security had been significantly affected by border disputes and conflicts among former Soviet nations.

The security environment in the region has been unstable, with two major conflicts, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, with both having deep historical roots. Cross-border hostilities following the Soviet Union's collapse further increased Georgia's security concerns, as the Caucasus country sought to maintain good relations with its neighbors while dealing with Russia.

In recent years, the regional security situation has worsened due to intense fighting between Azerbaijan and Armenia, leading to many casualties. The war in 2020 posed significant security challenges for both involved countries and Georgia, given its geopolitical location.

During the 1990s, Georgia faced internal conflicts and civil wars, allowing Russia to intervene and fuel tensions. Despite these challenges, Georgia pursued pro-Western aspirations, in deteriorated relations with Russia as Moscow tried to keep Tbilisi within its sphere of influence. as Moscow tried to keep Tbilisi within its sphere of influence. Georgia's aspirations to join NATO have been viewed by Russia as a threat to its national security, leading the Kremlin to wage a war against Georgia that resulted in the occupation of 20% of Georgian territories, and recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and the so-called South Ossetia.

Russia's attempts to gain international recognition for these regions failed. Only a few states recognize their independence. Russia established military bases in the occupied regions justifying their presence as a protection measure against the so-called Georgian aggression. Additionally, Georgian people in the occupied territories are facing pressure to obtain Russian passports. Russia follows a "**Borderization**" policy by setting wire fences, metal, or wooden barriers, digging ditches and fire-resistant furrows and gradually pushing forward the so-called administrative border lines in order to grab more land.

One of the main challenges is the illegal detention of Georgian citizens for so-called "illegal border crossing". The Kremlin-backed forces have systematically kidnapped and illegally detained Georgian citizens.

Moreover, there is an absence of international monitoring mechanisms on the ground. The Russian-occupied territories pose threats of organized crime, human trafficking, and terrorism.

Georgia faces other international challenges in the region such as international terrorism and a shifting geopolitical situation as a result of Russia's ongoing war against Ukraine.

Georgia has collaborated with international partners like NATO in countering terrorism and border security. In conclusion, the security challenges in the region, particularly in Georgia, necessitate international attention and cooperation to find effective solutions and promote stability.





General Context

- Soviet legacies
- Fragile security environment and contested borders
- Conflict-affected region:
  Nagorno-Karabakh wars
  Georgia-Russia war of 2208
- Role of the external actors in the region

The Case of Georgia

- Conflicts in the 90s
- Georgia's transformation
- August war of 2008
- Russian occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia: redrawing the borders
- Illegal recognition of independence of breakaway regions
- 20% of territories under occupation

Redrawing the Borders

- Unresolved conflicts
- Humanitarian catastrophe
- Setting up new boundary lines - "Fake borders"
- Russia claims it is following old Soviet military maps defining the border of South Ossetia
- Absence of international monitoring mechanisms on the ground

"Borderisation"

- What is "Borderisation" policy?
- The process of "bordering" is carried out mainly by the Russian military, with the participation of Ossetians
- Installartion of barbed wire fences, metal or wooden barriers, dig ditches and fire-resistant furrows, install signs with the inscription "state border of South Ossetia" and set up a monitoring infrastructure
- Illegal kidnapping of Georgian citizens

Creeping Annexation

- Borderization also means upholding a border regime and formalizing and limiting the passage through the "border checkpoints"
- Impact on human rights such as freedom of movement
- The process started in 2011 but intensified from 2013 and is still ongoing
- Some of the fences passes right through yards in Georgian villages in the conflict zone, depriving local residents of housing and access to gardens, pastures, and cemeteries

Latest Incident Marked on the Map

Other Challenges and Threats

- Terrorism and Organised Crime
- The impact of international terrorism affects the region
- Shifting geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus as a result of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh war between Azerbaijan and Armenia

Efforts at National Level and International Partnerships

- The role of external actors and international partnerships in the region
- The role of the law enforcement agencies in securing the borders
- International monitoring missions and mediation efforts in conflict-areas
- Way ahead for securing the borders

RUSI RISS

ANY QUESTIONS?

Africa, Counter-terrorism and Security: The Case Of Rwanda

Ltc. Paul Milas

Rwanda is located in Central Africa, with Uganda to the north. Partly smaller than Belgium. Rwanda has a population of 13.4 million people. It is a presidential Republic with President Paul Kagame, who has been in control of the government since the start of his presidency in 2000. Even before that, he was the commander of the front, the rebels that overthrew the previous government in 1994, and also served as Vice President from 1994 to 2000.

For quite a long time, since the end of the genocide, we have had a very strong authoritarian figure, President Paul, and a centrally led government focused on security. In terms of our security forces, we have a composite force of 33,000 soldiers, a small Air Force reserve, special forces, Rwanda National police, national intelligence security services, as well as Rwanda Investigation Bureau. These organizations are directly involved in maintaining security at our borders and internally, and they mostly operate together.

The speaker moved on to the armed actors in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. There are numerous active armed groups operating in the region. He argues that armed groups which operate in the Easter Democratic Republic of Congo directly impact the security issues of Rwanda.

ADF

First armed group Ltc. Milas mentioned is **the Allied Democratic Forces**, or the **ADF**, which originally emerged as an opposition to the Ugandan government before transforming into a religiously-motivated terrorist organization now based in Congo. This group pledged allegiance to DAESH in a propaganda video in June 2019 and operates independently across the region, much like other DAESH-affiliated and al-Qaeda groups. This is a matter of concern for Rwanda, given our ongoing tensions with them since 2021.

FDLR

Another significant group is **the Democratic Forces of Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)**. FDLR was created in 2000. Originally composed of troops from various other military groups. The armed group had an estimated 6,500 fighters in 2008. FDLR lost power due to the operations by Congo. Over the years, it has lost control over most of its territory and now has an estimated 500 to a thousand fighters as of 2020. Despite its small size, the FDLR played a crucial role in the 1994 genocide. It's essential to be vigilant about this group due to its past actions.

CNRD

The National Resistance Council for Democracy, or **CNRD**, is another notable group that emerged in 2016 due to political disagreements. CNRD took all of the FDLR units that operated in the south. Though initially seen as more moderate than FDLR. In the late 2010, armed group engaged in large-scale ground operations against Rwanda defense forces and lost significant amount of power.

Keynotes

Relations with neighboring countries play a crucial role in regional security. Rwanda has experienced strained relations with some neighboring countries due to allegations of supporting armed groups targeting their territories. This has contributed to regional instability.

The speaker provided a review of security incidents and activities in the region between **2018-2023** which reveals the complexity of the security situation.

Cooperation between the police, National Intelligence Service, and other security agencies led to identifying the target group behind the attacks. The Rwanda Defense Forces are known for their professionalism and effectiveness. They have participated in military missions in Mozambique and Somalia. Rwanda invested in **modern technology** for border security, installing **biometric scanners** similar to those used at international airports. In some cases, armed groups were reported to use southern forests as a route to enter Southern Rwanda.

In conclusion, the region faces complex security challenges involving armed groups, peacekeeping, and strained relations with neighboring countries**. Rwanda has been effective in implementing modern technology in security measures.** Regional cooperation and alignment of policies within the EU are crucial to address these challenges effectively.



Fig 1. Sgt. Heather Doppke, *RDF solider participating in training exercise*, 3 Sept 2019, https://www.setaf-africa.army.mil/image/29310/increasing-readiness-through-side-by-side-training. (12 May 2023)

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Agenda

Rwanda Overview

Armed Actors in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

Rwandan Counterterrorism Activities & Security Incidents

Rwanda as a Security Exporter

Fig 2. *The World Factbook 2021*. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2021, (26 May 2023)

Fig 3. *The World Factbook 2021*. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2021, (26 May 2023)

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Rwanda Overview

Size: 26,338 km

- Slightly smaller than Belgium
- 930 km of land border

Population: 13.4 million

- One of Africa's most densely populated countries

Ethnicity: Hutu, Tutsi, Twa (Pygmy)

Government: Presidential Republic

Security Forces:

- Rwanda Defense Force (RDF) 33,000
  - Army
  - Air Force
  - Reserve Force
  - Special Forces
- Rwanda National Police (RNP)
- National Intelligence Security Service (NISS)

Fig 4. *The World Factbook 2021*. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2021. (22 May 2023)

Fig 5. Source: GISGeography.com, (22 May 2023)

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Armed Actors in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo



Fig 6. Human Rights Watch, *DR Congo: New 'Kivu Security Tracker' Maps Eastern Violence*, 7 December 2017, available at https://kivusecurity.org/accessed. (11 May 2023)

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Armed Actors in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

Groups not listed by the Kivu Security Tracker:
MONUSCO
East African Community Troops
Burundi
Uganda
South Sudan

*MRCD-FLN

Fig 7. Human Rights Watch, *DR Congo: New 'Kivu Security Tracker' Maps Eastern Violence*, 7 December 2017, available at https://kivusecurity.org/accessed, (11 May 2023)

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Rwandan Counterterrorism Activities and Security Incidents

Security Incidents

2018:
June- FLN attack in S. Rwanda, 3 x civ killed, 2 x civ injured
December- FLN attack in S. Rwanda, 6 x civ killed, dozens injured

2020:
August- Paul Rusesabagina arrested in Kigali

2021:
October- 13 Suspected ADF members arrested

2022:
March- Cross border shelling incident
May- Cross border shelling incident
June- Cross border shelling incident
June- Bus shooting- 2 x civ killed, 6 x civ injured (suspected FLN)
June- Border incident- 1 x FARDC solider killed, 2 x RNP injured
November- Border incident- 1 x FARDC solider killed

2023:
January- Rwanda fires at DRC fighter jet
March- Border incident- 1 x FARDC solider killed

Fig 8. IGIHE, *13 arrested planning to conduct terrorist attacks in Kigali*, October 2021 https://en.igihe.com/news/article/13-arrested-planning-to-conduct-terrorist-attacks-in-Kigali, (22 May 2023)

Fig 9. IGIHE, *Defence Attachés accredited to Rwanda witness circumstances that led to fatal shooting of DRC soldier*, November 2022, https://en.igihe.com/news/article/defence-attaches-accredited-to-rwanda-witness-circumstances-that-led-to-fatal, (02 June 2023)

DRC FIRES ROCKETS INTO RWANDA

REF: RDF/MPR/A/10/03/22

Kigali, 10 June 2022

The DRC armed forces, FARDC, fired two 122mm rockets into Rwanda from the Bunagana area, striking along the Rwanda-DRC border in Nyabigoma Cell, Kinigi Sector, Musanze District on 10 June 2022 at 11:55am. There were no casualties but the local population is terrified.

This follows similar shelling by forces in DRC on 19 March and 23 May 2022 in Kinigi and Nyange Sectors of Musanze District and in Gahunga Sector of Burera District, which caused casualties and damaged property.

These incidents, including the kidnap by FARDC-FDLR of two RDF soldiers on border patrol, have been reported to the Government of DRC, the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism of the ICGLR and other partners.

RDF assures the population that efforts to resolve this issue are underway and their safety is assured.

END

Fig 10. RDF Communique, *DRC Fires Rockets into Rwanda*, June 2022. https://twitter.com/RwandaMoD/status/1535305565404028929, (1 June 2023)

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Rwanda as a Security Exporter

Fig 11. Paul Kagame, *Working Visit to Mozambique | Pemba, 24 September 2021.* https://www.flickr.com/photos/paulkagame/51511967810/in/photostream/, (22 May 2023)

RDF operations in Mozambique

President Kagame in Benin

Fig 12. Paul Kagame, *Joint Press Conference with President Patrice Talon of Benin | Cotonou, 15 April 2023.* https://www.flickr.com/photos/paulkagame/52819650922/in/album-72177720207525815/, (22 May 2023)

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Questions?

Fig 13. Rosine250, *The Forces that take over Rwanda*, 2 November 2021| https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Inkotanyita_zifata_u_Rwanda.jpg, (27 May 2023)

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SESSION 7: SECURITY CHALLENGES AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN DIFFERENT ENVIRONMENTS -2: IGAD AND OSCE APPROACHES

OSCE and Border Security Management in Europe

Ms. Colleen Ryan

Ms. Colleen Ryan provides an overview of the various border security and management projects undertaken by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). OSCE is the world's largest regional security organization, comprising 57 participating states spanning from Vancouver to Vladivostok, with 12 field operations, making it one of the most operational security organizations.

The OSCE's comprehensive approach to security covers political, military, economic, environmental, and human rights dimensions. The Transnational Threats Department includes units focusing on cyber security, strategic police matters, and action against terrorism. Main areas that were focused on in the presentation were **Combatting Illicit Trafficking in Cultural Properties, Border Professionalization Platforms, and networks in BSM, Identification of Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Travel Security and Identity Management**.

In the current year, the OSCE focuses on several thematic areas in its projects. These areas include professionalization platforms and networks, combating illicit trafficking, cultural property protection, travel security, identity management, and identification of foreign fighters.

To address budget constraints, the OSCE has shifted towards more extra-budgetary projects, where participating states fund initiatives aligned with their objectives. Currently, there are ongoing projects under development to tackle various security issues.

Ms. Ryan put forward that the OSCE's project on combating illicit cross-border trafficking and cultural property is managed by its Customs Adviser. This multi-year program collaborates with law enforcement, international organizations, academics, and museums to track and recover stolen cultural property, disrupting the financing of terrorism, money laundering, corruption networks, and organized crime through cultural property.

The OSCE mobile training team focuses on identifying cross-border movement of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs). In 2022 launched a new phase to expand the MTT (added additional members and subject matter expertise). **The new concept of Modular Training Curriculum includes training expertise and subjects, covering identity management, behavioral analysis, crisis management, and identification of illicit trafficking (SALW, CA, THB).**

In line with UN obligations, the OSCE API/PNR Project on passenger data exchange collaborates with participating states to organize meetings, conduct needs assessment visits, and facilitate cooperation with relevant entities such as UNOCT. **The aim of the activities is to support the implementation of UN SCRs and OSCE commitments focused on adopting**

and using API and PNR for identifying and detecting terrorists and serious criminals in accordance with international law and human rights principles.

Furthermore, in partnership with the Austrian Federal Ministry of Interior and Frontex, the project on detection of forged documents and impostor provides basic, advanced, and Training of Trainers (ToT) training courses to frontline border police officers, equipping them with essential tools to identify forged documents. The program was launched in 2016 and enhanced with the launch of Phase II in 2022.

The OSCE's **Gender Equality Platform in Border Security and Management** fosters dialogue among female border officers to address gender-specific challenges in border security and management, identifying needs and informing tailored projects. The project was launched in May 2016 and available to all 57 OSCE members and 11 partners for Co-operation.

Key lessons learned from the OSCE's work include travel security, identity management and detection of forged documents and impostors. **Project based activities enables the OSCE to learn what practitioners need on the field.** The organization prioritizes long-term sustainability and exit strategies for projects and actively collaborates with other organizations such as **INTERPOL**, **EUROPOL**, **UNODC**, **UNOCT**, **WCO**, **UNESCO** and **ICOM** to avoid duplication of efforts.

In conclusion, the speaker reiterated that OSCE remains committed to strengthening border security and addressing challenges proactively, continuing its efforts to enhance regional and international cooperation in the realm of security and management.

Question 7.1.: Could you give more detail on training the trainees? What are the profiles of the trainees? Do they differ?

For example, in the forged documents project, training participants came for two weeks in March. And then, two trainers that we used were document experts from Austrian border police, Ministry of Interior. They do training and they do a post- training report for us. Once trainees complete training they continue training in their countries.

Question 7.2.: How do you coordinate the training program with the other organizations? How do you prevent overlapping/doing same training?

In the similar training programs, the other organizations such as UN make sure that participants of the OSCE training are kept separate. So, we can keep training cycle. It has been a challenge. We examine the post training reports not to duplicate efforts.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

SECURITY CHALLENGES AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN DIFFERENT ENVIRONMENTS: OSCE APPROACHES

Border Security in Contested Environment Workshop 2023
NATO COE DAT| Ankara, Turkey

osce.org

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Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

- World's largest regional organization
- Established under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter
- 57 participating States
- 12 field operations
- Comprehensive approach to security: politico-military, economic and environmental, and human dimensions

OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

OSCE Secretariat, Transnational Threats Department



OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

Thematic Areas



OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

BSMU PROJECTS



OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

Combating Illicit Cross -Border Trafficking in Cultural Property in the OSCE Area

- Multi-year programme to strengthen capacity of border security and law enforcement organizations to combat illicit trafficking of cultural property (TCP) and its direct linkages to organized crime and terrorism financing, money laundering and corruption networks
- An OSCE-led team of experts is now the only international organization task force of its kind in the world – Heritage Crime Task Force
- Includes OSCE participating State experts, INTERPOL, EUROPOL, UNODC, UNOCT, WCO, UNESCO, and ICOM

OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

Identification of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs)

OSCE Mobile Training Team on identifying the cross-border movement of FTFs

- 2022 – developed new phase to expand the MTT (added additional members and subject matter expertise)
- New concept of Modular Training Curriculum with a strong gender - and human rights perspective incorporated
  - Modules include – Identity Management, Behavioural Analysis & Interviewing Techniques, Crisis Management, and Identification of Illicit Trafficking (SALW, CA, THB)
- Delivering training on the specific Modules identified by countries
- MTT Pilot Deployment to Albania – September 2023

OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

Travel Security & Identity Management – Support States and PfC to Effectively Secure and Manage Air, Land, and Maritime Borders

API/PNR Project

- Annual PDE Meetings
- Needs Assessment visits
- Secretariat of the EE IWG
- Co-operation with UNOCT

In 2023 support to API/PNR national entities from the Balkans, South Caucasus and Central Asia will be provided

OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

Participants at conferences on implementing passenger data programmes organized by the OSCE Transnational Threats Department and the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), held at the Hofburg in Vienna, from 1 to 4 November. (OSCE) Photo details

Objective of activities

- to support the implementation of UN SCRs and OSCE commitments focused on adopting and using API and PNR for identifying and detecting terrorists and serious criminals in accordance with international law and human rights principles

Detection of Forged Documents and Impostors

- Project launched in 2016
- Main partners: Austrian Federal Ministry of Interior, Frontex
- Project provides basic, advanced, and training of trainers courses to border police officers of pS
- The forensic equipment (magnifiers) is donated through the project

OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

Participants of train-the-trainers course on identifying forged documents and impostors at border crossing points in Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 16 December 2022. (OSCE/Anja Krajcinovic) Photo details

- **The increasing diversification of forgery trends in passports and other identity documents has necessitated a continued effort to raise the capacities of border officials to deal with the latest trends in document fraud.**

Detection of Forged Documents and Impostors

- Phase II – 2023
  - Includes stronger human rights & gender perspectives
  - Improved follow -up on training courses with participants
  - Ongoing training cycles with Ukraine, Albania, and Bosnia - Herzegovina

OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

Detection of Forged Documents and Impostors

"I am certain that this two-week training will enhance practical skills of Ukrainian Border Guards in countering forged documents, which they will be able to use in everyday work." - Ukraine SBGS Training Participant

- The war in Ukraine has increased the need and demand for this training
- Training cycle initiated with Ukraine in March 2023 with 20 SBGS Border officers trained

OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

Enhancing Airport Security at International Airports in Moldova

- Comprehensive needs assessment of Moldovan airports
- Development of Border Community and Security Programme
- Capacity building activities for national authorities engaged in airport security
- Equipping a training center on airport security at Chisinau International Airport
- Support in the implementation of the Roadmap on Establishing API System in Moldova
- Technical equipment to enhance airport security in Moldova

OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

Strengthening resilience of Uzbekistan in addressing cross-border challenges emanating from Afghanistan

Key activities in 2023:

-Capacity building and specialized equipment for K9 Center
-Establishment and training of National Mobile Training on identification of criminals
-Specialized equipment for Ayritam BCP and other selected borders
-Gender Mainstreaming Training

OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

The OSCE Gender Equality Platform in Border Security and Management

- Launched in May 2016
- Available to all 57 OSCE pS and 11 Partners for Co -operation
- Serves as a forum for dialogue and sharing of best practices on gender mainstreaming in border agencies.
- Capacity building on trauma sensitive interviewing of victims of THB, workshops on gender sensitive CTHB, addressing stereotypes and biases at the border, gendered aspects of cross-border crimes, etc.

OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

Thank you

Questions?

***Colleen Ryan**, Border Adviser, OSCE Border Security and Management Unit colleen.ryan@osce.org*

OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

SESSION 8: UNITED NATIONS AND BORDER SECURITY AND GENERAL EVALUATION

UN Good Practises in Border Security and Counter-terrorism

Mr Ulrik Ahnfeldt-Mollerup:

Mr. Ulrik Ahnfeldt-Mollerup emphasized the crucial role of UNCTT providing thematic expertise to Member States, regional, and subregional bodies in developing and implementing comprehensive border management strategies and action plans. These strategies aim to incorporate effective counter-terrorism measures and emerging threats and challenges across all dimensions of cross-border transportation.

A key aspect of the Mr. Ahnfeldt-Mollerup's presentation is the enhancement of capacities for member states in addressing these challenges. By imparting knowledge and skills, the aim was to empower border officials and policy makers in handling various challenges related to air, maritime, rail, and bus travel, both for people and cargo. This included the development and dissemination of reference materials and guidance tools, which played a pivotal role in reinforcing security measures.

In promoting a holistic approach, the speaker emphasized the importance of incorporating Gender and Human Rights dimensions in border management strategies. By recognizing the diverse impact of border management policies, the goal was to ensure fair treatment and protection of human rights while also fostering gender equality.

A core theme of the lecture was sustainability which was aimed to be achieved through leveraging partnerships, national ownership, and ongoing monitoring. The collaborative efforts of various global and regional organizations, such as CTED, UNODC, WCO, ICAO, INTERPOL, IOM, OHCHR, and IATA, were highlighted as essential in establishing effective border management strategies.

The speaker provided valuable insights into cooperative partnerships with organizations such as IOM, IGAD-SSP, NAUSS, EU, OSCE, and FRONTEX, which further strengthened the capacity-building process of national, regional, and subregional entities in border management.

The presentation mentioned "Good Practices" in border security and management in the context of counterterrorism. Training sessions, workshops, and webinars were organized to support policymakers and border officials from different countries.

The speaker indicated that the UN promotes the responsible use and sharing of biometric data to counter terrorism at borders. Some countries from the Sahel region, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia requested ad hoc support on this issue.

Notably, Mr. Ahnfeldt-Mollerup shared information about an ongoing project titled "BSM Good Practices in Contested Environment" in collaboration with NATO COE-DAT, and projects related to maritime security, human rights at international borders, and the use of new technologies in the context of counter-terrorism with the Austrian Institute of Technology.

Mr. Ahnfeldt-Mollerup mentioned UNCCT's publication of the "Human Rights Handbook," which provides guidance on thematic issues at the policy level.

To conclude, the professor's lecture provided valuable insights into the cooperative framework of the organization, emphasizing the importance of capacity building, good practices, and collaborative partnerships in enhancing border management strategies to counter terrorism and safeguard global security effectively.

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UNITED NATIONS
OFFICE OF COUNTER-TERRORISM
UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT)

Border Security and Management (BSM)

Presentation Outline

1. UNCCT-BSM Global Programme
2. Capacity-Building Activities
3. Reference Material and Guidance Tools

UNITED NATIONS
OFFICE OF COUNTER-TERRORISM
UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT)

Border Security and Management (BSM)
1. UNCCT-BSM Global Programme
1
2
3
UNCCT-BSM
Global Programme
UNITED NATIONS
OFFICE OF COUNTER-TERRORISM
UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT)

Border Security and Management (BSM)
Programme Objectives
• Providing thematic expertise to Member States, regional and/or sub-regional bodies in developing and implementing comprehensive border management strategies and action plans which incorporate counter-terrorism measures
• Enhancing the capacities of Member States to address challenges and emerging threats within all modes of cross-border transportation
• Development and dissemination of reference material and guidance tools including modules on cross-border travel cycle pertaining to air, maritime, rail and bus travel relating to both people and cargo
• Promotion and incorporation of Gender and Human Rights dimensions
• Sustainability through leveraging partnerships; national ownership; ToT programming and ongoing mentoring
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UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT)
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Border Security and Management (BSM)

Key Partners

- **Global Compact BMLE WG Entities:** CTED, UNODC, WCO, ICAO, OHCHR, INTERPOL, IMO, IATA, IOM, Special Rapporteur
- **Cooperative partnerships established with**: IOM, IGAD-SSP, NAUSS
- **Regional and Sub-Regional organizations:** EU, OSCE, FRONTEX, OAS, AU, CARICOM-IMPACS, GCTF, NATO COE-DAT
- **Other entities:** Biometrics Institute, Stimson Center, ISS, Private Sector (WBSC)

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UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT)

Border Security and Management (BSM)

Cooperation & Coordination Framework



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UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT)

Border Security and Management (BSM)

Geographical Coverage



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Border Security and Management (BSM)

2. UNCCT-BSM Capacity Building Activities

1 **2** 3

UNCCT-BSM Capacity
Building Activities

UNITED NATIONS
OFFICE OF COUNTER-TERRORISM
UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT)

Border Security and Management (BSM)

UNCCT-BSM Good Practices

Good Practice 1 Enhance intra-agency cooperation	Good Practice 2 Enhance inter-agency cooperation	Good Practice 3 Enhance international cooperation
Good Practice 4 Develop and establish comprehensive remote border area surveillance programs	Good Practice 5 Engage with and empower border communities as key contributors in border security and management	Good Practice 6 Develop and implement Border Community Policing programs
Good Practice 7 Develop and implement BSM information exchange programs and mechanisms	Good Practice 8 Establish Border Cooperation Centers	Good Practice 9 Nominate and assign Border Liaison Officers
Good Practice 10 Conduct joint and coordinated cross-border patrols, as well as joint multiagency and interdisciplinary operation exercises	Good Practice 11 Define parameters for cross-border operational engagement	Good Practice 12 Conduct effective risk analysis assessments
Good Practice 13 Create National Border Management Strategies and Action Plans	Good Practice 14 Establish Joint Border Crossing Points	Good Practice 15 Identify corruption as a serious risk for effective and robust BSM

The Good Practices in the Area of Border Security and Management in the Context of Counter-Terrorism and Stemming the Flow of Foreign Terrorist Fighters

Trainings, workshops and webinars organized in all the relevant regions aimed to both policy-makers and border officials from all the border related entities.

GCTF
GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM FORUM

UNITED NATIONS
OFFICE OF COUNTER-TERRORISM
UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT)

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Border Security and Management (BSM)

Biometric Initiative

UNCCT-UNCTED Joint Initiative to Promote the Responsible Use and Sharing of Biometrics Data to Counter Terrorism at Borders

- ❑ *Ad hoc* support requested by countries in the Sahel Region, Central Asia and South-East Asia
- ❑ Assessment Survey on national biometric capabilities and frameworks performed over 75 Member States
- ❑ Webinars and workshops organized to support the responsible use of biometrics
- ❑ Active collaboration with the Austrian Institute of Technology on the development of contactless systems to verify biometrics
- ❑ Development of related projects on the use of innovative technology at borders

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
COUNTER-TERRORISM COMMITTEE
EXECUTIVE DIRECTORATE (CTED)

UNITED NATIONS
OFFICE OF COUNTER-TERRORISM
UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT)

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Border Security and Management (BSM)

BSM Good Practices as a response to Covid 19

UNCCT-Republic of Korea Initiative to expand the UNCCT Border Security and Management Good Practices in response to COVID-19

COVID-19 RESPONSE

High-level meetings, technical consultations & round table exercises with the ROK COVID-19 Task Force and relevant authorities to:

(i) identify BSM legal framework and operational procedures and main CT challenges

(ii) identify the special measures and operational procedures adopted at borders in response to the COVID19 pandemic

WORLD CUSTOMS ORGANIZATION

IOM UN MIGRATION

STIMSON

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF COUNTER-TERRORISM
UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT)

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Border Security and Management (BSM)

Ongoing Projects

BSM Good Practices in Contested Environment

- In cooperation with the NATO CoE-DAT to develop border security good practices in contested environments.

Maritime Security

- Focused on maritime-related threats in East Africa
- Update the BSM Good Practices to address the maritime domain
- Cross-border information sharing

Human Rights at International Borders

- Jointly with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), supporting the inclusion of human rights elements in border security and management strategies and providing specialized capacity-building activities.

Use of New Technologies at Border in CT Context

- Jointly with the AIT Austrian Institute of Technology and other research institutes, developing a project to increase the capacities of Member States to monitor cross border movement of people in compliance with UNSC Resolutions and Human Rights obligations.

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Border Security and Management (BSM)

3. UNCCT-BSM Implementation Tools

1 2 **3**

Reference Material and Guidance Tools

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Border Security and Management (BSM)

Human Rights Handbook

Handbook on Human Rights and Screening in Border Security and Management

- Overarching principles
- Human Rights guidance on thematic issues at the policy level
- Human Rights guidance on specific screening practices



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Border Security and Management (BSM)

Compendium on Biometrics



UNCCT jointly with UNCTED and in collaboration with the Biometrics Institute (UK) developed the
UN Compendium on Recommended Practices for the Responsible Use and Sharing of Biometrics in Counter-Terrorism
as a technical tool to assist Member States

- Overview of biometric technology and identity management
- Government and regulatory requirements
- Counter-Terrorism biometric systems and their maintenance

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Thank you | Merci beaucoup | شكرا جزيلا | Спасибо | Gracias | 谢谢

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BORDER SECURITY AND MANAGEMENT (BSM)

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(Re)Evaluation of Good Practices

While there may be additional elements to consider, experts stressed that these 15 practices are still valid. Over the past five years, we have witnessed their implementation in action. GP 15 was tailored to meet specific needs and emerging contexts. Cost-effective and time-effective policies should be developed, as these should be the fundamental objectives of Good Practices. However, excessive specification could render them impractical for universal application. Nonetheless, the question remains: Should we prioritize a generic approach or focus on specificity?

The expert stated that NATO has the potential to provide robust remote support and offer assistance to allies in the realm of emerging technologies, including procurement guidance. However, the concept of international cooperation may need help due to existing disputes between neighboring countries, hindering the development of effective policies. While theoretical applications appear promising, practical challenges often arise. To address political issues stemming from bilateral tensions, the involvement of a neutral third party could prove beneficial.

They offered that combining the first three good practices (Enhancing intra-agency/inter-agency/international cooperation) could lead to generating more generic yet comprehensive content. Examples of countries integrating INTERPOL's systems and classified communication methods could be utilized in this context. By organizing the topics under two main headings, specific and general aspects can be distinguished, leading to better coordination of good practices. The systems at borders could be integrated as one to promptly respond to all kinds of threats.

Further research could be conducted to evaluate the generalizability of specific examples, and relevant generalized principles could be shared with partner countries. Fusions Centers may be initiated to disseminate the lessons learned to allied nations so that emerging threats can be detected and other states can be kept informed for preparedness and cooperation.

While NATO's military capabilities are substantial, experts reiterated, neglecting logistical support could limit their effectiveness even though this has always been supported by the host country. Considering the impact on the local population, factors such as food and water aid can influence perceptions of stationed forces. Collaboration with NGOs and civil society is crucial in countering violent extremism, with a focus on community policing that extends beyond border regions.

Measuring the effectiveness of these GPs, a coordination office with scientific expertise could facilitate joint efforts, enhancing NATO's capabilities through collaboration with organizations like Frontex and NGOs. Experts agreed that NATO would need to expand its collaboration to civilian institutions and organizations, thus making the role of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) potentially more significant in the forthcoming period.

The adoption of a linear approach toward supporting different institutions is not feasible. However, having well-defined policies can facilitate the effectiveness of an alliance like NATO, which possesses a military component. In other words, commanders require a specific framework and roadmap for conveying support utilizing NATO's knowledge and expertise.

Experts pointed out that the training component could be integrated into the GP2 (Enhance intra-agency cooperation), thereby emphasizing the role of training in enhancing inter-agency collaboration. This perspective highlights the significance of training in fostering practical cooperation between institutions. Within the scope of training, the concept of Humanitarian Border Management can be further examined in greater detail. Some experts argue that HBM is not sufficiently humanitarian, thus lacking a practical basis in reality.

The role of NGOs and civil society is of utmost importance concerning Violent Extremism (VE). The engagement and coordination of these groups at borders are critical. As part of collaborative efforts, these entities should be considered, as they can facilitate information exchange.

The role of media in the conduct of processes is highly significant as it influences the perception of the public, which is crucial for the continuation of implemented policies. Information should not be solely derived from the media; however, the information present in the media should be effectively managed. This is especially important concerning sensitive issues such as migration in recent years. International organizations should be responsible for conveying information to the media. This approach allows the dissemination of accurate information. Strategic communication can be included as a Good Practice in this context.

Some experts have expressed that when GPs are examined individually, their contributions may appear ambiguous. To address this, there should be coherence and coordination among the GPs. Visualization or reorganization of these practices could be considered, taking into account institutional differences. The implementation of these GPs is significantly influenced by financial capacities, capabilities, and equipment.

Additionally, they highlighted the need for a clearer definition of the collaboration concept frequently addressed within the GPs. Determining how collaboration should be conducted and clarifying legal and procedural aspects are essential. Moreover, the areas where collaboration can take place should be re-evaluated.

Several experts expressed that GP7 might be redundant as it seems to be covered by other sections and could potentially be removed.

Risk analysis units could be created to coordinate GPs and contribute to border security management. Risk analysis units can aid in coordinating GPs, drawing on past experiences to address security threats more effectively. Specialized units for intelligence interrogation can help in identifying and apprehending threats during critical times.

Furthermore, integrating GP4, GP5 and GP8, and implementing pre-emptive measures and early warning systems, can strengthen NATO's response to threats and mass migration. Legal and ethical considerations must be addressed in GP4, which raises situational awareness through surveillance and technology use.

Corruption and GP12 could be explored further to identify effective methods of detection and prevention. Transforming GP9 will require legislative changes and institutional commitment.

The Joint Information Sharing Community can serve as the foundation for GP7, fostering effective communication among stakeholders. However, to address gender-related issues and incorporate emerging technologies, a more precise information structure and grouping of items are necessary.

In summary, by streamlining and integrating the GPs, NATO can strengthen its collective capabilities and response mechanisms. Emphasizing cooperation, standardized procedures, and continuous assessment of results will contribute to NATO's effectiveness in addressing challenges and safeguarding regional and international security.